 Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon and welcome to the Lowy Institute for International Policy. I'm Michael Fully Love, the Institute's Executive Director, and it's my great honour today to be conducting a conversation with Malcolm Fraser. Mr Fraser was Australia's 22nd Prime Minister, residing in the lodge from 1975 until 1983, and when he retired from the Federal Parliament, he'd served as the member for one and for 28 years. Prior to that, he served as minister in the Holt, Gorton and McMahon governments. In office, Prime Minister Fraser opposed apartheid, campaigned against white minority rule in South Africa, supported multiculturalism. On the other hand, he was, I think it's fair to say, generally seen as a hawk on international affairs. His support for multiculturalism was evidenced by the establishment of the government-funded radio and television network, the special broadcasting service. And here, actually, my family has a connection with you, Malcolm, because my late father, Eric Fully Love, was one of the first creative consultants that was hired under Bruce Gingel to establish SPS and to send him to training. Thank you very much. We think so. Since leaving office, Mr Fraser has continued to play a role in international policy. He was, for example, co-chairman of the Commonwealth Committee of Eminent Persons in 1986 on South Africa. He served as chairman of Care Australia, president of Care International. He was a board member of ICG, and he's held various other important international posts. He is also, as many people here know, a keen exponent of Twitter. In fact, I asked Mr Fraser today how many followers he had on Twitter, and he said, oh, I'm not sure, about 32,000. So I think he follows it pretty closely, which is fair enough. We all follow our follower numbers closely. I asked him how he got on to Twitter, and he said, oh, well, it was serving my interest better than Facebook. So I gather he was on Facebook, and his family said, look, why don't you get out of the way off Facebook and get on Twitter? And his Twitter feed makes for extremely interesting reading. He curates a lot of very interesting articles and flicks them on to the rest of us. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr Fraser is here today, of course, because he's published this book, Dangerous Allies, which is a provocative look at Australia's role in the world, and in particular, the U.S. Alliance. Well, it can be factual and provocative. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Malcolm Fraser. I'm going to ask Malcolm questions, I guess, for about 20 minutes or half an hour, and then I'll go to the audience. So please have a think about questions you'd like to ask. I want to ask you a lot of questions about the United States, about Japan, about China, but I'm going to start with a general question, if I can, Malcolm. You're a former Liberal Prime Minister, but you're no longer a member of the Liberal Party. And I think that when you left the Liberal Party, you said something like, the party was no longer a Liberal Party, but a conservative party. I think if I'm not misquoting you that you make the argument that the political scene has changed, you haven't changed your positions. Is that, well, first of all, is that a correct characterization of your view? And if it is, is it really true that you haven't moderated at all since you were in politics? In terms of policy in relation to Australia, how Australia should operate, multicultural society and open society and all of that, I don't think my views have changed. But when you're talking about Australia in the wider world, when the strategic context in which we must live and operate as a nation changes, it's very foolish not also to change and take account of those other major international changes. Now, one of the problems I've got and tried to bring out in the book is that while the strategic context has changed, our government and their opposition and the political class in Canberra behave as though it hasn't. So how have you changed then when it comes to Australia's role in the world? Because I think it's true to say that you were seen as a bit of a hawk on defence, on conscription, on Vietnam. How have you changed, do you think, in the last? Yes, I would have been regarded. I made a speech in 1976 in which I said that Russia or the Soviet Union wants peace. It should work for that and demonstrate that. And then they invaded Afghanistan a few years later. And this was at a time when some people in Europe were talking about they taunt and thought it was a reality. I thought that was always wishful thinking and I thought it was inaccurate. But, you know, Australia was a small country with few resources. The Cold War was on. The Soviet Union was real. At one point they had enabled flotilla that circumnavigated Australia. And I regarded, and many people regarded, the Soviet Union as outward thrusting, aggressive. And there were problems in our own part of the world. It wasn't just Europe, it wasn't just Czechoslovakia or Hungary. The independence of Malaysia was delayed 10 years because of a communist insurgency. Then there was the PKIQ in Indonesia. So it wasn't just a question of Soviet actions far from our shores. Some things were quite close. And in those circumstances I believe that the policy Australia had adopted from its very birth, not federation, going back to the colonies. Our strategic dependence on a major power was still a valid policy. But after 1990, I thought we could have become a little more independent. Instead we become ever more closely entangled in America's web, if you like. Well, let me come on to an America in a sec, but let me just follow up. Are you really saying that you believe the Soviet Union was of a greater direct threat to Australia during the Cold War than China might be in the future? Without any doubt whatsoever. The Soviet Union was an imperial power as Britain had been, France, the European powers generally, Japan had been an imperial power and also the United States. And the United States has now developed a new kind of imperialism. You know, you don't have bases, you just rotate through. The language has changed, but the policy is not. China has never, I think, been, I mean people can argue about Tibet, I know, and some of the provinces and the edges of China. But China has not been, through its very ancient history, an imperial power in the way those European states, Japan and America, have been imperial powers. I do not believe with sensible diplomacy on the part of other countries, Hugh White has suggested that America should share power over the Pacific and