 OK, I want to start with some stuff we were discussing last time and some student questions. So first of all, somebody asked the question when we were talking about causality, and Hobbs claimed that we have experience that one thing causes another, for example, fire and heating or ice and cooling. And that experience is our only basis for that. And so when we claim that fire causes warming, we're relating that back to an experience we had and something that actually occurred in sense, not just the fire or the warmth but seeing them conjoined. And then he further said that this isn't just a matter of the meaning of the word fire or the meaning of the word hot or the meaning of the word ice or the meaning of the word cold as in claims about a triangle being a three-sided figure or something. That is a matter of what those names are. And possibly a claim like that the interior angles of the triangle added to the sum of two right angles is something that we can unpack from the meaning of those terms. But we can't unpack causality, necessarily, from the meaning of terms whose truth we have to relate back to sensation. And in those cases, we depend on probabilities. So we say it's very probably true that fire is going to warm that thing as opposed to cooling it or that ice is going to cool it instead of warming it. But we can't say that with certainty like we can say that the interior angles of the triangle add up to the sum of two right angles. There is no question, both in the past, in the future and in the present, that that statement is true because that is merely to unpack the meanings of those words, whereas that will never be the case with the causal claim. Now, as the examples show, we can be pretty sure. And if anybody wants to place a million to one bet that the next time you try the experiment of holding a lighter under your hand or putting ice in your hand, that it's going to be warm or cold, I'll take that bet. But the point is that we cannot say that with certainty because the next time we do it, something else could happen or even the opposite could happen. All we have to go on is sensation. Now, we're going to revisit that issue because Hume takes that to be a crucial point about causality and reaches a lot of skeptical conclusions on its basis. But some students said, well, what about laws of nature? Isn't it a law of nature that fire warms instead of cools or that ice cools instead of warms? And how does that come into Hobbes' thesis? Is the person who asked that question willing to identify themselves? Because I think it was a good question. Yes, OK. Thank you. What's your name? Yuval. Yuval. OK. The fact of the matter is that Hobbes does have an idea of laws of nature and natural laws. But they only come in when we start talking about civil, civic philosophy, civil philosophy, political philosophy. Because laws are things created by humans and imposed on other humans. So the term natural law or law of nature is actually really confusing because it's as if some human-imposed institution could affect or govern physical entities that don't have minds and don't have any. So it's not the case that fire, when it warms things up, is obeying some law that some humans that I require fire to heat things up instead of cool it. And it better watch out because I'll punish this piece of fire if it doesn't do that. That would be a law. So in that sense of laws of nature, there is no such thing. It's a metaphorical way of talking. It actually relates to an idea that God created all of this stuff and then God imposed laws on all of those things. And they actually all obeyed his laws as if they were agents like human beings. Now, whatever merits there are of that position, Hobbes rejects it totally. God didn't create everything. And God didn't give laws to inanimate objects. And inanimate objects don't cause the things they do because they're following laws. And so this is actually a really, really important point in Hobbes is that he, unlike a lot of his predecessors, does not use the terms laws of nature or natural law in that metaphorical and confusing way. He uses it for laws that people impose on others on the basis of human nature. So the law that says that you must obey an authority figure like the sovereign of the state or something has to do with his theory about human nature. And humans can, of course, design laws. And humans can break laws, whereas inanimate objects can't break laws. Gravity, we say gravity. It's not just a good idea. It's the law. But that's just a joke because there's no way for a falling object to literally disobey. And similarly, there's no way for it to actually obey anything. So this is a big difference with Hobbes is that this confusing metaphorical talk of laws of nature as if inanimate objects could obey human-like laws, he rejects completely. So he's going to have to come up with another theory of what science is and what science does. So first, on background of what knowledge and science are here used simultaneously. See, there's this corrupt thing that people no longer use Greek. But the Greek term here is epistemi. That can be translated knowledge or science. And so Hobbes uses both of them. Epistemi is where we get the term epistemology. And that's what we're dealing with here, the theory of what knowledge or what science is. Now, he says there's two conditions for knowledge. So when we think we have knowledge, we think we have access to two things. One, truth, and two, evidence. And this is basically still the concept of knowledge that we operate with. And it's actually a very ancient one. And it's a very problematic and in fact unsatisfactory one. But it's the best one we have going. So in Plato's dialogue Theatetus, he showed that knowledge is not just truth because you can know something is true without, you can accept that something is true without knowing that it's true. Okay, and it's not just truth plus some account because people can give an account of anything. And even if something that's true and it still wouldn't constitute knowledge. And