 Rhaid i'n ddiwrnod, rhai i'r cymryd ystyried gwyfyddiad 21 yw'n 2015. Rhaid i'n adnid i chi i ddweud o'r mae'r pethau o'r ddefnyddio arfer oedd y dyfodol? Yn oes oedd oedd yn dwy enghreifftu, ond mae'r ddechrau chi'n byw i ddiogel, rhaid i'n dweud o'r ddefnyddio'n mynd i amlwg. Rhe amp1, ein seffordd yndg i'r sefyll, wedi'n gwneud yn cyfryddiad y newid, Ynghyddiad nagdyn Britain Llyfridol yn yw ddiwedd. Maen nhw'n ei fawr i'r arddirionedd ar y cyfnodol, a fawr oedd Gyfrindir yn entrweithio iaith i ddweud o'r newid yn gwybod pan sydd wedi'u cyfle cyfnod. Felly, maen nhw angen chi'n byw sy'n edrych i chi ddisgwmwylliant y Llyfridol, Maen nhw'n ei fawr i'r arddyr yn y cyd-durdudol, maen nhw'n ei fawr i'r arddirionedd flynyddu y Llyfridol, maen nhw'n ei fawr i'r arddirionedd, system division i Catherine McGregor, directorate for legal services. Good morning. I understand minister, you'd like to make a very short opening statement, yes? Thank you. Thank the committee for inviting me to give evidence on this bill. The Scottish Government supports the aim of promoting and encouraging giving of apologies by private and public bodies to achieve a better outcome for victims. However, a fine balance needs to be struck between promoting the general use of apologies in the the public interest and protecting individuals' access to justice. We are concerned that the bill as currently drafted does not strike this balance. Our concerns are detailed in the Government memorandum and have been raised with Ms Mitchell directly in the main. Those relate to the definition of apology and the application of the legislation if enacted. In my view, there are evidential problems that could arise if an apology is defined to include an admission of fault and fact. This concern appears to be shared by a number of key stakeholders who have questioned whether apology should be defined in legislation at all and if so, whether the proposed definition is too wide in scope. In considering how apologies could be put on a statutory footing, section 2 of the Compensation Act 2006 is considered by many to be a favourable alternative approach. We also have concerns with the intended application to all civil proceedings with the exception of fatal accident enquiries and defamation actions. If the bill is to be progressed in its current form, consideration should be given to removing public enquiries, tribunals and arbitration proceedings from the scope of the proposed legislation. The interaction between the provisions on duty of candour in the health, tobacco, nicotine, etc. and care Scotland bill and the Apology Scotland bill are relevant. While it is not preventing an apology being admissible in court, the intention is that any apology or other step taken in accordance with the duty of candour procedure cannot be taken by itself to be an admission of negligence or a breach of statutory duty. The Apologies Bill risks of statutory undermining the duty of candour provisions. Moreover, in the health context, there is provision in legislation and guidance that encourages cultural changes to the giving of an apology. All of that raises a question about the policy justification for an Apologies Bill. We would welcome a change in culture that supports the effect of giving of apologies, but we remain unconvinced due to the lack of relevant empirical evidence that legislation of the kind proposed by Margaret Mitchell would deliver that outcome without creating an inadvertent injustice. Margaret Mitchell suggests that the bill will provide legal certainty, which is an admirable aim, but it should not be done at the cost of restricting access to justice for potential pursuers in actions for damages. There would appear to be merit in putting the common law on a statutory footing similar to that in section 2 of the 2006 act, as that would raise awareness of the common law position that an apology cannot, in itself, be used to prove liability, which might in turn encourage more apologies to be made. I am grateful to the committee for providing me with an opportunity to give evidence on the Apologies Scotland Bill. I hope that it has been helpful and I would be very happy to follow up this session with a written summary of the Scottish Government's concerns on the bill if that would be of assistance to the committee. Well, we'll find out. Minister, questions from members? I've got Roddy, I've got Elaine, I've got Christian. Thank you so far. Good morning. That's a fairly comprehensive opening statement, but one matter that I didn't take you touched on in the opening statement was the Scottish Human Rights Commission's argument that the Apologies legislation might be important in relation to historic child abuse. Would you like to comment on that? I'm certainly, that's a very important issue. I know that Margaret Mitchell has discussed that with me as well. We both agree that historic child abuse is clearly something that we want to tackle and to help those who are survivors of historic child abuse. I suppose that the concern would be where perhaps in the absence of other forms of evidence that an apology or admission of wrongdoing on the part of an organisation may potentially be the only evidence, other than the person's own testimony, that might be relied upon in proving what will happen. We know that some organisations in the past—I think that that's a point that's been raised in evidence to the committee—have felt prevented from giving an apology because of the role of their insurers. Their insurers may have said in the past that they were prevented from giving an apology because that might be an initial liability, and therefore that undermines the ability for organisations—I'll not name them for obvious reasons, but organisations who feel very genuinely apologetic for what's happened on their watch and want to say so to those who've been affected, but there may be a risk that they're not able to do so. There's still some uncertainty that may be picked up by the committee about the role of the legislation in relation to the insurance industry. In relation to the issue of cultural change, Mr Anderson said that the bill would not be a panacea, but he suggested that it would be of assistance in helping to change that culture. Is there anything further that you can say on legislation impacting on cultural change? The first thing to say is that I reiterate the point that I made in my opening statement. I'm sympathetic to the point that Margaret Mitchell is trying to achieve here in terms of trying to affect a cultural change, because clearly in all sorts of aspects of public services where things do go wrong, and we have to admit that it would be good if there was a culture where people could genuinely apologise, because often that is the only thing that people are looking for. They're not looking for compensation, they're not looking for anything else. They just want to have it recognised that that wrong was done to them and to have an apology. However, we do have a concern as to the potential that, in giving an apology, we may remove access to justice for some individuals. As I say, it can be the only evidence or key bit of evidence that might otherwise be used in court, admissible in court under the provisions of the 2006 act. That is still possible to use that evidence in a court case, but without the ability to do that, it might take away an important plank of a case that could be taken by an individual for compensation. In general, that could obviously have an impact on those involved with historic child abuse as well. Given the length of time in many cases that we are talking about, and we are going back to the period when people were very young as well, there are clearly going to be evidential difficulties for those involved in historic child abuse. Therefore, there is a question as to whether the rights of the individual who is giving the apology are trumping, in a sense, the right for evidence to be provided on behalf of the person who survived to historic child abuse, to be able to use that in the courts. I hope that I have picked up the point that Mr Campbell is making correctly. That is a good start for us for the day, if Roddy Campbell is content. It is always a good test. You mentioned in your opening statement the compensation act of 2006 and also the health bill, which I think was introduced just last week, and it proposed the duty of Canada. I presume that that would only apply to the health service, whereas that bill has a wider application. I am correct in terms of that. That is correct. My understanding is that the duty of Canada provisions would only relate to the healthcare sector. In that case, you have indicated that you have some concerns about the bills that are currently drafted. Do you think that the bill is capable of amendment to take on board the points that you made in your statement? If so, how do you think that it should be amended as a question of the definition, or is it transposing some of the issues in the health bill into a more general bill? That is a good point. We have a Professor White who is here today to do with the detail of the duty of Canada provisions. In principle, the duty of Canada proposals are based broadly on what is in the 2006 act. Therefore, a similar approach has been taken in tackling the issue of liability and how giving an apology will impact on the liability or otherwise of individuals. It is left to the courts to determine whether taking into account all the evidence and the apology that has been given whether there is a liability on the part of the health professionals. The approach that is taken to the apology under the duty of Canada is, as I said, aligned with the 2006 act. In our apology, our other step, taking in accordance with the duty of Canada procedure itself, cannot be used to prove liability that can be admissible in court. Given that we understand one of the main reasons for the Apologies that the Scotland bill is to enable apologies to be made more freely in the health sector, that may suggest that a similar approach could be adopted here as well. That further supports the view that legislation is similar to section 2 of the 2006 act, but covering other aspects of public services and going beyond health might be a more effective means of delivering the aims of the legislation that are entirely laudable and are not critical of any way of the aim. If the definition of apology remains as currently detailed in the bill, we are of the view that apologies given in the context of duty of Canada should be excluded from the Apologies Scotland bill. If the Parliament's will is that the part of the bill goes forward as is currently drafted, we believe that one important change would be to take that apologies given in the duty of Canada in the health sector context should be removed from the coverage of the bill. If the bill were amended in the way that you suggest, would you feel that the same exception should be available or what do you think about the exceptions in the bill? We certainly believe that the exception should include accepting public inquiries on the Public Inquiries Act for the same reason that those are, and arbitration and tribunals. There is an issue of tribunals in terms of the impact potential on reserved tribunals, particularly when they go to the appeal in the court of session, reserved tribunals could be appealed to the court of session, and therefore it may come under the remit of the law that the bill is currently drafted. We think that that would be unhelpful as well. There are a number of issues in terms of the coverage of the bill, the exceptions in the bill and drafting issues that we have raised already with Margaret Mitchell. I believe that those have been shared, but we certainly can come back to the committee in more detail if that would be helpful. There are a number of things that could be done to make the bill one that we could support, but at the moment we are taking a view that, as it is currently drafted, we would have difficulty with the drafting of the bill. Do you have an issue around how it would interact with the general medical council's professional rules? If I may bring Professor White in here, he could be more expert in this issue. My understanding is that your previous evidence session concerns what expressed that information may be then used as part of the GMC's regulatory and investigatory process. That is something that we had looked at in terms of the drafting of the duty of candor procedure, particularly not only in relation to disciplinary and regulatory processes but also in relation to employment practice. There are issues that we need to consider in terms of the legislation, as you know, for regulation of health professions as a UK matter. My understanding is that those are the sorts of issues that the GMC would be content to discuss in terms of guidance for its members and also for its processes. That guidance would also apply here then, as it does to the duty of candor in the other bill. On that particular point, we will not have a problem with reserved issues when we talk about regulators like the GMC if it is introduced to what you are saying. Partly it is down to the drafting of the bill. Obviously, the compensation act already applies in England and Wales. If we move to a similar approach to defining an apology and treatment of an apology in this bill, including the common law and the statutory footing, there would be no change in legal position. However, it would formalise that position and give people greater clarity on what is not possible in terms of giving an apology. That might be helpful in terms of having a level playing field. There are particular issues around powers in relation to reserved tribunals. Although I am sure that Margaret Mitchell has done her best to take account of that issue, we have a concern about the appeals that might go up to the court session. I do not know whether I have confused matters in my response to Ms Allard, but perhaps Professor White can come in on the issue with GMC in mind. The proposals that are drafted for the duty of candor procedure relate to organisations providing health and social care in Scotland. It is very clear that the focus is on the organisation, though in reviewing the intended or unexpected incident that results in harm, clearly there might be matters that are reviewed or raised in relation to individuals. The proposals have been drafted in recognition of the fact that, in the same way that someone may wish to pursue a compensation claim, it is signposting people to separate processes, explaining that there is a regulatory procedure if they have concerns about the practice of a nursery doctor and signposting that there are separate legal processes if they wish to seek compensation. The duty of candor procedure has very much been drafted in mind. It is an organisational duty, but during the course of dialogue with individuals affected by the harm outcomes that are defined, they may benefit from signposting to other established procedures, some of which would include GMC, NMC and other legal processes. What would address as well the point about closies as insurance law are reserved matters as well? Is it the same point at GMC? Mr Lodge is absolutely correct that we have concerns about insurance. It is a different regulator in different situations, but financial services are still a reserved area to UK Government. We are not sure that the bill as proposed will alter the position whereby insurers would still potentially have clauses in their insurance policies that people have signed that they do not give an apology and therefore would not necessarily put them in any better position than they currently are. They may still find themselves—they may have the impression that through an apology bill coming in that it is okay to give an apology—that they actually find them and validate their insurance by giving it. That is a genuine concern. I am sure that it is not something that is intentional in the part of the bill, but we have a concern that that might be the effect of giving an apology bill, creating an expectation among the public that consumers can give an apology if perhaps there is a driver who has an accident and they give an apology that that is okay. They might find out that they have invalidated their insurance by doing so, so that is a concern. It is both on a reserved, devolved basis but also a concern about the effect of that, whether it will have the effect that it is desired. It could remove access to justice and make it more difficult for people in that they may find that they are unable to pay the cost to the person that they have had the accident with because their insurance has been invalidated. Except that the evidence that we have is that people say that they are sorry all the time and that you may not even be at fault, they are just sorry that it happened. I do not know if that makes much difference to what actually happens in motor accidents in any event. I want to raise with you the other point here in your definition of apology. I am bringing in Marcus, I do not have MDLs after that. In definition of apology 3B, the apology can also contain a statement of fact. I do not know if you addressed that in your very comprehensive statement, which kind of dealt with everything, but I do not know if you dealt with that. The statement of fact in relation to the act, I am sorry—I think that I am sorry when an example of Genghis Khan, I am sorry I hit the wife and killed her, whatever, you know that kind of thing. You cannot use it. Obviously, that would be a criminal one anyway, but you cannot use it. I am sorry that I did not stop the traffic lights and ran at the bank of the car. You are not allowed—that is just more than saying that you are sorry. Is there an issue there? Could that be taken out with that to be helpful? I think that it is certainly an area that we have expressed some concern to Margaret Mitchell about. I have no doubt that Margaret Mitchell is taking that point on board in terms of the conversations that you have. We are concerned about the inclusion of statements of facts being included as part of a protected statement. It creates a different situation. We believe that a potential injustice could arise in cases where statement of fact is the only means, as I said earlier, in relation to the historic child abuse case, the only means perhaps of demonstrating liability for the harm caused, but that statement is then protected and so cannot be led in evidence because it is part of a statutory apology. If there is no other evidence available on liability, a pursuer would be unable to succeed in an action for damages. We contend that that cannot be a fair outcome. An example is, in the historic child abuse situation, where perhaps the survivor or grieve person decided to seek damages in court for the harm, which was a subject of the apology. They too could not rely on the apology but would have to find other evidence to support the claim. That might be extremely difficult, especially with the passage of time. We would have a concern therefore that survivors of historic abuse who already face very significant and evidential hurdles when seeking to progress a court action could inadvertently be prevented from taking forward a civil action. It gives us a cause for concern. It is certainly taking that kind of potential problem out of the bill. Is it story of the cases like that but just across the whole spectrum? Absolutely. Your other example was a perfectly good one in terms of an accident. Well, I am also content now, so is there anybody else? No? Margaret, do you want to run down the questions, please? Morning, minister. If I could press a little more on the duty of candor, which is going to be including an apology, which is admissible, have you sought directly from the Association of British Insurers their view on that proposal? If I may, can you bring Professor Whighton on this, since the knowledge of the bill? I do not recall the Association of British Insurers being one of the stakeholders that we consulted specifically with. We have consulted with similar organisations, but I can check and let the committee know, but I do not believe so. Perhaps I can help you out then. I have been in direct contact with them, and they have said that they are quite content not to comment on the Apologies Bill. In other words, they seem to be suggesting a satisfaction with the content as is. They have said, however, that they reserve the right comment and other legislation, and by that I thought that they were looking at the duty of candor. It may well be, with the very prescriptive nature of the duty of candor, that the Apology and the cover that the Government seems to think it has under incorporating the Compensation Act section 2 may not actually cover the concerns that insurers have, in which circumstance does the minister see or envisies a situation in which the Apology Bill might complement what the Government is trying to achieve in the duty of candor? Clearly, convener, we are keen to see what the insurers have said, and we can obviously get a view on that. If there is any firm commitment from the insurers that they would not damage the interests of those insured by fighting an adapt, that would obviously be helpful to our deliberations in coming to a formal position on the bill. At the moment, we are still waiting to interact with Margaret Mitchell on some of the detail before taking a firm stance on it, but certainly anything that can show that there is a willingness on the part of the insurance industry not to invalidate insurance on the basis of the bill would be helpful. Until I have seen the detail, it would be difficult to comment further, but I will certainly welcome the engagement in the insurance industry, if that has been something that they are willing to do. I would have thought that the question might want to make a comment