 Question 4 of Summa Theologica Pars Prima Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica Pars Prima Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 4, The Perfection of God. Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything insofar as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection, secondly of the divine goodness. Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry. Whether God is perfect universally is having in himself the perfections of all things, and whether creatures can be said to be like God. First article, whether God is perfect. Objection 1, it seems that perfection does not belong to God, for we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made, but it does not be fit God to be made, therefore he is not perfect. Objection 2, further God is the first beginning of things, but the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life, therefore God is imperfect. Objection 3, further as shown above, God's essence is existence, but existence seems most imperfect since it is most universal and receptive of all modification, therefore God is imperfect. On the contrary, it is written, be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect. I answer that as the philosopher relates, some ancient philosophers, namely the Pythagoreans and Lusipus, did not predicate best and most perfect of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle. And a material principle is most imperfect, for since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause which must be most perfect, for just as matter as such is merely potential, an agent as such is in the state of actuality, hence the first active principle must needs be most actual and therefore most perfect, for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection. Reply to Objection 1, as Gregory says, though our lips can only stammer, yet we chant the high things of God, for that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless, because created things are then called perfect when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word perfect signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not. Reply to Objection 2, the material principle which with us is found to be imperfect cannot be absolutely primal, but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life, reproduced through seed, has previous to it the animal or plant from which it came, because previous to that which is potential must be that which is actual, since the potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual. Reply to Objection 3, existence is the most perfect of all things, therefore it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual, for nothing has actuality, so except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received, but rather as the received to the receiver. Whence therefore I speak of the existence of man or horse or anything else, this is considered a formal principle and as something received and not as that which exists. Second article, whether the perfections of all things are in God. Objection 1, it seems that the perfections of all things are not in God, for God is simple as shown above, whereas the perfections of all things are many and diverse, therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. Objection 2, further opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference, but the differences by which genera are divided and species constituted are opposed to each other, therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. Objection 3, further a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, and an intelligent thing than what merely lives, therefore life is more perfect than existence and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself, therefore he has not the perfections of life and knowledge and other similar perfections. On the contrary, Dionysius says that God in his one existence pre-possesses all things. I answer that all created perfections are in God. And he has spoken of it universally perfect because he lacks not, says the commentator, any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause, either in the same formality, if it is a univical agent, as when man reproduces man, or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent, thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause, and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect, still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way, since therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dienesis implies the same line of argument by saying of God, it is not that he is this and not that, but that he is all as the cause of all. Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself of itself subsistent. Consequently, he must contain within himself the whole perfection of being. Word is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection. But if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it, since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being for things are perfect precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument too is implied by Dienesis when he says that God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within himself absolutely, without limitation, uniformly. And afterwards he adds that he is the very existence to subsisting things. Reply to Objection 1. Even as the sun, as Dienesis remarks, while remaining one and shining uniformly contains within itself first and uniformly, the substances of sensible things and many and diverse qualities, a fortiare should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things. And thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other pre-exist in God as one without injury to his simplicity. This suffices for the reply to the second objection. Reply to Objection 3. The same Dienesis says that although existence is more perfect than life and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea, nevertheless a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists because living things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence, nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to him who is subsisting being itself. Third article, whether any creature can be like God. Objection 1. It seems that no creature can be like God for it is written, there is none among the gods like unto thee, O Lord, but of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called by participation gods, therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God. Objection 2. Further, likeness implies comparison, but there can be no comparison between things in a different genus, therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness, but no creature is in the same genus as God since God is no genus as shown above, therefore no creature is like God. Objection 3. Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form, but nothing can agree with God in form, for save in God alone essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God. Objection 4. Further among things there is a mutual likeness, or like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaiah, to whom have you likened God? On the contrary, it is written, let us make man to our image and likeness, and when he shall appear we shall be like to him. I answer that since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode, and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness. As two things equally white are said to be like in whiteness, and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way we speak of things as alike, which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less. Something less white is said to be like another thing, more white, and this is imperfect likeness. In the third way some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality, as we see in non-univical agents, for since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes, and that which is made according to the same formality of the species, as man reproduces man. If however the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, not according to the formality of the same species, as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they receive the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not that is so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy, as existence is common to all. In this way all created things so far as they are beings are like God as the first and universal principle of all being. Reply to Objection 1 as Dionysius says, when Holy Rit declares that nothing is like God it does not mean to deny all likeness to him, for the same things can be like and unlike to God. Like according as they imitate him, as far as he who is not perfectly imitable can be imitated, unlike according as they fall short of their cause, not merely an intensity and remission as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white, but because they are not in agreement specifically or generically. Reply to Objection 2, God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different genus but as transcending every genus and as the principle of all genera. Reply to Objection 3, likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement and form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy in as much as God is essential being whereas other things are merely beings by participation. Reply to Objection 4, although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God it must know wise be admitted that God is like creatures because as Dionysius says, a mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order but not between a cause and that which is caused for we say that a statue is like a man but not conversely so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God but not that God is like a creature. The End of Question 4 Question 5 of Summa Theologica Paras Prima Initial Questions This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica Paras Prima Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 5 of Goodness in General We next consider goodness. First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry whether goodness and being are the same really. Granted that they differ only in idea which is prior in thought. Granted that being is prior whether every being is good to what cause should goodness be reduced whether goodness consists in mode species and order and whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. First article, whether goodness differs really from being. Objection 1 It seems that goodness differs really from being although Boethius says, I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing that they are is another. Therefore goodness and being really differ. Objection 2 Further nothing can be its own form but that is called good which has the form of being according to the commentary on Decauses. Therefore goodness differs really from being. Objection 3 Further goodness can be more or less if our goodness differs really from being. On the contrary Augustine says that in as much as we exist we are good. I answer that goodness and being are really the same and differ only in idea which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this that it is in some way desirable. Hence the philosopher says goodness is what all desire. Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect for all desire their own perfection but everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists for it is existence that makes all things actual as is clear from the foregoing. Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really but goodness presents the aspect of desirableness which being does not present. Reply to Objection 1 although goodness and being are the same really nevertheless since they differ in thought they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is an actuality properly correlates to potentiality a thing is in consequence said simply to have being according as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality and this is precisely each thing's substantial being hence by its substantial being everything is said to have being simply but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively thus to be white implies relative being for to be white does not take a thing out of simple potential being because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being but goodness signifies perfection which is desirable and consequently of ultimate perfection hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have insofar as it is at all actual it has some perfection is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply but only relatively in this way therefore viewed in its primal that is substantial being a thing is said to be simply and to be good relatively that is insofar as it has being but viewed in its complete actuality a thing is said to be relatively and to be good simply is saying a Boethius I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing that they are is another is to be referred to a things goodness simply and having being simply because regarded in its primal actuality a thing simply exists and regarded in its complete actuality it is good simply in such sort that even in its primal actuality it is in some sort good and even in its complete actuality it in some sort has being replied to objection to goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality replied to objection three again goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a things super added actuality for example as to knowledge or virtue second article whether goodness is prior in idea to being objection one it seems that goodness is prior in idea to being for names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names but Dionysius assigned the first place among the other names of God to his goodness rather than to his being therefore in idea goodness is prior to being objection two further that which is the more extensive is prior in idea but goodness is more extensive than being because as Dionysius notes goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing whereas existence extends to existing things alone therefore goodness is in idea prior to being further what is the more universal is prior in idea but goodness seems to be more universal than being since goodness has the aspect of desirable whereas to some non-existence is desirable for the set of Judas it were better for him if that man had not been born therefore in idea goodness is prior to being objection four further not only is existence desirable but life knowledge and many other things besides thus it seems that existence is a particular a petable and goodness a universal a petable therefore absolutely goodness is prior in idea to being on the contrary it is said by Aristotle that the first of created things is being I answer that in idea being is prior to goodness for the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it therefore that is prior in idea which is first conceived by the intellect now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being because everything is knowable only as much as it is in actuality hence being is the proper object of the intellect and is primarily intelligible as sound is that which is primarily audible therefore in idea being is prior to goodness reply to objection one Dionysius discusses the divine names as implying some causal relation in God for we name God as he says from creatures as a cause from its effects but goodness since it has the aspect of desirable implies the idea of a final cause the causality of which is first among causes since an agent does not act except for some end and by an agent matter is moved to its form hence the end is called the cause of causes thus goodness as a cause is prior to being as is the end to the form therefore among the names signifying the divine causality goodness precedes being again according to the Platonists who through not distinguishing primary matter from privation said that matter was non-being goodness is more extensively participated than being for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it for all seek their like but it does not participate in being since it is presumed to be non-being therefore Dionysius says that goodness extends to non-existence replied to objection too the same solution is applied to this objection or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things not so far as it can be predicated of them but so far as it can cause them if indeed by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist but those which are potential and not actual for goodness has the aspect of the end in which not only actual things find their completion but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual but merely potential now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only either inherent or exemplar and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual reply to objection 3 non-being is desirable not of itself but only relatively that is in as much as the removal of an evil which can only be removed by non-being is desirable now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being therefore being is desirable of itself and non-being only relatively in as much as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good reply to objection 4 life, wisdom and the like are desirable only so far as they are actual hence in each one of them some sort of being is desired and thus nothing can be desired except being consequently nothing is good except being third article whether every being is good objection 1 it seems that not every being is good for goodness is something super added to being as is clear from article 1 but whatever is added to being limits it as substance quantity, quality, etc therefore goodness limits being therefore not every being is good objection 2 further no evil is good woe to you that call evil good and good evil but some things are called evil therefore not every being is good objection 3 further goodness implies desirability now primary matter does not imply desirability but rather that which desires therefore primary matter does not contain formality of goodness therefore not every being is good objection 4 further the philosopher notes in mathematics goodness does not exist but mathematics are entities otherwise there would be no science of mathematics therefore not every being is good on the contrary every being that is not god is god's creature now every creature of god is good and god is the greatest good therefore every being is good I answer that every being as being is good for all being as being has actuality and is in some way perfect since every act implies some sort of perfection and perfection implies desirability and goodness as is clear from article 1 hence it follows that every being as such is good reply to objection 1 substance, quantity, quality and everything included in them limit being by applying it to some essence or nature now in this sense goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection which is also proper to being whatever kind of nature it may be hence goodness does not limit being reply to objection 2 no being can be spoken of as evil formally as being but only so far as it lacks being thus a man is said to be evil because he lacks some virtue and an eye is said to be evil because it lacks the power to see well reply to objection 3 as primary matter has only potential being so it is only potentially good although according to the plateness primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it nevertheless it does participate to a certain extent in goodness namely by its relation to or aptitude for goodness consequently to be desirable is not its property but to desire reply to objection 4 mathematical entities do not subsist as realities because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted but they have only logical existence in as much as they are abstracted from motion and matter thus they cannot have the aspect of an end which itself has the aspect of moving another nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness as was said in the preceding article fourth article whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause objection 1 it seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause but rather of the other causes for as Dionysius says goodness is praised as beauty but beauty has the aspect of a formal cause therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause objection 2 further goodness is self-diffusive for Dionysius says that goodness is that whereby all things subsist and are but to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause objection 3 further Augustine says that we exist because God is good but we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause on the contrary the philosopher says that that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things for the sake of which something is therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause I answer that since goodness is that which all things desire and since this has the aspect of an end it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end nevertheless the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause and also of a formal cause for we see that what is first in causing is last in the thing cause fire for example heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form now in causing goodness and the end come first both of which move the agent to act secondly the action of the agent moving to the form thirdly comes the form hence in that which is cause the converse ought to take place so that there should be a first the form whereby it is a being secondly we consider in it its effective power whereby it is perfect in being for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like as the philosopher says thirdly there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection reply to objection one beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally for they are based upon the same thing namely the form and consequently goodness is praised as beauty but they differ logically for goodness properly relates to the appetite goodness being with all things desire and therefore it has the aspect of an end the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing on the other hand beauty relates to the cognitive faculty therefore beautiful things are those which please when seen hence beauty consists in due proportion for the senses delight in things duly proportioned as in what is after their own kind because every sense is a sort of reason just as is every cognitive faculty now since knowledge is by assimilation and similarly relates to form beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause reply to objection two goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move reply to objection three he who has a will is said to be good so far as he has a good will because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have hence a man is said to be good not by his good understanding but by his good will now the will relates to the end as to its proper object thus the saying we exist because God is good has reference to the final cause fifth article whether the essence of goodness consists in mode species and order objection one it seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode species and order for goodness and being differ logically but mode species and order seem to belong to the nature of being for it is written thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight and to those three can be reduced species mode and order as Augustine says measure fixes the mode of everything number gives it its species and weight gives it rest instability therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode species and order objection two further mode species and order are themselves good therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode species and order then every mode must have its own mode species and order the same would be the case with species and order in endless succession objection three further evil is the privation of mode species and order but evil is not the total absence of goodness therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode species and order objection four further that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil yet we can speak of an evil mode species and order therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode species and order objection five further mode species and order are caused by weight number and measure as appears from the quotation from Augustine but not every good thing has weight number and measure for Ambrose says it is of the nature of light not to have been created in number weight and measure therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode species and order on the contrary Augustine says these three mode species and order as common good things are in everything God has made thus where these three abound the things are very good where they are less the things are less good where they do not exist at all there can be nothing good but this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode species and order I answer that everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect for in that way only is it desirable now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection but since everything is what it is by its form and since the form presupposes certain things and from the form certain things necessarily follow in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form together with all that precedes and follows upon that form now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles whether material or efficient and this is signified by the mode hence it is said that the measure marks the mode but the form itself is signified by the species where everything is placed in its species by its form hence the number is said to give the species for definitions signifying species are like numbers according to the philosopher whereas a unit added to or taken from a number changes its species so a difference added to or taken from a definition changes its species further upon the form follows an inclination to the end or to an action or something of the sort where everything in so far as it is in act acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form and this belongs to weight and order hence the essence of goodness so far as it consists in perfection consists also in mode species and order reply to objection one these three only follow upon being so far as it is perfect and according to this perfection it is good reply to objection two mode species and order are said to be good and to be beings not as though they themselves were substances but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good spoken of as good not as though formally constituted so by something else but as formally constituting others good thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else because by it something else has accidental being as an object that is white reply to objection three every being is due to some form hence according to every being of a thing is its mode species and order thus a man has a mode species and order as he is white virtuous learned and so on according to everything predicated of him but evil deprives the thing of some sort of being as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight yet it does not destroy every mode species and order but only such as follow upon the being of sight reply to objection four Augustine says every mode as mode is good and the same can be said of species and order but an evil mode species and order are called so as being less than they ought to be or is not belonging to that which they ought to belong therefore they are called evil because they are out of place and incongruous reply to objection five the nature of light is spoken of as being without number weight in measure not absolutely but in comparison with corporeal things because the power of light extends to all corporeal things in as much as it is an active quality of the first body that causes things namely the heavens sixth article whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous the useful and the pleasant objection one it seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous the useful and the pleasant for goodness is divided by the ten predicaments as the philosopher says but the virtuous the useful and the pleasant can be found only under one predicament therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them objection two further every division is made by opposites but these three do not seem to be opposites for the virtuous is pleasing and no wickedness is useful whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed until he speaks of this therefore this division is incorrect objection three further where one thing is on account of another there is only one thing but the useful is not goodness except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous on the contrary Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness I answer that this division properly concerns human goodness but if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such for everything is good so far as it is desirable and is a term of the movement of the appetite the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end where the movement ceases so a thing is called a term of movement so far as it terminates any part of that movement now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways either as the thing itself towards which it tends for example place or form or a state of rest in that thing thus in the movement of the appetite the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively as a means by which something tends towards another is called the useful but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends is called the virtuous for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired is called the pleasant reply to objection one goodness so far as it is identical with being is divided by the ten predicaments but this division belongs to it according to its proper formality reply to objection two this division is not by opposite things but by opposite aspects now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves but are desired only as helpful to something further as the taking of bitter medicine while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves reply to objection three goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous then of the pleasant and lastly of the useful the end of question five question six of summa teologica par's prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa teologica par's prima initial questions by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question six the goodness of God next consider the goodness of God under which head there are four points of inquiry whether goodness belongs to God whether God is the supreme good whether he alone is essentially good and whether all things are good by the divine goodness first article whether God is good objection one it seems that to be good does not belong to God for goodness consists in mode, species and order but these do not seem to belong to God since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else therefore to be good does not belong to God objection two further the good is what all things desire but all things do not desire God because all things do not know him and nothing is desired unless it is known therefore to be good does not belong to God on the contrary it is written the Lord is good to them that hope in him to the soul that seeketh him I answer that to be good belongs preeminently to God for a thing is good according to its desirableness now everything seeks after its own perfection and the perfection and form of an effect consists in a certain likeness to the agent since every agent makes its like and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good for the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness for since God is the first effective cause of all things it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to him and hence Dionysius attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause saying that God is called good as by whom all things subsist reply to objection one to have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good but good is in God as in its cause and hence it belongs to him to impose mode species and order on others where for these three things are in God as in their cause reply to objection two all things by desiring their own perfection desire God himself in as much as the perfection of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being as appears from what is said above and so of those things which desire God some know him as he is in himself as this is proper to the rational creature others know some participation of his goodness and this belongs also to sensible knowledge others have a natural desire without knowledge as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence second article whether God is the supreme good objection one it seems that God is not the supreme good for the supreme good adds something to good otherwise it would belong to every good but everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing therefore the supreme good is a compound but God is supremely simple as was shown above therefore God is not the supreme good objection two further good is what all desire as the philosopher says now what all desire is nothing but God who is the end of all things therefore there is no other good but God this appears also from what is said none is good but God alone but we use the word supreme in comparison with others as for example supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats therefore God cannot be called the supreme good objection three further supreme implies comparison but things not in the same genus are not comparable as sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line therefore since God is not in the same genus as other good things as appears above it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others on the contrary Augustine says that the trinity of the divine persons is the supreme good discerned by purified minds I answer that God is the supreme good simply and not only as existing in any genus or order of things for good is attributed to God as was said in the preceding article in as much as all desired perfections flow from him as from the first cause they do not however flow from him as from a univical agent as shown above but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus now the likeness of an effect in the univical cause is found uniformly but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently as heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire therefore as good is in God as in the first but not the univical cause of all things it must be in him in a most excellent way and therefore he is called the supreme good reply to objection one the supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing it is only a relation now a relation of God to creatures is not a reality in God but in the creature for it is in God in our idea only as what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge not that it depends on knowledge but because knowledge depends on it thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good but only that other things are deficient in comparison with it reply to objection two when we say that good is what all desire it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all but that whatever is desired has the nature of good and when it is said none is good but God alone this is to be understood of essential goodness as will be explained in the next article reply to objection three things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things not that he is in any other genus but that he is outside genus and is the principle of every genus and thus he is compared to others by excess and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies third article whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone objection one it seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone for as one is convertible with being so is good as we said above but every being is one essentially as appears from the philosopher but every being is good essentially objection two further if good is what all things desire since being itself is desired by all then the being of each thing is its good but everything is a being essentially therefore every being is good essentially objection three further everything is good by its own goodness therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially it is not necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence therefore its goodness since it is not a being must be good and if it is good by some other goodness the same question applies to that goodness also therefore we must either proceed to infinity or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness therefore the first supposition holds good therefore everything is good essentially on the contrary Boethius says that all things but God are good by participation therefore they are not good essentially I answer that God alone is good essentially for everything is called good according to its perfection now perfection of a thing is threefold first according to the constitution of its own being secondly in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation thirdly perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end thus for instance the first perfection of fire consists in its existence which it has through its own substantial form its secondary perfection consists in heat lightness and dryness and the like its third perfection is to rest in its own place this triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence it belongs to God only in whom alone essence is existence in whom there are no accidents since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to him essentially as to be powerful, wise and the like as appears from what is stated above and he is not directed to anything else as to an end but is himself the last end of all things hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by his own essence therefore he himself alone is good essentially reply to objection one one does not include the idea of perfection but only of indivision which belongs to everything according to its own essence now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually and therefore everything must be one essentially but not good essentially as was shown above reply to objection two although everything is good in that it has being yet the essence of a creature is not very being and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially reply to objection three the goodness of a creature is not its very essence but something super added it is either its existence or some added perfection or the order to its end still the goodness itself thus added is good just as it is being but for this reason it is called being because by it something has being not because it itself has being through something else hence for this reason it is called good because by it something is good and not because it itself has some other goodness whereby it is good fourth article whether all things are good by the divine goodness objection one it seems that all things are good by the divine goodness for Augustine says this and that are good take away this and that and see good itself if thou canst and so thou shalt see God good not by any other good but the good of every good but everything is good by its own good therefore everything is good by that very good which is God objection two further as Boethius says all things are called good according as they are directed to God and this is by reason of the divine goodness therefore all things are good by the divine goodness on the contrary all things are good in as much as they have being but they are not called beings through the divine being but through their own being therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness but by their own goodness I answer that as regards relative things we must admit extrinsic denomination as a thing is denominated placed from place referred from measure but as regards absolute things opinions differ Plato held the existence of separate ideas of all things and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas for instance that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse so likewise he laid down separate ideas of being and of one and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness and by participation of these everything was called being or one and what was thus absolute being and absolute one he said was the supreme good because good is convertible with