 today lectures I am going to explain about supervenience and emergentism or emergentism and supervenience. How though emergentism and supervenience goes together at the same time there are some differences and how the emergent theory of mind explaining the concept of mind at the same time how the supervenience this is explaining the concept of mind as we know that emergentism thing as a theory of mind which is part of non-computational view of mind non-mechanistic view of mind that is the main aim in this lecture to show now the question is what is emergentism according to emergentism the higher level of quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its root there in but it emerges there from and it does not belong to that level but it gives rise to a new order of existence with special laws but whereas somewhere Alexander who is the founder of this emergentist thesis and he says that the higher level of quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its root there in but it emerges from what it does not belongs to lower level but constitutes it possesses a new order of existence with its special laws of behavior the existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted as some would say another conclusion of brute empirical facts or as we should prefer to say in less harsh term to be accepted with the natural pity of the investigators it admits no explanations here eminence refers to the fact that in the course of evolution new things and events occur with unexpected and unpredicted properties things and events are new in the sense in which a great work of art may be described as a new thing every genuine emergence introduces nobility in the world to say that an emergent characteristic is a novel means firstly it is not simply a rearrangement of pre-existing elements although such rearrangements may be one of its determining conditions secondly the characteristics is qualitatively not just quantitatively unlike the anything that existed before in history thirdly it is unpredictable not only on the basis of knowledge available prior to its emergence but even on the basis of ideally complete knowledge of the state prior to its emergence these points permits a distinction to be made between what is new in the sense of being a fresh combination of old factors and what is novel in the sense of being qualitatively unique and unpredictable in this lectures we will find out how consciousness emerges from mental properties and how the emergent properties of consciousness cannot be explained in a functional or computational way some philosophers argue that consciousness might be an emergent property in the sense that it is still compatible with metallism it is also often held that emergent properties are unpredictable from lower level properties however it can be argued that these properties are new in an ontological sense what is interesting about these properties is that they are not obvious consequence of the lower level properties but they are tailed causary supervenient on the lower level of facts following the above arguments we can put that the phenomena of consciousness could rise only in the presence of some non-computational physical processes taking place in the brain as we know living human brains are ultimately composed of the same material satisfying the same physical laws as are the inanimate objects of the universe there is the Cartesian view that consciousness arises only in humans and that animals are inanimate automata a view which is clearly pre-evolutionary and we have reason to accept the view that there are lower and higher states of consciousness moreover the most reasonable view seems to be that consciousness is an emergent property of animals arising under the pressure of natural selections if this is so then the questions are like this that how does consciousness arises from antecedent conditions in the physical universe this question is still unanswered even if the observer version of the behavior of the amoeba created the strong impression that it is conscious and we can find symptoms of activity and initiative in its behavior that activity and behavior is something different from what happens in the neurons the human brain is estimated to have ten thousand millions of neurons there are also thousands of synaptic relations among the neurons but the qualities which exist in the consciousness are not found in the neural relations there is a new emergent entity in consciousness which did not exist in the neurons because the emergent properties of consciousness are ontologically new the problem of emerges in this context starts with life and it should be remember that the brain is just a piece of inanimate matter but a part of the living body as Daya Krishna remarks it is not even clear whether those who want to deny the reality of consciousness want to deny the reality of life also the body they talk about is a living body the brain they are found of the brain that is alive take life away and everything dies seizes at least live it and feel it and know it here Daya Krishna is trying to identify life with consciousness here like consciousness life also emerges from human body and identify consciousness in fact the problem of emergence of life is a far wider one but here we are concerned with human life only because the question is that why is it that the phenomenon of consciousness appears to occur as far as we know only in a living beings although we should not rule out the possibility that consciousness might be present also in other appropriate physical systems the second question is how could it be that such a seemingly ingredient as non-computational behavior presumed to be inherent in the actions of all material things so far as entirely escaped the notice of persist the first question is that the question is related with the subtlety and complex as the organization of the brain but that alone could not provide a sufficient explanation penrots clearly maintains that I quote I am containing that the faculty of human understanding lies beyond any computational schemes whatever if it is microtobules