in this. In relation to many of the elements of the duty of candor procedure that is drafted, they reflect the approach that is taken by a number of NHS boards currently in terms of disclosure, apology, review, learning and improvement. To my knowledge, there have not been any negative consequences on insurance arrangements where that arrangement currently applies, certainly within the NHS, where there are not only our apologies but often statements of facts made in terms of significant adverse event reviews that are undertaken, and in some cases there are also statements of thought made as a result of that existing process that is in place. I think that it is a pretty fundamental point that will shape opinions about the apology bill and about the duty of candor provision. If I could turn to the compensation act section 2, which states that an apology is an offer or treatment or other reject shall not, in itself, amount to admission of negligence or a breach of statutory duty, that allows an expression of regret. In other words, it allows for a partial apology. The evidence very clearly seems to suggest that a partial apology does not satisfy the person seeking an apology and, in fact, could do more harm than good. Can I ask you particularly in the context of historic abuse victims where, above all, they want an apology but, crucially, an acknowledgement of the wrong done? As it stands, it seems to me, under the compensation act, that would not be possible, that would be equivalent to an admission of fault. If the Government was not minded to support the inclusion of admission of fault, i.e. a full apology, it would not help and be the restitution that survivors and I would imagine the Government seeks. Would the minister like to comment on that particular point? Clearly, I share Margaret Mitchell's concern for a historic child abuse survivors and what we want to do is to help them to get what they need from the process. I certainly recognise that, in the interaction process, some of the child sex abuse survivors—I have discussed the issue with Clue Want and Apology—want an explanation of what happened to them as part of that. I can understand the point that Margaret Mitchell is making. What we do not want is a situation whereby, by including the detail of what happened in the apology, that apology is therefore included in the excluded effect of it from being taken forward as evidence, and it is no longer admissible. That would potentially create an unintended—I totally understand that it is unintended, but we believe that it could create an unintended harm in terms of access to justice for those individuals if that is the only evidence that they have other than their own testimony to make the case that they have been abused. I very much identify and share the concern that Margaret Mitchell has to make sure that people do get the quality of apology that they are looking for, but it is about the admissibility of that detail that Margaret Mitchell refers to in her remarks, then being excluded from being taken forward as evidence in court. That is where our concern lies. It is not that we disagree on the need for people to have a good quality apology, but it is just the concern that it would then no longer be admissible as evidence and then undermine their case for civil damages if that is what they wish to do. Can I take a step further, minister, and suggest that, without the protection of the admission of fault, there is likely to be no apology or one that is so inadequate, that it will further aggravate the situation. I do not know whether you have spoken to Professor Miller about his view on the apology bill as it is currently drafted and the Government's proposal just to restrict it, because it was my understanding that he felt that the inclusion of fault would be absolutely essential to give that acknowledgement and recognition that survivors seek above all else. I certainly recognise the need for a good quality apology. I can share Professor Miller's concerns there to ensure that people get the quality of apology that they are looking for, at least explanation and an apology. The concern is about how the bill, as drafted, would impact on the admissibility of that further detail if it was a lengthy apology with lots of facts brought in. I think that it would be likely that people might face an access to justice issue and that they would no longer be able to use that evidence. I suppose that, as a point that I referred to earlier in the session, it is about balancing the rights of the individual who is seeking damages in relation to a historic child sex abuse case or child abuse case in terms of their ability to get an apology, which I am sure they want, but not taking away their right to therefore take that case to civil courts and to get damages if that is what they need and want. In many cases, as I am sure Margaret Mitchell is aware, individuals have significant health and other needs, which they would then have to seek damages to help to cover the costs of those in due course. Out a little bit further minister, would you be prepared to look at the inclusion of the admission of fault, which gives that crucial acknowledgement and recognition of wrong done, but perhaps look at some movement at stage 2 in the inclusion of a statement of fact, which may allay some of the fears that you have raised this morning about access to justice? It would certainly be more than willing, convener, to engage with Margaret Mitchell, if there are drafting changes that could help to accommodate both interests. We are not seeking to stop this bill on any fundamental principle. We agree with the principle behind it in terms of trying to give an apology, where that helps both the public service provider and, indeed, it helps the individual. If we can work on something that deals with that, I am more than happy to discuss that with Margaret Mitchell. I wonder if you are aware that one of the greatest kind of obstacles to the medical profession apologising is the fear that this is a mission of liability and, in fact, negligence, and that there is quite misunderstanding, even with some lawyers about what constitutes liability leading to negligence. In those circumstances, would you consider that the definition of apology and a full apology being able to be given would help to solve that problem? I might bring Professor White in the second, if I may, convener, but, certainly in principle, I identify with the point that Margaret Mitchell is making. I am aware of my constituents in many cases, not many cases, but a number of cases who have had concerns and felt that there was a culture where it was difficult to get a recognition of what had happened to them in the process. I very much accept the principle that I am sure that health professionals would ideally like to apologise if they feel that there was something that was not satisfactory, but they obviously are uncertain perhaps. That is why the bill that Professor White is involved with is trying to provide a better platform in which those apologies have been given. I might bring Professor White in just to finish that point. We have concentrated a lot on medical, but there is a huge application of the bill in public services more generally, where people just want an acknowledgement that something has gone wrong and, hopefully, that it is going to be looked at and ensured that it never happens to anyone again. I think that it is worth making that point, because the direction has seemed to be very much medical. That is certainly true, and I accept that the bill is not focused entirely on medical cases. Indeed, we have discussed a good range of cases, including insurance cases, as the convener has. There does seem to be a wealth of research and a positive effect that apologies can have, and we accept that. We have no doubt that apologies are a good thing, and it should be promoted as such. However, the research seems to be less convincing on what effects apologies legislation has in achieving that aim. We note generally that research is based on other jurisdictions, and the majority of which seems to have been focused on healthcare settings, which is perhaps why the debate has centred on that. However, it is very difficult to draw meaningful conclusions between experiences elsewhere and the impact legislation might have on Scotland. I believe that that is a point that the convener made last week and last week's session would be like comparing apples with pears. However, I accept the point that we want to create a culture in which people can feel that there is a deficiency in a service to get an apology for that. That is all that some people are looking for. In many cases, it is just a recognition that things could have been better and things will be addressed, so I accept the principle. I am supportive in principle of what Mark Mitchell is trying to achieve. It is the detail that we have to find agreement on. Since you have brought up the empirical evidence minister, then can I turn it round? Is there any evidence that I am not aware of any harm the apology bill has caused? I think that that is an important thing. Obviously, in this context, convener, the bill has drafted to be have some concerns about what it might do. I think that we have a concern, obviously. We do not want to necessarily road test that if we think that it could have implications for an inadvertent one. However, we do not necessarily want to put that to the test if we think that it will have harms for those requiring to take forward evidence. However, I think that there is potential to still work in some of the detail and I am happy to do that with Mark Mitchell if we can do so. I want to ask the last specific question, which is that there has been a view by the children's report of SCRA that children's hearings, second court proceedings and the Children's Hearings Scotland Act 2011, should be added to the list of excluded actions. Do you agree, minister? By the way, you are back to being a minister. I have promoted you, if only. I am quite happy with my current role, convener. Certainly, we are happy to come back to the committee if that would be helpful on the issue of children's hearings and implications. Sorry, Margaret. I just thought I would raise next. It has not been raised. I think that Professor White wants you to come back. Professor White has knowledge on that. I can happily bring him in. Thank you, minister. In responding to Ms Mitchell, you had said that it might be helpful if I add some comments in relation to your question about the fear that medical professionals have of apologising. Two points that I would make first is that all medical practitioners—in fact, all registered health professionals—have a professional duty of candour currently and should be apologising in instances where there have been unintended consequences or harm. Secondly, in recognition of the culture where there is a fear, at times the duty of candour provisions have been drafted in a way that not only are there provisions around procedures but there are requirements on organisations that will come within the scope of the duty to provide training and support to staff. Part of that training and support will involve an understanding that there are separate tests around liability and causation. The duty of candour procedure is very much focused on learning and improvement, as opposed to fear and blame. I accept all that, but despite the training, despite all that, there is still a fear. That is where the apology bill spells out exactly what you would be admitting if you admit for that it is not equivalent to liability, let alone negligence. That would go in some considerable way to providing the reassurance and encouraging apologies and asking the minister just to reflect on that. I certainly will, convener, but I have just rated at the point that we certainly are using the Compensation Act 2006 as a basis for the duty of candour, and we think that that would work in the context of the Apologies Bill as well. I think that we have exhausted the questioning. I thank you very much, minister, and I am going to have a short break while everybody settles down to get the papers ready for stage 2. Thank you, minister, and suspend for five minutes. Now we move on to item 2. I remind everyone to have all electronic devices and mobile phones off completely as they interfere with broadcasting even when they are switched to silent. We are on to stage 2 of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation Scotland bill, and I welcome Michael Matheson, cabinet secretary, justice and his officials for this item. Members should have their copies of the bill, the marshal list and groupings of amendments for today's consideration. Everybody has got the papers ready. I will start and try to get through this today, and if I see anybody wearying halfway through, we might have another little break. We will see how it goes. First of all, I call amendment 13, the name of the cabinet secretary grouped with amendments 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 40, 19, 20 and 33. Cabinet secretary, please, to remove amendment 13 and speak to all the amendments in the group. Good morning, convener. Thank you. We carefully considered the comments made during stage 1 evidence regarding the definition of the offence of human trafficking in section 1. Those comments related to two issues. The first was a concern that the use of travel in the definition suggested the offence required across border element. The second was a wider concern that the emphasis on travel in the definition did not align with our international obligations, including the EU trafficking directive, which do not have a similar emphasis. The Justice Committee reflected those views in its stage 1 report, which recommended that the Scottish Government should look again at section 1 to establish whether it can be better aligned to international obligations without decriminalising conduct, which is currently criminal, and give further consideration to the wording, especially the emphasis on travel. I stated in my evidence to the committee that the definition was wider than our international obligations. It mirrored the offences in the modern slavery act 2015 and the trafficking and exploitation act 2015 in Northern Ireland. The bill, as it stands, does not require there to be any cross-border element to establish the offence. However, we accept that many people thought that the emphasis on travel was unhelpful and served to unduly narrow the scope of the new offence. We are also aware that there have been some moves recently to clearly decouple movement from human trafficking. Indeed, that is set out specifically in the United Nations human rights and human trafficking fact sheet 36, which was published last year and states clearly in chapter 1b that trafficking does not always require movement. After careful consideration, we now believe that the focus on travel is unhelpful and unnecessary in this context. Amendment 13 to 17 amended the definition in section 1 by removing the need to establish that a victim's travel was arranged or facilitated and instead reframed the offence to criminalise instead certain defined and listed relevant actions, including the ranging or facilitating of those actions. As before, the relevant actions must be undertaken with a view to another person being exploited. Amendment 13 lists the relevant actions and they are similar to those listed in section 1a of the bill. The recruitment of another person, the transportation or transfer of another person, the harboring or receiving of another person, the exchange or transfer of control over another person. Amendment 13 clarifies that any person involved in the arranging or facilitating of any of those relevant actions is committing an offence. Although some of those actions may involve travel, not all will and so there is no longer any suggestion that travel is a necessary prerequisite. Amendment 14 to 17 made consequential changes, removing reference to travel in the remainder of section 1 and 2 and replaced them with reference to the relevant action. Amendment 18 to 20 makes similar consequential changes to section 2, ensuring that provisions on the territorial application of the offence operates properly in respect of relevant action. Finally, amendment 33 removes the definition of travel in section 36, as there is no longer necessary. In relation to amendment 40, in the name of Elaine Murray, the Scottish Government believes that this is unnecessary. Section 23, as introduced and as amended by amendments 19 and 20, captures any person who is temporarily in the UK when they carry out any of the conduct constituting the offence. Indeed, as amended, it goes further as it captures non-UK nationals by applying the offence even when an individual is not in the UK provided some part of the relevant action is in the UK. I hope that this has been able to provide some comfort to Dr Murray on this point and I would ask her not to press her amendment. The Scottish Government is satisfied that this new definition covers all of the conduct currently criminalised as trafficking here and elsewhere in the UK. Further, the removal of travel and listing of the relevant actions shows clear alignment with their obligations under the EU directive and gives the offence the maximum flexibility to deal with all instances of human trafficking, whether or not involving movement. I move amendment 13. Thank you very much, cabinet secretary. Before I call Elaine Murray to speak to amendment 40, can I say omitted to welcome Christina McKelvie, Rhoda Grant and Jenny Marra to the committee who will also understand moving amendments later on? Welcome to the committee. Elaine, please to speak to amendment 40 and other amendments in the group. Thank you, convener. I start by saying I very much welcome the amendments in the name of the cabinet secretary, which take on board the concerns raised both to and by the committee at stage 1 with regard to references to travel and the need for the definition to be more aligned to that of the co-convention, while at the same time not excluding offences that are currently criminal in Scotland. I think that we made that recommendation in the report, so it is very welcome to see those. With regard to amendment 40, it reflects comments that were made at stage 1 evidence sessions, which I do not think that we really explored with you at that time. Obviously, you have covered some of this particular issue in your statements around your own amendments. What I was keen to see was that somebody who was temporarily resident in Scotland should not be excluded from prosecution under this bill purely because they were not habitually resident here or UK national, but if you can, as you have, give the assurance that the amendments that you have put will exclude that possibility, then I would be happy not to press amendment 40. I welcome the cabinet secretary's amendments in this group. I think that the emphasis on travel did seem to be at odds with international obligations, and therefore we will support those amendments. I very much welcome this amendment, which now leaves absolutely no dubiety about what could constitute the offensive trafficking. I add my own voice to it. I am glad that the cabinet secretary listened to the committee. I think that we were all at one about what was the original definition. Cabinet secretary, to wind up, please. Almost to say on the point that Elaine Murray has raised is that amendment 19 and 20 captures that a person who is temporarily in the UK and is conducting anything that constitutes one of the offences that will be covered by the bill as the amendments have outlined. Thank you very much. The question is that amendment 13 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Thank you. Collin amendments 14, 15, 16 and 17 are all the names of the cabinet secretary in all previous and the debated cabinet secretary. I invite you to move those amendments 14 to 17 on block. Moved. Does any member object to a single question being put on those amendments? Nope. The question is that amendments 14 to 17 are agreed to. Are we all agreed? The question is that section 1 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Collin amendment 18, in the name of the cabinet secretary, is ready to debate with amendment 13. Cabinet secretary, to move formally. Moved. The question is that amendment 18 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Agreed. Collin amendment 14, in the name of Elaine Murray, is ready to debate with amendment 13. Elaine, to move or not, move. Not moved. Collin amendment 19, in the name of the cabinet secretary, is already debated with amendment 13. Cabinet secretary, to move formally. Moved. The question is that amendment 19 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Collin amendment 20, in the name of the cabinet secretary, is already debated with amendment 13. Cabinet secretary, to move formally. Moved. The question is that amendment 20 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? The question is that section 2 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Collin amendment 1, in the name of Rhoda Grant, group of amendments 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 Roddie Grant yw hag 5 ar y b veutu arraff勲 newid dim i all ac i'r newid dim i'r gwybwys trends policewyr wedi gyfanol. Myd 디ch chi i'r dangos gyπουwn sydd ar yr ageaddaf ei fyddag yw'r gwybod, oaf i gyd yn ffordd decid yma. Rydym nhw'n ni'n dechreu ddestu ch announcement gyda ni Talks meid operates ond ag yr adeilus byddu dysa mblwys y te hydroyrwyr meid, liЧ simplesmente o'r cythysigau ac Focus Physiogiad meid i gyd am ffordd seigne un1911, oedd meddych gyda ni ddim gweithwys The remainder of the amendments, apart from 2, 4 and 5, in the group are consequential of 2, 4 and 5, which are the three key amendments. I truly believe that