 Part 2, Section 12 of the Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards. This lever box recording is in the public domain. God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity. Having proved that God has a certain and infallible prescience of the voluntary acts of moral agents, I come now in the second place to show the consequence, how it follows from hence that these events are necessary with a necessity of connection or consequence. The chief Armenian divine so far as I have had opportunity to observe, deny this consequence, and affirm that if such foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any necessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I cannot but think that on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly determined whether it be indeed so or not. In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things. One, it is very evident that with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissoluble connected with something which already has or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following particulars. One, I observed before in explaining the nature of necessity that in things which are past, their past existence is now necessary. Having already made sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect. It is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true that the thing has existed. Two, if there be any such thing as a divine foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that foreknowledge by the supposition is a thing which already has and long ago had existence, and so now its existence is necessary. It is now utterly impossible to be otherwise than that this foreknowledge should be or should have been. Three, it is also very manifest that those things which are indissoluble connected with other things that are necessary are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition which is necessarily true is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise would be a contradiction. It would be in effect to say that the connection was indissoluble and yet was not so but might be broken. If that the existence of which is indissoluble connected with something whose existence is now necessary is itself not necessary then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its existence. Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge. Four, it is no less evident than if there be a full certain and infallible foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents then there is a certain infallible and indissoluble connection between those events and that foreknowledge and that therefore by the preceding observations those events are necessary events being infallibly and indissoluble connected with that whose existence already is and so is now necessary and cannot but have been. To say the foreknowledge is certain and infallible and yet the connection of the event with that foreknowledge is dissoluble and infallible is very absurd. To affirm it would be the same thing as to affirm that there is no necessary connection between a proposition being infallibly known to be true and it's being true indeed so that it is perfectly demonstrable that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions the event is necessary or in other words that it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass may not now be true. There is this absurdity in it that it is not impossible but that there now should be no truth in that proposition which is now infallibly known to be true. To that no future event can be certainly foreknown whose existence is contingent and without all necessity may be proved thus. It is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence to suppose otherwise implies a contradiction because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding is for it to be evident to that understanding and for a thing to be evident to any understanding is the same thing as for that understanding to see evidence of it. But no understanding created or uncreated can see evidence where there is none for that is the same thing as to see that to be which is not and therefore if there be any truth which is absolutely without evidence that truth is absolutely unknowable in so much that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known. But if there be any future event whose existence is contingent without all necessity the future existence of the event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence of it it must be one of these two sorts either self-evidence or proof. An evident thing must be either evident in itself or evident in something else that is evident by connection with something else but a future thing whose existence is without all necessity kind of neither of these sorts of evidence. It cannot be self-evident for if it be it may be now known by what is now to be seen in the thing itself its present existence or the necessity of its nature but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed both that the thing has no present existence to be seen and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the future so that its future existence is not self-evident. And secondly neither is there any proof or evidence in anything else or evidence of connection with something else that is evident for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected for such a connection destroys its contingent and suppose as necessity. Thus it is demonstrated that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event which is contingent without all necessity if any such event there be neither self-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident and so cannot be seen to be evident or which is the same thing cannot be known. Let us consider this in an example suppose that 5,760 years ago there was no other being but the divine being and then this world or some particular body or spirit all at once starts out of nothing and to being and takes on itself a particular nature and form all in absolute contingence without any concern of God or any other cause in the matter without any manner of ground or reason of its existence or any dependence upon or connection at all with anything foregoing. I say that if this be supposed there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself for the thing itself as yet was not and there was no evidence of it to be seen in anything else for evidence in something else is connection with something else but such connection is contrary to this supposition. There was no evidence before that this thing would happen for by the supposition there was no reason why it should happen rather than something else or rather than nothing and if so then all things before were exactly equal and the same with respect to that and other possible things there was no preponderation no superior weight or value and therefore nothing that could be of weight or value to determine any understanding the thing was absolutely without evidence and absolutely unknowable an increase of understanding or of the capacity of discerning has no tendency and makes no advance towards discerning any signs or evidences of it let it be increased never so much yay if it be increased infinitely the increase of the strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which is far off and very much hidden deeply involved in clouds and darkness but it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence where there is none if the sight be infinitely strong and the capacity of discerning infinitely great it will enable to see all that there is and to see it perfectly and with ease yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not but on the contrary it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none three to suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events or which is the same thing events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them and knows all things is to suppose God's knowledge to be inconsistent with itself for to say that God certainly without all conjecture knows that a thing will infallibly be which at the same time he knows to be so contingent that it may possibly not be is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself or that one thing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows it is the same as to say he now knows a proposition to be a certain infallible truth which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth if a