 This session is going to be a fireside chat to discuss what those real-world challenges I alluded to look like and how the US military prepared to deal with them, both today and into the future. We're going to run this through the conversation. I have some topics that I want to discuss, some questions, and I have a little bit of back and forth. But we also are going to be incorporating some of the audience questions. As we did yesterday, please make sure to pull up your Hoover app, go to the right session, put in your questions, and I'll work those in as we go along. To get us started, we've got a short video clip that US Space Command has prepared to kind of set the stage for how they're thinking about these things. So please roll the clip. All right, so some very interesting stuff in there. And that touches on sort of what I wanted to get started with. They mentioned your deputy commander of the space command that is a command that existed from 85,002, went away, and now came back. So what is different about US Space Command's mission set now compared to back then? I think that video hints at some of that, absolutely. Thanks, Brian. Hey, first thanks for inviting me to be part of this here today. Brian, I've known each other for quite a while, and he offered a little while back to give me a chance to come to New York and be part of this. So thanks for that opportunity. Let me start by being really provocative, and I think you might want to look at a little change in the name of your organization. I mean, no, no, I'm not saying, it's not a big change. Not the first time we've heard that. Just one letter. I think just one letter. Add an S after world, the Secure Worlds Foundation, because then we start to really get at the vision of what this conference is all about, all right. I told you, I'd be intentionally provocative. Brian's never going to invite me back to talk. Hey, I think I'll start by saying, let me talk, you saw at the very end of the video the welcome to the third space age, and some of the aunts have heard me talk about this, but it's worth kind of walking through that, because I think it's a good framework to try to describe a lot of the dynamics that we're seeing today in the space environment, and it leads to why we have a US Space Force and US Space Command today. So if you look at it this way, the first space age was probably Cold War, and that was dominated by national security activities and strategic space capabilities, a little bit of scientific discovery, very, very little commercial, until kind of near the end when we all wanted our MTV, right, I mean, that's kind of that. And then, but the end of the Cold War, it was kind of a fairly sharp break, and we entered the second space age that coincided with the Gulf War, and so from a national security perspective, that was the beginning of a new way of looking at how to use space, driving it out of the tactical level, right, and since then, and a good part of my career has been, how do we get all of those capabilities, GPS, SATCOM, missile warning, everything down to the tactical level, and then, but civil, we weren't going back to the moon, right, we just routinized travel to low Earth orbit, and commercials started to pick up. They're right at the end of the Cold War, but sort of in a linear fashion, mostly geosynchronous, little dabbling in Leo, and government capabilities were still primary to the dominant form of space capability. And right around, right around in 2015, it's hard to put, history doesn't like us to put firm lines on a timeline chart. Right around 2015, I think we started to see some inflection changes, some dramatic ones, you know, that's when SpaceX first landed a reusable core booster for the first time. It's also when they filed their license for Starlink in 2015. It's also in the Department of Defense where we began to talk openly about space as a warfighting domain. You can pin it to some speeches in 2015. And right around that time, the frame is when NASA, after maybe some fall starts in the 90s and early 2000s, said we're going back to the moon and actually, no kidding, got funding, right? And we're actually going to do it, folks, and we're going to do it with international partnerships in ways that we did not do in the Apollo era. So we're in this third space age now and some characteristics of that. First, what's different from the second space age is we're under threat in the domain. We actually weren't able to enjoy a fairly lengthy period of benign domain and our space systems that we developed and fielded and operated reflected that. Well, now we have to think about that differently from a national security perspective. And but I would also say, and there's a terrific panel coming, a terrific title for a panel and the panel is going to be terrific right after this talk here. I think it's space security. It's your problem too. Is that the name of it? What a terrific title. I kind of stole a lot of what I was going to say. It is everybody's, it is everyone's concern today. And I would say that one of the other characteristics of this third space age is it's actually a positive one in a sense, even though we now have threats and security challenges. It's kind of normalized in human society. That's kind of the silver lining or the good news. In all other domains, we have lots of commercial activity