the market for prostitution in Scotland leads to people being trafficked to Scotland for sexual exploitation. This was recognised by the European Parliament in a resolution passed in February 2014, which, I quote, stresses that there are several links between prostitution and trafficking and recognises that prostitution, both globally and across Europe, feeds the trafficking of vulnerable women and underaged females. The Scottish Government's violence against women strategy equally safe recognises that commercial sexual exploitation, including prostitution, is violence against women. However, our laws penalise the victim rather than the perpetrator, and this needs to be rectified. Prostitution is often portrayed as a choice for women, however the vast majority of people in prostitution are poor, homeless and often drug addicts who have already suffered violence, abuse and neglect. For those in prostitution, it is often a means of survival rather than a choice. I believe that bringing forward those amendments will challenge the perception that this is a choice. They will also challenge the perception that men have a right to sex. Although the committee has not taken evidence on those amendments, many organisations give support and evidence to the committee during the stage 1 proceedings. Those supportive organisations came from a wide range of perspectives, including a group of 15 academics, the STUC, the women's support project, various church groups and a collective of formerly prostituted women, as well as Tata, which is the lead organisation for trafficking in Scotland. Northern Ireland has recently passed similar legislation as part of their human trafficking bill, and I therefore believe that those amendments fall within the scope of the bill. I also believe that reducing demand for paid sexual services, whether the person involved is trafficked or not, is an entirely legitimate aim for this bill and is in keeping with the full title of the human trafficking and exploitation bill. Amendments 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11 will make the purchasing of sexual services a criminal offence with sanctions. It is vital to challenge the demand for sexual exploitation, and those amendments ensure that those creating the demand are held to account for their actions. Amendment 2 adds section 4A to the bill that creates an offence to pay, promise to pay, or have a third part to pay for sexual services and defines a payment as any financial advantage. It also ensures a public education programme before the offence comes into force. Amendment 3 adds section 4B to the bill that provides a review of the operation of section 4A. Amendments 1, 6, 7 and 11 are consequential to those. Amendments 4 and 9 decriminalise the individual providing the sexual service by repealing section 46 of the Civic Government Scotland 1982 act. That act, along with the proposed section 4A, is five to decriminalise victims of the offence. Both those together act to decriminalise victims. Our laws are perverse, penalising victims currently and ignoring the perpetrators. Too often those who have been sexually exploited are the ones that are criminalised. Having a criminal record stigmatises victims and makes it harder for them to exit. That needs to change. It is also important that victims know that they are not committing any offence, which enables them to access services and empowers them to have a positive relationship with the police and the wider public services that provide them with support. Amendment 9 is consequential to 4. The final amendments in the group are 5, 8 and 10. Amendment 5 adds section 8A to the bill, which places a duty on the Scottish Government to provide exiting services for victims of sexual exploitation. It also ensures that support and assistance is never conditional on the co-operation with a criminal investigation. We need to ensure that victims of sexual exploitation are able to exit. Most individuals get involved in prostitution in order to survive. It is vitally important that we do not abandon victims without alternatives. Academic evidence has shown that a large percentage of women would like to leave prostitution if they could. Creating support programmes to help people to exit prostitution is also part of the resolution from the European Parliament and I quote again, recognises that the vast majority of persons in prostitution would like to stop but feel unable to do so. Stresses that those persons need appropriate support, particularly psychological and social assistance to escape the sexual exploitation networks and dependencies frequently associated with those, suggests therefore that the competent authorities put in place programmes to help persons to escape prostitution in close co-operation with stakeholders. Victims often need extensive support to rebuild their lives, as evidence shows that victims suffer at wide-ranging physical and mental conditions because of their exploitation. The issues that tend to lead them into prostitution in the first place must also be dealt with. Amendments 8 and 10 are a consequential to 5. I thank you very much to the other members, Mr Cymyn, John, Roddy, Gill and Margaret. Was that an indication of intent? John? Thank you, Presiding Officer. Everybody is getting promoted. Everybody is getting promoted this morning. Sorry, convener. When we reported in our earlier report, we talked about not being the correct vehicle for this particular piece of legislation. I hold by that position, and I have no wish to comment on many of the sweeping statements that Roder Grant has made. However, I would like to comment on the issues of personal safety and exiting that has been alluded to, which would be covered by amendment 4. If I can quote from Scott Pepin, and they have circulated a briefing to members, they talk about the criminalisation of soliciting and putting sex workers in danger as they work. They have to work in dark, isolated spots in an attempt to avoid arrest, which means that they are unwilling to approach the police or other services if they are attacked. There is then a series of statistics that I will pass over, but they go on to say that the soliciting lot is a barrier to women being able to exit sex work. That is a position that the proposer has alluded to. As an arrest prosecution or conviction, it is hugely stigmatising to have a personal record and to prevent them from being able to find other employment. I would support amendment 4, but not the other. Roderick Gil, Margaret McLean and Christian in that order, Roderick. Obviously, the committee considered this issue in general terms in providing a stage 1 report. Just a couple of points. First, Roder has referred to the Northern Island experience, but it is important to remember that the provisions in the Northern Island Bill were contained at stage 1, and they had the opportunity of taking evidence that we have not. To remind people of the comment that Siobhan Reardon and the Family City International made that prostitution does not always equal human trafficking, the concern was that conflating the two within the Bill will not address either of these complex issues adequately. I think that it is true that these are complex issues that require further attention. I welcomed the comment of the cabinet secretary who already made about the need to take appropriate research into this area and to consider it further, but not within the parameters of the bill at this time. Gil? That committee has not taken any evidence on this, and that would worry me. The two issues are so important in their own right, but to join them together, I am very uncomfortable with that. When I look at other jurisdictions, it is quite clear that, yes, most of what Ronan was talking about was about prostitution and not about the subject in regard to trafficking. We are discussing it at present time and taking evidence on it, but looking at other jurisdictions, certainly the incidence of prostitution has gone down. However, it has not stopped, so that tells me that the fact that it has not stopped means that the trafficking is still taking place. My principal view is on the slow ship in the convoy. I feel that the prospect that, on the prostitution side of it, if you took proactive action like that, the very people that we want to find are the people that are going to be driven away from protection and reaching out to find them. In particular, there are certain ethnic groups where, for instance, the Caucasian will never enter into certain groups to find or even to participate because they restrict it to their own ethnic group. To try and find a way in to protect the very most serious people who are involved in this, the ones that really need to be sought, found and rescued, I think that we put it underground and we find it very difficult, because there are two points that I am making, the principal point of would it work in regards to criminalisation? I do not know. I would like to seek evidence on that, and then the other thing, we have not actually taken evidence in this committee on it in principle. I think that the key point is that the committee has not taken evidence in this, and I think that it really has to be looked at in detail, properly scrutinised to make sure that there are not any unintended consequences. It may well be that there is legislation later in the Parliament or some other opportunity where that could be brought up. Perhaps there is domestic abuse legislation or another opportunity where we may have an opportunity to look at this in some detail, and I would certainly welcome that. I would agree as well with other members of the committee, particularly on our report that we were very clear that we did not think that it was fit to go forward in this Bill. We said as well in our report that we noted that the Cabinet Secretary intends to meet stakeholders on both sides of the debate to inform his decision on the matter. If you, Cabinet Secretary, could give us some indication whether we, on the discussion, how we can take the matters forward in another Bill or at a different stage. Elaine Folbot-Allison I am very sympathetic to the intention of the amendments. I fail to see how decriminalising being a prostitute would drive underground. I just do not understand that argument and would actually make it easier for women who are in prostitution often because they are victims to be able to come forward. We did say at stage 1 that we felt that we had not taken any evidence on it, but there is quite a lot of evidence that is out with the studies of this committee, not least the two bills that were prepared for the Parliament in the past, including Rhoda Grant's own bill, so there is evidence out there. In principle, I believe that those who create the demand, the men, predominantly men, who believe that they can purchase the use of somebody else's body, should be the people on whom the blame attaches, not the women who are forced to sell themselves. I am very sympathetic towards it. I do not actually think that it does not fit in the bill because it has been in other bills. I think that it is a pity that it was not in the bill from stage 1. We could have taken evidence properly on it at stage 1. I do not think that it is not appropriate for the bill because that is the reason for sex work, which is the purpose for which many women are trafficked. We know that. That is prostitution and other forms of sex work. Our major implication in human trafficking could have fitted quite nicely in the bill, but it was not there at stage 1. Therefore, the committee was a bit more anxious about considering it at stage 2. However, I have to say on the record that I am very much in favour of those amendments. If that is not the place to take them forward, I certainly hope that they will be taken forward elsewhere and in early course, because those suggestions and desires to legislate in this way have been in this Parliament for some use now, without us having taken any further action on them. I hope that action will be taken. Elaine Murray said that Rhoda Grant has already tested her views on the matter earlier this session with her member's bill, which fell due to lack of support. The criminalising of purchase of sex, I believe, will make women more vulnerable and not safer. I recognise that amendment 4 decriminalising the provision is a position that I would like to achieve. However, regardless of our differing views on that, the committee all agreed at stage 1 that this was not the vehicle to try to bring a significant change about without consultation. I just think that it is totally inappropriate to do it through this bill. Yes, amendment 4 is substantial. As the member has already said, the committee has not taken evidence on those amendments. We are all in this Parliament aware of unintended consequences when you do not test clauses in a bill almost to death. It is all very well to have been evidence out there, but the committee has not tested the evidence to see if there are any unintended consequences, not with standing at Amy's views about whether or not your purpose is appropriate, which I make no comment on, simply that the process of examining the legislation, I do not think that it is, as we said in our report, we are not able to do it within this bill. I am even wondering whether it would distort the purpose. The purpose of the bill is about human trafficking, slavery, servitude and compulsory labour, including provision about offences and sentencing and so on. Obviously, prostitution is part of trafficking. There are other issues as well, and it may have tipped the balance. I think that perhaps a standalone legislation may be what is required in due course. Sympathetic to your purposes, do not make any comment on whether or not I agree with the end in sight, whether it should be criminalised, not making any comment on that, but I cannot see how we could possibly have dealt with even 4A in the context of the committee at stage 2. I welcome the opportunity to set out the Scottish Government's position regarding amendments 1 to 11 that has been lodged by Rhoda Grant. The issue of prostitution is clearly a substantive and complex one, with strongly held views from both sides of the debate. As such, I consider that it was appropriate and correct that, when I gave evidence during stage 1, I committed to hearing the views of people on both sides of this particular debate and to then consider their views before coming to a position on the Scottish Government's response to this matter. I have also been mindful of the Justice Committee's clear recommendation in your stage 1 report that this bill is not the correct vehicle for making the purchase of sex a criminal offence and the views offered in the stage 1 debate. The Scottish Government respects the strongly held views of both those in support of criminalisation and those who oppose criminalisation. I have heard that supporters of Rhoda Grant's amendments indicate that it will drive down demand and thus reduce or eliminate prostitution in Scotland. Further, I am aware that it is considered that by decriminalising the sale of sex it will assist those exploited by their involvement in prostitution and encourage the use of appropriate support and services so that they can exit prostitution safely. However, opponents of these amendments consider that it will make sex workers more vulnerable by requiring the people involved such as a seller and purchaser to hide from law enforcement. There are also concerns that the trade would become hidden from those who provide support which would leave sex workers more open to abuse and potential exploitation. It is right for us to explore this substantive and complex issue and Rhoda Grant's amendments give us some opportunity to do that. Convener, while supporters and opponents cite specific research backing up their views, listening to members during the stage 1 debate on the bill it was apparent that some members have concerns about the reliability of the evidence available and how it applies to Scotland in order for them to make an informed decision on this issue. The Scottish Government has therefore taken a view that there is clearly a lack of consensus on the strength of the evidence based underpinning the debate on whether the law should be changed to criminalise paying for sexual services. Convener, I believe that consideration of calls for criminalisation of the purchase of sex need to fit within the wider set of Scottish Government policies designed to address violence against and exploitation of women. That is why the Scottish Government responded to the Justice Committee's stage 1 report stating that we will commission independent academic research to review the evidence on the impacts of a policy of criminalisation of the purchase of sex. This research will also include an assessment of the wider impact that will have on Scottish Government policy to address violence against women and gather evidence on the sex work industry in Scotland. I believe that this is an appropriate way to deal with such an emotive issue where there are strongly held opposing views. Once the independent research is available early in 2016, it will allow the Scottish Government and the Department to debate this substantive issue, which will be informed by Scottish evidence and to come to a decision on what is the best approach in going forward. I believe that any action in this area should be evidence-based and not rushed through at stage 2 of the bill, not least because of implications it may have in areas beyond the scope of the bill. On that basis, the Scottish Government does not support amendments 1 to 11 that are put forward by Rhoda Grant and I invite the committee not to agree those amendments. I have listened to what the committee said. I want to make a few points in winding up. A number of people have talked about trafficking and sexual exploitation, and the two might not be as closely linked. It is very clear that they are very closely linked. We have seen in Northern Ireland that the two have been linked, but we have also seen information from the EU making those links as well as other international organisations, so I do believe that they are linked. However, I take note that it was not in the bill at stage 1. Also, comments have been made about those amendments driving it underground or making it hidden. It is already largely hidden unless you are working with people in prostitution, and you are not aware of the harms that happen. However, it has to be visible to a purchaser, and therefore, if it is visible to a purchaser, it must be visible to the authorities if they make the effort to find it. I have also heard what the cabinet secretary said, and I recognise and welcome the fact that he has not ruled out introducing laws of this nature in the future. However, given the clear statement and equally safe of the commercial sexual exploitation, including prostitution and human trafficking, our forms of violence against women, why is it only now that we are commissioning research? I fear that it is in order to avoid taking action at this stage. Evidence of the harmful effects of prostitution in Scotland already exist, and I also do not believe that prostitution in Scotland is somehow different from elsewhere, particularly in other western developed countries. That has been consulted on twice, but those arguments have never been tested. I know that Alison McInnes said that they were. They have never been tested in the floor of this Parliament. Indeed, all the evidence that has come back from those consultations are overwhelmingly for taking action in this area. As well as the research in Scotland, there is very reliable information available from countries that are already operating the law and have been for a long time. I very much hope that the cabinet secretary will consider the evidence from Sweden and Norway and indeed undertake a visit to the relevant Swedish enforcement authorities. He will also be aware that most of the academic research that opposes the approach that I am putting forward also opposes the Scottish Government's own stance that prostitution is violence against women. I very much hope that the new research comes from the basis of the Government's own acceptance of the gendered approach to violence against women. Whatever the research discovers, it will not change the ultimate question that must be asked. Is it acceptable in a modern Scotland for a citizen to exploit the vulnerability of another for their own personal sexual gratification? I believe that it is not. Our national strategy on violence against women says that it is not, and I think that our law needs to catch up. I have a number of concerns about the practicalities proposed in the research, and we will be seeking a meeting with the cabinet secretary to discuss that further prior to stage 3. Having listened to what the cabinet secretary has said and to what members of the committee have said, I withdraw amendment 1. I seek to withdraw amendment 1 and will seek not to move the others in the group but to reserve my position for stage 3. Amendment 1 inserts section 4A. That is what it does, but we are only dealing with amendment 1 just now, so it seeks to withdraw your agreed. I am looking around your agreed. Thank you very much. I will call amendment 49 in the name of Jenny Marra, group with amendments 21, 50 and 32. Can I point out that amendment 21 is agreed to? I cannot call amendment 50 as it is preempted. Jenny, please to move amendment 49 and speak to the other amendments in the group, if you wish. Amendments 49 and 50 in my name seek to strengthen the section 3 definition of exploitation in relation to children. The international definition of trafficking, included in article 25 of the EU anti-traffking directive, states very clearly that where the victim is a child, there is no requirement for there to be any use of coercion, threats