says we should persuade America to do so. Well, it would be wonderful if we could, but America doesn't make policy that way. They make policy amongst themselves and then they consult with alleged special friends. And that consultation is really no more than persuading special friends that what they have already decided is the right policy. In other words, we have no influence in that. Thank you. Well, let me ask you, on that subject of China, I showed you before a review that Hugh White had published in the American Review on your book and he says that you're too soft on China, which for Hugh is actually saying quite a lot. I take your point about China not having an imperial history, but when you think about Chinese behaviour in the last year, when you think about, for example, the unilateral declaration of an air defence identification zone. Have you looked at the air defence zones around the United States? You have? Yeah, it's not unusual for countries to have air defence identification zones. And they don't consult with others in relation to them. No, but you know that the unilateral declaration of that zone over those disputed waters with those very intense rivalries, you must think that was a provocative act by China? I also think, well, yes, if you like, I'll concede you that. But have you read the protocols relating to air defence zones? Tell me about them. Well, the civil aircraft have to declare America told its civilian aircraft to abide by the rules. Japan and Korea both said they were not going to abide by the rules and very quietly they were forced to reverse. America flew a bomber through, and I'll bet most of its electronics were turned off because they wouldn't have wanted to provoke something. But under the protocols, military aircraft do not have to give any notice. And so an air defence zone, what it means, I'm not too damn sure, but it doesn't inhibit military aircraft activity. But if you want provocation, when you have USS Washington at the station in the Japanese harbor, an Australian frigate is part of its escort service for four months of last year. And again, I think it will be this year. Stoogeing up and down the eastern South China Seas in sight of the Chinese mainland, is that a provocative act? When the Chinese have an equivalent aircraft carrier, which they may do unless they decide they can sync them too easily and they're not worth having. But if they could and sailed a carry up and down the east coast of the United States, America would go paranoid. They wouldn't know how to control it or handle it. But let me ask you this. I wasn't really just asking you about the air defence identification zone. Most experts who followed China, including you, would say that in the last year or two, there has been a significant uptick in Chinese assertiveness. You can talk about the air defence identification zone. And in Japan. I'll ask you about Japan in a sec. I could ask you about whether it's appropriate or why you think China chose to station a state-owned oil rig in the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam, for example. There's a lot of specific examples I could ask you about, but doesn't it really add up to a China that is changing and that a China that is becoming more assertive? And doesn't that contain some risks for Australia? I don't think it contains any risks for Australia. It might contain some risks for some of the countries on the periphery of China and what they think is theirs and what they think is not. But one of the problems with Americans, a lot of Europeans, very few are like Helmut Schmitt or Henry Kissinger and look at things from the perspective of history, tradition and culture. And China went through a period of maximum weakness around the time of the Boxer Rebellion and in the years before that and afterwards for reasons that we all know. And it was the unequal treaties then imposed on China by the European and Japanese and American powers at some point all going to be redressed. Well, most have been. The Sindaco Islands, as the Japanese called them, were taken from China in 1895 after a war with Japan. China and Japan incorporated by the act of the Japanese cabinet into Japan. Before that they were Chinese and this has been well reported in the New York Times. That of course has not been redressed. And before President Obama went to Japan last time he was saying he's got no position in relation to this but they shouldn't negotiate about it. Instead he gave a cast on guarantee that the nuclear defense guarantee will apply to those islands as well as to the mainland of Japan and the other islands. And I think that was a major mistake. He should have got Japan to accept that there is a dispute and accept that they should negotiate with China or subject to international arbitration. Now China might not accept it either of that. But at least it would have been a step in the right direction instead of a very significant step and from China's point of view a provocative step in the wrong direction. So Hugh White wrote in an article not so long ago that Chinese assertiveness could itself be the Chinese response to the American pivot. America is saying here we are, we're going to strengthen all our military, we're going to make you safe, you only have to rely on us. And Hugh was saying the China might well be just demonstrating to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines that America has some words of comfort but not much else. Now I don't know if that's right or if that's wrong but that was Hugh's view in that particular article. So let me come back to the pivot because I would take issue with the way you characterize it in your book but let me ask you about Japan. The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is in Australia at the moment. You've been critical of some aspects of the changing Japanese defence policy and the relationship I think between Australia and Japan. Let me ask you two questions. What did you think of his speech to the federal parliament yesterday? And secondly, why shouldn't Japan reinterpret its constitution so that it can act in collective self-defence? Well, it can act in its own self-defence, we know that. But it really means that Japan can also, if it wants to, send troops as allies of the United States to invade a country like Korea. The reinterpretation carries that connotation also and that is not collective self-defence. It's just an act of gross stupidity on America's part as it was on ours. The speech in the parliament, well, he's the second head of state, head of government who's made a speech that should have only been made from his own soil. The first was