future volition is so without all necessity that nothing hinders but it may not be then the proposition which asserts its future existence is so uncertain that nothing hinders but that the truth of it may entirely fail and if God knows all things he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain and that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true if the thing be indeed contingent God views itself and judges it to be contingent if he views things as they are if the event be not necessary then it is possible it may never be and if it be possible it may never be God knows it may possibly never be and that is to know that the proposition which affirms its existence may possibly not be true and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain which truly is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth if volitions are in themselves contingent events without all necessity then it is no argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be but on the contrary an argument of ignorance and mistake because it would argue that he supposes that proposition to be certain which in its own nature and all things considered is uncertain and contingent to say in such a case that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of is ridiculous as much so as to say that God may know contradictions to be true for ought we know or that he may know a thing to be certain and at the same time know it not to be certain that we cannot conceive how because he has ways of knowing which we cannot comprehend corollary one from what has been observed it is evident that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty on account of any necessity of the event which follows from such decrees than the absolute foreknowledge of God because the connection between the event and certain foreknowledge is as infallible and indissoluble as between the event and absolute decree that is it is no more impossible that the event and decree should not agree together and that the event and absolute knowledge should disagree the connection between the event and foreknowledge is absolutely perfect by the supposition because it is supposed that the certainty and infallibility of the knowledge is absolutely perfect and it being so the certainty cannot be increased and therefore the connection between the knowledge and thing known cannot be increased so that if a decree be added to the foreknowledge it does not at all increase the connection or make it more infallible and indissoluble if it were not so the certainty of knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree which is contrary to the supposition which is that the knowledge is absolutely perfect or perfect to the highest possible degree there is as much impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown should be or which is the same thing as greater necessity of their future existence as if the event were already written down and was known and read by all mankind through all preceding ages and there was the most indissoluble and perfect connection possible between the writing and the thing written in such a case it would be as impossible the event should fail of existence as if it had existed already and a decree cannot make an event sure or more necessary than this and therefore if there be any such foreknowledge as it has been proved there is then the necessity of connection and consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which man or any other creature enjoys and from hence it may be inferred that absolute decrees which do not at all increase the necessity are not inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys on any such account as that they make the event decreed necessary and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass therefore if absolute decrees are inconsistent with man's liberty as a moral agent or his liberty in a state of probation or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys it is not on account of any necessity which absolute decrees infer Dr. Whitby supposes there is a great difference between God's foreknowledge and his decrees with regard to necessity of future events in his discourse on the five points page 474 et cetera he says God's prescience has no influence at all on our actions should God says he by immediate revelation give me the knowledge of the event of any man's state or actions with my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions surely none at all our knowledge doth not affect the things we know to make them more certain or more future than they would be without it now foreknowledge in God is knowledge as therefore knowledge has no influence on things that are so neither has foreknowledge on things that shall be and consequently the foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free cannot alter or diminish that freedom whereas God's decree of election is powerful and active and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means as shall unfrustrably produce the end hence God's prescience renders no actions necessary and to this purpose page 473 he cites origin where he says God's prescience is not the cause of things future but their being future is the cause of God's prescience that they will be and LeBlanc where he says this is the truest resolution of this difficulty that prescience is not the cause that things are future but their being future is the cause they are foreseen in like manner Dr. Clark in his demonstration of the being and attributes of God pages 95 to 99 and the author of the freedom of will in God and the creature speaking to the like purpose with Dr. Whitby represents foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known to make them necessary than afterknowledge or to that purpose to all which I would say that what is said about knowledge it's not having influence on the thing known to make it necessary is nothing to the purpose nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning whether prescience be the thing that makes the event necessary or known it alters not the case infallible foreknowledge may prove the necessity of the event foreknown and yet not be the thing which causes the necessity if the foreknowledge be absolute this proves the event known to be necessary or proves that it is impossible but that the event should be by some means or other either by a decree or some other way if there be any other way because as was said before it is absurd to say that a proposition is known to be certainly an infallibly true which yet may possibly prove not true the whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this that in as much as certain foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary as a decree does therefore it does not prove it to be necessary as a decree does but there is no force in this arguing for it is built only on this supposition that nothing can prove or be an evidence of a thing being necessary but that which has a causal influence to make it so but this can never be maintained if certain foreknowledge of the future existence of an event be not the thing which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence yet it may and certainly does demonstrate that it is impossible it should fail of it however that impossibility comes if foreknowledge be not the cause but the effect of this impossibility it may prove that there is such an impossibility as much as if it were the cause it is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause as from the cause to the effect it is enough that an existence which is infallibly foreknown cannot fail whether that impossibility arises from the foreknowledge or is prior to it it is as evident as anything can be that it is impossible a thing which is infallibly known to be true should prove not to be true therefore there is a necessity that it should be otherwise whether the knowledge be the cause of this necessity or the necessity the cause of the knowledge all certain knowledge whether it be foreknowledge or afterknowledge or concomitant knowledge proves the thing known now to be necessary by some means or other or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true I freely allow that foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than afterknowledge but then afterknowledge which is certain and infallible proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true certain afterknowledge proves that it is now by some means or other become