so he said, well, maybe it's some kind of justified true account, justified true belief. Okay, and we still essentially work with that definition of knowledge, that knowledge is justified true belief. So that's what we say. That's what we tell undergraduate students to reassure them that we actually have a theory of knowledge. But there are counter examples and problems with every aspect of that definition. So I could give you examples of justified true belief that does not in fact constitute knowledge. But Hobbes gives us a variant of that. Truth means true belief and evidence is the justification or the reasoned account that we can give. Now he defined truth in the previous chapter as the comprehension of the subject by the predicate. So for example, the claim that a human is an animal is true because the term animal encompasses human. It also encompasses fish and bird, but it does encompass human. How do I know that? Because a human is defined as a rational animal. And there's other ways I can know that because it exhibits certain powers that are animal powers and that sort of thing. Compare that with the claim an animal is a human. That's false because the predicate doesn't comprehend the subject. There was lots of animals that aren't human, birds and fishes. So if I had a bird in mind and I said, that must be a human because an animal is a human, the principle that I'm operating on there is false simply because the predicate does not comprehend the subject. So all I need for truth is comprehension of the predicate by the subject. And this is most obvious in the case of definitions. So you take something like a bachelor. What's a bachelor? A bachelor is an unmarried male. Every unmarried male is a bachelor and every bachelor is an unmarried male and there is a perfect comprehension of the subject by the predicate there. There's no remainder as there is in this other example I gave of the term animal comprehending the term human. Okay, and again notice that this truth about bachelors or unmarried male, this isn't a deep empirical truth that we go out and we look at various bachelors and we say, is he married or not? This just has to do with the comprehension of terms. That's what the term indicates. So once we've got a truth that we have a candidate for something that we can actually know, okay? But we need to add evidence. Now what is evidence? He says evidence is the, and this is a mouthful, the concomitance of a man's conception, man meaning human, a person's conception, with the words that signify such conception in the act of reasoning. And so here he ties evidence to the conception and the conception we have already seen is tied to sensation. And so it ultimately has to be grounded in some kind of sensation. So I've got to be able to dissolve the elements of these true propositions that I'm giving into things that actually relate to conceptions and conceptions that relate to sensations. And as I said last time, because we can, because the conceptions we form don't perfectly capture the things and sometimes they capture more than what we're trying to include in the object. We get this problem of equivocation and ambiguity entering into language. And Paul says that the elimination of that ambiguity is what gives us understanding another intellectual virtue. Is that a question? Yeah. Is truth important to the definition of knowledge? You can't have, like they're not the definition like to the essence of it. No, no, to the definition. Yes, and essence just means definition. All right, so it can't, you can't have knowledge that is like false knowledge. Right, there's no such thing as false knowledge. That's right. I mean that, in fact, that's the big difference between knowledge and other things is that knowledge can't be false. Opinions can be good or bad, okay, and they can be true or false, okay, but knowledge can't be true or false. Knowledge has to be true. Okay, if we say we know something, like we know that the interior angles of the triangle add up to the sum of two right angles, okay, that can't possibly ever be false. What if I said like I know today is Tuesday, but I mean I would be wrong, but what if I, like internally that would be wrong? Yes, and why would you be wrong? You'd be wrong on, I mean the most immediate way to say that you're wrong is that it's not true that it's Tuesday. It actually is Monday, right? And I was like walking around and I was like, today's Tuesday, and I was like, what was in my, if someone was like, do you know what day it is? I feel like I do. And they would just walk away, we wouldn't even say what day it is, but in my head, my answer would be Tuesday evening. So there's no problem with people thinking that they have knowledge. In fact, this is the big problem is that everybody thinks they have knowledge about all kinds of stuff, including stuff that's false and including stuff that they don't have evidence for, but they think they know it, they think they know God exists, they think they know there's an external world, they think they, and so on. But, and unfortunately holding false beliefs doesn't hurt and cause you pain or doesn't set off some alarm system in your mind that shows you that it's false. So we have to, it's actually difficult in a lot of cases to show that things are false. Now, in this case, we break down the conceptions you have, okay? Make sure that we mean the same thing by today. By today you're not talking about tomorrow, right? And then we relate what today and tomorrow are back to sensations we have. And then we make sure that we mean the same thing by Monday because you might be confused or you might come from a place where Monday is called Tuesday and Tuesday is called Monday or something. That's all eliminating ambiguity. So that's getting understanding about what you're really saying. Now, if you persist in this, no, I mean the same, we mean the same thing by it. Okay, then we're gonna come down to a contention. I say that today is Monday, you say that today is Tuesday and we have to analyze it down to the