President Obama, when he made a speech that should only have been made from Australian, from American soil, or from soil which he thought, you know, there's a view in America that Australia is the best of allies because we'll do what America wants, when America wants it, and might even ask any questions. And that's pretty accurate. And the Obama speech in the parliament about the pivot was misguided and wrong. And when Abe... What sense, what did he say specifically that was misguided and wrong? Because it was a major announcement of American policy from Australian soil as though Australian soil was American soil. And, you know, if you can't understand that, well, then you can't understand what being Australian means. Well, I think I can understand what being Australian means. I would say to you that for decades, Australians have been... Australian leaders have been... I didn't finish the other part of your question. Well, what you've asked... Abe shouldn't have attacked China from Australian soil, and he did. How did he do that? Well, I haven't read the speech in full in detail. I've read the press reports of it, and he was criticising what he calls Chinese assertiveness and aggression. What about his nationalisation of the Sendaku Islands and cooperating them into Japan? What, 18 months ago? He knows quite well that China would regard that, and many others regard that as a totally aggressive act on the part of Japan. Let me ask you, because the United States is probably the preoccupation, I think it's fair to say, of the book. Let me... I told you I'd ask you some tough questions. Let me put one to you. I thought you were just being gentle. I haven't started yet. Let me put this to you. Your book, in its characterisation of the United States, feels very out of date. It feels like a book that should have been published in 2004, not in 2014. You talk a lot about the neo-conservatives, as though the neo-conservatives are running Washington these days, and we know they're not. We know that President Obama is not a muscular unilateralist. He's a cautious realist. In fact, there was a very funny article in The Washington Post yesterday by Dana Milbank, when he said, when it comes to imperial rulers, President Obama is more the Prince of Lichtenstein than he is Alexander the Great. Obama is much more, really, on the model, isn't he, of the sort of cautious realists that you like to cite. If anything, Obama is usually criticised for avoiding the use of force, not for using force. So it seems to me that a lot of the criticism of the United States is based on the United States of President George W. Bush, and I was the first to say at the time that the invasion of Iraq was wrong, but is it really right to, when we're trying to grapple with what the United States role in the world is now, as opposed to 10 or 15 years ago, is it right to dwell as much as you do on that period? I think the ideas of American exceptionalism have really spread and grown significantly since America has been the only superpower. When the Soviet Union existed, the two superpowers, in spite of being some quite sensitive moments, they acted as a restraint on each other. Now, since 1991, you had an America that has at times acted totally without restraint, and some would argue totally outside the law. I don't know if you've read the legal opinion which Obama used to justify drone killing of Americans in Yemen or in other places, but it's a very odd legal opinion and it's not quite as bad as Mr. Justice Yo about the definition of torture, but it would not be far behind. The question of legality in America, however, is a bit more important because people question it and ask for it and they force the publication of the documents. In Australia, there doesn't seem to be the same concern, we just let it go. All right, the Australians in Yemen, they were nasty people, they were in bad company, untrue, when somebody said so, it doesn't matter, they get killed, they're Australian. I think America, as the only superpower, wants to stay there, wants to... Hugh White says that they have got to give space to China. Now, if he says that, how is he going to achieve it? If he can't achieve it, he is really saying, I think, that a provocative Japan or maybe not a provocative Japan, if you like a provocative China, causes a conflict between China and Japan. From our point of view, it may not matter which one starts it, but America is then involved and Obama in his recent visit made that very clear. If America is involved, we have to be involved because we cannot say to the Chinese, with troops in Darwin, a powerful air ground task force, three service task force, which can demonstrate, use power anywhere throughout the region. We can't say, we're not complicit, we house the damn thing. Of course, we're complicit and we are also complicit in what Pan Gap has done, which has changed from being a largely defensive facility very useful, very successful in collecting information, but with changed weapons technology has really become an extraordinarily important offensive part of the American military machine. And not just for drones, for other strategic and tactical weapons of a very sophisticated China. And therefore, Pan Gap would be integral to any American conflict. In the North West Pacific. If that's there, all right, the law might say, Australian law, but it's a subterfuge, as you well know, that it's an Australian base, but it's not. It's got an American in charge of it, we've got somebody number two, and it serves American purposes. And so it's a American base. I don't know how the numbers fall out between Americans and Australians at the base, but both are there. We are complicit in what it does. And when targeting information goes back to America, and within not quite real time, but within an hour or not much more, the bomb goes off or a drone goes off and people are killed or some other thing is damaged. You know, in Australian Prime Minister says, look, this time we're going to be like Canada. We're not going to join the Americans, as we did in Vietnam. We're not going to join the Americans, as we did in Iraq. We're going to stand aside. China just would not believe it. So we are involved. We have constitutional capacity to say no, but no practical capacity to say no in an effective sense. And it is that which I object to more than anything else. Now, whether America is good or America is not so good, as an Australian, I don't want anyone else ever again to have the capacity to take Australia to war, as Britain could take us to war in the First World War, and indeed almost certainly in the Second World War. That is an abdication