that control the activity of the brain and then there must be something within the action of microtobules that is different from mere computations on quote here he says that this inanimate matter is microtobules that control the activity of the brain because there is life in it that is in the brain the actions of microtobules is different from mere computations because he points out that such actions are non-computational actions in which life is related to consciousness the above statement leads to the question is is there any evidence that the phenomena of consciousness is related to the action of microtobules in particular it must also be the case that the detailed neural organization of the brain is fundamentally involved in growing what from that consciousness must take for penrots if that organization were not important then our lives would evoke as much consciousness as do our brains here he put it like this what the preceding argument strongly suggest is that it is not just a neural organization of our brain that is important the cytoskeletal under printing of those very neurons seems to be essential for consciousness to be present on quote but it is not the cytosolution as such that is relevant but some essential physical actions that biology has so cleverly contribute to incorporate into the activity of its microtobules moreover it may be pointed out that in our brain there is an anonymous organization and since consciousness appears to be a very global feature of our thinking it seems that we must look to some kind of coherence on a much larger than that level of single microtobules or even single cytoskeletons and there is some kind of useful non-computational actions involved which penrots takes to be an essential part of consciousness secondly we must expect that the best guess of such non-computational should also be present at some reasonable levels in inanimate matter but yet the physics of ordinary matter seems to allow no room for such non-computational behavior. Jayan Kim is one of the famous founder of supervenience thesis in his book on supervenience and in his article on supervenience he argued that there is a strikingly similarity between emergence and supervenience according to Kim the higher level properties notable consciousness and other mental properties emerges emerge when and only when an appropriate set of low level or basal conditions are present and this means that the occurrence of the higher level properties is determined by and dependent on the instantiation of appropriate low level properties and relations in spite of this emergent properties were held to be genuinely novel. Characteristically irreducible to the lower level processes from which they emerge on quote then the concept of emergence combines the three components of supervenience delineated above namely property covariance dependence and non-reducibility. Thus emergentism can be regarded as the first systematic formulation of non-reductive physicalism this thesis makes the mental life supervenient on its physical background that is to say according to this thesis the mental states are not reducible to what are supervenient on the physical state in such a way that whatever changes take place in the physical states most make a differences to the mental states. Well no two things could differ in a mental respect unless they differ in some physical aspect that is imperceptibility with respect to physical properties entails indiscriminability with respect to mental properties that is the core idea of mind body supervenience. Thus supervenience thesis understood in the strong sense that it makes rooms for a nomological dependence of the mental on the physical such that the physical states are necessarily responsible for the mental states as a keen points out that the mental is dependent on the physical but not vice versa because the mental states are directly a consequence of the physical states. The mental states themselves do not determine the physical states in that sense the mental states remains nomological dependent on the physical universe. In his article on the non-reductionistic troubles with mental conditions and he mentions that the non-reductive physicalism consists of following thesis firstly all concrete particulars are physical secondly mental properties are not reducible to physical properties thirdly all mental properties are physically realized that is whenever an organism or system instances a mental phenomenon m there is a physical property p such that p realizes in m in organization of its kind. Fourthly mental properties are real properties of the objects and events they are not merely useful as in making predications or fictitious manners of speech therefore we find that these four basic tenets bring non-reductive physicalism very close to emergentism in fact the non-reductive physicalism of this variety is best viewed as a form of emergentism emergentist in general accepted purely mentalistic ontology of concrete physical objects and events for example Samuel Alexander is one of the principal theoreticians of emergent schools argue that there are mental events over and above neural processes Alexander says we thus becomes our partly by experience partly by reflections that processes with the distinct quality of mind or consciousness is in the same place and time with a neural processes that is with a highly differentiated and complex processes of our living body. We are forced therefore to go beyond the mere correlation of the mental with these neural processes and to identify them there is but one processes which being of a specific complexity has the quality of understanding consciousness it has then to be accepted as an empirical fact that a neural processes of a shorter level of development process the quality of consciousness and is thereby mental processes and alternative a mental processes is also a vital one of the certain order. However emergent properties are irreducible to the physical conditions out of which the emerge is familiar this irreducibility claim is constructive of the emergentist metaphysical worldview although