or force in carrying out the acts or the exploitation for an offence to be punished. Subsection 8 seeks to establish this principle in this bill, but sadly it does not do so effectively in my view. First, let me say that I welcome the cabinet secretary's amendment 21, which clarifies that the subsection deals with children under the age of 18 years old. It is a very helpful amendment and one that I hope will enable more successful prosecutions of those who commit such offences against children and vulnerable adults. However, there is one further aspect of subsection 8, which I believe remains a barrier to prosecution. The subsection contains a requirement not simply that the victim be a child or a vulnerable adult, but that they be specifically chosen for exploitation because they are a child or a vulnerable adult. That creates an additional burden of proof for the prosecution in order to obtain a conviction, a burden of proof that is not easy to satisfy and which does not take into account the nature of long-trafficking chains involving a number of people and which does not reflect international definitions. In evidence to the justice committee, the legal services agency state that the term chosen was the wrong terminology, saying that it does not reflect how a person's experiences are disclosed and therefore would be difficult to prove. In its evidence to the committee, the anti-trafficking monitoring group highlighted that it is also very difficult to prove that a person has been chosen as a result of a vulnerability factor. There can be many people involved in trafficking and exploiting as a child, as I know that the cabinet secretary appreciates. Not all of them can be identified, investigated and prosecuted. Proving the motivations of any of them in relation to a victim can be very difficult, particularly proving that they chose to exploit a child because they were a child rather than for some other reason would be extremely difficult. Cabinet secretary, say for example that a person receives and harbors a child victim, knowing that another person is using them to obtain some form of benefit. That offender is clearly involved in the trafficking under the international definition, made clear by the Government's amendment 13. However, they themselves may not have particularly chosen the child. They may have been following instructions and told that they will get some financial benefit by holding the child. I believe that the individual should still be punishable for the offence, but that would appear impossible under the burden of proof in the clause. I have welcomed the cabinet secretary's amendments to the definition of the human trafficking offence to reflect international understanding. I urge him to do the same in respect of offences against children. There is no requirement in the international definition for the offender to have chosen a victim because of the victim's particular characteristics. Moreover, international law states clearly that an offence against a child should be prosecuted without the need for any use of force threats or coercion. It makes no requirement for an assessment of whether an adult would have refused to allow themselves to be exploited in that way. Introducing a further test in this manner creates a false comparison between a child and an adult. Children are generally more dependent on others, more easily manipulated, physically smaller and weaker, and often culturally conditioned to obey the instructions of adults and to trust adults. International law assumes that this distinction and response by providing special protection for child victims is entirely unnecessary to require the court to consider whether or not an adult would have refused to allow the exploitation under the EU directive. It is sufficient that it was committed against a child. Amendment 50 addresses this by removing this test. I have taken note of the conflict of amendment 50 with amendment 21, which in all other respects I support, so I will be content to withdraw amendment 50, but I hope very much that the cabinet secretary might consider a further amendment to paragraph B of amendment 21 at stage 3. Can I move amendment 49? Excellent. You cannot withdraw anything until you have decided to move it or not move it. Cabinet secretary, can I ask you to speak please to amendment 21 and other amendments in the group? First, I will cover the Government's amendments and then I will respond to Ms Marra and the amendments that she has lodged. We carefully consider the comments made during stage 1 evidence regarding section 3A. Those comments fell into two categories, one specific and one general. The specific concern related to the reference to a person being young as a vulnerable characteristic. In particular, views expressed during stage 1 suggested that it is unclear at what age a person could be considered sufficiently young for it to be a relevant factor. The stage 1 report reflected those views, recommending that section 3A reference to young and youth be replaced by a reference to a person being a child, with child defined as a person under 18. Amendment 21 takes the opportunity to make clear the Scottish Government's policy intention that a person who is under 18 is always to be regarded as vulnerable for the purposes of section 3A of the bill by removing reference to young and youth and replacing them with reference to being a child. Amendment 32 introduces a general definition of child into section 36 of the bill for the purposes of this section and others. A child is defined as a person under 18. On the issue of vulnerability of adults, there was a more general concern that the other vulnerability factors in section 38 represented too narrow a list and did not properly reflect the variety of ways in which vulnerability can manifest in respect of trafficking victims. Amendment 21 also addresses this issue by introducing the concept of a vulnerable adult. Being a person whose ability to refuse the use to be used for an exploitative purpose, mentioned in section 37, is impaired because of mental or physical illness, disability, old age or for any other reason. That creates significant flexibility for law enforcement and courts to consider the listed factors and other unlisted factors, as relevant to the question of whether exploitation exists, provided those factors were sufficient to impair a victim's ability to refuse to be exploited. We believe that those amendments will provide some welcome clarification on those issues, address stakeholders' concerns and meet the justice committee's recommended change to this part of the bill. Turning to Jenny Marra's amendment 49 and 50, the first point is that those would not cover the issues raised by the committee which the Government's amendments seek to address, since the limit vulnerability to the narrow range of factors already described in section 38. Secondly, they change the entire purpose of section 38 into something that we do not believe is acceptable. The purpose of section 38 is to ensure that any person defined as vulnerable cannot be used for the purposes of subsection 7A, B and C due to the nature of their vulnerability. That means that if a person has used the vulnerability of another to do anything covered by 7A, B or C, there is no need to prove that it was by means of threat, deception or force. The fact that they were vulnerable was a factor in them being chosen is enough to prove that they were exploited. However, Ms Marra's amendment removes any reference to vulnerability being the reason for that person being chosen and indeed the test that a person without the vulnerability would not have acted similarly to the victim. In practice, that would mean, for example, that anyone asking a family member to provide any sort of service or recruiting a person with a mental or physical illness, even without any coercion of any kind, would be committing an offence. That is clearly unreasonable and surely not Ms Marra's intention. As such, I would ask the committee to support amendment 21 and 32 in my name and to reject amendment 49 and 50 in the name of Jenny Marra. I just wanted to ask the cabinet secretary about the effect of 49 in conjunction with both 21 and 32, because on that case he would remove the issue of somebody having to prove that they have been chosen, but at the same time he would have the definition of the vulnerability in terms of their age and being a vulnerable adult and whether 49, 21 and 32 together would work as a set of amendments. Do you want to respond before I bring in Jenny Marra to wind up? Well, as I have outlined, I will remove the vulnerability aspect. Sorry, cabinet secretary, I may not have been clear. If your amendment 21 is passed, the vulnerability aspects in terms of whether the person is a child or a vulnerable adult would still be included. I am not entirely sure that they would work, but I am not entirely sure that they would work sufficiently for the purposes of which we have intended within the legislation until they are considered individually together, but I am not entirely sure that they would. Jenny, please, to wind up and then press or withdraw. I think that Elaine Murray raises a good point. Clearly, there is a bit of conflict with amendment 21 and amendment 50. As I indicated in my opening remarks, I am content to withdraw amendment 50, but really only on the proviso that perhaps the cabinet secretary would consider a further amendment to paragraph B of amendment 21 at stage 3. Given his exchange there with Elaine Murray and a bit of uncertainty there on the cabinet secretary's part, I hope that he can give that undertaking and perhaps we can revisit this at stage 3. I am not persuaded that there is a need for a further amendment. That is why I have asked the committee to support our amendments and to reject amendments in your name. I thought that you indicated to Elaine Murray that I am not certain that we would deliver what Elaine Murray thinks that we would deliver. I will withdraw amendment 50. We have not got to amendment 50, so we cannot withdraw it. I want to know what you are doing with 49. I am going to withdraw amendment 49 and 50 just now. You seek leave to withdraw 49. Is the committee in agreement? Amendment 21, in the name of the cabinet secretary, is ready to meet with amendment 45. Call amendment 21, in the name of the cabinet secretary, is ready to meet with amendment 49. I remind members that amendment 21 is agreed to. I cannot call amendment 50, which would be preempted. The question is that amendment 21 be agreed to are we all agreed? I call the question is that section 3 be agreed to are we all agreed? Call amendment 22, in the name of the cabinet secretary, group with amendments 28, 28A and 30. Cabinet secretary, please to move amendment 22 and speak to all the amendments in the group. Thank you, convener. I am aware of the views expressed in stage 1 written and oral evidence with some stakeholders, including the Lord Advocate and the Police Service, raising the issue of a victim's consent in respect of section 4 offence. Specifically, there appears to be a concern that a victim's apparent consent to section 4 conduct may preclude a section 4 prosecution from taking place. It is important to note that the policy intention behind the bill's silence on the issue of consent is not to provide that the victim can consent to being held in slavery or servitude or being required to perform forced or compulsory labour. That presupposes an understanding on the victim's part of the nature of their circumstances and an element of choice that we think it could be difficult to sustain an argument that a person can give free and informed consent to being held in slavery. It is also important to note that consent is not simply irrelevant in relation to section 4. For example, a refusal to consent would clearly be relevant in the determination of whether a section 4 offence had been committed. That said, the Government is happy to accept the position that the position could be made clearer to avoid any misreading of section 4's silence on consent, particularly when compared with the treatment of the issue of consent in relation to the trafficking offence. Amendment 22 therefore amends section 4 of the bill so that the consent of a person to an act constituting slavery or servitude or forced or compulsory labour will not preclude a determination that a person has been held in slavery or servitude or forced to perform such labour. Importantly, that does not have the effect that the issue of consent is irrelevant under section 4, which might actually make it more difficult to establish a charge under this section. It simply ensures that the victim's consent is not an absolute defence for the accused. Amendment 28 expands provision on support and assistance for victims by providing for regulations to be made to provide assistance to victims of the offence under section 4 of the bill. The power here is modelled on the framework for support for trafficking under section 8 of the bill and will ensure that ministers can provide that the system of identification, support and assistance, similar to that provided to support victims of trafficking, is extended to adults of section 4 offence. Amendment 30 makes a consequential change to section 31 of the bill on the trafficking and exploitation strategy, clarifying that support and assistance mentioned in the strategy can include support and assistance provided by virtue of amendment 28 power. I turn now to amendment 28A in the name of Alison McInnes. This seeks to ensure that a victim of a section 4 offence would receive support or assistance for a period of at least 90 days. Whether we agree that this is the appropriate length of time or indeed why it is specified for a victim of a section 4 offence but not of a section 1 offence, we believe that this is not appropriate to be on the face of the bill. Leaving the detail of the support to be determined in regulations provides more flexibility to change the minimum or maximum period that support and assistance should be provided. That will allow the system of support provided under the regulations to be a better fit with other supports such as that given to victims of trafficking. Therefore, I would ask the committee to support amendments 22, 28 and 13, my name, and to reject 28A in the name of Alison McInnes. I move amendment 22. Alison McInnes plays to speak to amendment 28A and other amendments in the group, if you wish. Without wishing to get ahead of ourselves, I expect that there will be some discussion later on during stage 2 about the length of time in which victims of trafficking should be entitled to support and assistance as well. I did consider it would be helpful to discuss the duration of the support services available to victims of section 4 offences, and that is subjected to slavery, servitude and forced compulsory labour. The cabinet secretary's amendment 28 is very welcome, and it states that the Scottish Government may, through regulations, make provision about the period of support. As the cabinet secretary himself said, my amendment would entitle those victims to 90 days of support and assistance. I drew on Amnesty's views on that in line with the reflection and recovery provision, which Amnesty notes is recommended for victims of human trafficking by UN agencies. It strikes me that there will be many similarities in the support that victims of human trafficking and victims of exploitation will require. I have listened to what the cabinet secretary has had to say about not being appropriate to put on the face of the bill. I recognise that there is perhaps some sense in allowing there to be a flexibility to moderate the minimum land maximum, and, on that basis, I will not press my amendment when the time comes. When you come to it, yes. Oh, dear. Anyone else wanting to come in? Roddy Campbell, please. It is very brief, as I have to welcome section 22, taking on board the evidence that we have heard from both the Lord Advocate and the police at stage 1, and I think section 28 does give the flexibility required. The amendment 28, sorry, does give the flexibility required. Cabinet secretary, to wind up. If you wish, you don't have to. Thank you. In March, the question is that amendment 22 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Read to read. Questions at section 4 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Call amendment 2 in the name of Rhoda Grant. Already debate with amendment 1. Rhoda, move or not move. Call amendment 3 in the name of Rhoda Grant. Already debate with amendment 1. Rhoda, to move or not move. Not moved. The question is that section 5 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Call amendment 51 in the name of Alice McInnes in a group on its own. Are you ready? Alice McInnes, please, to move and speak to that amendment. Thank you very much. My amendment 51 seeks to introduce a statutory aggravation relating to the vulnerability of children. That would be in addition to the general aggravation and would, in the words of Bernardo's, recognise the vulnerability of children and the seriousness of a trafficking offence against a child at the stage of sentencing. In his written evidence to us, the Scotland's commissioner for children and young people said that he supports calls for the inclusion of such a statutory aggravation. I believe that the specific rights, vulnerabilities and requirements of children should be taken into account at the sentencing stage. They are at greater risk than adults being trafficked and Bernardo's tells us that the long-term impact of this upon them will be greater. The trauma caused by being trafficked at such a formative age can understandably be much more severe. The recent Northern Irish legislation lists the fact that the offence was committed against a child as an aggravating factor, meaning that it must be considered by the court. I see no reason why that legislation cannot also specifically recognise children's unique vulnerability. Thank you very much. Any other member, Margaret? I have some sympathy with this amendment, but I look forward to what the cabinet secretary says. There we are. We are all waiting in anticipation, cabinet secretary. You might persuade Margaret. Let's see. I will let you down. Alison McInnes's amendment 51 seeks to amend the bill to add an aggravation for the offence of human trafficking where involving a child. The bill already includes provision for a statutory aggravator that will apply in cases where an accused person commits an offence other than the offence under section 1, which is connected with human trafficking, involving either a child or an adult victim. If satisfied with the connection to human trafficking, the court must take the aggravation into account when determining the appropriate sentence within the maximum for that crime. However, I recognise that Alison McInnes's amendment is about the offence of trafficking itself being aggravated because of it being committed against a child. An important point to make is that the main offence of human trafficking under section 1 will carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, whether it is against an adult or a child. It is also worth noting that, as it currently stands, the bill allows for the full context of any offending to be narrated to the court. Where that includes trafficking of a child, that will be narrated to the court and can be taken into consideration for the sentencing purposes. Prosecutors will ensure that whatever is available and relevant at this information is provided to the courts. However, I also take into account that an addition to the bill that recognises the vulnerability of child victims of trafficking and the seriousness of trafficking offences against a child at the stage of sentencing is something that many people would find appropriate. While human trafficking is a vile offence no matter who is a victim, it is particularly important when those victims are children. Clearly, we all want the best outcomes for all victims of human trafficking and having listened carefully to the case presented for the inclusion of an aggravation for the offence of human trafficking, where, involving a child, I am of a view that a provision on the face of the bill would, on balance, have a positive impact. On that basis, convener, I am happy to support amendment 55, and I would ask the committee to do so. I have made Alice McKinnon's smile, but have you made Margaret Mitchell's smile? There we are then. Alison, do you wind up? Do you wish to wind up? I thank the cabinet secretary for his support and recognition of the case that has been made. I press him. Thank you very much. The question is, amendment 51 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? The question is, section 6 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? I call amendment 23 and name the cabinet secretary group with amendments 24, 41, 42, 52 and 25. Can I point out that if amendment 52 is agreed to, I cannot call amendment 25, which will be preempted. Cabinet secretary, please to move amendment 23 and speak to the other amendments in the group. Section 7 of the bill requires the Lord Advocate to make and publish guidelines about the prosecution of victims of trafficking or exploitation. The committee will recall that, in his stage 1 evidence, the Lord Advocate took the view that the duty under section 7 should instead be to issue instructions. The Lord Advocate noted in particular that instructions would be much better than guidelines. The point was made that guidelines are guidelines, they are not instructions that somebody has to do something. It seems to me that, in this field, it would be much better to have instructions. I agree that this proposed change would bring further clarity and force to the requirement in section 7. Amendments 23 to 25 amend section 7 of the bill in order to require