sensations of what those things actually mean. And then since they contradict, only one of them can be true. They can't both be true at the same time. They can't be both Monday and Tuesday. Okay, so don't confuse knowledge with a subjective state of certainty or belief. That's very important. And the conditions under which doubt is justified. Some beliefs are basically what we get by on. And it's not clear that we actually have knowledge of anything. Even my geometric examples might be problematic. Belief is what we get by on. And the real question is, when is it legitimate to doubt somebody's belief? But in the case where I think A and you think not A is a case where we must have doubt. And the only way to resolve it is to figure out what we mean by these terms. How these terms relate to actual concepts. How those concepts relate to actual sensation. And then hopefully we can arrive at agreement on it. Now, so that maybe that brings me to the two different definitions that we get. In human nature here, knowledge is defined as evidence of truth from some beginning or principle of sense. That's also basically looks like a principle of empiricism. Knowledge depends on a beginning or a starting point in sensation. Or he says a knowledge of consequences of names appertaining to the subject at hand. So I've given some examples of that. Both of them will count as knowledge. So bachelor is an unmarried male. I know that, okay? But also if, but when I claim that fire is hot seems like something that I can get evident. It seems like a true claim and something that I can relate to some beginning of sense tracing it back to some experience that I've had with it. Now, as for this idea of consequences of names pertaining to the subject at hand in the Leviathan, Hobbes gives a chart of all of the sciences. I know this is too small to read but you can download the slides. And he, this is a synopsis of all kinds of science and all of them are defined in terms of consequences. Science in general. That is knowledge of consequences which is called philosophy. And then that divides into consequences from accidents of bodies that are natural and consequences from accidents of bodies which are political. And so there's the two major kinds of science that he has. And then we divide those further and further. And after these divisions we get to sciences like geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, et cetera. And those are understood to be consequences from quantities, consequences from qualities, et cetera. Here it is all in one diagram but that one's even harder to read. But the point of this is that he eventually takes this idea of being consequences and chains of consequence to be crucial to what the sciences are. Not this very attenuated definition simply evidence of truth that originates from senses. Okay, so there's, go ahead. Do we have knowledge of colors since they're not in the object themselves? Well, being in the object themselves is not relevant to any kind of knowledge, okay? So, and what is relevant is having an origin or a principle in sense. So senses in the subject or the sentient or the recipient, not in the object. So no, sciences about these things in our head. Now they ultimately relate to objects that are outside of us because they're caused by those objects. And we continue to talk about them as if we're talking about external objects. But insofar as we're talking about consequences of qualities of bodies, we're talking about internal things, internal entities. Yeah. So how's applied knowledge as being universal? Because I know in the past he said that nothing is universal and that things don't exist because we exist to receive it. Yes, this is the doctrine I've called nominalism that only individual or particular things exist. And he does hold that, but we can use general terms to describe those particular objects when they have certain commonalities. Okay, so only individual humans exist. Let me reassure you all, you all exist as individuals. And I'm calling you all humans, but there's not some other platonic form or some kind of other entity that's called human being besides all these individual humans. So when I say human, I'm just referring to some commonality of all of those objects. For example, their bipedalism or their rationality, okay? And so, but because the term human can mean a lot of different things to a lot of different people, that's how we get this ambiguity creeps in and we can start getting equivocation and we can start failing to understand what we're talking about. So I need to make it clear that I'm talking about a two-footed land animal and that's what I mean by human or am I talking about a rational animal because different consequences will follow from those different definitions. Okay, but these universals just, they don't exist as entities, they are merely words that we attach to those objects to describe their similarities. Okay, so these passages, if you read through them quickly, look very different, radically different on first reading, okay? And that's what I thought, I thought this is crazy, he's just totally reconceived of what science is. So then I started playing around with the two passages and I found they're actually a lot more similar than they seem. The one in human nature starts out with this definition, starts with a definition and it gives a definition that seems different than the one that we get in Leviathan and the equivalent passage in Leviathan ends with the definition and those two definitions appear at first glance to be different. But in human nature he says that knowledge which we call science, I define to be evidence of truth from some beginning or principle of sense for the truth of a proposition is never evident until we conceive the meaning of the words or terms where it consists, which are always conceptions in the mind nor can we remember those conceptions without the thing that produced the same by our senses. And then he gives four principles. The first principle of knowledge therefore is that we have such and such