impossible but that the proposition which predicates past existence on the event should be true and so does certain foreknowledge prove that now in the time of the knowledge it is by some means or other become impossible but that the proposition which predicates future existence on the event should be true the necessity of the truth of the propositions consisting in the present impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirmed in both cases is the immediate ground of the certainty of the knowledge there can be no certainty of knowledge without it there must be a certainty in things themselves before they are certainly known or which is the same thing known to be certain for certainty of knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves which are known therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of knowledge and to render things capable of being known to be certain and there is nothing but the necessity of truth known or it's being impossible but that it should be true wherein other words the firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition that contains that truth all certainty of knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that connection so God's certain foreknowledge of the future existence of any event is his view of the firm and indissoluble connection of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence the subject is that possible event the predicate is its future existence but if future existence be firmly indissoluble connected with that event then the future existence of that event is necessary if God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent and may possibly never be then he sees a firm connection between a subject and predicate predicate that are not firmly connected which is a contradiction I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true that mere knowledge does not affect the thing known to make it more certain or more future but yet I say it supposes and proves the thing to be already both future and certain that is necessarily future knowledge of futurity supposes futurity and a certain knowledge of futurity supposes certain futurity and antecedent to that certain knowledge but there is no other certain futurity of a thing antecedent to certainty of knowledge than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true or which is the same thing the necessity of the event I would observe one thing further that if it be as those four mentioned writers suppose that God's foreknowledge is not the cause but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown this is so far from showing that this foreknowledge doth not infer the necessity of the existence of that event that it rather shows the contrary the more plainly because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm that it is as if it had already been in as much as in effect it actually exists already its future existence has already had actual influence and efficiency and has produced an effect these prescience the effect exists already and as the effect supposes the cause and depends entirely upon it therefore it is as if the future event which is the cause had existed already the effect is firm as possible it having already the possession of existence and has made sure of it but the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause ground and reason the building cannot be firmer than the foundation to illustrate this matter let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glass for instance a reflecting telescope to be the real effects of heavenly bodies at a distance and out of sight which they resemble if it be so then as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence and it has become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed so they being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble this proves the existence of those heavenly bodies to be as real infallible firm and necessary as the existence of these effects the one being connected with and wholly depending on the other now let us suppose future existences some way or other to have influence back to produce effects beforehand and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass a thousand years before they exist yay in all preceding ages but yet that these images are real effects of these future existences perfectly dependent on and connected with their cause these effects and images having already had actual existence render that matter of their existence perfectly firm and stable and utterly impossible to be otherwise and this proves as in the other instance that the existence of the things which are their causes is also equally sure firm and necessary and that it is alike impossible but that they should be as if they have been already as their effects have and if instead of images in a glass we suppose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the divine mind which have existed there from all eternity which are as properly effects as truly and properly connected with their cause the case is not altered another thing which has been said by some Armenians to take off the force of what is urged from God's prescience against the contingents of the volitions of moral agents is to this purpose that when we talk of foreknowledge in God there is no strict propriety in our so speaking and that although it be true that there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity yet there is no such thing as before and after in God but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view without any succession to this I answer one it has been already shown that all certain knowledge proves the necessity of the truth known whether it be before after or at the same time though it be true that there is no succession in God's knowledge and the manner of his knowledge is to us inconceivable yet thus much we know concerning it that there is no event past present or to come that God is ever uncertain of he never is never was and never will be without infallible knowledge of it he always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible and as he always sees things just as they are in truth hence there never is in reality anything contingent in such a sense as that possibly it may happen never to exist if strictly speaking there is no foreknowledge in God it is because those things which are future to us are as present to God as if they had already had existence and that is as much as to say that future events are always in God's view as evident, clear, sure and necessary as if they already were if there never is a time where in the existence of the event is not present with God then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence as if its existence were present and were already come to pass God viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably as that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment does not hinder but that there is properly now in the mind of God a certain and perfect knowledge of the moral actions of men which to us are and hundred years hence yea the objection supposes this and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that by the foregoing arguments it is now impossible these moral actions should not come to pass we know that God foreknows the future voluntary actions of men in such a sense as that he is able particularly to foretell them and cause them to be recorded as he often has done and therefore that necessary connection which there is between God's knowledge and the event known as much proves the event to be necessary beforehand as if the divine knowledge were in the same sense before the event that the prediction or writing is if the knowledge be infallible then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible that is there is an infallible connection between that written prediction and the event and if so then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise then that the prediction and the event should agree and this is the same thing as to say it is impossible that the event should come to pass and this is the same as to say that it is coming to pass is necessary so that it is manifest that there being no proper succession in God's mind makes no alteration as to the necessity of the existence of the events known yay to this is so far from weakening the proof given of the impossibility of future events known not coming to pass as that it establishes the clearness and shows the clearness