being as one is also he called God the absolute good and these things are called good by way of participation although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves as Aristotle argues in many ways still it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good which we call God as appears from what is shown above hence from the first being essentially such and good everything can be called good and a being in as much as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective as appears from the above everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness nevertheless everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it which is formally its own goodness whereby it is denominated good and so of all things there is one goodness yet many this is a sufficient reply to the objections the end of question six question seven of summa theologica pars prima initial questions this is a Libra Vox recording all Libra Vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit Libra Vox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima initial questions by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question seven the infinity of God after considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity and God's existence and things for God is everywhere and in all things and as much as he is boundless and infinite concerning the first there are four points of inquiry whether God is infinite whether anything besides him is infinite in essence whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude and whether an infinite multitude can exist first article whether God is infinite objection one it seems that God is not infinite for everything infinite is imperfect as the philosopher says because it has parts and matter as is said in the physics but God is most perfect therefore he is not infinite objection two further according to the philosopher finite and infinite belong to quantity but there is no quantity in God for he is not a body as was shown above therefore it does not belong to him to be infinite objection three further what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere is finite according to place therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing is finite according to substance but God is this and not another for he is not a stone or wood therefore God is not infinite in substance on the contrary damascene says that God is infinite and eternal and boundless I answer that all the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle as is said and with reason for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle but because some concerning the nature of the first principle as a consequence they are also concerning its infinity for as much as they asserted that matter was the first principle consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things we must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite now matter is in a way made finite by form and the form by matter matter indeed is made finite by form and as much as matter before it receives its form is in potentiality to many forms but on receiving a form it is terminated by that one again form is made finite by matter and as much as form considered in itself is common to many but when perceived in matter the form is determined to this one particular thing now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite therefore infinite as attributed to matter has the nature of something imperfect for it is as it were formless matter on the other hand form is not made perfect by matter but rather is contracted by matter and hence the infinite regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter has the nature of something perfect now being is the most formal of all things as appears from what is shown above since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything but he is his own subsistence being as was shown above it is clear that God himself is infinite and perfect from this applies the reply to objection one reply to objection two quantity is terminated by its form which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated is a kind of quantitative form hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God as was said above in this article reply to objection three the fact that the being of God is self-subsisting not received in any other and is thus called infinite shows him to be distinguished from all other beings and all others to be apart from him even so were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness the very fact that it did not exist in anything else would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject second article whether anything but God can be essentially infinite objection one it seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite for the power of anything is proportion to its essence now if the essence of God is infinite his power must also be infinite therefore he can produce an infinite effect since the extent of power is known by its effect objection two further whatever has infinite power has infinite essence now the created intellect has an infinite power for it apprehends the universal which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite objection three further primary matter is something other than God as were shown above but primary matter is infinite therefore something besides God can be infinite on the contrary the infinite beginning as said in the physics but everything outside of God is from God as from its first principle therefore besides God nothing can be infinite I answer that things other than God can be relatively infinite but not absolutely infinite for with regard to infinite as applied to matter it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form that matter is determined by form but because matter considers as existing under some substantial form remains in potentiality to many accidental forms which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite as for example would is finite according to its own form but still it is relatively infinite in as much as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes but if we speak of the infinite form it is manifest that those things the forms of which are in matter are absolutely finite and in no way infinite if however any created forms are not received into matter but are self subsisting as some think is the case with angels these will be relatively infinite in as much as such kinds of forms are not terminated nor contracted by any matter but because a created form thus subsisting has being and yet is not its own being it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature as it cannot be absolutely infinite replied to objection one it is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence because subsisting being is not a created being as it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite therefore as God although he has infinite power cannot make a thing to be not made for this would imply that two contradictory are true at the same time so likewise he cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite replied to objection two the fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things is because the intellect is a form not in matter but either wholly separated from matter as is the angelic substance or at least an intellectual power which is not the act of any organ in the intellectual soul joined to a body replied to objection three primary matter does not exist by itself in nature since it is not actually being but potentially only hence it is something concreated rather than created nevertheless primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite but relatively because its potentiality extends only to natural natural forms third article whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist objection one it seems that there can be something actually infinite and magnitude for in mathematics there is no error since there is no lie in things abstract as the philosopher says but mathematics uses the infinite and magnitude thus the geometrician in his demonstration says let this line be infinite therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude objection two further what is not against the nature of anything can agree with it now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite objection three further magnitude is infinitely divisible so the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible as is clear from physics but contraries are concerned about one and the same thing since therefore addition is opposed to division and increase opposed to diminution it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite objection four further movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes as is said in the physics but it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite since every determinant indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite on the contrary everybody has a surface which has a surface is finite because surface is the term of a finite body therefore all bodies are finite the same applies both the surface and to a line therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude I answer that it is one thing to be infinite in essence and another to be infinite in magnitude for granted that the body exists infinite in magnitude as fire or air yet this could not be infinite in essence because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form and confined to individuality by matter and so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude we must therefore observe that a body which is a complete magnitude can be considered in two ways basically in respect to its quantity only and naturally as regards its matter and form now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite for every natural body has some determined substantial form since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form and among these accidents is quantity so every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite the same appears from movement because every natural body has some natural movement whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement neither direct because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place