 I'm not quite sure how I wound up on a panel with such distinguished other speakers and distinguished discussant, but there actually will be some complementarities I think with what my other panelists have said today. Like Justin, I'm also going to be focusing predominantly on Sub-Saharan Africa, mostly because this has been the region that has traditionally been, as we know, the most aid dependent. It's also just the region that I focus on the most for my own research. And so kind of my interest is three-fold in the presentation. One is first to just kind of understand how has the finance landscape changed in Africa over the last decade or so. Secondly, just briefly why that might be more from the recipient side. I think we know a little bit from the donor side why things have changed, but what about on the recipient side? And then lastly, what does this mean for traditional development assistance? Is there still a role that traditional DAC donors, for example, can be playing in development assistance in Africa? So I'm first starting with a slightly blurry map here, but it's basically comparing disbursement flows of non-ODA disbursements since the mid-2000s to Africa. And what's a note here is basically the turquoise area that's really showing countries that were getting less than 30% of their disbursement flows were non-ODA, so they were more aid dependent. They were getting more of their flows from typical ODA disbursements. And so the thing to note is between 2004 and 2015 we have here is that we've seen a shift in this color distribution. We have a lot more countries in 2015 that are getting at least 30, 30 to 50 or more than 50% of their disbursements flows coming into the country are not from ODA. And so some of these are major ones that we hear more and more about are lower middle income countries, particularly Ghana, Zambia, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire is a big one as well. So we've really seen a shift in the financing flows going to Africa. A lot of this has been private finance, it's been FDI, it'll be Eurobonds, which we'll talk about in a minute. It's been tax revenue, there's been a huge effort by donors in trying to increase domestic revenue mobilization. And actually one of the biggest sources of flows is actually private remittances. And you actually saw this increasing a lot in the late 2000s, about a half dozen African countries allowed for external voting, allowing their populations overseas to vote. And you saw an increase in remittances from overseas. So we do know that there is a change in the financing landscape. Private finance in particular is much more pronounced. We have about 15, 16 African countries that have launched Eurobonds. Some of them, such as Ghana, have done this repeatedly. So billions of dollars in Eurobond issuances. We see that private sector finance foreign direct investment, which is being shown on the right side with the kind of Navy histogram bars there. That's also increased over time since the beginning of the 1990s. But with caveats, because I think it is important to note the kind of percentages that are indicated by the kind of yellow and the green lines here. So, I mean, Africa hasn't really seen a dramatic increase in the share of FDI that is going to the developing world in general. So it's still a number of other developing countries and emerging market economies that get most of the FDI. So it's been increasing in absolute terms. That's definitely true. And the amounts here that they have in 2017 are about equivalent to the ODA disbursements sub-Saharan Africa received in the same year. So it is significant, but it's important to keep it in relative terms based on other developing regions. So we do see a slight shift in the finance landscape in Africa. Now, we know some of the reasons why this might be. We know, of course, on the donor side, with the financial crisis. There's been a reduction in ODA. There's been the issue with interest rates up until now. US interest rates, which were attracting a lot of the Euro bond issuances. On the recipient side, I think we've seen this kind of aspirations to be less aid dependent amongst middle income countries. And nowhere has this been as pronounced as in Ghana. At the 61st anniversary independence of Ghana last year, the president, Nana Akufo-Auto, he launched this Ghana going beyond aid agenda, the GBA agenda, emphasizing that they don't want to be going to the donors, asking for charity and handouts anymore. As he says, it's unhealthy for both the giver and the receiver. And there was a lot of excitement on Ghanaian social media when he basically repeated the same statement a few months ago when Emmanuel Macron went to visit Ghana. And he basically said, you know, we don't want to be dependent on foreign aid anymore. Of course, part of this is really motivated by I think a lot of what Justin was just saying. I mean, I think a lot of recipient countries have bought in to this idea of structural transformation. I mean, most of our national development policies in Africa have transformations somewhere in the title. And particularly this interest in industrial policy. So Ghana has these huge ambitions to have one district, one factory per district. There's 216 districts in