instructions to be issued on the matter rather than guidelines. We believe that those amendments will strengthen the bill and also respond to the Lord Advocate's commitment and the Justice Committee's request on section 7. I now turn to the amendments lodged by Elaine Murray and Jenny Marra. Amendment 41 and 42 seeks to introduce into statute the duty on the Lord Advocate to provide separate instructions for child victims of trafficking. I am aware that the draft Lord Advocate's instructions have already been circulated to a number of stakeholders and have been provided to the Justice Committee. Those instructions, which the committee has seen, acknowledge the specific issues and vulnerabilities around child victims of human trafficking and provide for a separate test for children, which does not include a requirement to establish that a child was compelled by her status as a trafficking victim to commit an offence in order for the instructions to apply. Work is on-going within the Crown Office and Procater Fiscal Service to consider the responses to the consultation and to redraft the instructions so as to ensure that the full range of opinions are taken into account. The proposals put forward by Elaine Murray are well-intentioned and emphasising that there should be a separate instruction for dealing with child victims as currently contained in the instructions is not something we would, in principle, oppose. However, as I have already noted, the existing draft instructions already make the distinction between child and adult victims clear. However, I am concerned at the change to attributable from directly attributable in relation to the test for adults. That is an important component in ensuring that any presumption against prosecution does not cover those who try to use the protection offered to victims of human trafficking and exploitation where it is not appropriate. Turning to Jenny Marra's amendment 52, which relates to the on-going review of Lord Advocate's instructions, the Lord Advocate has already consulted widely on instructions with a wide range of stakeholders and may revise them from time to time as appropriate, as is already provided for in the bill. Part of the process will, of course, be consultation with relevant parties. The amendment also proposes a three-year rolling review period and to place a statutory duty on the Lord Advocate to take steps to ensure that the strategy prepared by ministers takes account of the instructions. We do not agree that placing such a requirement on the Lord Advocate in statute is necessary or appropriate. I also consider the proposal in amendment 52 to impose a statutory duty on the Lord Advocate as to who must be consulted on reviewing the instructions to be appropriate. There are a number of issues raised given the positions held by some of the group that have been listed within the criminal justice system. Lord President is the head of the judiciary who may ultimately make any decision about legal review of the instructions and any cases that are prosecuted or discontinued under them by prosecutors. The police will be instructed by prosecutors in relation to investigations that have been undertaken regarding human trafficking and exploitation cases, and the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society equally represent defence solicitors and advocates who will represent those accused of offences in a criminal court. Although it is not to say that information that has been taken from those sources and lessons learned from cases that are going or have been concluded will not be taken into account in considering the terms of the instructions, putting the relationship between those parties into statute may raise some constitutional issues, and a broader, more flexible approach should be favoured, as per the bill, as it currently stands. On that basis, I would ask the committee to reject amendment 41, 42 and 52, and to support amendments 23, 24 and 25, and to move amendment 23. Thank you, convener. First of all, I indicate my welcome of amendments 23, 24 and 25. The Lord Advocate had indicated in his oral evidence to me when I asked him specifically about whether he would prefer guidelines or instructions that he would wish to issue instructions, so I am pleased that that is now the case in terms of the way in which the bill is worded. Amendments 41 and 42 reflected the concerns expressed by a number of witnesses and referred to earlier this morning that evidence of compulsions should not be required where trafficking victim is a child. The Faculty of Advocates and their written submission point out that article 2.5 directive 2011-36, EU and article 4 of the Trafficking Convention make it clear that, when a child is concerned, it is not necessary that threat, force, abduction, deception, etc. have occurred in order for that child to be have been trafficked for exploitation. The faculty also argued that provision in relation to the prosecution of children should make it clear that it is not necessary that the child have been compelled by any of those means in order to access protection against prosecution. My amendments were intended to make it clear that, while the Lord Advocate's instructions should exempt an adult from prosecution for a crime that they have been compelled to commit, compulsions should not be required to be demonstrated in the case of a child. I note the reassurance that the cabinet secretary has given us that the draft guidance or the draft instructions that the Lord Advocate has drafted will be separate for children and adults who will contain separate provision. I also have to say that I had not picked up the fact that the word directly had been missed out of 2A to be—sorry, that the compulsion is attributable rather than the compulsion is directly attributable. Clearly, I would not be pressing that amendment because it is obviously a drafting error in it, since that directly has been missed out. Thank you. Jenny, please, to speak to amendment 52 and the other amendments in the group. With the minister's remarks on amendment 52 and I do not intend to press it. Thank you very much. Any other members? Cabinet secretary, please, to wind up. Nothing further to add. The question is amendment 23. We agree to or we all agreed. The name of the cabinet secretary is already debated. The cabinet secretary is to move formally. The question is amendment 24. We agree to or we all agreed. The name of Elaine Murray is already debated. Amendment 23, move or not? Move. Not moved. Call amendment 42. The name of Elaine Murray is already debated. Amendment 43, move or not? Move. The name of Jenny Marr is already debated. Amendment 23, Jenny, to move or not? Move. Not moved. Call amendment 25. The name of the cabinet secretary is already debated. Amendment 23, cabinet secretary, to move formally. Moved. The question is amendment 25. We agree to or we all agreed. Moved. The question is section 7. We agree to or we all agreed. Moved. Call amendment 4. The name of Rhoda Grant is already debated. Amendment 1. Rhoda, move or not? Moved. You shout move. Moved. Moved. Okay. That amendment has been moved. The question is amendment 4. Be agreed to or we all agreed. Nope. There will be a division. Those in favour, please show. Those against, please show. Abstentions. No, it was against. None for seven against. It was none for seven against and two abstentions. Thank you very much. That's what you do. You just shout move as fast as you can before we move on. Never mind. Call amendment 43. The name of Elaine Murray group with amendment 48. Elaine pleased to move amendment 43 and speak to both amendments in the group. Thank you, convener. Those two amendments refer to the statutory defence, which we discussed at stage 1. Amendments 43 and 48 introduce a statutory defence for victims of human trafficking. Recommendation 56 of the committee's stage 1 report states that the committee considers that the Lord Advocate's argument in favour of prosecutorial guidelines was persuasive and indeed at the view of the Dean of Faculty of Advocates. Others, in favour of including a statutory defence in the bill, was also persuasive. Given that the cabinet secretary has confirmed that prosecutorial guidelines and the statutory defence are not mutually exclusive, the committee asks the cabinet secretary to consider the position further. The faculty of advocates observed in their evidence that the availability of a statutory defence would provide a significant additional protection to the victims of trafficking and that if an individual is not recognised by the crown as being or appearing to be a victim of trafficking or the crown does not appear to accept that there is a link between the offending behaviour and status as a victim, the individual may have difficulty in challenging effectively a decision to prosecute. With Scotland also stated that a key concern for them was that a non-prosecuciful principle and a statutory defence should be included on the face of the bill. Committee members who have received a briefing from care will be aware that they too simple at these amendments arguing that a statutory defence provides additional opportunities for preventing or halting the prosecution of a victim and that that would enhance the victim-centred approach. Amendment 43 introduces a new section on defence for victims comprising a defence for a trafficked adult if they have been compelled to commit the offence and mirroring amendment 42 and not requiring compulsion to be demonstrated in the case of a child victim. During stage 1, we heard that similar provisions in the UK and Northern Irish acts enabled serious offences to be removed from the statutory defence. Clearly, if there are some offences, sexual assaults such as violence fix-up or example where it would be very undesirable that a statutory defence should apply. Amendment 43, section 7, therefore empowers Scottish ministers to specify exemptions by regulation. That allows flexibility should ministers wish to introduce an additional exemptions at a later date. Amendment 48 specifies that those regulations be made by affirmative procedure allowing the scrutiny of exempted offences. Now I know last yesterday evening that we received a letter from the Lord Advocate who objects to those amendments. He states that, for example, if the route taken in England and Wales or Northern Ireland were to be followed, there would be a large number of offences where the special defence would simply not apply. If that were the case, my instructions would also have to be limited in their scope as any decisions by prosecutor to discontinue a case with which the Government stated that it should not be subject to the protection could rightly be challenged. I was not sure if I completely understood that because I would not have thought that the prosecutorial guidelines would include things like rape or murder and so on in terms of not prosecuting somebody. I am not really quite clear about the arguments. Maybe the cabinet secretary may have had more discussion with the Lord Advocate about that, but I was not really quite understanding, if you like, of why that was such a problem since I would imagine that there would be guidelines issued by the Lord Advocate, or should we say instructions now, issued by the Lord Advocate, which would apply to prosecution of extremely serious offences such as rape and murder. Could you move the amendments? I will move my amendments. Thank you very much. Anyone, members, Margaret, John and Alison? I am mindy to support this. Of course, I am interested to hear what the cabinet secretary says, but it seems to me, without its inclusion, there will be a lesser provision and protection here in Scotland than elsewhere in the UK. During evidence, we certainly heard that the Lord Advocate's guidance now instructions were not mutually exclusive and that we could therefore have both provisions, and that would certainly seem to me the best way forward. I have John, then Alison, then Roderick John. I found this one of the more interesting aspects of the debate that we had about the competing arguments for and against. I have to say, and reinforced by the Lord Advocate's letter of 15 June, I think that it is very compelling the argument that the Lord Advocate makes there that the support being lent by the prosecution and it is taking the onus away from the individuals, for instance, the phrase where he says, and I think that he acknowledges that in itself it is not sufficient. He says that there is work that is required to support the instructions and I will undertake to work with the relevance stakeholders within the criminal justice system and third sector communities to raise the pure profile. I favour the Lord Advocate having that position, but I understand why others will think otherwise. Alison, please, followed by Roderick. Thank you. I suppose that my starting point is at one of the earliest intervention possible and the most support that could possibly be available. I think that we had thought, and we have wrestled with this as we have gone through committee, that they weren't contradictory to each other and that the statutory defence would perhaps be a safety net for anyone who hadn't been picked up by the procedure as it's gone through. And I think that we heard from Aberlour in particular that there were some young victims of trafficking who had been prosecuted, but I'm persuaded by the Lord Advocate's letter of yesterday. He says that if a statutory defence was introduced in legislation, that would result in a two-tier system for potential victims of trafficking, as my instructions would only apply post-conclusion of criminal proceedings. And if that is the case, and he says that very clearly, that the statutory defence would be the choice of Parliament in transposing the human trafficking directive into law, and I have to rely on that and therefore have to accept that these two things are mutually exclusive. Thank you. Roderick, followed by Christian. Of what I was going to say has already been said, but obviously we've moved on a bit from not mutually exclusive to consider the extent to which statutory defence is governed and influenced by the instructions. And Alison really didn't mention the penultimate sentence in the Lord Advocate's letter, which says my instructions could in the circumstances only apply when the statutory defence was not available. So I'm persuaded by the Lord Advocate's argument. Christian. I'm persuaded by the Lord Advocate's argument, particularly when we were in Magyline Mutual repeating what we had, that both were mutually exclusive. Maybe our mutually inclusive program is how we implement it, and the Lord Advocate would really make a case that the implementation would cause a lot of problems as Alison MacKinnon spoke on the 49th. Gil. Yeah, I think before the Lord Advocate intervened with his evidence originally to the committee, I think the committee itself worked on a long line of a statutory element to this, but I think at that time the evidence was quite compelling and it's reinforced with the Lord Advocate's letter. And for the public record, if I could just state a couple of sentences, a statutory defence would not only usually require the victim to raise it, it would also usually require them to raise it in sufficient time so that the court was properly notified of their intention to rely on it and would require the defence to be supported by evidence which would be admissible under Scots law. And then finally he says, I believe that my instruction provides the best protection for vulnerable individuals who are forced to commit criminal offences as a result of having been trafficked or exploited by its very nature, this type of offending operates in the shadows and given the circumstances victims find themselves in, it is unnecessary onerous to add further burden to them in order to ensure their rights are protected. I think these are powerful arguments and I go along with the evidence that he's produced for us today. Cabinet Secretary. Thank you, convener, and I welcome the opportunity to set out the Government's position regarding amendments 43 and 48 in the name of Elaine Murray. The Government gave this issue very serious consideration prior to the introduction of the bill. In framing the bill, our aim was to ensure that victims were protected from prosecution at the earliest possible stage. We have carefully considered the views raised during the stage 1 evidence and debate and of the committee's comments in its stage 1 report. Whilst we agree that many of those stakeholders with many of those stakeholders that legally a statutory defence and the Lord Advocate's instructions are not mutually exclusive, the Lord Advocate made it clear that any statutory defence would govern and influence any instructions that were to be produced. As you are aware, our main argument against a statutory defence is that this places a burden on a victim to raise a defence and that such a defence would, in general terms, need to be lodged before the trial commenced and meet a certain evidential threshold. However, prosecutorial guidelines would provide flexibility not to ensure that prosecutions do not proceed in the first place, but to allow the prosecution to be able to abandon or, for the crown, to apply to set aside a conviction based on credible evidence or intelligence that is provided at any time. The Lord Advocate argued strongly and clearly against such a defence in his evidence to the committee. Members recall the Lord Advocate stated in his evidence that, and I quote, "...we need a more flexible approach in which the Lord Advocate issues not guidance but instructions to our prosecutors and the police that will be far more productive and lead to fewer injustices than a rigid statutory defence in the bill would." Following the stage 1 debate, there has been on-going engagement with my officials and the Crown and Procurator Fiscal Service officials regarding the issue of a statutory defence. The Lord Advocate remains strongly opposed to the proposal for a statutory defence and I am aware that the committee received a letter from the Lord Advocate yesterday that reiterated his view on instructions that are required under section 7 of the bill and the proposal for a potential statutory defence for victims. Another of the concerns is that a statutory defence, as defined in the modern slavery act 2015, has significant exclusions and caveats, which are a large number of exceptions to it. With a large number of exceptions to it, well over 100 are listed in schedule 4 to that act. As Ms Thomson of the LSA told his committee during stage 1, the extent of those exclusions will make the defence difficult to implement in practice. I know that Elaine Murray has not tried to replicate that in her amendment, but has left the listing of offences to be done by regulation which may be made by Scottish ministers and which, as set out in amendment 48, would be subject to affirmative procedure. I suspect that Elaine Murray would want this list to be developed prior to the commencement of the section, but, as worded, there is no requirement for this to be the case. convener, as you said in the stage 1 debate, there are compelling arguments on both sides of the case. However, I believe that the case has not been made that adding a statutory defence would provide any further benefit to victims of these crimes. And indeed, I remain concerned that where this amendment to be accepted, this may have a detrimental effect on the victims by placing an unnecessary burden on them. This would also create a requirement, as noted by the Lord Advocate himself, that any prosecutorial instructions take account of the different landscape which would exist if a defence were on the statute book. For example, failure by a victim to plead the defence or establish it during the trial might become relevant factors to take into account when considering further future exercise of prosecutorial discretion in respect of that trial and that victim. Prosecutorial instructions will allow for an early intelligence-led assessment to be made of a person's victim status, taking into account the views of a range of organisations. The EU directive on human trafficking requires that prosecutors have discretion not to prosecute alleged victims of trafficking who may have been exploited to participate in any form of criminality. The flexibility offered by placing the duty on the Lord Advocate to produce and review instructions to prosecutors remains a Scottish Government's preferred option to meet our victim-centred approach to this issue. As such, I urge the committee to reject amendments 43 and 48 in the name of Elaine Murray. Thank you very much, cabinet secretary. Elaine Murray, to wind up and press the thought, please. It was never my intention that it is a question of instructions versus a statutory defence. I do not think that that is part of the argument that was intended as an additional measure. As I said, I did not see the Lord Advocate's letter until about 6 o'clock last night, so there has not been any opportunity to consult with any of the witnesses who were arguing in favour of including a statutory defence. I am prepared to withdraw amendment 43, and not to press 48, given particularly the fact that the bill will not enter stage 3 until after the recess, in which case there will be time for those bodies who are arguing in favour of including a statutory defence to come back. Having seen the letter in greater detail than I was able to give it last night, I will withdraw amendment 43 at once. Elaine wants to withdraw amendment 43. Is that agreed? Right, that is very convenient, because I am going to suspend until 11.40 to give you a little break. Everybody needs it. Thank you. Back on, and can I call amendment 53 in the name of Jenny Marra, grouped with amendments 54, 55, 56, 44, 26, 27 and 34. Jenny, please, to