and this could not happen in the infinite body for it would occupy every place and thus every place would be in differently its own place neither could it move circularly for as much as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body for of two lines be drawn from the center the farther they extend from the center therefore if a body were infinite the lines would be infinitely distant from each other and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other the same applies to a mathematical body for if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing we must imagine it under some form because nothing is actual except by its form hence since the form of quantity as such as figure is some figure and so would be finite for figure is confined by a term or boundary replied to objection one a geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite but takes some actually finite line from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary which line he calls infinite replied to objection two although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general still it is against the nature of any species of it thus for instance it is against the nature of a bicubal or tricubal magnitude whether circular or triangular and so on now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude since no species of magnitude is infinite replied to objection three the infinite in quantity as was shown above belongs to matter now by division of the whole we approach to matter for as much as parts have the aspect of matter but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude but only in division replied to objection four movement and time are whole not actually but successively hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality but magnitude is an actual whole therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter and does not agree with the totality of magnitude yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality fourth article whether an infinite multitude can exist objection one it seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible for it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual but number can be multiplied to infinity therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist objection two further it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual but the species of figures are infinite therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible objection three further things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other but supposing a multitude of things to exist there can still be many others not opposed to them therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them and so on to infinitude therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible on the contrary it is written thou hast ordered all things in measure and number I answer that a twofold opinion exists on this subject some as avicenna and al-gazel said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible a multitude is said to be infinite absolutely when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist so this is impossible because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence an instance generation could never come to be because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium a multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary but accidental this can be shown for example in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude namely art in the soul the movement of the hand and a hammer and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied the carpentering would would never be finished for as much as it would depend on an infinite number of causes but the multitude of hammers in as much as one may be broken and another used is an accidental multitude for it happens by accident that many hammers are used and it matters little whether one or two are used or an infinite number if the work is carried on for an infinite time in this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude this however is impossible since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers but no species of number is infinite for every number is multitude measured by one hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude either absolute or accidental likewise multitude in nature is created and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the creator for no agent acts aimlessly hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist even accidentally but a potentially infinite multitude is possible because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude since the more a thing is divided the greater number of things result hence as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division which is very continuous because we thus approach matter as was shown in the preceding article by the same rule the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude reply to objection one every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being for instance a day is reduced to act successively and not all at once likewise the infinite and multitude successively and not all at once because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity reply to objection two species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number now there are various species of figures such as trilateral quadrilateral and so on and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act so neither is the multitude of figures replied to objection three although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist the end of question seven question eight of summa theologica pars prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima initial questions by saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question eight the existence of God in things that evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere and in all things we now consider whether this belongs to God and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry whether God is in all things whether God is everywhere whether God is everywhere by essence power and presence and whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone first article whether God is in all things objection one it seems that God is not in all things for what is above all things is not in all things but God is above all according to the psalm the Lord is high above all nations therefore God is not in all things objection two further what is in anything is thereby contained now God is not contained by things but rather does he contain them therefore God is not in things but things are rather in him things are rather than he is in any place objection three further the more powerful an agent is the more extended is its action but God is the most powerful of all agents therefore his action can extend to things which are far removed from him nor is it necessary that he should be in all things objection four further the demons are beings but God is not in demons for there is no fellowship between light and darkness therefore God is not in all things on the contrary thing is wherever it operates but God operates in all things according to Isaiah Lord thou hast brought all our works in us therefore God is in all things I answer that God is in all things not indeed as part of their essence nor as an accident but as an agent is present to that upon which it works for an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power hence it is proved in physics that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together now since God is very being by his own essence created being must be his proper effect as to ignite is the proper effect of fire now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be but as long as they are preserved in being as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated therefore as long as the thing has being God must be present to it according to its mode of being but being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing as was shown above hence it must be that God is in all things and innermostly replied to objection one God is above all things by the excellence of his power or nature nevertheless he is in all things as the cause of the being of all things as was shown above in the article replied to objection two although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them nevertheless spiritual things contain those things in which they are as the soul contains the body hence also God is in things containing them nevertheless by a certain similitude to corporeal things it is said that all things are in God in as much as they are contained by him by objection three no action of an agent however powerful it may be acts at a distance except through a medium but it belongs to the great power of God that he acts immediately in all things as nothing is distant from him as if it could be without God in itself but things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to him in nature or grace as also he is above all by the excellence of his own nature replied to objection four in the demons there is their nature which is from God and also the deformity of sin which is not from him therefore it is not to be absolutely conceited that God is in the demons except with the addition in as much as they are beings but in things not deformed in their nature we must say absolutely that God is second article whether God is everywhere objection one it seems that God is not everywhere for to be everywhere means to be in every place but to be in every place does not belong to God to whom it does not belong to be in place at all for incorporeal things as Boethius says are not in a place therefore God is not everywhere objection two further the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence but one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place now the divine being is not successive but permanent therefore God is not in many places and thus he is not everywhere objection three further what is holy in any one place is not in part elsewhere but if God is in any one place he is all there for he has no parts no part of him then is elsewhere and therefore God is not everywhere on the contrary it is written I