the country. So it's quite ambitious. One dam per village. This is these are pretty ambitious industrial and infrastructural goals. And of course, this is requiring new sources of financing, because as Justin was alluding to, I mean, many of our traditional DAC donors have focused in the last decade more on kind of education and health areas and not on the investments you need for structural transformation. And so, of course, China has been a huge, a huge source of this funding. Most recently, Ghana getting about what it's it's trying to get. If its parliament lets it $2 billion from China for road projects in exchange for bauxite deposits. And it's trying to follow in the footsteps of Argentina and considering launching a century bond worth over $50 billion for industrial development. And it's definitely not unique. We're seeing this in Senegal. We're seeing this in Zambia. And I think it is very much also influenced by what Justin alluded to, these STGs, eight and nine that also emphasize jobs, emphasize infrastructure, emphasize innovation. And that involves a different type of finance than we've traditionally seen by the DAC donors. So what are the implications of this new finance environment? You know, I think on the on the positive side, you are seeing the markets, particularly those that have launched your bonds, you have seen the markets kind of reward and punish those that have had better or worse macroeconomic frameworks. So Senegal, for example, is getting much better interest rates on its Euro bond issuances than Ghana. And that's kind of a reflection of the fact that Senegal has managed its debt better. I think a quite positive development as well, particularly from a political standpoint, is Euro bonds offer potential for greater legislative oversight than traditional donor finance in many countries in the region? You actually have to have the parliament needs to vote on on issuing a Euro bond, for example, or, you know, going for a loan in general, but for these Euro bonds in particular. And you have seen opposition parties try to block some of these, try to question ministries of finance about the debt implications of some of these bond issuances. And I think that's healthy. A lot of donor agreements are not not in the public domain. They're not in parliamentary answers in the same way that you're seeing some of these debates over debt financing. I think also, you know, we're seeing an array of other type of debt instruments that are viable for subnational entities. So typically municipal governments, for example, they cannot really negotiate with donors directly for municipal financing. They're having to have their national government negotiate on their behalf. This is problematic. Many countries in the region were actually capital cities in particular governed by opposition parties. There might be incentives for national governments not to be giving financing to subnational entities. So you're seeing, you know, other types of financing, such as municipal bonds that have been launched in South Africa, Cameroon. Senegal has tried to do this, giving a little bit more autonomy to subnational governments as well. Well, what are the cons of this? I think one of the most obvious ones that has already been alluded to before is this worry about growth and debt again. You know, the IMF claims that about 18 African countries are at risk of debt distress. We've just had 30 30 African countries have just reached their completion point with HIPAAC or the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. And now we're kind of seeing this resurgence in debt again. On the face of it, debt is not necessarily problematic unless it is displacing investments that you would have made elsewhere. And we're starting to see that in places like Zambia. It's had a pretty notable social cash transfer program since the early 2000s. Just this past year, the Ministry of Finance said because of debt servicing, they will now need to reduce their cash transfer program by by about 24 percent there. And then the timing of your bonds. Once you start to look at this a little bit more, you see this has been linked in many countries to elections, trying to, you know, get out the get out the roads, get out the visibility of investments before elections and showing at least that you're going to be investing in these quite visible infrastructure projects. And so this is very similar to what we've seen with traditional aid finance. There's also been accusations of, you know, donors reinforcing incumbent advantage as well. So in that way, there's some similarities in these new sources of financing. OK, so let me just turn to what this really means for continuing role of traditional development assistance. And I'll just talk about four areas. They're all relatively similar in terms of building state capacity and dealing with regulatory issues. And I think, you know, the first one is supporting the capacity of the public sector, especially for debt management. This has been going on, you know, for the past decade or so. And budget support was supposed to be a main mechanism for supporting public sector financial management. But what we've seen when we break down some of the ODA disbursements that's gone to Africa since 2008 