conceptions. The second that we have thus and thus named the things of which these are conceptions. The third that we have joined those names in such manner is to make true propositions. The fourth and the last is that we've joined those propositions in such a manner that they be concluding. And by these four steps, the conclusion is known and evident and the truth of the conclusion is said to be known. So that should be scientific knowledge, just a four step process, right? Well, I don't wanna make it seem too easy because I don't actually have any idea what he's talking about here, right? I mean, what does this actually, what does this four stage process mean? But I do find when I analyze this passage in Leviathan, there's also a four stage structure. So there he says, by this it appears that reason is not as sense and memory born with us nor gotten by experience only as prudences, but it's attained by industry. Meaning we have to actively do something to get science. It doesn't just happen to us like sensation of red or sounds do. What do we have to do? We have to first impose names, okay? We have to secondly get a good and orderly method in proceeding from elements which are names. We have to get two assertions which are made in connection of one of them to another and so to syllogisms which are the connections of one assertion to another tell we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject at hand. That is what people call science. Okay, so in order to understand what these four stages are and whether they really are parallel between these two texts I started thinking, okay, I need to apply an example. I need to come up with an example. So here's an extension of that passage from on human nature and I supplied it with an example of what I think he's talking about. So the first principle is that we have such and such conceptions. So just take a mass of conceptions. Humans, rational, animal, sentient, living, death, mortal, immortal, Monday, Tuesday, yesterday, today. Those are all conceptions. We have such and such conceptions. We agree that we have these conceptions. The second that we've thus and thus named the things where of they are conceptions so the conception of human relates to rational animals or terrestrial bipeds or whatever. Animals relate to sentient living things. Mortal means the things living but will eventually die. Okay, so I take this to be either decomposing these concepts into their definitions or tracing them back to their origins in sense. Then the third stage, we join these names together in such a manner as to make true propositions. So I can say mortal applies to all humans. Okay, so will die applies to all human beings. Hate to break it to you, but that's a true proposition. Animals applies to all humans. Mortal applies to all animals, okay? So I start, I come up with some true propositions. Then once I've got, so notice that these true propositions are just unities of concepts, concepts that ultimately have a principle or an origin and a starting point in sense. But once I've got these true propositions then I can join propositions together in a way to see their consequences. So for example, I can join the propositions mortal of all animals, animal of all humans, and then conclude the consequence, therefore mortal of all humans or all humans will die. And then I can be said to have scientific knowledge. Okay, so here's the traditional way to diagram that syllogism, a syllogism is this kind of structure where we unify propositions in an orderly way. Mortal applies to every animal, animal to every human, therefore mortal applies to every human. So if those propositions are true and if the terms in those propositions can actually be traced back to something in sense then this constitutes scientific knowledge. I can actually have a scientific knowledge that all humans are mortal. Yeah. I wonder for like in the last slide, I mean the first stages are persuasive to me but I wonder like for the, because like all of the connection are built like based on the pre-existing conceptions or so-called pre-existing knowledge. But I wonder like where does the assertion of truth come from? Because it sounds like if we do not have some pre-existing conception taught by others. Yes, so in order to answer that we have to go back to our concept of truth, okay? And truth is defined in human nature 511 as the comprehension of the subject by the predicate, okay? So animal of every human. And in sense I go around and I find that everything called human, everything that anyone calls human is actually an animal. That traces back to something that I actually experienced. And if people are calling other things human that aren't animals, then we don't have understanding of what we're talking about and we need to actually go through and make sure to, okay, what is the sensation you're tying to that notion and try to eliminate that ambiguity? Experience itself is false to some extent. I mean, someone might tell me the full thing. Yes, and that can easily happen because of this problem of ambiguity, equivocation, and so forth where the names don't attach to the actual sensations or they are meant to describe something else. Okay, so that's always a possibility. In fact, Hobbes thinks that's mostly what's going on. Most of the things we think or science isn't that we think we know are actually confusions that we don't really have understanding of what we're talking about. Okay, so, but it all has to be grounded in sense. So either I have to have a conception that every animal dies and that has to be apparent in sense or I get it from somebody like a biologist who I trust and that biologist has the sensation of all those things that animal is applied to every human. If there are humans out there that aren't animals, they're angels or something like that, then there would be a problem. But again, that would probably be just a confusion of terminology. Then those two propositions can be united to generate this consequence and when I have generated that consequence, then we say