move amendment 53 and speak to all the amendments in the group. Thank you, convener. Amendments 53, 54 and 55 in my name seek to strengthen the section 8 provision of support to victims of trafficking. First, let me say, convener, that I fully support section 8. It is an example of the victim-centred approach that this bill takes, and one that we can be very rightly proud of. I am concerned, though, that there are limitations on this victim-centred approach because section 8 requires that victims be recipients of a positive reasonable grounds decision under the national referral mechanism in order to access that support. Now, a number of groups that gave evidence to the Justice Committee at stage 1 indicated their concern that access to support and assistance was tied to the national referral mechanism. It may not be ideal, but I am willing to accept the general tenor of the response to this section of the report that is to say that there needs to be some criteria for determining if a person is eligible to receive assistance, and at that moment the NRM is the only system that we have. I welcome the cabinet secretary's amendment 27 to allow Scottish ministers in the future to set out new criteria on what will constitute a reasonable grounds decision and conclusive determination. However, I do not believe that that justifies the restriction of support until after a reasonable grounds decision has been made. I believe that we should at least ensure that assistance is provided to someone from the moment that they are identified as a potential victim. Now, I recognise that there is a discretionary power in section 8 3A to provide support in this period before a reasonable grounds decision, but that is inadequate since by its very nature it is discretionary. It is not clear on what grounds the support would be provided, and it is inadequate because it is at exactly that moment that support is most needed by the victim. Leaving early stage provision to discretion potentially places a burden on a victim not only to provide the necessary information for an NRM referral, but also to prove that they are needy enough to receive interim support. Several organisations gave evidence to the justice committee suggesting that support should be available even without referral to the NRM because some victims are unable to provide informed consent due to their level of vulnerability. Amendment 53 and the consequential amendment 55 will remove the lack of uncertainty associated with the discretionary power in section 3A and ensure that all individuals who are referred to the NRM are immediately provided with assistance pending the reasonable grounds decision. That is in line with the approach taken in Northern Ireland's human trafficking and exploitation act from this year and was recommended in evidence to the committee by a number of organisations, including Police Scotland and NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde trauma services. As the latter group suggested, I believe that it is better for our legislation to start from a presumption that the victims should be provided with support and assistance. Amendments 54 and 55 Now, a key motivating factor for me in launching my consultation on the human trafficking bill was to ensure that our laws and our practice implemented comprehensively our international obligations, in particular the 2005 Council of Europe Convention and the 2011 EU directive on combating trafficking in human beings. Providing support to victims of trafficking is a fundamental aspect of both of those conventions and I am pleased that it will now be set firmly in the centre of our law, ensuring that victims have their needs are a priority and giving them confidence that they will receive help if they come forward. I welcome the cabinet secretary's amendment 34 to ensure that the power to set out the relevant period is to be made by affirmative resolution as recommended by the committee. However, that does not go far enough to reassure victims that government will meet the current provisions tied in with the NRM. That is a minimum of 45 days for reflection and recovery. Obviously, we must already provide at least 30 days required by the European Convention in article 13 and I hope that the minimum period would be 45 days as it is now. However, that section does not make that clear. I can understand that the Government might want to give itself the ability to extend the support it gives to victims in the future, something that I would greatly support. So I welcome the regulatory power, but the Scottish Parliament should be clearly stating what the minimum amount of support should be. My amendment 54 and the consequential amendment 55 would ensure that existing 45 days of support will be guaranteed in addition to allowing the possibility of a longer basic period of support and a discretionary extension. Convener, amendment 56 clarifies the criteria for providing assistance on a discretionary basis to victims following receipt of a conclusive grounds decision. It makes clear that that support should be provided not only to enable a victim to assist with criminal investigations on court proceedings but also to facilitate the fullest possible recovery of the victim. Could I ask you please to move amendment 53? Yes, moved. Jane Baxter, please to speak to amendment 44 and the other amendments in the group. 44 is quite simply been asking that there's a bit of clarity about the word accommodation and that the stage is appropriate and secure as uncertain. I think that that's the very least that I can expect accommodation to be. Thank you. Thank you very much. Cabinet Secretary, please to speak to amendment 26 and the other amendments in the group. Thank you, convener. I'll cover the Government's amendments and then I'll respond to the amendments lodged by Jenny Marr and to Jane Baxter. Amendment 26, amend section 84C to make clear that medical advice and treatment includes psychological assessment and treatment. That approach retains the reference to counselling in section 84E since we think this kind of non-medical emotional support is an important part of the package of assistance that should be available to trafficking victims. Convenience is important to emphasise that the list of support and assistance under section 84 of the bill is not exhaustive. Further, the illustrative list provides for access to medical advice and treatment which would cover both physical and mental health needs as well as non-medical counselling. So we consider that section 8 already allows for the provision of psychological assistance, but given the doubts raised about this issue, particularly by practitioners in this field, we are happy to clarify the position to avoid any future contention. Amendment 27 provides a power for Scottish ministers to make regulations which set out the method and procedures by which it is to be determined that there are reasonable and conclusive grounds to consider that a person may be a victim of trafficking for the purposes of provision of support and assistance under section 8 of the bill. Amendment 27 further permits ministers to make provision about the procedure to be followed and the criteria to be applied in making these determinations and about who may make those determinations. Those amendments have two purposes. The first is to build flexibility into the arrangements for support and assistance under section 8, in particular by allowing any changes to the existing national referral mechanism for identifying victims to be reflected in the legislative provisions underpinning support and assistance to victims. The aim is to ensure that those changes, if they occur on the back of the UK Government's review of the existing system, for example, do not make the operation of section 8 here in Scotland problematic. The second purpose is to permit aspects of any reformed national referral mechanism to be placed on a statutory basis, if that is considered appropriate. Finally, amendment 34 amends section 37 on the procedure for subordinate legislation under the bill. The effects of this amendment is that regulations made under the power in amendments 27 and 28 will be subject to affirmative procedure. The amendment also implements my commitment to this committee to amend the bill so that any change to the specified period under section 8 to B i is subject to affirmative rather than negative procedure. Finally, amendment 34 provides that the regulation making power in amendment 29 on the presumption of age which is still to be debated is also subject to the affirmative procedure. Turning now to Jenny Marra's amendment 53 to 55, those look to make the date that compulsory support and assistance is available earlier to include people who are or about to be referred to a competent authority for a reasonable grounds determination. Those go against the Government's amendment 27, which is looking to provide flexibility to allow those issues to be considered and changed through regulations. We have concerns that those amendments are extremely wide, especially in relation to the question of when a reference is about to be made. We do not see how that would work in practice. In relation to the ending of the period of compulsory support and assistance, amendment 54 seeks to ensure that a victim of section 1 offence would receive support or assistance for a period of at least 45 days. That is similar to amendment 28A in the name of Alison McInnes and, indeed, a response is similar. Whether we agree that this is an appropriate length of time or, indeed, why it is half the time that Alison McInnes suggests is required for victims of section 4 offences, we believe that this is not appropriate to be on the face of the bill. Allowing that to be determined in regulations provides more flexibility to change the minimum or the maximum period that support and assistance should be provided. That will allow any changes as a result of any review to be dealt with more easily. In relation to amendment 56, which seeks to ensure continued support for victims until their fullest possible recovery, again, we have concerns about the practicality of this amendment. It is neither clear how the person's recovery is to be measured or by whom. In addition, section 83 provides Scottish ministers with necessary additional flexibility to provide support and assistance beyond the end of the specified period or the making of a conclusive grounds decision. It is an open-ended power not tied to any particular objective or outcome and we believe that amendment 56 may potentially limit the scope of that by specifically specifying the purpose for which support is to be given and therefore removing the flexibility that the subsection seeks to provide. Subsection 80 currently allows for ministers to provide support and assistance for such periods as they think appropriate after the conclusive determination. That power would in fact be limited by amendment 54 to the recovery of the person or the involvement in the criminal justice system. I turn to James Baxter's amendment. That seeks to ensure that the accommodation provided for under section 8 is appropriate and secure. Whilst I sympathise with the aim of this amendment, we do not believe that it is necessary. Section 81 requires Scottish ministers to provide such support as is necessary given the adult's needs. It is not conceivable that this could include accommodation that was not appropriate. If the accommodation were not appropriate, the duty would not be met. In terms of secure accommodation, our concern is that this word has connotations relating to confinement or restriction of liberty. Therefore, we believe that this amendment is unnecessary and may actually cause confusion. Convener, more generally, we recognise that victims of the vile crime of human trafficking and exploitation need time both to recover and to reflect on their experience. In doing so, they have the right to expect immediate support and assistance that is based on their individual needs. Having considered the issues raised at stage 1 and carefully reflecting on the views expressed during the stage 1 debate, I believe that the Government's amendments strike the right balance in addressing stakeholders' concerns and making necessary and appropriate adjustments that will strengthen the bill and build in necessary flexibility as work on the review of the NRM proceeds. Looking forward, we will continue to work with stakeholders to determine if any further measures for support and assistance for victims of human trafficking and exploitation are required. Therefore, I ask the committee to support amendments 26, 27 and 34 in my name and to reject amendments 53 to 56 in the name of Jenny Marra and 44 in the name of Jane Baxter. Thank you, cabinet secretary. Any other members wish to nope? Jenny, please to wind up. Sorry, no, I don't... Were you wanting to come in? Christiana, I beg your pardon. I just wanted to regarding the flexibility. I do agree with the cabinet secretary on the flexibility because the linear limitation is... We heard a lot of limitation of the referal mechanism, part international referal mechanism and it's going to be under review so we need to give that flexibility and I'm very encouraged about that. Regarding Jane Baxter, I didn't realise that the second word, secure, was added to our accommodation which makes me very difficult to be able to support social amendment. Thank you very much. No, Jenny, please. Thank you, convener. I'm happy to accept the cabinet secretary's comments on amendment 56 in the meantime but may look at it again at stage 3 on my other amendments in this group, convener. I was interested that the cabinet secretary just said that victims have a right to expect immediate support and assistance. And I wonder therefore if he means when they are identified through a bureaucratic process as a victim or whether it becomes apparent that they are a victim to the people who work with victims day in, day out and can identify potential victims because that's what these amendments seek to do. They seek to give victims support as soon as the organisations like TARA, the people who work day in, day out with victims, identify people as potential trafficking victims and start that process of support and recovery. Now, I do welcome amendment 27 to review and give flexibility but I really don't think that that justifies the restriction of support until after that bureaucratic process of a reasonable grounds decision has been made. I would urge the cabinet secretary to deal with whether and what time he means that support and identification takes place if that's helpful to you, Jenny. There's obviously two stages in this process and that's where an individual may be at the subject of trafficking exploitation where support and assistance would be provided while the process has been undertaken to confirm that that's a process which then actually brings in further rights for that particular individual. So our view is that the approach we want to take is that support and assistance is provided prior to that process being taken forward in a flexible way but also the rights which are conferred once the person is being confirmed as being trafficked or exploited that they then have further rights that come about as a result of that. So I don't think anybody should consider this as an issue on the basis that you get nothing until it's being confirmed. It's about working with people who may have been the subject to trafficking and exploitation prior to that being determined and been given the right support at that particular point but they are of course conferred additional rights once that has actually been confirmed which is provided within the legislation. I mean, can we then accept what the cabinet secretary says but I mean what my amendments 53, 54 and 55 simply do is put in statute that right to that support that the cabinet secretary is saying he expects that victims will get before that conclusive grounds decision is made. It seems to me that he's nervous about the conferral of rights that would come with that process. I mean, is he indicating that perhaps we could look at wording of this at stage 3? We're not actually having a debate about this now, you're summing up but so I just would like to know whether you're going to press or withdraw. I'm going to press 53, 54 and 55. Right, well you're just pressing at the moment 53. All right, okay. The question is that amendment 53 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? There is a division, there will be a division, there's not agreement. Those in favour please show. Those against please show. Two, four, seven against that is not agreed. Call of amendment 54, name of Jenny Marrow, ready to wait for amendment 53 to move or not move. Moved. Big pardon? Moved. Moved. The question is that amendment 54 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? There will be a division, that's not agreed. Those in favour please show. Those against please show. For two, seven against, no abstentions, that is not agreed. Call of amendment 55, the name of Jenny Marrow, ready to wait for amendment 53, move or not move. Moved. The question is that amendment 55 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? There will be a division, those in favour please show. Those against please show. Two, four, seven against, no abstentions, that amendment is not agreed. Call of amendment 56, name of Jenny Marrow, ready to wait for amendment 53, move or not move. Not moved. Call of amendment 44, name of Jane Baxter, ready to wait for amendment 53, move or not move. Not moved. Call of amendment 26, name of the cabinet secretary, ready to wait for amendment 53, to move or not move cabinet secretary. Moved. The question is amendment 26, be agreed to. Are we all agreed? There will be a division. Call of amendment 27, the name of the cabinet secretary, ready to wait for amendment 53, to move formally cabinet secretary. Moved. The question is that amendment 27, be agreed to. Are we all agreed? There will be a division. The question is that section 8, be agreed to. Are we all agreed? There will be a division. Call of amendment 28, the name of the cabinet secretary, ready to wait for amendment 22, cabinet secretary to move formally. Moved. Call of amendment 28A, in the name of Alison McInnesl, ready to wait for amendment 22, Is that amendment 28 be agreed to, or will be agreed? Amendment 12, in the name of Christina McKelvie, group with amendments 12a, 12b, 12c, 12d, 12e, 12f, 12h and 12i. That's your lot. Christina, please, to move amendment 12 and to stick to the other amendments in the group. Thank you very much. Can you be anithr to you? You were going to give us the whole alphabet there, but I'm glad you stopped at i. The amendments that I am moving on in my name today are designed to strengthen the provisions within the bill around the support and provision afforded to child victims of trafficking, an issue that I have been pushing in this Parliament for eight years now, and with the support of my colleague Alison McInnes there. Whilst I welcome very much the current provisions, there are some gaps that I think need to be addressed, which would leave children inadequately protected under the legislation. At this point, I give thanks to Bernardos Naberlawer and the members of the cross-party group on human trafficking, who have helped me to understand some of the impacts of that and articulated what I wanted to say in my heart on paper, so I am very grateful for that. Amendment 12, convener, the amendment proposed is intended to place independent child trafficking guardians on a statutory footing. The amendment will leave it to Scottish ministers to make arrangements for guardianship, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a child may be a victim of human trafficking and where there is no person in the United Kingdom with parental rights and responsibilities in relation to said child. The amendment will ensure that all children who are suspected of being victims of human trafficking offence will be brought to the attention of an independent guardian, who will provide the intensive support needed to build a relationship with the child and expertise required to help the child navigate the complex legal processes. Independent child trafficking guardians will work closely and in equal partnerships within the existing child protection framework to improve outcomes for trafficked children. The evidence that I have seen is that children do not disclose easily their experiences and having someone that can trust is exactly what they need. The need for independent child trafficking guardians is clear due to specific vulnerabilities of trafficked children. I urge the cabinet secretary at stage 3 to look at children that are unaccompanied within the system and may give some due regard to those. The committee has heard evidence of the inconsistent accommodation, provision and support in Scotland for under-16s and 16s and 17-year-olds. Independent guardians will work with other child protection professionals and agencies to ensure that appropriate support and care is given to all children. Finally, Scotland is obliged to be compliant with the EU directive, which I have taken a keen interest in giving my role as a convener of the European Committee on Trafficking and Human Beans to provide responses that recognise the specific vulnerabilities of children. Introducing independent child trafficking guardians will help to ensure that Scotland meets its obligations under the directive that I move, amendment 12. Alison MacKinnon is pleased to move amendment 12A and to speak to the other amendments in the group. I start by welcoming Christina McKelvie's amendment 12 and to acknowledge the sterling work that she has done in this area. The Government's willingness to reflect on the debate about placing guardians for child victims of trafficking on a