of the evidence for one the very reason why God's knowledge is without succession is because it is absolutely perfect to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty all things where the past present or to come being viewed with equal evidence and fullness future things being seen with as much clearness as if they were present the view is always absolute perfection and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration and so no succession the actual existence of the thing known does not at all increase or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing known God calls the things that are not as though they were they are all one to him as if they had already existed but herein consists the strength of the demonstration before given that it is as impossible they should fail of existence as if they existed already this objection instead of weakening the argument sets it in the strongest light for it supposes it to be so indeed that the existence of future events is in God's view so much as if it already had been that when they come actually to exist it makes not the least alteration or variation in his knowledge of them to the objection is founded on the immutability of God's knowledge for it is the immutability of knowledge that makes it to be without succession but this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I insist on these that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of existence for if that were possible then a change in God's knowledge and view of things were possible for if the known event should not come into being as God expected then he would see it so would change his mind and see his former mistake and thus there would be change and succession in his knowledge but as God is immutable and it is infinitely impossible that his view should be changed so it is for the same reason just so impossible that the fore known event should not exist and that is to be impossible in the highest degree and therefore the contrary is necessary nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed by the succession of time who comprehends all things from eternity to eternity in one most perfect and unalterable view so that his whole eternal duration is we tie into minabulous totasimil et perfecta possessio on the whole I need not fear to say that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever more capable of strict demonstration than that God's certain prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a contingence of these events as is without all necessity and so is inconsistent with the Armenian notion of liberty corollary to hence the doctrine of the Calvinists concerning the absolute decrees of God does not all infer any more fatality in things than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of the most Armenian divines who acknowledge God's omniscience and universal prescience therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the Calvinists as implying obses doctrine of necessity or the stoical doctrine of fate lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists than their own doctrine and therefore it doth not become those divines to raise such an outcry against the corollary three hence all arguments of Armenians who own God's omniscience against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties and against the Calvinist doctrine of efficacious grace on this ground that those doctrines though they do not suppose men to be underneath constraint or co-action yet suppose them under necessity must fall to the ground and their arguments against the necessity of men's volitions taken from the reasonableness of God's commands promises and threatenings and the sincerity of his councils and imitations and all objections against any doctrines of the Calvinists as being inconsistent with human liberty because they infer necessity I say all these arguments and objections must be justly esteemed vain and frivolous as coming from them being leveled against their own doctrine as well as against that of the Calvinists end of part two section 12 part two section 13 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this lever box recording is in the public domain whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with anything antecedent or not yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Armenian liberty every act of the will has a cause or it has not if it has a cause then according to what has already been demonstrated it is not contingent but necessary the effect being necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause let that cause be what it will if the cause is the will itself by antecedent acts choosing and determining still the determined cause act must be a necessary effect the act that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause but must be wholly subject to its determination and command as much as the motions of the hands and feet the consequent commanded acts of the will are as passive and as necessary with respect to the antecedent determining acts as the parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command them and therefore if all the free acts of the will are all determined effects determined by the will itself that is by antecedent choice then they are all necessary they are all subject to and decisively fixed by the foregoing act which is their cause yet even the determining act itself for that must be determined and fixed by another act preceding if it be a free and voluntary act so must be necessary so that by this all the free acts of the will are necessary and cannot be free unless they are necessary because they cannot be free according to the Armenian notion of freedom unless they are determined by the will and this is to be determined by antecedent choice which being their cause proves them necessary and yet they say necessity is utterly inconsistent with liberty so that by their scheme the acts of the will cannot be free unless they are necessary and yet cannot be free if they be necessary but if the other part of the dilemma be taken that the free acts of the will have no cause and are connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before and determines them in order to maintain their proper and absolute contingents and this should be allowed to be possible still it will not serve their turn for if the volition come to pass by perfect contingents and without any cause at all then it is certain no act of the will no prior act of the soul was the cause no determination or choice of the soul had any hand in it the will or the soul was indeed the subject of what happened to it accidentally but was not the cause the will is not active in causing or determining but purely the passive subject at least according to their notion of action and passion in this case contingents as much prevents the determination of the will as a proper cause and as to the will it was necessary and could be no otherwise for to suppose that it could have been otherwise the will or soul had pleased is to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of choice or pleasure contrary to what is now supposed it is to suppose that it might have been otherwise if its cause had ordered it otherwise but this does not agree to it having no cause or order at all that must be necessary as to the soul which is dependent on no free act of the soul but that which is without a cause is dependent on no free act of the soul because by the supposition it is dependent on nothing and is connected with nothing in such a case the soul is necessarily subjected to what accident brings to pass from time to time as much as the earth that is enacted is necessarily subjected to what falls upon it but this does not consist with the Armenian notion of liberty which is the will's power of determining itself in its own acts and being wholly active in it without passiveness and without being subject to necessity thus contingence belongs to the Armenian notion of liberty and yet is inconsistent with it I would hear observed that the author of the essay on the freedom of the will in God and the creature pages 76 77 says as follows that chance always means something done without design chance and design stand in direct opposition to each other and chance can never be properly applied to acts of the will which is the spring of all design and which designs to choose whatsoever a death choose whether there be any superior fitness in the thing which it