 Congress gave us another powerful tool this summer by passing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act, or SASADA, which the President signed on July 1st. SASADA forces a stark choice. If you conduct certain business with Iran, you can't do business with the United States. And SASADA contains significant restrictions on government contracting and sanctions for companies that assist Iran in acquiring refined petroleum products or that invest in Iran's energy sector. SASADA also requires the Treasury to prohibit or to impose strict conditions on access to the U.S. financial system on any foreign bank that facilitates significant transactions or provides significant financial services to either the IRGC or any of its affiliates or to any of the banks that the United States has sanctioned for participation in Iran's WMD proliferation or international terrorism. For all of those reasons, because of the way we designed our strategy, because we have built a broad coalition with powerful tools to use, and because Iran is vulnerable, the strategy we have in place today is working to create the leverage we need to enhance our diplomatic options. In the end, you don't have to take my word for it, last week, former Iranian President Rasanjani publicly warned leaders in Iran to, quote, take the sanction seriously and not as a joke. He also said, quote, we have never had such intensified sanctions and they're getting more intensified every day. Whenever we find a loophole, they, meaning the Western powers, block it. The goal of sanctions is not to harm the people of Iran, rather is to influence the calculations of Iran's leaders. However, until Iran agrees to abide by its international obligations, what Rasanjani is observing will only continue and the pressure on Iran will only increase. Norman Bailey, Institute of World Politics. First of all, I want to congratulate you, Secretary Levy, for the excellent work that you and the department are doing. I'm asking about a situation which can be illustrated by Venezuela where Iranian banks have been sanctioned, but Venezuelan banks that are used as conduits for the Iranian banks have not been sanctioned. And I wonder whether that is something that the department's looking into, not just in the case of Venezuela, but also other countries. Right. That's an excellent question and it's also a perfect example of exactly what Sasada does. So what is new in this statute is that financial institutions that do business with banks that we've already sanctioned, and there is, as the questioner indicates, a bank in Venezuela that we have designated for being a subsidiary of the Export Development Bank of Iran, now other banks that do business with that bank stand the risk of being cut off from the U.S. financial system. And so that is something that we will be looking at going forward. We had an obligation to issue regulations under that new law, which we did in August. And so now we're in a position to start doing exactly what you've mentioned. Simultaneous with the ratcheting up of the sanctions program against Iran has been continued effort to engage the government of Iran in discussion about the nuclear program and other matters. So my question is, can you tell us a bit about how these two things are calibrated within the administration? It is our policy and it remains the policy that there's not a contradiction between engagement and pressure. We can do both at the same time. Now, of course, they could have had engagement at the beginning of the administration under conditions that were less pressurized, of course, but there is no indication now that we're withdrawing this offer of engagement. Rather, I think the Secretary of State made it very clear in comments she made yesterday that it is still very much our desire to have that kind of engagement even while we're taking steps to hold Iran accountable for its international obligations.