that drives the economy and drives our society. We have security challenges in all those other domains. We have scientific exploration and civil programs in those other domains. We now have them in space, but we're all intertwined in ways that we've never, never been before. And that's pretty exciting. So it's against that backdrop and the realization at the beginning of the third space age that yes, we now have to face the idea that we may have threats in the domain to our space capabilities on which our joint war fighters and our society is more reliant than it's ever been. And that curve seems to keep on going upward. That we established a United States Space Force in United States Space Command. Now, a quick 32nd tutorial, right? Because people get confused about this even in the Department of Defense, this happens. We really have kind of two pieces to the Department of Defense, two macro pieces. The first are the services, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines, and now the Space Force. And they exist. They're all headquartered in the Pentagon and they have the budgets to which they acquire systems and they recruit personnel and train those personnel. That's what services do. But services don't conduct war fighting operations or security operations. That's done by kind of the other major half of the Department of Defense and that's the combatant commands, which there are 11. Your average person on the street out here in New York City probably knows a couple of them. Central command from the Global War and Terror Days or Indo-Pacific command as we focus on China today or strategic command. But we now have a U.S. Space Command. Now you're right, Brian. We did have one in 1985 to 2002. There's a long story there, but the short version is we stood it down, we stood up Northern Command in the wake of 9-11, focused on Global War and Terror and gave space functions to U.S. Strategic Command. But we stood up the combatant command again in 2019. So in addition to a Space Force, we have a combatant command. What's different? What's different about this new combatant command, U.S. Space Command? We've been around, we're going to celebrate our fourth birthday in August, the new version. The old combatant command was functional in nature, meaning it was looked at from the Department as, hey, you just supply space capabilities down to users on the earth in much the same way we look at another combatant command called transportation command, right? You just provide those services. When this new instantiation of U.S. Space Command, we actually have an assigned area of responsibility. That's actually, sounds like a minor thing, but it's actually pretty significant when you look at, now, we're not just providing capabilities, we're actually having to think about security in this area of responsibility. And by the way, it's defined as a hundred kilometers above mean sea level and extending outward indefinitely. That's a huge AOR. That's pretty big. It's very big. Do the math. Actually, it's a good time for me to point out what you see on, I think that some others can see the chart there. I like to show this perspective to show, yeah, we may have a huge AOR that goes outward indefinitely, but this is kind of the relevant strategic space that we're looking at from our perspective a little bit different than what you might normally see. So, now that we have responsibility for this area, we have this area of responsibility. And by the way, it's the first military area of responsibility in history that's not geographic. All right, you can go back to ancient times. There's always been geographic areas of responsibility in military matters. Lines drawn, what does it mean? Lines drawn on the earth, right? That's the derivation of that word. Well, we have an astrographic AOR. So, we're responsible for understanding what's going on in that environment, understanding what threats exist there and protecting, defending our capabilities within that AOR. So, that's why we have a US base command. That's why we have a US space force is to provide the capabilities that US space command needs, although we are happy to take, we're a joint command, so we'll take capabilities from any service, and we do. Navy and the Army have radars and other capabilities that we can use to better understand what's going on in our own domain and achieve our mission. It's an interesting mission, but a lot of people still don't understand that division between the services and the combatant commands. I made a comment on Twitter a couple weeks ago about how the Navy doesn't fight wars anymore, and let me tell you, I got responses to that. Even though it's true, right? They provide forces to CENTCOM, anyone else does this. This whole event we had the last two days is focused on space sustainability. How does space command see sustainability relate to its mission set? And are there specific things space command is prioritizing to enhance sustainability as they see it for sort of their operations and the domain they work in? Yeah, so let me start and say something that might surprise some of you. We're as interested in space sustainability as anybody. And I'll talk a little bit more about what we've been doing along those lines in a second. Let me take a second to sort of, so I already laid out that third space age or the three space