of Australian sovereignty. And if you want that to be returned to Australia and put under Australia's control, and that's the number of my book, which a lot of the commentators, and I think Hugh White, people haven't talked about this question. How can we establish the circumstances in which only the Australian government can take us to war on a decision that we make based on our interests, not because some other greater power goes to war and we have to follow. Canada has never put itself in that position. But why are you so sure that Australia could never make that decision? For example, if there had been a Labor government in office during the Iraq War, I'm not at all convinced that Australia would have participated in the Iraq War. They didn't have the Marines in Darwin. Well, that would make no difference to whether we're deployed to the Middle East. Well, in the Middle East, no. Look, but now we're not talking about the Middle East. No, but you're making big claims, Mr. Fraser. You're saying we've abdicated our sovereignty, Australians have no say over whether they go to war but I can imagine plenty of circumstances where Australia would say no. Things have changed since the Iraq War. The Marines are in Darwin. The American, unfortunately, is paying less attention to the Middle East and more to the Western Pacific. And if their diplomacy exercises the same skill in the Western Pacific as they have exercised in the Middle East, well, you might say, who's going to help us? It's not going to be America because they'll make a mess of it. And we're now talking about our part of the world. And the facilities, pie and gap, you can't say it doesn't exist. You can't say those troops in Darwin don't exist. Apparently, the Prime Minister, when he was in Washington, gave an indication that if you want to increase the number, you can send, what, another task force. We don't know. Maybe a year or two later, they'll take over Leverick, Barracks, or Townsville, or whatever. A war on the far side of the world is one thing. But a war in our part of the world, and especially one involving China, if it's China and America, there is only one thing for Australia to do in such a contest, and that's to stay out of it. Because if you want to take it further and speculate further, the American technical superiority over the Vietnamese was massive, just as great, if not greater, than the technical superiority over China. Now, if America couldn't beat Vietnam, do you think they can beat China? Not one hope in a thousand. And Hugh White has recognized that, that America may well not win such a war. And if America loses such a war, it would take 10 or 12 years because of the air-sea warfare concept, which I'm sure you studied in detail, all 600 pages of it, published in Washington. The, after 10, 12, 14 years, the Americans wouldn't get tired of it. They'd go back to the Western Hemisphere. Their trade, their commerce, their investment wouldn't be really greatly affected because these things do not need protection of war. But they would do military bases throughout countries in the Western Pacific. That would be the price of peace in those circumstances. Then Australia's left here as a defeated ally of a defeated superpower. I think that's rather an uncomfortable position to be in. And we'll put Australia in greater danger than we've ever been in our history, except before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and saved us. If you think, if the alliance is so dangerous to Australia, why do you think every year the Lowy Institute publishes its Lowy Institute poll? About 80% of Australians say it's either very important or somewhat important to our security. Of course they say it's important because the political leaders the Lowy Institute says it's important. And when there is no debate between the political parties... I wish we were that influential, but go on. When there is no debate between the political parties, Habit takes over. Again, Hugh White, you used him against me. I'm now using him and supporting me. He said, one of the things is Habit. We just go on. We don't recognize that the strategic context in which Australia operates has changed dramatically since the destruction of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the Soviet Union. And we have gone on as though the world is comfortable. The same policies will still suit us well. We vaguely think that because of the rise of China they might be danger, but that doesn't matter because America is there, the ANZUS Treaty is there. Let me interrupt. I think it's quite the opposite, isn't it? I mean, isn't it that in circumstances where Chinese behavior is changing much more quickly than most experts would have predicted when there is a real risk of or at least significant uncertainty about China's future role in the world, doesn't it make perfect sense to balance against, to hedge against the chance of Chinese recklessness in the future by keeping the United States engaged in our region, by balancing, by providing a counterweight to China? Doesn't that make perfect sense to Australia? What's the alternative to? You sound like a minister in the Menzies government arguing, arguing to, we've got to put people into Vietnam to keep America involved. No, I'm not arguing about putting people in Vietnam. I'm arguing about keeping the United States involved in this region. You've sounded that because Australia is a relatively small country. I mean, for people, resources still, we should be much larger than we are. But that's another question, another subject. The, do we really think we can influence America? America is a major superpower and will do what is in America's interests regardless of what Australia does. They will have their pivot whether we allow Darwin to be, continue to be their major base and whether we allow Panjab to continue to operate as it now is as an offensive weapon in their armory. Even without those things, America is not going to go away because they're on top of the greasy pole and they want to stay there. But relatively, their power, not even in their own absolute terms, but relatively to the rest of the world, their power is declining to an extent. It'll be slow and gradual. But a declining superpower through history has always been a little more dangerous than a rising power. And you are making assumptions about China which run against Chinese history, against Chinese tradition, which you do need to take into account if you want to make a valid judgment about what will put Australia at least at risk. And that's the kind of judgment that I've tried to make in the book and people can argue and disagree as