chooses or no and it designs to determine itself to one thing where two things perfectly equal are proposed merely because it will but herein appears a very great inadvertence for if the will be the spring of all design as he says then certainly it is not always the effect of design and the acts of the will themselves must sometimes come to pass when they do not spring from design and consequently come to pass by chance according to his own definition of chance to choose whatsoever it does choose and designs to determine itself as he says then it designs to determine all its designs which carries us back from one design to a foregoing design determining that and to another determining that and so on in in finitum the very first design must be the effect of foregoing design or else it must be by chance in his notion of it here another alternative may be proposed relating to the connection of the acts of the will with something foregoing that is their cause not much alike to the other which is this either human liberty may well stand with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the understanding and so is consistent with necessity or it is inconsistent with and contrary to such a connection and necessity the former is directly subversive of the Armenian notion of liberty consisting in freedom from all necessity and if the latter be chosen and it be said that liberty is inconsistent with any such necessary connection of volition with foregoing views of the understanding it consisting in freedom from any such necessity of the will as that would imply that the soul consists partly at least in freedom from restraint, limitation and government in its actings by the understanding and in liberty and liableness to act contrary to the views and dictates of the understanding and consequently the more the soul has of this disengagedness in its acting the more liberty now let it be considered to what this brings the noble principle of human liberty when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection these are full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether random without the least connection with or restraint or government by any dictative reason or anything whatsoever apprehended considered or viewed by the understanding as being inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the will over its own determinations and have conceived of liberty is some dignity or privilege something worth claiming but what dignity or privilege is there in being given up to such a wild contingence as this to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unreasonably and as much without the guidance of understanding as if we had none or were as destitute of perception as the smoke that is driven by the wind end of part 2 section 13 part 3 section 1 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain part 3 wherein is inquired whether any such liberty of will as Armenians hold be necessary to moral agency, virtue and vice to praise and dispraise etc section 1 God's moral excellency necessary yet virtuous and praise worthy having considered the first thing proposed relating to that freedom of will which Armenians maintain namely whether any such thing does ever did or ever can exist I come now to the second thing proposed to be the subject of inquiry whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice praise and blame, rewarded punishment etc I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the supreme moral agent and fountain of all agency and virtue Dr. Whitby in his discourse on the five points section 14 says if all human actions are necessary virtue and vice must be empty names we being capable of nothing that is blame worthy or deserved praise for who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help or judge that he deserved praise only for what he could not avoid to the like purpose he speaks in places innumerable in his discourse on the freedom of the will constantly maintaining that a freedom not only from co-action but necessity is absolutely requisite in order to actions being either worthy of blame or deserving of praise and to this agrees as is well known the current doctrine of Armenian writers who in general hold that there is no virtue or vice reward or punishment nothing to be commended or blamed for this freedom and yet Dr. Whitby page 300 allows that God is without this freedom and Armenian so far as I have had opportunity to observe generally acknowledge that God is necessarily holy and his will necessarily determined to that which is good so that putting these things together the infinitely holy God who always used to be esteemed by God's people is all possible virtue in the most absolute purity and perfection brightness and amiableness the most perfect pattern of virtue and from whom all the virtue of others is but as beams from the sun and who has been supposed to be being thus everywhere represented in scripture on the account of his virtue and holiness infinitely more worthy to be esteemed loved honored admired commended extolled and praised than any creature being according to this notion of Dr. Whitby and other Armenians has no virtue at all virtue when ascribed to him is but an empty name and he is deserving of no commendation or praise because he is under necessity he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is therefore no thanks to him for it it seems the holiness justice faithfulness etc of the most high must not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is praiseworthy they will not deny that these things in God are good but then we must understand them that they are no more virtuous or of the nature of anything commendable than the good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent as the brightness of the sun and the fertility of the earth are good but not virtuous because these properties are necessary to these bodies and not the fruit of self determining power needs no other computation of this notion to Christians acquainted with the Bible but only stating and particularly representing it to bring texts of scripture where in God is represented as in every respect in the highest manner virtuous and supremely praiseworthy would be endless and is altogether needless to such as have been brought up in the light of the gospel it were to be wished that doctor Whitby and other divines of the same sort had explained themselves when they have asserted that that which is necessary is not deserving of praise at the same time that they have owned God's perfection to be necessary and so in effect representing God is not deserving praise certainly if their words have any meaning at all by praise they must mean the exercise or testimony of esteem respect or honorable regard and will they then say that men are worthy of that esteem respect and honor for their virtue small and imperfect as it is which yet God is not worthy of for his infinite righteousness holiness and goodness if so it must be because of some sort of peculiar excellency in the virtuous man which is his prerogative wherein he really has the preference some dignity that is entirely distinguished from any excellency or any openness in God not in dependence but in preeminence which therefore he does not receive from God nor is God the fountain or pattern of it nor can God in that respect standing competition with him as the object of honor and regard but man may claim a peculiar esteem commendation and glory to which God can have no pretension yea God has no right by virtue of his necessary holiness to intermedal with that grateful respect and praise due to the virtuous man who chooses virtue in the exercise of a freedom God who trump quay any more than a precious stone which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful and if it be so let it be explained what that peculiar respect is that is due to the virtuous man which differs in nature and kind in some way of preeminence from all that is due to God what is the name or description of that peculiar affection is it esteem love admiration honor praise or gratitude the scripture represents God as the highest object of all these there we read of the soul magnifying the Lord of loving him with all the heart with all the soul with all the mind and with all the strength admiring him and his righteous acts or greatly regarding them as marvelous and wonderful honoring glorifying exalting extolling blessing thanking and praising him giving unto him