age kind of framework, right? Let's look at that. Let's look at that from a sustainability lens. So in the first space age, we didn't really even care about that. Whenever we were launching payloads into orbit, we didn't care about, we littered, you know? We littered all the time. Doors would come off and just float away, right? We didn't think about that and we didn't care. There's a huge space, there was very little going on and we just need to get things going and we didn't care. And I should also point out, let's be perfectly transparent here. In that first space age, a certain nation conducted a kinetic ASAP intercept test. It was the United States in 1985. We launched an ASAP from an F-15 and struck one of our old satellites as an ASAP test during that first space age during the Cold War. You know what we learned from that? That we shouldn't do that. And so we stopped. We learned in the first space age. Why haven't others learned more recently? Moving to the second space age, we actually started to realize, you know, we gotta track a lot of objects now, right? And I'd offer to you, the Department of Defense is still today. I know there was some talk about this yesterday about where it's going and such, but still the gold standard when it comes to tracking the 44,000 objects per day that we're tracking in the catalog that we're executing today on behalf of the planet. So who here has a spacetrack.org account? Okay, that's a good number there. But you can go, you can get one today and you'll get conjunction alerts if you want on any time that we're detecting a possible collision in space. Now you heard yesterday from Rich Delbello and others, we do wanna move a lot of that function to a civilian organization, Department of Commerce, that makes sense. That's the whole discussion itself and we're enthusiastic about that. But the Department of Defense is always gonna place some role in space domain awareness. It'll probably just be on the fringes of what, and other places where Department of Commerce isn't focused and we need to do it internationally. Internationally focused. So anyway, back. So second space age, we started to realize this. We started a little bit smarter about how we deployed our satellites, not littering as much and thinking about end of life. We didn't think about that early on, but we thought about that in that second space age, moving geosynchronous satellites out to a graveyard orbit, re-entering to some extent low earth orbit satellites, whereas we weren't really doing that before. And now in this third space age, wow, is it getting busy, right? If that first space age was like the Arctic Ocean, mostly national security, scientific, not a lot of traffic, the earth, moon system of today is like the Mediterranean. I mean, there's just so much going on. And so we need to think about sustainability. Thanks for what you do here in this conference and thinking about that and we need to do it responsibly. I'd like to point out that one of the commercial advances here in this third space age is proliferated low earth orbit. Constellations, Starlink and OneWeb to start with, others coming. I would like to point out that those companies and programs that I just mentioned have built into their systems the ability to deorbit their satellites. They didn't need to do that. There's no law that said that they had to do that. They did it because they were being responsible. I hope that when China fields its first proliferated low earth orbit constellation which they're planning to do, they take the same responsible steps at the end of life of their satellites to be able to deorbit those. They need to. It needs to be a norm of what we do in the space environment. So that's sort of a lens of how to think so sustainability, now we have to talk about it because it's so important to so many actors. From a US Space Command perspective, we're absolutely interested in sustainability. A lot of what we do is really focused on transparency and understanding what's happening in the domain to ensure safe and secure operations, not only for our capability but for everybody. So again, that's why we do spacetrack.org. Why we'll always be part of that team that's gonna do that. And so a lot of the functions of US Space Command as we do operations day in and day out in our area of responsibility, yes, we have to be prepared for a very bad day and we have to be prepared for security challenges in the environment. But a lot of the functions we do in day in and day out are less like the US Air Force or maybe the US Army and more like the US Coast Guard. Looking for hazards, understanding what's going on the domain, sharing that with others and making a safe and secure place to operate. I'm sure you can imagine that there's not a single official in the US Coast Guard that loves to see navigation hazards on the high seas, oil slicks or other kinds of problems. They want a sustainable environment, helps them do their job better, it's why they do what they do. And I would just say that same spirit infuses what we're trying to do in US Space Command is keep the domain sustainable. Let me, I need to throw one more thing here. You heard Audrey talk yesterday about the moratorium on ASAT testing. Some of you were like, yeah, I bet the DOD non-concrete with that one. No, we were one of the earliest and biggest proponents