I have scientific knowledge. So this appears to be something that we have scientific knowledge about. It is a scientific, we know that all humans die. Okay, and we know that because fundamentally because of things that we've sensed but also because we've related those to conceptions, we've clarified and we understand those conceptions, we've arranged those conceptions into true propositions and we've arranged those propositions into a valid form of argument. Yeah? Are we in fact coming to the conclusion that in reality both the Thomas Hobbes' definitions of knowledge are in fact kind of like the same thing because the first definition relates to how all knowledge comes from science all the second you build on the definition of the science is the consequence of the conceptions that we give. So is the purpose of having shown us this comparison to show everything? Yeah, okay, so it's a good question and so you'll be very disappointed by my answer which is I'm not gonna tell you because there is actually a dispute in the scholarly literature. So there are scholars, in fact there's a Stanford encyclopedia article I came across yesterday called Hobbes' Philosophy of Science. If you read that article and I'll post it to Canvas, it says scholars are divided. Some think that he has two totally different concepts of science and that they aren't consistent and others think that they are actually equivalent to each other. So there's a dispute, so we need more research. The problem hasn't been resolved. So that's the kind of thing that somebody could write. A research paper is seeing whether these notions are similar or not. Now the argument I just gave shows a way to think of them as being essentially similar. So even though he doesn't mention consequences in the earlier one, he does mention syllogisms which are inferences and use consequences. And even though he doesn't mention sense in the later one, we know that what he's talking about consequences of are consequences of propositions and we know that propositions consists of copulations or unities of concepts and we know that concepts can only originate in sense so it must connect to sense. So there's a kind of thesis that one could argue that these though he uses different terminology it's ultimately consistent. That's a nice charitable reading of it. Now there's a further bit of the definition that comes after the part that I've compared so I didn't compare in this one the part that comes down here in this passage and that's a part where he talks about it's not just consequences but it's seeing on how I can produce something, how I can produce like effects. And this truly does not seem to correlate to anything in human nature. And in fact seems to make all science for Hobbes into practical or productive science. It's not science unless I can produce something with it. Now geometry can still fit into that because you could conceive geometry as being the ability to produce proofs or produce figures of a certain kind given certain definitions or something like that. But I think that so far I have shown that we can bring these concepts very close together but I haven't given any way to account for this idea that we have to be able to make or produce something on the basis of this knowledge and that doesn't seem to correspond to something in human nature. Whether it's consistent and coherent with what he says in human nature is another question but I leave that as a question for further research. Okay and I won't, because I want to get on to this exciting stuff about pleasure and pain and passions and so forth but what he then, belief is basically defined as when we don't have science. So when we have arguments and propositions and conceptions that we take without there being evident we can't ourselves trace them back to sensations that we've had but we take them on trust from someone else, maybe we take them from a biologist but of course the biologist could be wrong and so doubt creeps in if I can't confirm that in my own mind with my own kind of sensation. The extent to which doubt is justified is an open issue. When is doubt admissible and when is it not? We'll return to that issue in due course. Okay now I want to talk about chapters seven to nine on passions, pleasure and pain and good and evil and I'm going to just outline his basic arguments and there's a lot of controversial stuff so it'll seem like I'm just asserting a bunch of ridiculous claims but hopefully get around to defending them. So first of all recall that conceptions and apparitions are nothing but some motion in the internal substance of the head. Okay that's what he says in that famous chapter two eight and he here references himself back to that passage. Now he adds that these motions don't stop in the head but they actually proceed to the heart where they either help or hinder vital motion. Vital motion is, so there's two kinds of motion. If you remember the original diagram I had of human nature and we have passions and we have reason and we have body and we have mind and the body has all of these vital capabilities that Hobbes hasn't said much about like ability to use nutrition, ability to reproduce, ability to move yourself around in space and animals have all of those. Those are what he means by vital as opposed to cognitive or mental powers. So when, and those vital things are, we don't have voluntary control over them. They start when we're born or rather when we're conceived and they persist without our doing anything about them. So the theory here is that sensations cause concepts, that's happening in the head but then this physical process because it is a physical, there is a physical account of this proceeds to the heart where it always either helps or hinders these vital activities. In the case where it helps the vital activities we call it pleasure or delight or contentment and we say that we love those objects and in the cases where it weakens or hinders the vital motion it's called pain and we say that we hate the things. So pleasures and pains are nothing more