you clearly do and most people in the establishment do was the conclusions. But what puts Australia least at risk? There's always a risk about the future. There's no cast iron guarantee. We thought the British Empire could save us and the British Empire couldn't save us because they'd run out of power and we should have recognized that long before we did. You think the United States saved us against the Japanese in the Second World War? Well, there's still the unanswered question. And I was speaking to a senior Japanese, I'm sorry, American officials. I'm not going to mention his name because you'd recognize it. But very well respected. Without Pearl Harbor, would America have come into the war? You know, when you think of it, Britain was fighting. No, no, no. It is a valid question because to leave Britain totally beleaguered, fighting alone for two and a half years against Nazi Germany, knowing what Germany was doing to the Jewish population right throughout the whole of Europe, created very real questions about America's future intentions. Now, of course, Roosevelt was trying to persuade Portugal, I'm trying to get America into the war. I'm trying to do it. I'm trying to do it. But after Pearl Harbor, America declared war on Japan. America never declared war on Germany. Germany declared war on America first. And so there is a valid question, what will America regard in its own best interests? We lost, Dick Wolcott might disagree with this, but I'm not sure. I think we lost a foreign minister when he said that ANZIS would apply to our troops fighting in Borneo. And I've read the transcript of the discussions which involved Menzies, McKeown, Harriman, a couple of other Americans, Barwick. And McKeown was the one who towards the end of the discussions pressed a hard question. The troops in Borneo were top grade Indianese in troops, but they were posing as irregular because it was not a war, it was confrontation. And our army, I was army minister at the time, our army regarded the top 300,000 Indonesians as good as any. They had about a million and a half in their army and tailed off after that, but the top 300,000 very good, very effective. And Harriman had said, of course, if there's an invasion of Australia, we'd be with you. But McKeown said, it's not the way it's going to be, is it? It'll be infiltration, the sort of thing that's happening in Borneo in these circumstances. And Harriman, well, Mr. McKeown, you've come to the nub of the issue. But I find in the time remaining, it would not be possible to find words that would give you a sufficiently accurate answer to be able to answer your question at all. Now, you can, if you like, say that that's the politest no you've ever heard in your life. And Barwick, three months later, wasn't foreign minister. But I know three times in my political lifetime, when America has chosen Indonesia over Australia, and there's no reason why they shouldn't continue to choose the largest Islamic country in the world over 23 million Australians, even in spite of Pongap and Barwick. I've had my go. I've asked some questions. I've got a few more. I might come back to them, but I also want to give the audience an opportunity. So can I ask who might be interested in asking Mr. Fraser a question? I'll ask this gentleman over here first. If you wait for the microphone and state your name and affiliation if there is one before you ask your question. Yeah, Mr. Fraser, my name is Paul Power, and I'm from the Refugee Council of Australia. And perhaps not surprisingly, I'm interested in your views on the implications for international affairs of current Australian policy in relation to refugees. And also, if you were advising the government, where you would suggest we take our policy in relation to refugees from here, particularly in relation to our partnerships or relationships in Southeast Asia and South Asia? Well, that's another question I'd sooner keep on the book. I'm not going to run away from it. There would be some dramatic changes in policy. We wouldn't practice piracy in the high seas and capture a boat in international waters and take everyone off it. There'd be many, many things that would be changed. If you want to see what the pattern of change might be, look to the way we handled very large exodus, very, very much larger than anything that's happened in recent times out of Indochina in the 70s and early 1980s. I mean, people were processed off shore because to try and stop boats coming through the Indonesian archipelago, which was dangerous, not only in unsea-worthy boats, but also from Indonesian parrots. So Malaysia was persuaded to allow a lot to be processed on Malaysian soil, but on condition that we were going to take very large numbers out of that center. And America and Canada also took very large numbers, so then Malaysia wasn't left with a problem that they would not be able to handle. They had initially started to push boats back out to sea we had to act quickly to try and stop that. But that will give you a pattern, but then you've got to take the issue way beyond our region because the numbers could get larger than we'd handle. So can America and Canada again be involved? Can New Zealand be more involved? We've been secretary on the Security Council. We could have tried to reinvigorate the world. We could have paid a bit more attention to the huge numbers hitting Greece, Italy, Spain, France. Anyway, I'd say anyone a different minister. I think I saw Rory Medkaf with his hand. Thanks very much. Mr Fraser, Rory Medkaf from the Lowy Institute, and I've read your book and I respect the fact that you've contributed your experience to the debate in this way. I have to say that I personally, I disagree quite strongly with not only your conclusions, but much of the analysis underlying the conclusions. And I think to me there are distortions and emissions in the analysis that damage the credibility of the conclusion that really we could do with a much reduced American strategic role in Asia. The key point I wanted to go to or the question that I wanted to go to, if I may, Mr Fraser, is about Southeast Asia. In your book you make I think a case that really the countries of Southeast Asia, of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, would rather get on with managing their problems with China by themselves without American support and involvement. My strong sense is that at least five substantial ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and indeed Singapore, have become more worried about China in recent years, more comfortable with an American role. The fact that Singapore hosted Japanese Prime Minister Abe recently