of that for exactly the reasons that I just laid out. We don't need to do that. When the Russians did their test back in 2021, we kind of had an idea it was coming, all right? I would hope so. We had an idea. In fact, I was on console there in our Joint Operations Center in Colorado Springs when we had a pretty good idea they were gonna do their launch and we kind of had an idea what satellite they were using as a target. And I actually was hopeful folks, you know? I mean, I spent time, where's my friend Eric Desatelli's here in the room somewhere? Hey, Eric, Eric and I spent some time talking to the Russians in Vienna a couple of years ago. I'm ready to go back if you can set that up. And, you know, they have a tradition. They consider themselves the senior space-faring country or nation, right? They have a long tradition. I was like, you know, they're gonna just do an offset test. You know, they're gonna aim this target and they're gonna launch it. It's gonna miss by 100 meters on purpose because they understand space and they wanna continue that tradition of being that senior responsible space-faring nation. I was wrong. I'm sad that I was wrong. They didn't need to. They could have done an offset test. I'm not sure exactly why they didn't. I got a lot of, we can always theorize about that. Was it messaging, was it whatever? They just not care. But they could have and they didn't. So we've been a big proponent of that effort and thanks to Audrey and the rest of the US government that made that happen and to the 13 nations that have signed up and to the many that have expressed support already in the UN and I hope we keep adding people to that. We also, the Department of Defense, if you aren't aware of this, you need to be. The Secretary of Defense signed a memo last year on tenants of responsible behavior in space. Five tenants of responsible behavior. And in that note, which is public record, you can find it on our website at US Space Command if you need to. He assigned some actions to US Space Command on implementing those tenants of responsible behavior and we've embraced that opportunity to go do that to make, again, operations in space safe, transparent, and sustainable for current and future generations. I happened to be on console on Colorado Springs in January 2007 for a very similar event and had a very similar reaction to that. So there's one more big topic I wanna talk about before we get into some of the audience questions that have come in. And that is sort of a double header. How are you thinking about the priorities for the command, and more importantly, sort of the difference between Leo, Geo, and Sis Lunar and Lunar? And sort of related to that second one, this afternoon we have a couple of sessions focused on all the various international commercial government missions to go back to the moon, Sis Lunar Space. And there's been some discussion about what is the role for the military in that? Well, of course, all this pointed out, the outer space treaty put significant restrictions on military activities on the moon itself. So how are you thinking about the priorities of Earth orbit versus Sis Lunar? And how is space command thinking about Sis Lunar and the moon? Yeah, so the first part of the question is, what are we looking at in terms of priorities and things that we need? And there is one kind of evolving capability gap. That's what we call them in our combatant commands, right? One of the luxuries of working in a combatant command, which is where I work as opposed to a service, is that I don't really have to worry about budgets or how much programs cost. It's kind of a nice setup, actually, within our department. It sets up a nice kind of tension. We just say, we don't have what we need. Give me it, right? I don't care how you solve it. This is a capability gap against a potential adversary. Just give it to me. And if you don't, you're not doing your job. So we just complain a lot and say, we need more stuff. And that's a not time-honored military tradition, too. And then the services have to go figure out within limited means and budgets. What do they have? And of course, we care about what their priorities are so we can weigh what we get. But there is this dynamic we'd be demanding. One thing that an evolving capability gap in need and even doctrinal concept that we have at US Space Command is the idea for sustained space maneuver. And what I mean by that is pretty much everything we operate in the Earth-Moon system today, we tend to launch it and then it stays in its Keplerian orbit, right? It doesn't maneuver. It's positional in many ways in the way you would look at that. And we're kind of learning as we need to do our missions in space that that probably doesn't work. We need to be able to maneuver freely and regularly and we probably have to get away from satellites that last for years but have a certain finite propulsion or propellant available to them. And so it may seem like a very obvious thing, but when you start to think, well, what do you actually then need? It starts to drive requirements for a logistics and supply infrastructure or layer in the space domain. This is, so you should also think, many of you are probably work on on-orbit servicing and what the business case is for that and how you would supply that. Most of your customers today have been doing that