all the glory of the good which is done received rather than unto men that no flesh should glory in his presence but that he should be regarded as the being to whom all glory is due what then is that respect what passion affection or exercise is it that Armenians call praise diverse from all these things which men are worthy of for their virtue in which God is not worthy of in any degree if that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and actions be as inconsistent with being worthy of praise as a necessity of co-action as is plainly implied in or inferred from Dr. Whitby's discourse then why should we thank God for his goodness any more than if he were forced to be good or any more than we should thank one of our fellow creatures who did us good not freely and of goodwill or from any kindness of heart that from mere compulsion or extrinsical necessity Armenians suppose that God is necessarily a good and gracious being for this they make the ground of some of their main arguments against many doctrines maintained by Calvinists they say these are certainly false and it is impossible they should be true because they are not consistent with the goodness of God this supposes that it is impossible but that God should be good for if it be possible that he should be otherwise and that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases according to their own argument that virtue in God is not in the most proper sense rewardable is not for want of merit in his moral perfections and actions sufficient to deserve rewards from his creatures but because he is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any reward is already infinitely and unchangeably happy and we cannot be comfortable unto him but still he is worthy of our supreme benevolence for his virtue and would be worthy of our beneficence which is the fruit and expression of benevolence if our goodness could extend to him if God deserves to be thanked in praise for his goodness he would for the same reason deserve that we should also requite his kindness if that were possible what shall I render unto the Lord for all his benefits is the natural language of thankfulness so far as in us lies it is our duty to render again according to benefits received and that we might have opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude to God as beneficence notwithstanding his being infinitely above our reach he has appointed others to be his receivers and to stand in his stead as the objects of our beneficence such are especially our indigent brethren end of part 3 section 1 part 3 section 2 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this lever box recording is in the public domain the acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy yet truly virtuous praiseworthy rewardable etc I've already considered how Dr. Whitby insists upon it that a freedom not only from co-action but necessity is requisite either to virtue or vice praise or dispraise reward or punishment he also insists on the same freedom as absolutely requisite to a person being the subject of our law of precepts for prohibitions in the book before mentioned pages 301 314-328-339-340-341-342 347-361-373-410 and of promises and threatenings pages 298-301-305-311-339-343-63 and as requisite to a state of trial page 297 etc now therefore with an eye to these things I would inquire into the moral conduct or in practice as of our Lord Jesus Christ which he exhibited in his human nature in his state of humiliation and first I would show that his holy behavior was necessary or that it was impossible it should be otherwise then that he should behave himself holily and that he should be perfectly holy in each individual act of his life and secondly that his holy behavior was properly of the nature of virtue and was worthy of praise and that he was the subject of law precept or commands promises and rewards and that he was in a state of trial one it was impossible that the acts of the will of Christ own soul should in any instance degree or circumstance be otherwise than holy and agreeable to God's nature and will the following things make this evident 1. God had promised so effectually to preserve and uphold him by his spirit under all his temptations that he could not fail of the end for which he came into the world but he would have failed had he fallen into sin we have such a promise Isaiah 43-124 behold my servant whom I uphold and elect in whom my soul delighted I have put my spirit upon him he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles he shall not cry nor lift up nor cause his voice to be heard in the street he shall bring forth judgment unto truth he shall not fail nor be discouraged till he have set judgment in the earth and the aisles shall wait his law this promise of God's spirit put upon him and his not crying and lifting up his voice etc relates to the time of Christ's appearance on earth as is manifest from that nature of the promise and also the application of it in the New Testament Matthew 12-18 and the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God's spirit that he should be preserved from sin particularly from pride and vain glory and from being overcome by any temptations he should be under to effect the glory of this world the pomp of an earthly prince or the applause and praise of men and that he should be so upheld that he should by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming into the world of bringing forth judgment unto victory and establishing his kingdom of grace in the earth and in the following verses this promise is confirmed with the greatest imaginable solemnity thus sayeth the Lord he that created the heavens and stretched them out he that spread forth the earth and that which cometh out of it he that giveth breath unto the people upon it and spirit to them that walk therein I the Lord have called thee in righteousness and will hold thine hand and will keep thee and give thee for a covenant of the people for a light of the Gentiles to open the blind eyes to bring out the prisoners from the prison and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house that is my name etc very parallel with these promises is another Isaiah 49 789 which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's humiliation on earth thus sayeth the Lord the redeemer of Israel and his holy one to him whom man despises to him whom the nation abhoreth to a servant of rulers king shall see and arise princes also shall worship because of the Lord that is faithful and the holy one of Israel and he shall choose thee thus sayeth the Lord in an acceptable time have I heard thee in a day of salvation have I helped thee and I will preserve thee and give thee for a covenant of the people to establish the earth etc and in Isaiah 55 6 we have the Messiah expressing his assurance that God would help him by so opening his ear or inclining his heart to God's commandments that he should not be rebellious but should persevere and not apostatize or turn his back that through God's help he should be immovable in obedience under great trials of reproach and suffering setting his face like a flint so that he knew he should not be ashamed or frustrated in his design and finally should be approved and justified as having done his work faithfully the Lord hath opened my ear so that I was not rebellious neither turned away my back I gave my back to the smithers and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair I hid not my face from shame and spitting for the Lord God will help me therefore shall I not be confounded therefore have I set my face as a flint that I shall not be ashamed he is near that justifies me who will contend with me let us stand together who is mine adversary let him come near to me behold the Lord God will help me who is he that shall condemn me lo they shall all wax old as a garment the moth shall eat them up 2 the same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to the Messiah of his future glory kingdom and success his office and character of a mediator which glory could not have been obtained if his holiness had failed and he had been guilty of sin God's absolute promise makes the things promised necessary and they're failing to take place absolutely impossible and in light manner it makes those things necessary on which the things promised depends and without which it cannot take effect therefore it appears that it was utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail from such absolute promises as these Psalms 110 4 the Lord hath sworn and will not repent thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek and from every other promise in that Psalm contained in each verse of it and Psalm 267 I will declare the decree the Lord hath said unto me thou art my son this day have I begotten thee ask of me and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance et cetera Psalm 4534 et cetera gird thy sword on thy thigh O most mighty with thy glory and thy majesty and thy majesty ride prosperously and so everything that is said from thence to the end of the Psalm see Isaiah 3 13 2 15 and 53 10 2 12 and all those promises which God makes to the Messiah of success, dominion and glory in the character of a redeemer Isaiah chapter 49 3 it was often promised to the church of God of old for their comfort that God would give them a righteous sinless Saviour Jeremiah 23 5 6 behold the days come saith the Lord that I will raise up unto David a righteous branch and a king shall reign and prosper and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth in his days shall Judah be saved and Israel shall dwell safely and this is the name whereby he shall be called the Lord our righteousness so Jeremiah 33 15 I will cause the branch of righteousness to grow up unto David and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land Isaiah 11 6 7 4 unto us a child is born upon the throne of David and of his kingdom to order it and to establish it with judgment and justice from henceforth even forever the zeal of the Lord of hosts will do this chapter 11 1 etc there shall come forth the rod out of the stem of Jesse and the branch shall grow out of his roots and the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord with righteousness shall he judge the poor and reprove with equity righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins and faithfulness the girdle of his reigns chapter 52 13 my servant shall deal prudently chapter 53 9 because he had done no violence neither was guile found in his mouth if it be impossible that these promises should fail and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for one jot or a tittle of them to pass away than it was impossible that Christ should commit any sin Christ himself signified that it was impossible but that the things which were spoken concerning him should be fulfilled Luke 24 44 that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses and in the prophets and in the Psalms concerning me Matthew 26 53 54 then shall the scripture be fulfilled that thus it must be Mark 14 49 but the scriptures must be fulfilled and so the apostle acts 1 16 17 the scripture must needs have been fulfilled for all the promises which were made to the church of old of the Messiah as a future savior from that made to our first parents in paradise to that which was delivered by the prophet Malachi to it to be impossible that Christ should not have persevered in perfect holiness the ancient predictions given to God's church of the Messiah as a savior were of the nature of promises as is evident by the predictions themselves and that manner of delivering them but they are expressed in very often call promises in the New Testament as in Luke 1 54 55 72 73 Acts 13 32 33 Romans 1 1 2 3 and chapter 15 8 Hebrews 6 13 etc these promises were often made with great solemnity and confirmed with an oath as Genesis 22 16 17 by myself have I sworn say of the Lord that in blessing I will bless thee and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of heaven and as the sandwiches upon the sea shore shall all the nations of the earth be blessed compare Luke 1 72 73 and Galatians 3 8 15 16 the apostle Hebrews 6 17 18 speaking of this promise to Abraham says we're in God willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel confirmed it by an oath that by two immutable things in which it was impossible for God to lie we might have strong consolation in which words the necessity of the accomplishment or which is the same thing the impossibility of the contrary is fully declared so God confirmed the promise of the Messiah's great salvation made to David by an oath Psalm 89 34 I have made a covenant with my chosen I have sworn unto David my servant thy seed will I establish forever and build up thy throne to all generations there is nothing so abundantly set forth in Scripture as sure and irrefragable as this promise and oath to David see Psalm 89 34 to 36 2 Samuel 23 5 Isaiah 55 4 Acts 2 29 30 and 13 34 the Scripture expressly speaks of it as utterly impossible that this promise and oath to David concerning the everlasting dominion of the Messiah should fail Jeremiah 33 15 etc in those days and at that time I will cause the branch of righteousness to grow up unto David for thus saith the Lord David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel verses 20 21 if you can break my covenant of the day and my covenant of the night and that there should be day and night in their season then may also my covenant be broken with David my servant that he should not have a son to reign upon his throne so in verses 25 26 thus abundant is the Scripture in representing how impossible it was that the promise is made of old concerning the great salvation and kingdom of the Messiah should fail which implies that it was impossible that this Messiah the second Adam the promised seed of Abraham and of David should fall from his integrity as the first Adam did 5 all the promises that were made to the church of God under the Old Testament of the great enlargement of the church and advancement of our glory in the days of the Gospel after the coming of the Messiah the increase of her light, liberty, holiness joy triumph over her enemies etc of which so great a part of the Old Testament consists which are repeated so often are so variously exhibited so frequently introduced with great pomp and solemnity and are so abundantly sealed with typical and symbolical representations I say all these promises imply that the Messiah should perfect the work of redemption and this implies that he should persevere in the work which the Father had appointed him being in all things conformed to his will these promises were often confirmed by an oath see Isaiah 54 9 with the context chapter 62 18 and it is represented as utterly impossible that these promises should fail Isaiah 49 15 with the context chapter 54 10 with the context chapter 51 4 to 8 chapter 48 with the context and therefore it was impossible that the Messiah should fail or commit sin 6 it was impossible that the Messiah should persevere in integrity and holiness as the first Adam did because this would have been inconsistent with the promises which God made to the Blessed Virgin his mother and to her husband implying that he should save his people from their sins that God would give him the throne of his Father David that he should reign over the house of Jacob forever and that of his kingdom there shall be no end these promises were sure and it was impossible they should fail and therefore the Virgin Mary trusting fully to them acted reasonably having an immovable foundation of her faith as Elizabeth observes verse 45 and blessed is she that believeth for there shall be a performance of those things which were told her from the Lord 7 that it should have been possible that Christ should sin and so failing the work of our redemption does not consist with the eternal purpose and decree of God revealed in the Scriptures that he would provide salvation for fallen man in and by Jesus Christ and that salvation should be offered to sinners through the preaching of the gospel thus much is implied in many Scriptures as 1 Corinthians 2 7 Ephesians 1 4 5 and chapter 3 9 2 11 1 Peter 1 1920 such an absolute decree as this Armenians allowed to be signified in many texts their election of nations and societies in general election of the Christian church and conditional election of particular persons implied this God could not decree before the foundation of the world to save all that should believe in and obey Christ unless he had absolutely decided that salvation should be provided and if actually wrought out by Christ and since as the Armenians themselves strenuously maintain a decree of God infers necessity hence it became necessary that Christ should persevere and actually work out salvation for us and that he should not fail by the commission