for the Shangri-La Dialogue, I think is a very strong signal of that. So it strikes me as a bit confusing that you would argue that somehow these countries would prefer to solve their problems over the South China Sea or other issues with China without a strong American presence in the region. I appreciate your view on that. The point I was making in relation to ASEAN that these were countries that had in many cases been former enemies. They had formed an association, was growing in strength and growing in usefulness. Certainly they still had some problems between them, but largely they were managing those problems or if you like putting them into deep freeze so that the association as such was not going to be damaged. And I think that they have done this over the years remarkably successfully and if you like in their own way. From the very beginning, Indonesia was saying to both superpowers, keep out. We're not aligned. We don't want to be dragged one way or another. And strangely enough, the superpowers at that time largely defended that. Now you took a view of Singapore and that's the traditional view of the Singapore government. It's very difficult for those in positions of authority who've adopted a habit of mind over the trades if you like and this includes Australia to change and recognize the strange strategic context. But I heard Gochuk Tong two years ago in Tianjin before a meeting representing 20 countries from not just Asia but around the world saying that containment will not work. It is dangerous and it cannot succeed. He didn't elaborate to a great extent but his words were in his way pretty emphatic and for a Singaporean and the Singaporean who had been Prime Minister, I think he might have got, well he hadn't repeated it. So maybe somebody said something to him when he got back to Singapore but that no doubt was what he felt. I think ASEAN left to itself would still be remarkably successful and better able to negotiate a coat of conduct in the South China Sea and that every time America says I hope China gets on with it as Vice President Biden did a while ago and repeated it and somebody else has repeated it. That would probably make it harder to negotiate with China in today's context. I haven't been to China for two years when I was there. The common question, which America do we believe? This economic and strategic dialogue led by Hillary Clinton or the pivot and the military buildup. America is trying to have it both ways. They're saying there wasn't cooperation, collaboration and then in case they don't get their own way and that they're bringing in more guns. Which America do we believe? I also had Chinese saying to me we don't want America to leave because we know China's strength makes countries in our periphery nervous but there's a difference to maintaining the status quo and very substantially increasing a military buildup and trying to contain China and the way the Soviet Union ultimately was contained. I want to come back to this question of containment because you do use the word a lot but let me just follow up on Rory's question. I mean you said these are habits of mind that people are finding it hard to shake and that's what you said in relation to Australian policymakers too but it's not a habit of mine for Vietnam which fought a war against the United States which you helped to prosecute of course that is turning Vietnam and making Vietnam worried about Southeast Asia. That's not a habit of mine. Isn't it the fact that at least these five countries that Rory mentioned are nervous? They are worried about changes that they detect in China's behavior. That's why they're moving closer to America not because of habits of mind. Well I'm not sure that Vietnam is really moving closer to America when Panetta tried to get use of Cameron Bay for the American Navy as some sort of rotating through or base again. The Vietnamese very politely said well anyone's welcome here but they weren't going to let it turn into an American rotating through or base and the Vietnamese have had a very long history of living alongside a larger and more powerful China and they've often found it very awkward. There's nothing to suggest that that is going to change and the Vietnamese have been very tough very resilient and well able to look out to themselves. I think they'll come to a time when they realize that American involvement and as China would see it American provocation throughout the region is itself creating uncertainty because there's a push back and again quite a few white against me again quite on my side he has said that these actions by the Chinese can well be in part a response to the American policy of containment or the pivotal rebalancing to try and demonstrate to the neighbors that America is not going to be able to do much and the Vietnamese above all I think will know that and understand that because they're well and truly on the main land and they're well and truly a neighbor but that's a concern they have had through history they've been with it all their lives. But on this question of the pivot I think it's true that when Obama gave the speech in November 2011 to the Australian parliament that you criticized I think it's true that there was and my former boss Paul Keating also criticized it there was uncertainty and perhaps even anxiety in Beijing about what the pivot meant but in the two and a half years since the truth is that the pivot has run out of puff the truth is that if you go to Beijing now if you mentioned you haven't been for two years but if you go now most Chinese analysts are not at all concerned about the rebalance in fact the weakness of the rebalance is making them think that America is vulnerable it's not the sort of the containment scenario that you describe in your book where this or powerful America is moving the guns into place I think when you look at the military elements of the rebalance are pretty underwhelming I would say on the grand historical scheme of things the political elements of the pivot are very unclear you have I often quote the fact that John Kerry visited the Middle East I think it was 14 times last year and he visited Asia three or four times the numbers are something like that the United States is clearly distracted by problems overseas and by problems at home the economic elements of the rebalance in particular the TPP are also unclear so one aspect of the book that I found a bit perplexing was that you set up this straw man of a ramp in America influenced by neo-conservatives and pivoting towards Asia but I think most analysts in the region would say that the pivot is running out of puff well I don't think