so they might have that demand signal so they can extend the life of a satellite, upgrade a satellite and such for commercial service. We're kind of doubling down on it and saying, no, I need that to be able to maneuver all the time in the domain. I think we can contribute to a broader logistics, infrastructure and solution that everybody can leverage and I would propose contributes to sustainability. If we can move more freely in the domain then we don't have to, we may be able to produce less debris and have the ability to clean it up in ways that we don't today. So I think it's important to say that some of our capability apps and needs and things we're looking at can contribute to a better overall environment for everybody. When it comes to Leo Geo says Lunar Brian, you know our primary, I have to say our primary focus on our primary overall mission day in and day out is to make sure that we're making, we're getting those space capabilities that our terrestrial war fighters and our society need looking down to earth, right? That's kind of our key primary mission. And so from that respect, we're gonna use those, we're trying to keep sustaining those capabilities that are in Leo and Geo that are doing that. But our kind of our second primary mission is to understand what's going on domain, protect and defend and understand security challenges. So as more and more activity moves further and further up the gravity well, we are gonna have to keep pace to understand what's going on. When NASA and Artemis actually start taking humans into the lunar environment, they're gonna want us to help with space domain awareness in the lunar environment. The same way that we have spent decades providing awareness of potential conjunctions or collisions for the International Space Station and for astronauts in low earth orbit, we're gonna wanna provide that same kind of capability and support to NASA. But it won't be just NASA, right? I think I remember reading a couple of a few weeks ago is about a hundred missions going into the lunar environment over the next decade. Most of them uncrewed, but they're still going. So it's starting to get a little congested there too. How do we do that in a transparent way and understand what's going on? So we're absolutely interested in that. I'll end on, says Lunar, or at least this thought and we can maybe see if there's Q&A later that you're gonna hear from my good friend, Matt Daniels later today. Matt, you're here somewhere. I don't know if he, there he is, okay? He woke up, got to hear from my talk. Thanks Matt. He's gonna wow you. So stick around, make sure you catch his talk on Says Lunar, but if we've done anything wrong to date in these three space ages with regard to sustainability with regard to partnerships and such, we have a chance to do it right in the Says Lunar environment. Let's do it right. That's a great point. So Bernard, come to the questions here. You talked a little bit about how you're looking to prepare to leverage commercial satellite servicing capabilities. One of the questions here though is, does that bring any additional security challenges through the proliferation of those capabilities? And how are you thinking about that? I'll make a very short answer that, absolutely. But why would we be surprised? That would happen in any other domain. I mean, we're concerned about cybersecurity in the terrestrial domains. Just go talk to US Transportation Command that's responsible for logistics support across all the geographic combat commands. I kind of, sometimes I point at my counterpart at Transportation Command and say, what are you doing for me in the space arena? Where's my space logistics? And I'm like, please, you don't know. So the short answer to that is yes. And I don't think they will be too dissimilar to what we've seen in other domains. Sticking with the theme of the commercial and the video, you talked about, the video talked about the integration of commercial, military and civil space sectors. How are you approaching the question of protect and defend when it comes to commercial capabilities? And it's something we're seeing happening in Ukraine where there's a lot of commercial systems that are providing various levels of support and being used in that conflict. And there's been some very public statements from the Russians about those new potential targets. So how is Space Command thinking about that as part of this evolving space domain? So again, one of these key characteristics of the third space age is that everybody is in it together and we're all interdependent in ways that the sectors never were, certainly not the first space age and only tangentially in the second space age, commercial, scientific, civil, national security, interwoven, and this is one of those interfaces you mentioned is commercial systems could potentially be under threat. Yeah, we need to work through that, but we need to work through it together. One of the very first steps that you need to prosecute in that partnership is just understanding of what is happening in the domain, understanding the threat both as it, and it's sort of a longer term as it's evolving and a more immediate what's going on in the domain itself. And I do like to point out we have a great mechanism out at Vandenberg Space Force Base called the Commercial Integration Cell. So at Vandenberg