statutory footing. My amendments 12A, FG and I are intended to reflect the fact that local authorities are not necessarily the first point of contact for a trafficked child. It may be a health board, Police Scotland, UK visas and immigration or the Crown Office, who are first alerted to the possibility that a child has been trafficked. I believe that there is therefore merit in those other organisations also having the capacity to refer a child to an independent guardian as soon as reasonably practicable after they have been given grounds to consider that the child may be a trafficking victim. As the children's charity ECHPAC UK note, it is not enough to rely on local authorities alone to make a referral to the guardianship service. If members consider it appropriate that other organisations, in addition to the ones that I have mentioned, be added to the list then, we can reflect on that at stage 3. Amendment 12B extends the provision of guardianship and flags up the vulnerability of unaccompanied children claiming asylum. It would enable an authority to also refer a child to an independent guardian if the child's circumstances suggest that there is a risk that the child may be a victim of an offence of human trafficking. That is designed to create a presumption that a child travelling alone and seeking asylum may have been trafficked. If we want all children to have been trafficked to be given guardianship service, we must acknowledge surely that many separated children presenting as asylum seekers in the first instance will subsequently be identified as having been trafficked. Those most vulnerable young people will present with a cover story. They might not even understand that they have been trafficked, and they deserve the earliest intervention as possible. It is a small number of children, but as I say, they may not realise that they have been trafficked. Without this amendment, there is an increased risk that a child could be re-trafficked before they have been identified in the first place. I hope that people are able to support that. Can I ask you to move amendment 12A? Thank you. Jenny Marra, please to speak to amendment 12C and the other amendments in the group. Can I start by moving amendment 12A? No, speak. You do not move it just now. Okay. Thank you, convener. I would like to make the case to the Cabinet Secretary and welcome amendment 12, in the name of Christina McKelvie, and Alison McKinnon's amendments. Christina McKelvie, in her opening remarks, said that she hoped that the Cabinet Secretary would look at the case of unaccompanied children. That is what my amendment seeks to do, Cabinet Secretary, to make the civilised assumption that if a child arrives on our shores unaccompanied, they are in a very vulnerable position. In fact, you could make the assumption that they would be vulnerable to trafficking and therefore deserve the protection of the Scottish state and the protection of a child guardian. Thank you very much. Other members wish to come in. Elaine Margaret, please. John, was that a signal of just waving your pencil in a random fashion? I will come in now with it. Serving me right. Serving me right, yes. I would like to say that I very much welcome the amendments and the amendment to the amendment. I think that we heard not only in committee session but in the visits that we went to. We heard extensive evidence of the need for amendment of this type. I am in favour of all the amendments, including the amendments to the amendments, because I think that they seek to protect children who are unaccompanied and coming into this country is extremely important. I am very pleased to see those amendments. Margaret, men, of course, John. I am very much supportive of amendment 12 in Christina McKelvie's name, and of the other amendments, which I think provide extra crawlification and protection for these children. To the visits and the compelling stories that we heard from the young people and even the terminology guardian, I think that it is highly appropriate, so I am very supportive. Thank you very much. I am not obliged to come in and just say it, but you may come in, Christian. I am mindful of the time that you see. You are all, yes. Thank you, convener. Just to disagree with some of my members regarding the following amendments. I am quite happy to vote for Christina McKelvie's amendment, but the subsequent amendment, I am not so sure. I think we will see it a lot better in the strategy than to be on the face of the bill. Let's not forget that all this act of trafficking could change over the time, so it is very, very important that we keep that flexibility for having that in the strategy as opposed to being on the face of the bill. Let's see what the cabinet secretary has to say. Cabinet secretary. Thank you, convener. The provision of child guardians has been an issue raised throughout stage 1 of this bill. We have reflected on various points raised and have continued to work with stakeholders on this issue. We are therefore happy to support Christina McKelvie's amendment 12 as providing appropriate statutory provision in this area. Some details are to be left for ministers to make in regulations such as the specific functions of the guardian and the particular circumstances in which the guardian's appointment can end or continue beyond the age of 18. I think that appropriate ministers can take forward this detail and we will continue to work with stakeholders as we develop these regulations. I have considered the amendments 12A, 12F and 12G and 12I in the name of Alison McInnes. Those amendments seek to widen the duty to determine eligibility for and refer a child to the person appointed in the guardian as required by amendment 12. The effect would be to extend this duty to organisations other than local authorities. On balance, we consider that it should remain as the local authority who are charged with this duty. The reason for this is that although there would be other first responders or bodies, for instance the NHS or the police who first came into contact with our trafficked child, it would be the most appropriate for a local authority to make the determination of eligibility for and refer to a guardian service. That reflects the existing approach in which first responders would contact a social worker in the first instance once a vulnerable child presents to them. It also recognises the expertise of social workers in supporting and assessing the needs of vulnerable children and seeks to achieve consistency of approach in terms of eligibility and referral. I have also considered the amendments 12B and 12D in the name of Alison McInnes and 12C and 12E in the name of Jenny Marra. I am grateful to both of them for bringing forward those amendments. We believe that the Government has reflected on the common issues that are raised by those amendments, which is about widening the criteria for children who are to be appointed a guardian to those who are at risk of becoming a victim of trafficking, as well as those who may reasonably be believed to have been trafficked. The Scottish Government notes the intentions behind those amendments, as that may substantially broaden the scope of eligibility and the number of children whom we require to be appointed with a guardian. We believe that there is further work to be done on that matter. Therefore, we would like to continue to work with stakeholders on this issue to get a better understanding of whether those children's needs would be best met through this bill or through another mechanism. Accordingly, we would urge members not to press those amendments at this particular stage. Ahead of stage 3, we would be happy to work with members to explore those issues further, with a view to finding an appropriate response and considering whether further amendment is required at stage 3. Amendment 12h would require regulations to be made under amendment 12 subsection 7. The Scottish ministers would fully intend to exercise their power under this section to make those regulations. The preference in legislation is to use the word me in relation to the regulation making power, because the exercise of the power is ultimately and properly a matter for the Scottish Parliament. Using the word must would not necessarily ensure that any order that ministers made would become law. It would be for Parliament to decide whether to pass any second legislation that the Government has made. Accordingly, I consider that amendment 12 is unnecessary. As I have already said, we will continue to work with stakeholders on the development of those regulations. In conclusion, convener, I fully support amendment 12, which will help to provide a consistent service to unaccompanied children who appear to have been trafficked, recognising the very complex and specific needs of those children with the intended effect of improving the vulnerable group's outcomes. I do not support the other amendments that would ask the members to withdraw them at this stage with the view to consider those matters further, prior to stage 3 and possible further amendments at the stage 3 process. Thank you very much, convener. I thank the cabinet secretary because I know that it has been a lot of work and a lot of thoughtful work to consider the issue of legal guardians. I am very much welcome and I am sure that all the organisations involved will welcome that support. Just very quickly on the other amendments, I recognise that the cabinet secretary has seen work to be done further at stage 3, and I would urge him to do that. I would urge him to look at some of the case studies that are provided by the Scottish Refugee Council on young unaccompanied asylum seekers. You will find that many of them have indeed been trafficked, so that might be a starting point for some of the work that we do going forward to stage 3. I am pleased to wind up an amendment 12A in press or withdrawal. Thank you. On amendment 12A, I hear what the cabinet secretary says, but I think that there is some benefit in other authorities being able to respond and refer to the guardianship service, and I would press 12A. The question is that amendment 12A be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Pardon? We are not agreed, but there will be a division. Those for, please show. Those against, please show. For five against four, that amendment is agreed. Call amendment 12A, in the name of Alice McInnes, or ready to debate with amendment 12A, move or not move, Alice McInnes. I welcome the fact that it is sympathetic to the intentions of 12B, but it thinks that there is further work to be done, and I will not press this at the moment in the hope that we can discuss this matter if it is not moved at the moment. Of course. I hear you. I call amendment 12C, in the name of Jenny Marra, or ready to debate with amendment 12A, move or not move, Jenny? I am not moving. TwoД. Call amendment 12D, in the name of Alice McInnes, ready to debate with amendment 12A, move or not move. I am not moving. Call amendment 12F, in the name of Alice McInnes, ready to debate with amendment 12A, move or not move, Alice McInnes. I am moving 12F. The question is, that ddifusio ru'n glyffswyl ein chyfnodol hwn ac mae'r ddysgol wlad iawn. Mae'r ddawn hyn yn ei chyfnodol, mae'r gwaith cy deployment hwn, mae'r ddysgol i gŵr, mae'r ddysgol i gŵr, mae'r bírful ffordd ei gŵr i gŵr o neiddiad. Rwy'n ddysgol ëThe Name of Jenny Marrow-Ladeyweight, ddysgol ëMove or not movedí. Rwy'n ddysgol ëIí, rydw i ddysgol zwef oedd yn ddysgol The questions amendment 12 will be agreed to, Arwe agreed? There'll be a division those for please show, those against please show. There's five, four, four, against that amendment is agreed. Christina McKelvie to press with draw amendment 12. The question is amendment 12 be agreed to, are we all agreed? Ysbytfysgwr a'r newid wedi cael ei fath o rywbeth o bwysigol yn byw mwy o unrhyw. Rwy'n ddif Style犯wm yn cael ei fath o leolai dwg y lawr, neurid y Prifysgwr yn y bwysigol i'r ddiwedd ar gyfer yr oeddfawr ac yn gafodd i'r argyffredinol sydd yn bwysigol o'r adwynt i'r perffasio ac i gyddoi'r gwahanol dwi gilydd maen nhw yn dod cael ei fath o greu of-trefwng a chaelio hynny a chaelio yn ceisio, a chaelio yn ceisio. Diolch i weithio 32 o'r newid yn dweud o fewn cyhoedd, clodd wrth ddechrau i'r bubl yn ddechrau'r llun o'r llewenol 18. The presumption would be made for the purposes of a series of supports and assistance functions under specified children's legislation, including the duty to provide accommodation under the Children's Scotland Act 1995 and the duties to provide a named person service and child's plan under the Children and Young Peoples Act 2014. The operation of the assumption will mean that support and assistance under these functions would require to be provided to victims whose age was uncertain but only where, despite the uncertainty as to their precise age, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the victim is under 18. The presumption is to be made for this purpose until such times as an age assessment has been carried out by a local authority to verify their age or their age has been determined by some other means. Although this duty would apply only to local authorities and health boards in the first instance, subsection 5 provides ministers with a regulation making power to apply the duty in respect of other authorities and other support functions should the need for such provision become evident through practical experience. In amendment 34, if amendment 34 is accepted, that power would be subject to affirmative procedure. We think that the flexibility of a power is necessary to identify the appropriate forms of child support going forward. Clearly, we want the best outcomes for all children who are victims of human trafficking. Amendment 29 will ensure that child victims are provided with age-appropriate support and services that will meet their individual needs and help to keep them safe from harm. That is in line with their getting it right for every child approach and child protection framework. Ultimately, this amendment aims to increase the support and protection available to the most vulnerable groups of children. I am further satisfied that the requirement for the relevant authority to have reasonable grounds to believe that a person under 18 will allow those authorities to exercise their judgment appropriately in order to reject any fraudulent claims in respect of a person's age. I move amendment 28-29 and ask the committee to support it. Turning now to amendment 29A, this seeks to list the chief constable of Police Scotland, the Crown Office and Procurator of Fiscal Service and the UK Visa and Immigration Authority to the duty to make them the assumption that would apply for them. As I have mentioned already, however, the assumption is relevant only for the purposes of a series of support and assistance functions under specified children's legislation. The authorities mentioned in amendment 29 have no function under that legislation, and so amendment 29, if agreed to, would likely cause confusion, but ultimately have no practical effect. There are technical issues, too, with the reference to the Crown Office and the Procurator of Fiscal Service and the UK VI, since neither of those are legal persons. That said, I understand the concerns behind amendment 29, which is to ensure that the list of relevant authorities to whom the presumption applies is not drawn too narrowly. Given local authorities and health boards' primary role in child protection, it means that conferring the duty on them is a more effective approach. We are alive to that issue, but we consider that the best response to ensure appropriate flexibility is the regulation making power in subsection 4 and 5 of amendment 29, which will allow Scottish ministers to apply the duty in respect of their other authorities and other support functions, should that be deemed necessary at some point in the future. For those reasons, I would ask the committee to reject amendment 29A and I move amendment 29A. The committee heard the absence of a presumption of age clause could compromise the ability of every child to access appropriate services, and I welcome the fact that the cabinet secretary has listened to the concerns of the committee and the witnesses and the Lord Advocate and opted to introduce a presumption of age clause. My amendment 29A is similar to the amendment 12 that I thought was similar to amendment 12, which is why the list of relevant authorities who may have reasonable grounds to consider a victim of human trafficking is a child that is limited to health boards and local authorities. The minister has made his case well and I accept the points that he has made, and I will not move amendment 29A. Do you have to move it and then withdraw it? I think that that is what you have to do so that the options are left open. You have moved it. Thank you very much. Any other members? No. Cabinet secretary, wind up on amendment 29. Nothing for her to add. Alison, to withdraw amendment 29A. I withdraw. Thank you very much. She seeks leave to withdraw. Have you agreed? I have agreed. You have agreed. Thank you very much. The question is that amendment 29 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? I call amendment 45 in the name of Jane Baxter, a group with amendments 46, 57, 58, 47 and 59. Jane pleased to move amendment 45 and speak to the other amendments in the group. Amendment 45 is intended to clarify what the cabinet secretary referred to in his previous evidence as provision here in Scotland under various bits of child protection legislation, and he said that the legislation provided a range of protections. Amendment 45 sets out in a bit more detail what guidance will be issued. We are 46 and 47 to say how that will be monitored and reported. I think that monitoring and reporting is very important if we are going to understand and make improvements to the system and the services that are available to child victims of trafficking. I move amendment 45. Christina McKelvie pleased to speak to amendment 57 and other amendments in the group. Thank you very much, convener. On amendment 57, the amendment proposed would require Scottish ministers to prepare an annual report on the support and assistance that they have put in place for child victims of human trafficking. One of the issues that have arose over the number of years that many of us have been involved is that they have proper empirical evidence of what happened where and when. The details to be provided would include the number of children who receive support and assistance, the tighten levels of support and assistance, the number of child victims who require a child's plan under part 5 of the children and young people's Scotland Act 2014, the number of children victims who received support and assistance under section 22 of the Children's Scotland Act 1995, the number of children victims who were accommodated under section 25 of the Scotland Act 1995, and the number of child victims who received support and assistance under section 29 of the Children's Scotland Act 1995. In Scotland, a child depending on legal context can be defined as someone who is under the age of 16 rather than under the age of 18, and I welcome the previous amendments that clarified some of that. Therefore, a child at 16 can be treated as an adult. At 16-year-old can be prosecuted within the adult criminal justice system rather than a children's hearing system, or can leave home without permission of parents. Although local authorities are obligated under the 1995 act to provide support to children who are in need of protection up to the age of 18, in practice, the nature of the support can look very different depending on if a child is over or under 16. The existing legislation, mainly 1995, 2011 and 2014 acts, and the national child protection guidance allows for the provision of good practice to meet obligations. However, it is not necessarily clear for trafficked children, especially those who are 16 and 17 years old, and the evidence suggests that it is not working consistently across the country to protect child trafficking victims and approach their risks and needs the same as other abused children, even though the needs of trafficked victims do not differ significantly from other exploited children. The amendment by introducing direct report or by ministers on the support and provision given to child victims of human trafficking would allow the Scottish Parliament to monitor the protection afforded to child victims of trafficking and ensure that it is consistent across Scotland. On amendment 58, the policy memorandum accompanying the human trafficking exploitation Scotland Bill states that the existing children's legislation provides for services to be provided to potentially trafficked children. That applies to children under the age of 18. It is therefore a priority to ensure that existing legislation, with reference to children, including elements of the Children and Young People's Scotland Act 2014, when commenced, is applied appropriately. However, that is a matter for the effect of engagement in good practice, rather than further legislation. However, the committee has heard a number of child protection professionals in agencies such as Bermudel Scotland and the Aberlawer Trust argue that there should be an explicit link between the bill and existing statutory provisions through which children will, according to the policy memorandum, be able to access support and assistance. The amendment provides an example of how that could be achieved by explicitly linking the bill to the children's plan provisions in the Children and Young People's Scotland Act 2014 and ensuring that all trafficked children will have a child's plan in place. That is intended as a probing amendment. I hope that I am probing deep enough, so I would like to use it as an opportunity to hear from the