 Stu Eisenstadt, thank you for being with us. You're a former ambassador to the US ambassador to the European Union. Also a big figure way back in the Carter administration and so on. But I want to talk to you about the Middle East. What is your view of the role that Iran is playing? And secondly, what will be the impact of Trump's decision not to certify the Iran nuclear deal? So the Iranian position in the Middle East is almost entirely disruptive and negative. They're funding Hezbollah. They're supplying Hezbollah with 100,000 increasingly precise missiles aimed at Israel. They're supporting Hamas. They have nuclear ambitions and they're increasing their medium range missiles. It's a very, very negative view and they are intruding themselves through the Revolutionary Guard and the Al-Quds force in Syria. But does this mean that the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal, was a bad deal? Absolutely not. I, for six years, have chaired the Iran-Tas force of the Atlantic Council of think tank in Washington. I've met three times with Zareed. It's not a perfect agreement. But for 10 years, it basically disables their nuclear capabilities. It ends their heavy water facility at Iran. It cuts by two-thirds their centrifuges. It reduces the amount of highly enriched uranium. And it provides through the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 24-7 intrusive inspections. Now, there are no other options, military or otherwise, that could achieve that. Now, having said that, there are deficiencies. The deficiencies are there's a sunset clause. What happens at the end? They can restore that. But we shouldn't, as we would say in the States, throw the baby out with the bathwater. The president's decision to decertify was not based on the fact that they had failed to comply with the terms of their agreement because they have. The IAEA has eight times said that. And the US has never disagreed, including now. What he said is that it was against the national security of the United States and affect the balance of sanctioned relief against benefits. But he's put himself into a box. And the box is that he set conditions like either renegotiate the existing agreement, which none of the P5 plus 1, except the US, want to do. Or outside of the agreement have a supplemental agreement that has a permanent ban on their nuclear weaponry and on their missiles. That won't happen in the short term. So why do you think he did it? He really wants to withdraw from the agreement. And what's going to happen on January 12th is a critical date, because that's when the six-month rolling period of waving sanctions against not just Iran, but against the European Union, China, any other companies doing business with Iran will expire. If he doesn't wave those sanctions again, an absent major progress, which is unlikely between now and then on these outstanding issues, he will have boxed himself in. And if he reimposes sanctions on it, he's putting himself in a situation of dividing the very allies in the European Union who brought Iran to the negotiating table to begin with when they stood shoulder to shoulder with us on sanction. Stu, as I start, it's a very sobering, I suspect, correct assessment. Thank you very much. My pleasure.