 There is an operational lead, but Clément, in your paper, you're also pointing out to that lag effect, but also on the fact that this is paving the way to big tech intrusion into what naturally would be the sovereign space for states. Can you elaborate a little bit on that? It's an interesting part. My point on sovereignty was that from a public sector point of view is that when you deal with a private company to carry out a policy, without any doubt you will improve the efficiency of your policy, but you will lose control, the control that you had over this policy. So it's not really a debate about sovereignty, it's a debate about the level of control that you want to retain on a given policy. Let me take an example. You had this debate during the crisis around the tracking application on mobile phone for the French in the room. The French government decided to develop a sovereign centralized application by itself, whereas other governments in Europe, including eventually the UK and Germany, decided to go with the Apple Google solution, decentralized solution. Actually, and you tell me if I'm wrong, but there was a fierce debate in Germany about the state having access to a massive amount of personal data, and in France the debate was pretty different. You have to look at the speech by the minister for digital affairs, Cédric O, in front of the National Assembly, he had to explain to the MPs why the French government wanted to develop a sovereign application. And he told them, it's no surprise that France wants to develop a sovereign application, because France is the only country from continental Europe to possess nuclear weapons. And I think the link between nuclear weapons and digital sovereignty can seem far-fetched. But actually it tells a lot about the French conception of digital sovereignty, and it's very different than the German one, I think. Very interesting because I think in Germany the perspective is from the past and data protection, to lose data to a foreign state, rather than from this perspective of kind of nuclear weapons, because it's a different history and we'd have a different military. But from our perspective, like I've heard Palantir was used in France for the database, unimaginable in Germany. An American company is building the COVID database for a country because people give their data, as the patients say. That was my second example. In France we have the internal security service contracting with Palantir to build up a database on security issues. So are we sovereign on our security policy? Good question. So my second point about sovereignty was about values. Because I think when it comes to technology, values matter. Technology is never value neutral. And I will take the example of smart cities, because China has been developing smart cities for, I think, 20 years now. It was after the epidemic in 2003. And more and more defense and security companies in China are investing into smart city solutions. And China is selling more and more smart city solutions to Central Asia, African countries and the Middle East. And it has become a soft power tool. And in the official language in China, smart city is called safe city. So you see it's very different from our conception. So I think when it comes to gov tech values matter and we'll have to dig on that in the years to come. And my final point on this topic of sovereignty is for states to handle the rise of gov tech. They will have to be very clear on which policy they want to outsource or not. Second point, they have to attract new talents, because they will have to deal on the same level of knowledge and skills with private companies. And I can assure you it's a real revolution for public HR to attract new talents in the gov tech sector. And finally, I really believe that it should be a subject for public debate. I mean, citizens have to be able to give their word to express themselves on the subject of gov tech, because in the end it is the quality of public services that is at stake and eventually there are personal data. Absolutely.