Obama would say it's running out of puff or the Secretary of State would say it's running out of puff it was always going to be a long-term move it was never going to be something that you know like a hot knife running through butter and you know if you think it's running out of puff maybe my concerns will be reduced and America will not be so provocative in the future okay I'm anxious I don't agree with you I thought I had you for a second there I'll take this lady here and then this gentleman in the third row Thanks Deborah Snow Mr Fraser from VFX you're looking in very fine fatal might I say could I just ask you to talk a little bit more about your characterization of Australia's latest intervention on the high seas as an act of piracy could you spell out for us what you think the ramifications of that might be and whether others are also seeing it in that light the second question I'd just like you to quickly touch on as well is that you referred a moment ago to the US choosing Indonesia over Australian interests three times I think in your lifetime as a politician and an observer of foreign affairs could you go into that in a little more detail as well please well I thought that if a ship is sailing in the high seas freedom of the seas meant it was able to continue sailing if it's in international waters to be apprehended by an Australian customs vessel or naval vessel people taken off it and all the rest what do you call it kidnapping piracy it certainly is in breach of international law and it hasn't been much reported here but Reuters yesterday morning reported a police chief in Srinankar is saying that all the passengers who had been returned the 41 I think were going to be prosecuted for leaving the country illegally and it would probably be not very difficult to prove that and if found guilty he said they'd all be subject to enhanced imprisonment what's enhanced imprisonment is that a new name for torture sounded very like it on the other thing Australia had wanted a genuine act of self-determination for Westerion West Papua and especially ex-servicemen in the parliament were adamant about that the Australian government supported us and argued for it very strongly and we were way way out on the limb because the Dutch didn't want it the Portuguese didn't want it the British was not going to support us and they made that very plain and America was not going to support it and in the end we had to settle for an act of self-determination as did the people of West Papua for something that was symbolism only and meaning nothing well that was I've given the example over creeps fighting in Borneo during confrontation and there was a very when John Howard acted in relation to East Timor and partly because her BB short circled the time scale from 10 years to a few months which if you knew her BB he was bound to do met him several times over the years and continued to do so but then we had a job of sort of maintaining peace we needed a bit of heavy lift capacity it took a lot of pushing and several days before the United States would agree to supply that heavy lift capacity which we did not have and certainly should have had and we should have been spending more money on the fence but we didn't have and we couldn't have done it without their support now what were they doing in those few days when they did not say yes they were clearing their lines I have no doubt with Jakarta that's not unreasonable is it I mean I did say yes totally unreasonable women you're saying we're a special friend a special ally they knew quite well that what John Howard was doing would fail abysmally without that heavy lift capacity but they did provide that didn't they in the end after a great deal of pushing and very reluctantly as you know let me ask you before I go to this gentleman on the defense budget issue you mentioned Australia's defense budget if Australia were to follow your policy prescriptions if we were to give the United States I think you advocate five years to vacate a pine gap if we were to I'd pull Australians out of there and say they're going to be out by Christmas the Americans can fill them up but there's not going to be any further Australian involvement in drone killings or targeting American weapon systems if we took those steps the steps in relation to Darwin and others we would be signaling would be sending a very strong signal to the Americans about about the alliance and one way or another it would it would probably end in the dissolution of the alliance do you think what in those circumstances how much more would Australia and should Australia spend on defense do you agree that if we were not in alliance with the United States it would be incumbent upon us to spend a much larger portion of our GDP on defense well in the book I make it quite plain I think we should probably spend about double three percent of GNP I think a number of European states spend something around that figure countries that are not basically as well off as we are we have as the American strategists with we've ridden had a cheap ride because of the alliance but you know you ought to I don't know how many people ever read the answers treaty there is one firm an absolute commitment in it and that is a commitment to consult and then if there's agreement other things could follow but it could only follow in accordance with one's constitutional processes now if we're thinking there might be help from America that as I understand it would need a war pass resolution through congress now NATO doesn't need that because the treaty itself makes it quite plain and attack on one and attack on all it's a different kind of treaty but answers treaty is the commitment is a commitment to consult and material support may follow you cannot say more than that it's also worth noting that every war in which we've supported America has not been covered by answers has not been part of answers has been outside the geographic limits of answers and it's restricted to the forces or territories of was the three powers it's now both powers in the pacific theater and that's the limit of the geographic bounds of answers it does not apply beyond that so whatever we've done in Vietnam Iraq Afghanistan you've got nothing to do with answers and so answers is a very limited treaty a very limited cover certainly a network has grown up under it but that is a network that I question whether it serves Australia's interest I don't question whether it serves America's interests it might certainly does that's very obvious but would it at the end of the day serve Australia's interests and my you know you can say it may but the future is balancing risk