the emergentist idea of reductions or reductive explanation diverges from the model of reduction implicit in current until reductionistic argument. The philosophical significance of the denial of reducibility between two property levels is the same the higher level of properties being irreducible are genuinely new addition to ontologies of this world for example Samuel Alexander says that out of certain physiological conditions nature has framed a new quality mind which is therefore not its physiological though it lives and moves and its its being in physiological conditions hence it is that there can be and is an independent science of psychology and no physiological constellation explains for us why it should be mind. The strong supermenace thesis does not reach the gap between mental and physical because it fails to account for how the mental state with their qualitative content arise at all in a material environment. The gap between the physical and mental remains wide because it is not known how the mental world can be explained now the question is is it not possible that the mental life not be there even if the physical universe exist perfectly that is to say that there are possible worlds in which all the physical states of the present universe are there but there is no conscious state at all for example robots behaves like human beings but lack consciousness the behavior itself is not consciousness and if consciousness is the same in all organisms like material things then there will be no qualitative difference between the human and non human therefore we cannot prove that consciousness is supervenient on the physical world. John Searle has given an example which will make this thesis more legitimate let us see thesis suppose that we have a system S and the elements of systems are A B C S might be a stone and the elements might be molecules there will be features of S that are not or not necessary feature of A B C but there are some features which are causally emergent system features like solidity, liquidity and transparency are example of causally emergent systems features in these connections will remind us that life is an emergent property and if there were no life there would be no consciousness either here in the case of two hydrogen and one oxygen we are getting water the quality which are existing in two hydrogen and one oxygen the same qualities are not in the water for example liquidity and solidity. What John Searle is making here although John Searle is giving one kind of naturalistic theory of mind or consciousness but in this naturalistic theory of consciousness if you see that there is a differences and in the case of a emergence there is some kind of qualitative may not be any kind of quantitative difference but there is a qualitative difference and this qualitative difference is sufficient in explaining that mind is different from the body and mind is different from the machines as we know that water is the combination of two hydrogen and one oxygen but there are qualitative difference between water on the one hand and the hydrogen and oxygen on the other hand the qualities which we find in the water will not find in the oxygen and hydrogen in the same way there is differences between consciousness and matter because there is a qualitative difference between the two the qualities which emerges from consciousness will not possible to explain in the mechanical or functional way what it needs separate explanation and its explanation is non reductive explanation that is self explanations the above definition shows that consciousness is a causally emergent properties of systems it is an emergent feature of creation system of neurons in the same way that solidity and liquidity are emergent features of the system of molecules thus the existence of consciousness can be explained by the causally interactions between elements of the brain at the micro level but consciousness cannot itself be deduced or calculated from the shear physical structure of the neurons without some additional account of the causation between them and the question is why is consciousness an irreducible feature of physical reality there is a standard argument to show that consciousness is not reducible in the way that material properties are reducible for example, that I am now in pain I am now in a certain consciousness state such as pain now the question is what fact in the world correspond to my statement I am now in pain here is the fact that I have no certain unpleasant conscious sensation and I am experiencing these sensation from my experiences it is these sensations that are constitutively of my present pain but the pain is also caused by certain underlying neuro physiological processes consisting in large part of patterns of neurons firing in my brain it is like that I have a pain because there is a sea fiber firing is happening in my physical systems and therefore, there is identity between the sea fiber firing and my pain experiences but if we reduce the first person sensation of pain to the third pattern of neurons firing then we try to say that the pain is really nothing but the patterns of neurons firing if this is show then we are leaving the essential feature of pain no description of the third person type would convey the first person character of pain because the first person features are different from the third person features. Thomas Nagel states that by contrasting the objectivity of the third person features with the what it is like to be features of the subjective experience subjective state of consciousness as Nagel says I quote conscious experience is a widespread phenomena it occurs at many levels of animals life though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simple organisms and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it and no matter how the form may vary the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means basically that there is something it is like to be that organisms but fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism something it is like to it is like further as thus I know that