is we've seen quite a decline in public sector financial and administrative management. We're seeing our kind of traditional adapter as being, you know, increasing more infrastructure issues. I think following the lead and recognizing this is of interest to recipients. But we've seen this decline in public sector financial and administrative management. We've also seen a decline in the kind of Moe Ibrahim governance indicators related to public administration and financial management. So those that are in the kind of blue are those that have declined in terms of their their their scoring on this issue since 2014. And this is a bit disappointing because there has been a lot of investment and interest in improving civil service and in improving public sector financial management. So I think there's still a need to to kind of kind of reinvigorate this area, particularly in this era of increasing debt distress. Another area that is kind of I think less exciting to to many people, but it's absolutely essential, which is in terms of regulatory issues. This is in terms of food safety, seed safety, land governance reforms and one that that's that's getting a lot of attention now is on pesticide issues. So we now have this example in the Sahel in West Africa of a huge explosion of herbicides in the mid 2000s. A lot of herbicides went off patent. You have a lot of counterfeit herbicides going into the Sahel. So you have about one hundred and fifty different varieties. Many of these, you know, are carcinogenic, they're environmentally toxic. And you just don't have the regulatory capacity amongst very poor Sahelian countries to regulate the Stephen test the quality of these. And so, you know, donors being able to finance and provide the technical support, particularly to the to the regional regulatory body. And the Sahel would be a tremendous contribution. So just one example of this where where donors can be active in the regulatory sector. The third area is on policy coordination. With the Paris Declaration, a lot of its successors, donors tried to avoid duplication of activities and a little bit of, you know, conspecialization in different areas, certain donors working on agriculture versus education versus decentralization. And I think what you've seen as a result is you sometimes see a lack of policy coordination kind of nationally within governments. And I think that's that's a reflection of the disconnect that's happened with donors, where they're each in their own specialized area. One key example that from if previous, we work a lot on food security. And one key example is with the New Alliance commitments on food security. This was in the G8 made this commitment to supporting food security, reducing hunger. And one of its aims was to make sure governments got rid of taxes on rural producers, on agricultural producers, saying this was repressive. This was preventing rural smallholders from reaching their potential. This really came to a head in Tanzania, which has had a crop tax, a tax on smallholder farmers, because Tanzania was launching a decentralization policy, and they said, you know, the Germans said, well, it's fine if USAID wants to promote food security and reduce agricultural taxes, but we're trying to promote local government. And, you know, these these agricultural taxes are one of the main sources of revenue for local government. So I think there's much more emphasis and room even amongst the traditional DAC donors to reconcile this fragmentation they've created in the policy arena. And then finally, this area of tax mobilization as I've said earlier, this is one area where we have seen increased increased progress. A lot of countries have increased, they're still small, but they have increased domestic tax mobilization. But you have a problem with tax policy consistency. And I think it links back to the interest in structural transformation to industrial policy. We have a lot of governments giving tax breaks to foreign companies to come in and work and export processing zones. But at the same time, seeing them trying to find ways to to tax small scale street hawkers, petty traders. So you have six, six African countries have just launched informal sector taxes, so taxing quite poor individuals in the informal sector, even as they're giving tax breaks to large companies to come into export processing zones. And so I think this is an area that that donors needs to think a little bit more about how you get that tax policy consistency to support domestic revenue mobilization in a way that doesn't short change efforts at structural transformation. I think the challenge with all these recommendations I've given is that they are what we call kind of low visibility public goods. These are not the areas where, you know, the the citizens and in either, you know, donor recipient or donor giving countries can really see the progress. It's hard for citizens to see the progress with regulatory reform, for example. And so the challenge is really how we reconcile, you know, donors need for impact indicators, quarterly reports showing impact to their publics with some of these kind of low visibility investments that are needed to improve state and financial capacity. So I'll leave it there. Thank you.