 So, by the name of President Maying-Joe won a convincing re-election in Taiwan. How and why did he have such a decisive victory? Well, he did win by a larger margin than I think some expected, although compared to 2008, of course, he got 1.4 million fewer votes than he got in 2008. But I think that the reason why he won this election by about six percentage points over the other candidates is because of the concern in Taiwan about the uncertainty, the uncertain future, if the DPP came back to power. And I think economics and business were the central parts of what was going on in people's minds. Very concerned about a downturn in Taiwan's economy if the cross-strait relationship went sour. The Chinese have to be quite happy about this in Beijing as they view it because they were worried that Tsai and the DPP might move away from Mao's process of steady rapprochement, the economic cooperation and framework agreement and the like. Do you think China actually shaped the election outcome with their behavior, or did they just sort of get a draw that's beneficial from their perspective? I think that the Chinese did seek to use some tools to influence this election. I don't think that their influence was decisive. They did encourage, provide, for example, many charter flights for businessmen from Taiwan and the mainland to go back to Taiwan. Probably about 200,000 people did go back, and many of those voted for Mao, although not all of them. And then they bought, for example, milkfish from southern Taiwan, fishermen. So I think it's small ways they did seek to influence it, but I think that they learned lessons from past elections where they have intervened too overtly, and that has been, of course, counterproductive. And does Mao come out of this victory with a mandate to continue the policies he's had, or do you think he comes out of this, as some in the DPP fear, emboldened to move even faster towards what the opposition in Taiwan worries would be, unification? I think that Mao only has a mandate to continue his existing policy, particularly the cross-strait policy. And in the legislature, the KMT will have a smaller margin. The DPP won 40 votes this time. The KMT got, again, 17 fewer than it did in 2008. So the DPP may be a more effective opposition in the legislature. I think that there is no appetite in Taiwan for accelerating the pace of the relationship with the mainland. We saw during the campaign that President Mao raised the possibility of signing a peace accord with Beijing, and his support in the polls did dip significantly. I think that's a lesson that President Mao will take away. There is an absence of domestic consensus in Taiwan on moving towards more sensitive political arrangements, talking about sovereignty with Beijing. So I don't think that is likely. I don't think it's in the cards. The speculation was that President Mao talked about that peace agreement to take some wind out of the sails of the third candidate, James Song, whose party is more pro-Beijing and more pro-unification broadly defined. Do you think it worked? Do you think the James Song factor as a third candidate, who was more likely to take votes from Mao, was blunted successfully by the KMT, or did they just get a lot more votes because they put forward a platform that worked? I think that the James Song factor was blunted for other reasons, not because of the strategy of the KMT, but because in the end, voters for James Song are pan-blue voters. They support the KMT and its agenda. And in this case, I think people at the end of the day did not want to waste their vote. They knew that James Song could not win. So even though he was polling about seven or eight percent in many of the polls, people did not want to use their vote and risk having Tsai Ing-wen come to power. So I think they cast it in the end for Ma Ying-jeou instead of for James Song. And in the end, he only got 2.8 percent. And finally, for the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy strategy in Asia, what are the implications? What's the takeaway for the administration? Stay on course? Does this change somehow our approach to the region and to Taiwan? Well, I think for the United States, it's clear that Ma's victory means that the cross-strait relationship will remain stable. There is not likely to be great tensions that will reemerge between the two sides of the strait. But I think that we need to remain very engaged with Taiwan and with Beijing going forward. We need to support Taiwan's desire to expand its participation in the international community, to support the process of negotiating free trade agreements that now Taiwan is entering into, first with Singapore, but now there are many other countries, India, New Zealand, that have expressed interest in those. We have to make sure that Taiwan is not marginalized going forward. And we have, of course, our own Tifa talks, the Trade Investment Framework Agreement talks, to resume with Taiwan, which are incredibly important because we would like to see Taiwan get itself ready to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks. We need Taiwan to be more integrated into the regional process of trade liberalization, and so far it has not. And I think that we need to put pressure on mainland China to reduce its military buildup opposite Taiwan. That's an area where we have just seen no progress. And I do hope that going forward we will continue to see arm sales to Taiwan. The Obama administration has sold $13 billion in arms so far, but in terms of platforms, new weapons systems, those were essentially approved by the Bush administration. We have not seen new weapons systems sold to Taiwan. And the F-16 CDs and Taiwan's request for them remains on the table. Thank you. Thank you.