minister on how the Scottish Government will ensure that children who are trafficked will have their needs met with regard to accommodation, day-to-day living, medical advice and treatment, including psychological assessment and treatment, language translation and interpretation, legal advice and information about other services available to the child and repatriation, if required. If I receive sufficient assurances on those points, I would be happy not to move the amendment. However, I hope that the fact that the amendment has been lodged and considered at stage 2 will ensure that the underlying issues will be addressed in the strategy in due course. I am moving very briefly to amendment 59. The amendment would require the Scottish ministers to include details in their trafficking and exploitation strategy of the aftercare support, which is available to child victims of trafficking. I move the amendment to my name. Sorry, you wanted? I move the amendment. No, you do not need to. You are just speaking to it. Any of the others want to come in just now? Right, Cabinet Secretary, have you been sufficiently probed? Time will tell. Amendment 45 in the name of James Baxter would require the publication of statutory guidance setting out the type of support and assistance that may be available to child victims of trafficking. Amendment 47 is related and requires section 31 on the trafficking and exploitation strategy to be amended to reference amendment 45. Amendment 58, in the name of Christina McKelvie, seeks to amend the Children and Young People Scotland Act 2014 to expressly specify that child victims of trafficking are eligible for a children's plan. It also seeks to specify the type of support that trafficked children may expect within their plan. I understand the intention behind those amendments to provide clarity around the services that may be provided to trafficked children. I also acknowledge the concerns that were raised at stage 1 about the inconsistency of service provision across Scotland. However, I believe that a legislative solution is unwarranted. That is not a legislative issue, it is an operational issue about local authorities fulfilling their existing statutory obligations to vulnerable children. I would like to reiterate that the necessary support for children is already enshrined in legislation, which provides for all vulnerable children. The Children's Act 1995 and the Children and Young People Act 2014. I believe that we can ensure that the existing legislative requirements are applied appropriately through effective engagement with our partners and the development of a good practice. The human trafficking and exploitation strategy, which is statutory and provided for section 31 of the bill, will be developed with our statutory and non-statutory partners. That will set out the assistance and support required for child victims of trafficking. Further, we do not believe that there is a need for additional statutory guidance to that currently being developed for the implementation of the Children and Young People Act. That guidance will provide a framework within which each individual child victim of trafficking will be provided with support and assistance to meet their specific wellbeing needs. Given that the majority, if not all, trafficked children will have experienced trauma and are likely to have multiple and complex needs, we would expect all trafficked children to have a children's plan under the Children and Young People Act. We do not believe that it is necessary to legislate in this bill to require all such children to have a plan, and that will flow from the provisions as set out in the 2014 act. Let me add that we also do not want to be prescriptive about what a targeted intervention in a children's plan might look like. There is a concern that amendment 58, although undoubtedly well-intentioned, could undermine Scotland's holistic approach to addressing the wellbeing needs of a child victim by suggesting a list of interventions and supports rather than being child-centred. I move on to amendment 46 and 57, in the names of Jane Baxter and Christina McKelvie. The effect of those amendments would be to produce an annual or biannual report setting out the support and assistance provided to child victims of human trafficking under certain provisions of the 1995 and the 2014 acts. We believe that it is by working collaboratively with their local authority partners that we will effect change rather than require them to collect and publish additional and unnecessary information. Further, when part 3 of the Children and Young People's Act is commenced, there will be a requirement on local authorities and health boards to publish a children's services plan for each three-year period. There will also be a specific requirement for a report to be published each year on compliance with the plan. We believe that services for child victims of trafficking will fall within the scope of those plans and reports and that, to add another reporting requirement, risks unnecessary duplication. Amendment 59, in the name of Christina McKelvie, also aims to amend section 31 on the strategy in order to reference section 25 and 29 of the 1995 act section 313C. The bill requires that the strategy makes reference to the support and assistance available to adults and children who are or appear to be victims of trafficking. It references support under the bill and support otherwise available to make the point that there is no inference that the support included in the strategy is only to be the new types of support under the bill. Additionally, specific reference to support under other statutes does not fit with that drafting approach and may have the unintended consequence of limiting the consideration of additional support by narrowly focusing on section 25 and 29 to the exclusion of other statutory provisions that may be relevant. There has been much discussion about support and assistance for child victims of human trafficking. We all agree that those vulnerable children must receive the necessary support and assistance to enable them to recover from the trauma of their experience. However, let me reiterate that our view remains that the issue of support and assistance to child victims of human trafficking would be best addressed within the human trafficking and exploitation strategy. Developing the strategy will provide us with the opportunity to engage actively with our partners across a range of sectors to address the issues raised in those amendments. I do not support any of the amendments that it stated in this particular group, and I would invite the committee to reject those amendments at this stage. I am not going to say very much in my winding up, other than that it is important enough to have these things in the face of the bill. The question is that amendment 45 be agreed to, are we all agreed? We are not agreed that there will be a division. Those in favour please show, those against please show, for 4, 5 against that amendment is not agreed. That was number 45, was not it? Call amendment 46, and the name of Jane Backs already agreed to amendment 45, move or not move. You are moving it. The question is amendment 46, we agree to, are we all agreed? There will be a division. Those in favour please show, those against please show, for 4, 5 against that amendment is not agreed. Call amendment 57, the name of Christina McKelvie already agreed to amendment 45, to move or not move. Not move, given the cabinet secretary's comments. The probing was worthwhile. Call amendment 48, the name of Christina McKelvie already agreed to amendment… I am meeting 58 and the same 57, it is just a long morning. Call amendment 58, the name of Christina McKelvie already agreed to amendment 45, move or not move. Not moved. Not moved. Call amendment 5, and the name of Rhoda Grant already agreed to amendment 1, move or not moved. The question is that sections 9 and 10 be agreed to, are we all agreed? Call amendment 6, the name of Rhoda Grant already agreed to amendment 1, move or not move. The question is that sections 11 be agreed to, are we all agreed? Call amendment 7, the name of Rhoda Grant already agreed to amendment 1, move or not move. The question is that sections 12 be agreed to, are we all agreed? Questions at sections 13 to 30 be agreed to, are we all agreed? 6. Thank you for participating in our debate. 59, The Name of Christina McKelvie, ayud wrth amendment 45, move or not move. Not moved. 8, A Rhoda Grant, 190. The questions at section 31 would be agreed to or agreed. 60, The Name of Alice McKinnison, a group in its own. Alice will be pleased to move on and speak to amendment 60. Thank you, convener, I move amendment 60. 31 of the bill states that ministers must prepare a trafficking and exploitation strategy. Amendment 60, in my name, would require the Scottish Government to publish this within one year of the main parts of the bill coming into force. At present, the publication date isn't defined in section 31 or 32. The latter simply states that the strategy must be reviewed or reported upon at least every three years after its initial publication. This strategy was, of course, a key part of Jenny Marra MSP's proposal for a member's bill. In our stage 1 report, we sought clarification on the timetable for the publication of the first strategy. In his response, the cabinet secretary indicated that his officials have been taking forward dialogue, noting that the aim is to have the first strategy available for formal consultation shortly after legislation is in place. The fact that the work is already under way to prepare the strategy is welcome. In this context, I see no reason why the Scottish Government shouldn't be compelled to introduce the strategy within a year of the implementations of part 1 and 2 of the bill to provide greater certainty for Parliament and for those who are tasked with providing support services to victims and those who represent them. Thank you, Alison. Anyone else wishing to come in? The cabinet secretary has already moved it. No, I was paying attention that time, yes. Other members are at my discretion and there is none, so it is your cabinet secretary. Thank you, convener. Alison MacKinnon's amendment would place a requirement on Scottish ministers to publish a strategy within one year of both part 1 and part 2 of the bill coming into force. In general terms, I am happy to commit to publishing a strategy within a suitable timeframe after the commencement of certain key provisions in the bill. I am also happy to agree that one year would be an appropriate timeframe. My concern is that linking that to the full commencement of all of part 1 and part 2 might delay the publication of the strategy. For example, we have had discussions today regarding the statutory defence, where a significant policy like that would be added to part 1 or part 2, either at this stage or stage 3. It could be reasonable to expect that significant further work and discussion with relevant stakeholders would be required before the relevant provisions could be commenced. In those circumstances, the amendment could ultimately require ministers to delay publication of the strategy, which is not what the amendment seeks to achieve. The Scottish Government's aim is to have a first strategy available for formal consultation soon after the bill is passed, if approved by Parliament. Exact timings, of course, will depend on progress of the bill. While I am sympathetic to the aims behind the amendment and the Scottish Government is committed to taking forward work on the strategy, as expeditiously as possible, there is a risk that the amendment could undermine progress in the area. Therefore, I would ask if the member would withdraw the amendment at this stage and I would give an undertaking that we will work with her to bring forward an alternative amendment at stage 3, which would clearly meet the member's aims. Does that delta body blow to your amendment, Alison? Absolutely. I thank the cabinet secretary for his comments and indeed for the commitment that he has made this morning. That is very welcome. The last thing that I would want is any unintended consequences. We would not want to delay the bill, so I am happy to withdraw them. I am happy to withdraw them. The question is that section 32 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? The question is that section 33 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Call of amendment 9, the name of Rhoda Grant already debated. Amendment 1, move or not move. Call of amendment 31, the name of the cabinet secretary group with amendment 61. Cabinet secretary, please to move amendment 31, speak to the amendments in this group. Amendment 31 performs two primary functions. The first is to place a duty on the police service to transmit a notification that it receives under section 341 to a specified person. The second is to give the Scottish ministers the power to specify regulations to whom those notifications must be given. Amendment 31 has been drafted in a similar way to the approach taken at section 342 of the bill, which makes it clear that information should not be provided that either identifies a person or enables them to be identified without their consent. It is worth bearing in mind that there are very significant challenges in establishing credible information about levels of human trafficking and numbers of victims. The original policy intent under pinning section 34 of the bill was to allow for the collision and processing of wider information about trafficking activity in Scotland, not currently collected through the national referral mechanism or criminal justice processes, ultimately providing a more accurate picture of the scale and scope of trafficking and a clearer basis for the requirement and provisions of support services for victims. We were mindful of the concerns raised by the Law Society of Scotland and Information Commissioner's Office when we drafted our amendment to section 34 of the bill. It may be helpful to provide a quick recap on the information commissioner's office's concerns. The ICO was concerned that victims of trafficking may be incapable of giving consent due to their vulnerability. In particular, stakeholders note that victims may have little understanding of English or of the Scottish legal system. While it is true that many victims will be in that position, we do not consider that all victims of trafficking will be incapable of giving consent. Victims from within the UK, for example, may understand well what has been asked of them. The public authorities who will work under this duty must assess whether a victim is capable of consenting to the inclusion of identifying information. We think that it is right that victims should be empowered to give that consent if capable. We are grateful to the offer from the Information Commissioner's Office to work with us in the drafting of any regulations made under the bill to ensure that specific individuals cannot be identified for what may be unique circumstances. I can confirm that my officials have been in touch with the ICO when we will be in touch with the ICO when drafting regulations and developing guidance will set out the notification arrangements and procedures that will apply. I should also add that my officials will continue to liaise with Police Scotland, who were comfortable with the way that amendment 31 had been drawn and other stakeholders when developing guidance and regulations. I am sympathetic to amendment 61 in the name of Alison McInnes. In my view, amendment 31 could help with the smooth and proper disclosure of information by Scottish public authorities. The impact of amendment 31, if accepted, would mean that the proposed change to section 34 by Alison McInnes would not be applied in respect of the duty on Police Scotland to pass information to other authorities. That is something that we would have to consider in framing the perimeters of the regulation-making powers. As I alluded to earlier, my officials will be meeting with stakeholders ahead of stage 3 to consider the formulation of regulations made under section 34 of the bill and development of guidance that would set out notification arrangements and procedures with a view to considering whether any amendments would be required at stage 3. I give members an assurance that the data protection, disclosure of information, confidentiality and consent issues will all be at the heart of our approach as we develop regulations, guidance and, if appropriate, amendments to the bill in this area. I therefore invite the committee to support amendment 31 and invite the member to withdraw amendment 61 on the basis that it takes no account of the regulation-making power in subsection 4 introduced by amendment 31 and on understanding that we will commit to reflect further on those issues before stage 3. Finally, I would be happy to engage further with Alison McInnes on this important issue prior to stage 3 to update the member on progress that is being made. The intention of amendment 61 was to ensure that the duty to notify and provide the chief constable with information about victims, as out in section 34 of the bill, does not have the effect of disciplining the data protection act. The amendment is backed by the Law Society of Scotland. The cabinet secretary stated in his response to the committee concerns about this that subsection 34.2 makes it clear that there is no disapplication of data protection laws, but I do not believe that it provides the level of clarity that he suggests. Members will recall that 34.2 provides that notification must not include information that identifies the adult or enables the adult to be identified. This is virtually identical to section 52 of the modern slavery act, but the UK Parliament did not deem further clarification unnecessary or surplus to requirements. It approved further provisions, which are virtually identical to amendment 61, ensuring that the data protection act is upheld. As the cabinet secretary has said, the information commissioner's office has also queried why the subsection currently includes provision that an adult victim might consent. In light of the offer of engagement, as we go forward to stage 3, I am happy to not press the amendment when we come to it. The question is that amendment 31 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Ames yn ymwyaf. I'm not moved. 35 be agreed to. Are we all agreed? 32, in the name of the cabinet secretary, ready to debate with amendment 49 to move formally, please. The question is amendment 32, be agreed to. Are we all agreed? Ames yn ymwyaf. 33, in the name of the cabinet secretary, ready to debate with amendment 31 to move formally. Moved. Questions at amendment 33, to be agreed or are we all agreed? Questions at section 36 be agreed or are we all agreed? Call amendment 48. The name will be PLAYEN, Murray already debate with amendment 43, move or not move? Call amendment 34 on the name of the cabinet secretary already debate with amendment 53 to move formally? Moved Questions at amendment 34, to be agreed or are we all agreed? Call amendment 10 in the name of Rhoda Grant already debate amendment 1, move or not moved? The question is at section 37 Adonis gyda Cymru. Daith y ddiogel i'r cwestiynau, fel y pryd yn Daniel Johnson, a dwi'n tirhwch ei fawr i ddawadur, pan wnaethm iawn eu cyfnodau y penderfyniad amserai, mae'n ddawadau i ddawadau i ddawadau, a'r troi'r ddawadau i ddawadau, maes unig iawn i'r ddawadau. wrth i'r diogel, wrth i ddawadau i ddawadau, mae'n ddawadau i ddawadau i ddawadau, a'r ddawadau That is a group of minor and technical amendments, which I will explain briefly. Amendment 35 makes a consequential change to section 271 of the Criminal Procedures Scotland Act 1995 to ensure that victims of the new traffic offence are treated as vulnerable witnesses during criminal proceedings and entitled to the special measures available to such witnesses. Felly 4, 5, mewn ffordd yn eixamol i fynd i ddweud iawn i gynddeithasolol unigol, iddyn ni fyddwn ni wedi meddwl i'r ffordd yn ein gyd, gyda'r cyfnodau ffyrdd yn y rhan fuddurisio, a fyddwn ni wedi'u meddwl i ddweud iawn i gyd, fel yr Sfadd yn trebyg i ddweud iawn i fynd i adleugio. Felly 4, 5, mewn ffordd yn eixamol i wneud chredeithawn i fynd i fynd i gyd. The bill, as introduced already, repeals the offence of trafficking in section 4, but section 5 can also be repealed since it contains only provisions, which is supplementary to section 4. Finally, amendment 39 is a minor technical revision, ensuring that commencement regulations made under section 41 have the usual power to specify different commencement dates for different purposes. I move amendment 35. Thank you very much, cabinet secretary. It must have been a long morning. The children are already packing their school bags and the bell hasn't rung. I take no member wishes to say anything now. You won't want to wind up either. The question is that amendment 35 be agreed to, are we all agreed? Amendment 11, in the name of Rhoda Grant, already agreed with amendment 1. Rhoda, move or not, move. Amendment 36, 37 and 38, all in the name of the cabinet secretary and all previous invading, invite the cabinet secretary to move 36 to 38 on block. Does any member object to a single question? The question is that amendments 36 to 38 agreed, are we all agreed? The next question is that the pledge will be agreed to, are we all agreed? sections 40 be agreed to, are we all agreed? I called 39 and the cabinet secretary is already debated on amendment 35, the cabinet secretary moved formally. dinner is achieved. I can hear you over the russle of the papers.aching 45 cm taken, are we all agreed? section 41 agreed to, are we all agreed? phanwys yn Ddesbill a'r hyn yn ei wneud i'r hynny'r instrument. A rwy'n cael ei wneud i'r gweithio'r gweithio, rwy'n cael ei wneud i'r gweithio'r gweithio.