fill heaven and earth I answer that since place is a thing to be in place can be understood in a two fold sense either by way of other things that is as one thing is said to be in another no matter how and thus the accidents of a place are in place or by a way proper to place and thus things placed are in a place now in both these senses in some way God is in every place and this is to be everywhere first as he is in all things giving them being power and operation so he is in every place is giving it existence and locket of power again things placed are in place in as much as they fill place and God fills every place not indeed like a body for a body is said to fill place in as much as it excludes the co presence of another body whereas by God being in a place others are not thereby excluded from it indeed by the very fact that he gives being to the things that fill every place he himself fills every place replied to objection one incorporeal things are in place not by contact of defensive quantity as bodies are by contact of power replied to objection two the indivisible is two fold one is the term of the continuous as a point in permanent things and as a moment in succession and this kind of the indivisible and permanent things for as much as it has a determinant site cannot be in many parts of place or in many places likewise the indivisible of action or movement for as much as it has a determinant order in movement or action cannot be in many parts of time another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous and in this way incorporeal substances like God angel and soul are called indivisible such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous as a part of it but as touching it by its power hence according as its power can extend itself to one or to many to a small thing or to a great one in this way it is in one place or in many places and in a small or large place replied to objection three a whole is so called with reference to its parts now part is two fold namely a part of the essence as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite while genus and difference are called parts of a species there is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided what therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity cannot be outside of that place because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place but totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing not to be at all outside of it this appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity as an example whiteness is whole in each part of the surface that we speak of its totality of essence because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface but if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally then it is not whole in every part of the surface on the other hand incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence hence as the soul is whole in every part of the body so is God whole in all things and in each one third article whether God is everywhere by essence presence and power objection one it seems that the mode of God existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power for what is by essence in anything is in it essentially but God is not essentially in things for he does to the essence of anything therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence presence and power objection two further to be present in anything means not to be absent from it but this is the meaning of God being in things by his essence that he is not absent from anything therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence mean the same thing therefore it is superfluous to say presence and power objection three further as God by his power is the principle of all things so he is the same likewise by his knowledge and will but it is not said that he is in things by knowledge and will therefore neither is he present by his power objection four further as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing so many other perfections are likewise added therefore of God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God existence in things on the contrary a gloss on the canicle of canicles says that God by a common mode is in all things by his presence power and substance still he is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace I answer that God is said to be in a thing in two ways and one way after the manner of inefficient cause and thus he is in all things created by him in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator and this is proper to the operations of the soul according as the thing known is in the one who knows and the thing desired is in the one desiring in this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves him actually or habitually and because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace as will be shown later he is said to be thus in the saints by grace but how he is in other things created by him may be considered from human affairs a king for example is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power although he is not everywhere present again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection as things in a house are said to be present to anyone who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house lastly a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be now there were some the manachese who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by his power but others though they believe that all things were subject to the divine power still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies and in the person of these it is said he walketh about the poles of the heavens and he does not consider our things against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by his presence further others said that although all things are subject to God's providence still all things are not immediately created by God but that he immediately created the first creatures and these created the others against these it is necessary to say that he is in all things by his essence therefore God is in all things by his power and as much as all things are subject to his power he is by his presence in all things as all things are bare and open to his eyes he is in all things by his essence and as much as he is present to all as the cause of their being replied to objection one God is said to be in all things by essence not indeed by the essence of the things themselves as if he were of their essence but by his own essence because his substance is present to all things as the cause of their being replied to objection two one can be said to be present to another when in its sight though the thing may be distant in substance as was shown in this article and therefore two modes of presence are necessary namely by essence and by presence replied to objection three knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows and the thing willed in the one who wills hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God in things but power is the principle of acting on another hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another replied to objection four no other perfection except grace added to substance renders God present in anything as the object known and loved therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things there is however another special mode of God's existence in man by union which will be treated of in its own place fourth article whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone objection one it seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone universal according to the philosopher is everywhere and always primary matter also since it is in all bodies is everywhere but neither of these is God as appears from what is said above therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone objection two further number is in things numbered but the whole universe is constituted in number as appears from the book of wisdom therefore there is in some number which is in the whole universe and is thus everywhere objection three further the universe is a kind of whole perfect body but the whole universe is everywhere because there is no place outside it therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone objection four further if any body were infinite no place would exist outside of it and so it would be everywhere therefore to be everywhere does not appear to God alone objection five further the soul as Augustine says is whole in the whole body and whole in every one of its parts therefore if there was only one animal in the world its soul would be everywhere and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone objection six further as Augustine says the soul feels where it sees and lives where it feels and is where it lives but the soul sees as it were everywhere for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight therefore the soul is everywhere on the contrary Ambrose says who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature who in all things and everywhere and always is which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone I answer that to be everywhere primarily and absolutely is proper to God now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places it would not be primarily everywhere for as much as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily thus if a man has white teeth whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth but the thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally that is merely on some supposition as a grain of millet would be everywhere supposing that no other body existed belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when on any supposition it must be everywhere and this properly belongs to God alone for whatever number of places be supposed even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exists would be necessary that God should be in all of them for nothing can exist except by him therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to him because whatever number of places be supposed to exist God must be in all of them not as to a part of him but as to his very self reply to objection one the universal and also primary