is where we run our Combined Space Operations Center that's responsible for the operational level of providing space capabilities to the terrestrial forces. But we have a cell out there with commercial partners, we have 10 of them, we're gonna increase that number fairly significantly here in the near term, by the way. I'll wait for General Dickinson, my boss, to make that announcement, US Space Command. But what that cell is, it's not a contractual arrangement, it's a cooperative agreement. And we have representatives from the companies there that are cleared to be on the ops floor there in the ops center, and they have real-time awareness of what we're seeing to inform what they need to do to keep their services providing a continuous, continually providing service to their customers. And then we can see what they see. So SACCOM companies are actually really good at detecting sources of electromagnetic interference intentional or unintentional geolocating and then we can see what they see. Together, that's a much bigger awareness than any of us could do by ourselves. And that's just one step about how do we get shared awareness? And then from that, we'll have to be steps at how do we then protect and defend capabilities against threats, and that's an evolving process, but we'll do it together. So sir, you mentioned General Dickinson, what's it like having an army guy in charge of all the stuff in space, right? Because I think it's pretty interesting, but I can imagine some of the old school Air Force Space Command might be grumbling a little bit, but how is he doing? No, it's grumbling. So again, a little bit of DOD 101, right? Those combatant commands I told you about, they're called joint commands, which means they're comprised of members from all the services. And that's actually a really good thing. It's been a good thing historically for the terrestrial combatant commands, and it's a good thing for US Space Command. Yes, my boss is an Army four star. Doesn't mean that the next boss will be from the Army. It could be from any service, as is the case with any combatant command. But we have representatives from all the services at US Space Command, too. I have a Marine that works right next door to me in our headquarters, and we have Army and Navy personnel. That's good for two reasons. First, because all of the services use space. So for them to have representation of that command to fill our primary and key mission, that's getting space capabilities to joint warfighters of all services, and allied warfighters is important. And then second, we also get, it turns out we get a nice diverse set of warfighting expertise when you bring in all of the services that help you look at problems a little bit differently and such. And so it's actually, so actually I've enjoyed working with General Dixon. I'm the Senior Space Force Officer in United States Space Command, so it's an exciting place to work in being a member of the Space Force and being a US Space Command. You mentioned this morning in your comments to the young professionals about transparency. I want to unpack that a little bit more. There's been a lot of talk in this conference about how improved transparency in space supports space sustainability. How does Space Command view that and sort of the balance between more transparency while also protecting national security, operational security, how do you see that balance and how are you working on that? Any military operation is always going to have its own security. And I use that as a principle of war security, right? You protect your information against an adversary that exploits it's just what you do. And we'll always have to do that. But we need to find the right balance between that and a sharing of what's actually happening in the environment. Remember, we see our job is not just, it's happening day in and day out, it's happening today, right? Understanding what's going on in the domain, sharing that with people who need to understand it. It's that Coast Guard function or even to some extent the US Navy. Think about the US Navy and counter piracy operations, right? I mean, that's mostly about transparency. It's more, hey, where is the threat? How do I identify where that is? How do I let others know about that? And maybe what do I do about it if I need to do something about it? So I urge us all to think about that continuity of operations or spectrum of operations that US Space Command is doing, what we do today, what we do when there are instances of security challenges that we need to look at and then if it comes to a very bad day, what we need to do, I need to mention that that very bad day, if we're doing our job right, then we deter that very bad day from ever happening in the first place. That's another reason why you have the United States Space Command. If other nations are gonna threaten us in space, we sure don't wanna just ignore it and hope it goes away. That doesn't bear well, a farewell, it hasn't fared well in any kind of military historical context. It wouldn't fare well in the space domain. So I wanna, there's a couple of questions that I wanna bring together. We've got about four or five minutes left here. One of them is the China question. We have a panel later on today, sort of our perspective is the space race framing is not necessarily the one we think is the