 Σε αυτή η αγόνα, στον πράγμα, για να διαβάζω μέσα τη πιο ανθρώπη της διευτήσης υπόθετων, για να δημιουργήσω την κείμψη που η διευτήση έχει διάφορει από τη δημιουργία από τη διευτήση και ανωσύγηση στην εμπανιφανία σε διευτήση within τα διευτήσης. Έτσι, επηρεάω αυτό το διευτήση της πάντρου και κατανον κάνω αυσ estadυσμής για να επισθήριξα για να δείξει και για ναμοκρισθούν These are attempts to draw a sharp epistemic dichotomy between those aspects of nature that are knowable and those that will remain secret. Attempts to circumscribe realms of being that are cognitively impenetrable to us, to set limits to our knowledge of nature. The tone was said by Kant. The things as they are in themselves remain forever hidden to the human intellect, bound as it is by sensible intuition. Being minded as we are forecloses the possibility of getting epistemic access to the numen. Η ανολήση, ο καντός του τέλος της ανθρωπότητας, ακόμα ψωή στην κάντα, is always knowledge of the appearances which are constituted by the forms of pure intuition, space and time, and the schematised categories of the understanding. Note, however, that Kant's Epistemic Di ECotomy was horizontal. The appearances are not just observable phenomena. Conversely, the things as they are in themselves would remain unknowable even if the whole of nature was revealed to us. Οι επιστήμικες δικοτομικές δικοτομικές μπροστάζονται από δικονοριαστικούς να δικονομικούς να δικονομικούς να δικονομικούς. Και they are by and large vertical. There is something epistemically suspicious with the unobservable, that's the non-realist view, or some aspects of the unobservable, that's the weak-realist view. Κωνστρακτική εμπειρικής δικονομικούς να δικονομικούς να δικονομικούς να δικονομικούς, quite sharply along the line observable, unobservable. The issue is said to be one between full truth, which is inaccessible, and truth about the appearances in van Vrasen's sense and not in Kant's, which is accessible at least in principle. Then we've got structural realism of the epistemic stripe. Here the epistemic dichotomy is between knowing the structure of nature and knowing whatever is left to fill out the structure. This is an epistemic dichotomy among bits of the unobservable world, its structure versus its non-structure. Hence, this is a weak-realist view. It allows some knowledge of the unobservable. But if we dig deeper, then this distinction of course can be contested. There is entity realism. Here the epistemic dichotomy is between knowing entities and perhaps some of their properties, and knowing the truth of fundamental theories. Here again the dichotomy is drawn within the realm of the unobservable. Another dichotomy is issued recently by Kyle Stanford, a philosopher of science who develops a new instrumentalist position. According to him, the epistemic dichotomy is between those entities to which there is an independent route of epistemic access, mediated by theories which cannot be subjected to serious doubt, and those entities to which all supposed epistemic access is mediated by high-level theories. Stanford takes it that the former are epistimically accessible while the latter are cognitively impenetrable. High-level theories are taken to be useful conceptual tools for guiding action rather than maps of an unavailable to the senses reality. Here again however the dichotomy is drawn within the realm of the unobservable. There is this position that was developed by another philosopher of science, Jody Azuni. The epistemic dichotomy here is between knowing whatever we have thick access to and whatever there is only thick epistemic access that is via the confirmation of scientific theories. Here the dichotomy is drawn within the realm of the unobservable again. It's instrument-based tracking of the properties of unobservables which makes their knowledge possible while theory mediated access to them via the confirmation of theories leaves them cognitively inaccessible. Finally there is semi-realism, a view developed by Anjan Chakravarti. Here the epistemic dichotomy is between detection properties and auxiliary properties of particular entities. According to Chakravarti there is epistemic access only to the parts of theories which can be interpreted as referring to a certain class of properties of concrete causal structure that is detection properties. Detection properties are contrasted to auxiliary properties. These are attributed to particulars by theories but there is no reason to believe in the reality since they are not detected though they might be detectable and become detected later on. Note that from epistemic structural realism and beyond or below if you like all positions make the dichotomy within the realm of the unobservable. Therefore they allow that there is epistemic access to some unobservable part of reality. So all these are weak realists or weak anti-realists if you like positions with Chakravarti's being the strongest realist among them. The key position now is that some knowledge of the unobservable is deemed possible and I think that's a victory for realism. Imagine where this debate started. The question is, is the dichotomy between the epistimically accessible, unobservable and the epistimically inaccessible one, strict, sharp, robust, principled and the like? The common denominator of all this position is that there is a principled division between what can be known of nature and what cannot. So there is a principled limit to the scientific knowledge of the world. The realist reaction which I have defended is that there is no good reason either a priori or a posteriori to think that there is a principled epistemic division between what can be known of nature and what cannot. There might be parts of nature that science might never be able to map out but these do not fall nicely within a conceptual category which captures one side of a sharp epistemic dichotomy. The unknown ex, the numena, the non-structure, the intrinsic properties, the auxiliary properties, whatever there is only thin epistemic access to, whatever there is only theory made it access to and the like. The argument for this unfortunately is book length and I've developed it in my own work on scientific realism.