I am in pain is a different sort of knowledge that my knowledge that you are in pain the feeling of pain indicates that there is close relation between consciousness and self consciousness this is due to the emergence of self consciousness out of consciousness and thus making it a radical different from what is if it is at all human levels but the Aikrishnan remarks that the development of robotics denies the reality of consciousness because of this self consciousness knowledge have self predeterminations and deny the existence of mind or consciousness this self consciousness has forgotten its dimension of knowing feeling and willing the last result in the transformations through technology that has obsessed the modern mind to such an exchange that it has gone to the extent of denying its own reality and considering the matter alone as real but yet matter though resistance is flexible agreeable to change which consciousness does not seem to be in the same sense the denial of I consciousness which is an invetable accompaniment of self consciousness the real cause a role of consciousness however becomes clear when self consciousness comes into its own and discovers that it can directly affect consciousness and indirectly everything else through imagining intending thinking attending concentrating reasoning and the other mirids activities which man has encountered in himself and developed through a long process therefore from the above exploration it follows that once consciousness emerges from physical properties it will never be reduced to it this shows that emergentism cannot support functionalism or computationalism because a functionality explains consciousness or mind in the reductnative way where as an emergent is explains consciousness in a non reductive way consciousness makes the mind body problems really intractable the reductionist shows that the mind body problems is not a real problem for him or her there is no explanatory gap between mind and body we have to find out why these arguments do not help us to understand the relations between mind and body without consciousness the mind and body problems would be less interesting but with consciousness it seems hopeless the hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience special to first person character which cannot be explained within a scientific framework cognitive science can explains a system function in terms of its internal mechanism but it is not possible to explain what it is to have subjective experience but it is not a problem about the performance of functions Thomas Nagel says that conscious experience is a wide spread phenomena fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism something it is like to be further organism in recent times all sorts of mental phenomena have yielded s to scientific explanation but consciousness has stubbornly resistant this explanation many philosophers and scientist have tried to explain it both explanations but explanation always seem to fall sort of the target now the question is why is it so difficult to explain according to the virtual words cognitive science has not explained why there is conscious experience at all why there is a conscious experience at all when we think and perceive there is a way of information processing but there are also subjective individual aspect of consciousness which goes beyond the information processing he says that when it comes to conscious this sort of explanation fails what makes the hard problem hard and the almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of the functions to see this not that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience perceptual descriptions categorization internal access verbal reports there may still remain a further question why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience according to the virtual words even if all the functions of a systems are well articulated there is further questions as to why there is an experience at all accompanying their functions cognitive science fails to explain why there is any experience at all even though it explains all the brain functions the hard problem of consciousness consist in the why questions regarding consciousness but the question is why is the hard problem so hard and why are the easy problems so easy the easy problems are easy because they are the concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions to explain and a cognitive functions we need a mechanism that can perform the functions the cognitive sciences offers this type of explanations and so are well suited to the easy problem of consciousness on the other hand the hard problem is hard because it is not a problem about the performance of the functions the problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained and he says that I quote I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental we know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness we might add some entirely new non-physical features from which experience can be derived but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like more like we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world alongside mass charge and space time if you take experience as fundamental then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience this is unquote the relaxationistic have not solved the hard problem of consciousness because as we have seen it has explained consciousness only in terms of the easy problem of consciousness easy problems are all concerned with how a cognitive or behavioural function is performed there are questions about how the brain carried out the cognitive task that is how it is discriminate stimuli integrate information and so on whereas the hard problem of consciousness goes beyond the problems about how functions are performed if scientific view of mind tries to give a definite definition of consciousness then it leaves out the explanation explainer gap that is there is no explainer gap between mind and body because there is no distinction between mind and body mind can be explained in terms of body and there is nothing