matter are indeed everywhere but not according to the same mode replied to objection two number since it is an accident does not of itself exist in place but accidentally neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere reply to objection three the whole body of the universe is everywhere but not primarily for as much as it is not wholly in each place but according to its parts nor again is it everywhere absolutely because supposing that other places existed beside itself it would not be in them reply to objection four if an infinite body existed it would be everywhere but according to its parts reply to objection five whether one animal only his soul would be everywhere primarily indeed but only accidentally reply to objection six when it is said that the soul sees anywhere this can be taken in two senses in one sense the adverb anywhere determines the act of seeing on the part of the object and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens it sees in the heavens and in the same way it feels in the heavens but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens because to live and to exist do not an act passing to an exterior object in another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer as proceeding from the seer thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees there it is and there it lives according to this modus speaking and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere the end of question eight question nine of sumo theologica pars prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy sumo theologica pars prima initial questions by Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question nine the immutability of God we next consider God's immutability and his eternity following on his immutability on the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry whether God is altogether immutable and whether to be immutable belongs to God alone first article whether God is altogether immutable objection one it seems that God is not altogether immutable but God moves itself is in some way mutable but as Augustine says the creator spirit moves himself neither by time nor by place therefore God is in some way mutable objection two further it is said of wisdom that it is more mobile than all things active but God is wisdom itself therefore God is movable objection three further to approach and to recede signify movement but these are said of God in Scripture draw nigh to God and he will draw nigh to you therefore God is mutable on the contrary it is written I am the Lord and I change not I answer that from what proceeds it is shown that God is altogether immutable first because it was shown above that there is some first being whom we call God and that this first being must be pure act without the admixture of any potentiality for the reason that absolutely potentiality is posterior to act now everything which is in any way changed is in some way in potentiality hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable secondly because everything which is moved remains as it was in part and passes away in part as what is moved from whiteness to blackness remains the same as to substance thus in everything which is moved there is some kind of composition to be found but it has been shown above that in God there is no composition for he is altogether simple hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved thirdly because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement and attains to what it had not attained previously but since God is infinite comprehending in himself all the plentitude of perfection of all being he cannot acquire anything new nor extend himself to anything that is extended previously hence movement in no way belongs to him so some of the ancients constrained as it were by the truth decided that the first principle was immovable replied to Objection 1 Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato who said that the first mover moves himself calling every operation of movement even as the acts of understanding and willing and loving are called movements therefore because God understands and loves himself in that respect they said that God moves himself not however as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality as we now speak of change and movement replied to Objection 2 wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation as from the first defective and formal principle as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist and so in the same way in as much as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things which participate more fully of its likeness to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree there is said to be a kind of procession at movement of the divine wisdom as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth in as much as the ray of light touches the earth in this way Dionysius expounds the matter that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the father of light replied to Objection 3 these things are said of God in scripture metaphorically for as the sun is said to enter a house or to go out according as its rays reach the house so God is said to approach to us or to recede from us when we receive the influx of his goodness or decline from him second article whether to be immutable belongs to God alone first objection it seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone for the philosopher says that matter is in everything which is moved but according to some certain created substances as angels and souls have no matter whether to be immutable does not belong to God alone objection 2 further everything in motion moves to some end what therefore has already attained its ultimate end is not in motion but some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end as all the blessed in heaven therefore some creatures are immovable objection 3 further everything which is mutable is variable but forms are invariable for it is said that form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable on the contrary Augustine says God alone is immutable and whatever things he has made being from nothing are immutable I answer that God alone is altogether immutable whereas every creature is in some way mutable be it known therefore that immutable thing can be called so in two ways by a power in itself and by a power possessed by another for all creatures before they existed were possible not by any created power since no creature is eternal but by the divine power alone in as much as God could produce them into existence thus as the production of the thing into existence depends on the will of God so likewise it depends on his will that things should be preserved for he does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence hence if he took away his actions from them all things would be reduced to nothing as appears from Augustine therefore as it was in the creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves so likewise it is in the creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing in this way therefore by the power of another namely of God they are mutable in as much as they are producible from nothing by him and are by him reducible from existence to non-existence if however a thing is called mutable by a power in itself thus also in some manner every creature is mutable for every creature has a twofold power active and passive and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being or in attaining to its end now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being in that way all creatures are not mutable but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent with non-being hence in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being and as much as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form and also as regards their accidental being supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident as for example the subject man can exist with not whiteness and can therefore be changed from white to not white but supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident as for example snow cannot be made black now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being but only as to locality because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place on the other hand incorporeal substances being subsistent forms although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act are not consistent with the privation of this act for as much as existence is consequent upon form and nothing corrupts except it loses its form hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence therefore Dionysius says that intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances still there remains in them a twofold mutability one as regards their potentiality to their end and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil as Damascene says the other as regards place and as much as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places which cannot be said of God who by his infinity fills all places as was shown above thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible or as regards locality only as in the case of the celestial bodies or as regards the order to their end and the application of their powers to diverse objects as is the case with the angels and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the creator in whose power is their existence and non-existence and since God is in none of these ways mutable it belongs to him alone to be all together immutable reply to objection one this objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being for philosophers treated of such movement reply to objection two the good angels besides their natural endowment of immutability of being have also immutability of election by divine power nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place reply to objection three forms are called invariable for as much as they cannot be subjects of variation they are subjects to variation because by them subject is variable and so it is clear that they vary and so far as they are for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being but because through them something has being the end of question nine