what is the least risky course for Australia and I believe there is a greater risk in staying with current arrangements than in having a much greater degree of strategic independence and if America wanted to say well that ends the alliance as a whole you know it would depend on how well I don't know vengeful how annoyed how peaked the Americans were but you know if they were prepared to accept that we cannot have any facilities on Australian soil that imply we are complicit in their warlike actions if we don't want to join that for if they were prepared to accept that as a basic principle of the alliance and then we adjust things which would obviously mean adjusting Darwin-Pine gap and maybe the new purposes for which Northwest Cape is used the then an alliance could continue but I suspect that they would not do that that they would want us out in the cold but I don't you know I don't believe they're going to tell their corporation to just invest from Australia we might have some economic price to pay are they going to say we they won't sell us military equipment well their companies will want to sell the military equipment and if not there's good military equipment made in other places and even in Japan so presumably we could buy Japanese equipment now under the new arrangements that Japan's adopted we had we're almost out of time I did promise I'd go to this gentleman but I'm going to ask you to ask you a question very quickly if you don't mind the gentleman on the third row no I'm sorry this is the last question we have time for thank you not very loudly thank you you could use that microphone sir I'm going to have to ask you to ask a very quick question I'm sorry because we're almost out of time as I said um just come to your question if you would the question that I really want to get to is this as China emerges as a potential superpower can you envisage the time in the relatively short term where China's emergence as a superpower will contribute rather than detracting from peace and stability because of its countervailing force as a superpower which currently we only have one thank you very much we might have two thank you I I think that's problematic because unless there can be a change in America I would see um look the most likely spark for a conflict is Japan in my view I don't think China wants war they've got too much to do in their own land building up the standard of life of still too many people who live very close to the poverty line um and you know what one thing China has been totally consistent on in my memory anyway the opposition to her gemini whether a Soviet gemini American of gemini or anyone else's at gemini as they call it and there's no reason to believe that that is not an article of faith it demonstrates why they don't like military interventions in other countries and often vote against them in the united nations and whatever or in the security council but um look I'm not sure that I can see far enough ahead really to give uh an answer but if America were prepared to accept that or to treat China with respect to treat China as an equal if Japan were prepared to apologize for the rape of Nen King and maybe give some rational reason why Japanese school children are not taught of Japanese atrocities doing across China when every Chinese school child is taught of those atrocities um the you know a lot of things can change an apology a proper apology for the rape of Nen King one of my Japanese friends took me up on this and they sent me about 20 pages of gobbledygook and not one word of it could be said to be regarded as an honest decent apology for one of the most terrible atrocities that's occurred anywhere um that that would start to change the environment Japan has managed to put itself and make itself into the aggrieved party when it's got no right to be China was the aggrieved party and we have or America has sided unequivocally with the then aggressor against the then aggrieved party I don't think our current world leadership and pretty well any country that I can think of pays anything like enough attention to history to culture to tradition to things which are deep in the heart of you know a Kissinger Wood and he wrote recently about the Ukraine he wrote about earlier about the movement of NATO eastwards um and he always understood the importance of history and culture and um over countries past and um for China if you ask people about the early days in China they didn't go back to chairman Mao they say you know how far back do you want to go how many thousand years communism is just a blot on on whatever of China's continuum and if we really understood how to treat China with respect or if America did that would make a huge difference ladies and gentlemen I want to thank Malcolm Fraser for a number of things today first of all for coming to the Lowy Institute the Lowy Institute is happy to ventilate these kinds of issues and to be the forum for this kind of debate I'd like to thank him for contributing to these important debates not only on Twitter but by taking the time and the effort to to uh to author a book of this substance and something that is deserving of a lot of attention I think you can tell Malcolm the interest in your work from the the packed room and the TV cameras and the and the questions from the journalists and finally I want to thank you for characterizing me as being something like a minister in the Menzies government this will this will further this will I was trying to say something flattering no no no this this will further confuse my critics who usually characterize me as a dewey eyed Keatingite or or a a stooge of the CIA so thank you foreign policy was great thank you very much something we can agree on ladies and gentlemen thank you very much we have as a gift for Mr Fraser we have a couple of wonderful Lowy Institute publications that I'd also urge everybody here to buy we have the first in our beautiful new Lowy Institute papers this is called beyond the boom by John Edwards who is Paul Keating's economics advisor it's a positive optimistic take on the Australian economy and secondly this edited volume reports from a turbulent decade which contains a lot of very lively compelling fresh arguments from the Institute over our first 10 years ladies and gentlemen before you go can I invite you to consider attending an event on the 29th of July at which Anthony Bubello my colleague will be convening a discussion of foreign correspondents including Zoe Daniel from the ABC and Stan Grant from Sky ladies and gentlemen thank you again for coming and thank you Malcolm Fraser thank you very much thank you there you go thank you