called the mind since the mind itself is a part of the body which we have already seen in the functionistic model of mind and in the artificial intelligence model of mind and if this is so then it leaves out subjective experience and adopts for the third person perspective of consciousness consciousness makes the mind body problems really intactable the reductionistic deny that there is a mind body problem at all for there is no explainer gap between the mind and body because there is no distinction between the mind and body mind can be explained in terms of body and there is a nothing called the mind since the mind itself is a part of the body therefore for them that the mind is reductively explainer in terms of body and many philosophers hold that mind cannot be explainable in terms of body but we as we have seen that there is subjective quality which is makes the distinction between mind and body and this subject includes emergent biological property such as life the essence of body is special extensions the essence of mind is thought as we have seen in the Cartesian concept of mind thought is taken to be defining attributes of mind which is an incorporeal substance a substance that is non-special in the nature the term thought we can understood everything which we are I give as for the happening within us in so far as we have awareness of it what follows from de Kertz view is that consciousness is essential a first person subjective phenomenon and consciousness states cannot be reduce or eliminated into the third person therefore it is consciousness which makes the explainer gap between the first person and third person perspective according to the Cartesian concept mind we have access to the contents of our own minds in a way denied to us in respect to matter there is something special about our own knowledge of our own mind that naturally goes with the Cartesian view but if you see especially some other argument are the mental life which is qualia cannot be nomologically determined by the physical conditions of the inverse the following are the reason of the thesis that the mental life is independent of the physical body although they co-exist firstly the qualia of the mental state cannot be reproduced in an artificial machines like a robot or a machines table their unique to the person concerned the qualia are the essence of consciousness and so must be increasing to the conscious subject thus there is one kind of intelligibility gap between the qualia and the physical world remains as the qualia are understood widely as belong to the conscious subject consciousness makes the gap between mind and body and the physical subjectivity and it is most troublesome features self is a subject which is the encompasses our feeling thinking and perception the qualitative character of consciousness is what it is like to be subjected to have the experiences but conscious experience is a as we have seen is one kind of widely spread phenomenon and this a conscious experience is very difficult to explains in a mechanistic way it is because of the emergence of consciousness make one kind of strong distinction between mind and body and mind and machines therefore the subjectivity cannot be explained reductively it is not analysing in terms of any explanatory system of functional states or intentional states since they could not be ascribed to robots or automata that behave like people though they experience nothing there is subjective feeling attached to our conscious experience because subjective feeling are the outcome of consciousness experience that is consciousness itself cannot be established simply on the basis of what we observe about the brain and its physical effects we cannot explain which property of the brain accounts consciousness and distinct cognitive properties namely perceptions and interpretations necessarily mediate our relationship with the brain and with consciousness we cannot understand how the subjective aspect of experience depends upon the brain that it is really the problem therefore consciousness is the essential subjectivity and that is not the mechanical as many philosophers believe that it is I or subject who is experiencing and it is I subject which is emerges from the biological systems are concerned and consciousness is essential therefore is essential subjectivity the term pain is subjective as it is not accessible to any observer because it is the first person perspective for example I have a pain in my leg in this case the statement is completely subjective the pain is itself as the subjective model of existence as soul says that conscious states exist only when they are experienced by some human or animal subject in that sense they are essential subjective I would treat subjectivity and qualitativeness as distinct feature but it is now seems to me that properly understood qualitativeness and subject is because there is this qualitative and subjectiveness making kind of difference if there is no subjectivity no experiences and this qualitative experiences can exist only in experienced by some subjects because conscious states are subjective in the sense it is legitimate to hold that there is a first person ontology as opposed to the first person ontology and this first person ontology is emerges from the one kind of emergent properties and that makes the differences between in the mind and body and that establish the distinction between the emergent stresses and supervenous stresses although but this is a one kind of naturalistic emergent stresses but still it makes a sufficient distinction between the emergentism and supervenous stresses because supervenous stresses as we have seen is that they have been arguing that there is close or there is a kind of close interaction with mind and body and mind can be explainable in terms of body and body can be explainable in terms of mind but in the case of emergentist there is mind is emerges the subject equality and conscious emerges from the physical object but it has its own identity and these are the main theses of emergentism and supervenous stresses. Thank you very much.