best thing for how to approach that relationship. And I'll sort of ask for your thoughts on that, sort of the what is the relationship with China? How should we view in that? And I'll bring in here the lunar, cis-lunar aspect, right? So China has a plan to go back to the moon, it's like to go to the moon. They have a robust robotic program. They've recently announced a pretty firm commitment to put Chinese astronauts on the moon by 2030. So how is Space Command thinking of that US-China relationship? Is it competitive? Is it adversarial in that expansion of activities? The biggest dynamic right now in our relationship with China with regard to space is a lack of communication and virtually zero transparency. That's our biggest challenge. By the way, it's not just the space domain. I think the Secretary of Defense was just saying in a week or so ago, talking about that exact problem happening at the highest levels of government, no communication. And I'm actually, I'm gonna channel the sec def when I say it's not me saying it. He actually kind of said that he said that lack of communication and interaction can lead to miscommunication, misperception, misinterpretation, and then things that could go wrong. And that can happen in any domain. It can happen in the maritime domain, in the western Pacific, it can happen in the air domain. It could happen in the space domain. And that's really our largest challenge. You know, we want to be transparent. We want to communicate. We actually have, so I mentioned spacetrack.org, right? So we actually have, if you sign up in your email and you give us your email, then you know, and you say you're interested in these particular satellites, then you know, and if there's a conjunction, we'll send you an email. We actually have a couple of Chinese email addresses. When there are conjunctions with Chinese platforms, we send an email. We never get a response. Never. Even the Russians know how to communicate with us. They may not do it, and they may not always be responsible in their actions. I'm not, but at least, you know, we saw, some of you are familiar with the Syrian de-confliction line during the war on ISIS and still exist today in the Middle East, right? It was our Air Operations Center, a direct line to their Air Operations Center. To least, hey, here's what's going on, you know, or here's what we're seeing, you know, and to have that discussion between professional airmen. So they know how to do it. We don't have anything like that with the Chinese, and that's the biggest hindrance to transparent operations. So as they progress further into the domain, we need to talk. We need to talk. That's a significant challenge. You said it's not just in space. It's across. It's all domains. All the various domains. So again, this is, again, the beauty of where we are with the space domain to now in the third space age is that it looks so much like the other domains. There are so many lessons we can draw and analogies we can bring. It's not, they're not perfect. Space is different to some extent, but you'd be surprised how many things you can apply from the other domains to space now that all of the sectors are involved, interdependent, there's so much going on in ways that didn't happen earlier. So I wanna work in one more question and then we'll wrap up here with some closing comments. And it goes back to the lunar, cis-lunar activities. As I mentioned, there are some specifications in the Outer Space Treaty about exclusively peaceful things on the moon. How is that impacting how Space Command thinks about potential future military operations in the domain? Yeah, so you did ask me that question earlier. I'm happy and glad you revisited. The Outer Space Treaty actually is fairly, it's fairly simple. There's not a lot in it. And there may be opportunities, and I think there's even some discussion about that happening here at this conference about how do we get to the next level of international agreement with regard to the moon, with regard to space. Maybe ones that incorporate commercial and economic interests a little bit more than the first space age, national security focused moon treaty and outer space treaty. We can do our job well underneath the framework of the Outer Space Treaty. We don't have to establish military bases and we wouldn't want others to do that. We can do that from within the Earth-Moon system. We can do it transparently. We can do it in partnership with all other nations that are acting in the lunar region. So I do not see that as an inhibition whatsoever. Well, that's all I wanna cover. Do you have any closing thoughts you wanna leave us with as we end the session? Well, just again, I hope that what you heard me say today is that US Space Force and US Space Command are as interested in sustainability as anybody else. It's part of our mission. It's part of what we need to do to make the space domain sustainable, safe, secure. I actually think it's our responsibility, much as the Coast Guard of the Navy would see it on the maritime domain to encourage economic investment in the domain. And we do that by encouraging confidence that you can operate safely in that domain because that's how we're really gonna move forward as a society, as a planet, as secure worlds. We'll take that under advisement. All right, please join me in thanking General Shaw.