than motions in the region of the heart. By the way, the fact that it's supposed to be in the heart is not essential to the theory if you think that pain and pleasure actually are states of the brain nothing significant seems to change for the theory. But pleasures and pains just are those motions happening within us that either help or hurt vital motions. Okay, and so they are completely internal. We think of objects as being painful or pleasant but that's just something occurring within us like all conceptions. Now, when we feel pleasure or pain he says that's either a solicitation or a provocation to approach or retreat from the object that caused it and this causes pursuit and avoidance. And the solicitation is said to be the endeavor or internal beginning of animal motion. So this is why animals move. Animals move because they experience pleasure from certain objects. For example, they see food in the environment that food forms some kind of conception or image which then when it locates in the heart leads to pleasure because it seems to enhance the vital powers and so the animal moves towards it pursues that thing in order to consume it or it perceives it as inhibiting its vital activities and so it avoids the thing. And basically all animal behavior can be explained as these pursuits or avoidances based on these internal conceptions of pleasure and pain. Yeah. Is movement necessary for this? Yes, in this account it is. How do you explain things like sleep? Well, it's because he actually has an account of sleep that it's still a kind of motion. So we don't actually stop moving in sleep. There's lots of stuff going on in sleep. All kinds of vital activities and so. Is it like motion, like motion in the heart rate? Oh yeah, and all other vital functions, right? Breathing, et cetera. So there's, but I mean that would be a kind of paradox is what about pleasures of rest or not acting or not thinking, right? Like the Buddhists who can, at least for a few minutes, find a way to stop this incessant succession of conceptions that Hobbes thinks were constantly happening. What about that? Is that a pleasant state? It couldn't be on Hobbes theory. He doesn't have a way to account for that. And it's not clear that Buddhists think that that is a pleasant state either. You know, it's nirvana or something, but it's not a pleasant state. Pleasure and pain are movements and must be understood as movements. Okay. But I like the question. So we define appetites and desires or aversions of fears relative to these pleasures and pains which are tied to these conceptions which have their origin and sense. And then here's a pretty radical idea. Good and evil are just the terms that we attach to pleasure and pain. They don't have any other reality than that. Things that please us, we say are good. Things that cause us pain, we say are bad, period. No such thing as good in general or absolute good. All of the stuff that Plato talks about is nonsense. It all has to do with pleasure or pain. So this is the basis of his heathenism, his theory that the purpose of life, the end of life is pleasure. He does differentiate between goods of the body and goods of the mind, but these are goods in the same sense. They're just kinds of pleasure that we experience. And he does say that different people experience, and this is of course true, different things as being pleasant or painful. So some people like chocolate ice cream, the correct people in my view, and others like vanilla ice cream. And that has to do with variations in our constitution, so how those things appear to us to affect our vital motion or not. I think chocolate is absolutely vital to all of my powers. And so to that extent, we can say he has a relativistic view of good and bad. So for me, I don't like vanilla, so for me vanilla is bad and chocolate's good, but you might dislike chocolate and prefer vanilla, and that would indicate there's some sense, there's no difference in the objects. We could have two pints of those different kinds of ice cream here, same object, and we have different reactions to them. It must mean that there's something different in our constitutions, but that doesn't mean that anything goes, that good and evil are just up for grabs and whatever anyone says it is, because it's still the case that the pleasant is what's good and the painful is what's bad. It's just that different objects cause the pleasure in pain. It's still as objectively true as ever that what causes pleasure is good and what causes pain is bad. It's just that what causes those things differ. Another example, using a mental pain, grief is very painful. Now different things cause grief for different people. I was in grief when my father died, my sister, not so much, but that doesn't mean that grief isn't a bad thing. Grief is a painful thing. It's just that because we have different internal constitutions, those sensations affected us differently. Now just a couple more things to add. Again, appetite is the beginning of all animal motion and attainment of the object of our desire, chocolate cake or whatever it is, is what we call the end and the good and the end are the same. So attaining that object of pleasure is actually what the good is. Now some ends are farther away, like earning a degree and some are closer to hand, like having lunch and some of these might be instrumentally valuable for others like you need lunch or you need dinner in order to survive to the point of having classes so that you can earn a degree and so we have what we call proximate versus more distant or even final ends, but there is no in Hobbes view ultimate final end, like Aristotle claims there is, that happiness is the ultimate final end of anything. He says that happiness is a concept like utopia. It doesn't really exist because while we're alive, we necessarily have desires, while we have desires we have unfulfilled ends and so the only thing that happiness could mean is continual prosperity in achieving my ends and so having a constant succession of pleasures, having less pain.