of sin 8 that it should have been possible for Christ's holiness to fail is not consistent with what God promised to his son before all ages for that salvation should be offered to men through Christ and bestowed on all his faithful followers is at least implied in that certain and infallible promise spoken of by the apostle Titus 1, 2 in hope of eternal life which God that cannot lie promised before the world began this does not seem to be controverted by Armenians 9 that it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his father's will is inconsistent with the promise made to the father by the son the logos that was with the father from the beginning before he took the human nature as may be seen in Psalms 46 to 8 compared with the apostle's interpretation Hebrews 10 5 to 9 sacrifice an offering thou didst not desire mine ears hast thou opened or bored burnt offering and sin offering thou hast not required then say I low I come in the volume of the book it is written of me I delight to do thy will oh my God gay thy law is within my heart where is a manifest illusion to the covenant which the willing of his master service made with his master to be his servant forever on the day wherein he had his ear board which covenant was probably inserted in the public records called the volume of the book by the judges who were called to take cognizance of the transaction Exodus 21 if the logos who was with the father before the world and who made the world thus engaged in covenant to do the will of the father in the human nature work recorded that it might be made sure doubtless it was impossible that it should fail and so it was impossible that Christ should fail of doing the will of the father in the human nature 10 if it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the will of his father and so to have failed of effectually working out redemption for sinners than the salvation of all the saints who were saved from the beginning of the world to the death of Christ was not built on a firm foundation which he was to work out by his obedience unto death was the saving foundation of all that ever were saved therefore if when the Old Testament saints had the pardon of their sins and the favor of God promised them and salvation bestowed upon them still it was possible that the Messiah when he came might commit sin than all this was on a foundation that was not firm and stable but liable to fail something which it was possible might never be God did as it were trust to what his son had engaged and promised to do in future time and depended so much upon it that he proceeded actually to save men on the account of it though it had been already done but this trust and dependence of God on that supposition of Christ being liable to fail of doing his will was leaning on a staff that was weak and might possibly break the saints of old trusted on the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out and completed by the Messiah and built their comfort upon it Abraham saw Christ's day and rejoiced and he and the other patriarchs died in the faith of the promise of it Hebrews 11 13 but on this supposition their faith their comfort and their salvation was built on a fallible foundation Christ was not to them a tried stone a sure foundation Isaiah 28 16 David entirely rested on the covenant of God with him concerning the glorious dominion and salvation of the Messiah and said it was all his salvation and all his desire and comforts himself that this covenant was an everlasting covenant ordered in all things and sure second Samuel 23 5 but if Christ virtue might fail he was mistaken his great comfort was not built so sure as he thought it was being founded entirely on the determinations of the free will of Christ human soul which was subject to no necessity it might be for the other also the dependence of those who looked for redemption in Jerusalem and waited for the constellation of Israel Luke 2 25 and 38 and the confidence of the disciples of Jesus who forsook all and follow him that they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom were built on a sandy foundation 11 the man Christ Jesus before he had finished his course of obedience and while in the midst of temptations and was abundant and positively predicting his own future glory in his kingdom and the enlargement of his church the salvation of his Gentiles through him etc and in promises of blessings he would bestow on his true disciples in his future kingdom on which promises he required the full dependence of his disciples John 14 but the disciples would have no ground for such dependence if Christ had been liable to fail in his work in Christ himself would see a presumption in so abounding in peremptory promises of great things which depended on a mere contingence these the determinations of his free will consisting in a freedom odd you Trump quay to either sin or holiness standing in indifference and incident in thousands of future instances to go either one way or the other thus it is evident that it was impossible that the acts of the will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy conformed to the will of the Father or in other words they were necessarily so conformed I've been the longer in the proof of this matter it being a thing denied by some of the greatest Armenians by Episcopius in particular and because I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between Calvinist and Armenians concerning the necessity of such a freedom of will as is insisted on by the latter in order to agency virtue command or prohibition promise or threatening reward or punishment praise or dispraise merit or demerit and now therefore proceed to to consider whether Christ in his holy behavior on earth was not thus a moral agent subject to commands promises etc doctor would be very often speaks of what he calls a freedom odd who Trump without necessity as requisite to law and commands and speaks of necessity is entirely inconsistent with injunctions and prohibitions but yet we read of Christ being the subject of his father's commands John 10 18 and 15 10 and Christ tells us that everything that he said or did was in a compliance with commandments he received of the father John 12 49 50 and 14 31 and we often read of Christ's obedience to his father's commands Romans 5 19 Philippians 2 18 Hebrews 5 8 the 4 mentioned writer represents promises offered as motives to persons to do their duty or are being moved and induced by promises as utterly inconsistent with a state wherein persons have not a liberty odd who Trump Lebed but are necessarily determined to one see particularly page 298 and 311 but the thing which this writer asserts is demonstrably false if the Christian religion be true if there be any truth in Christianity or the Holy Scriptures the man Christ Jesus had his will infallibly and alterably determined to good and that alone but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made to him on condition of his persevering in and perfecting the work which God had appointed him Isaiah 53 10 11 12 Psalms 2 and 110 Isaiah 49 789 in Luke 22 28 29 Christ says to his disciples ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations and I appoint unto you a kingdom as my father hath appointed unto me the word most properly signifies to a point by covenant or promise the plain meaning of Christ words is this as you have partaken of my temptations and trials and have been steadfast and have overcome I promise to make you partakers of my reward and to give you a kingdom as the father has promised me a kingdom for continuing steadfast and overcoming in those trials and the words are well explained by those in revelations 321 to him that overcomeeth will I grant to sit with me on my throne even as I also overcame and am set down with my father in his throne and Christ had not only promises of glorious success and rewards made to his obedience and sufferings but the scriptures plainly represent him as using these promises for motives and inducements to obey and suffer and particularly that promise of a kingdom which the father hath appointed him or sitting with the father on his throne as in Hebrews 12 12 let us lay aside every weight and the sin which doth easily beset us and let us run with patience the race that is set before us looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of faith who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross despising the shame and is set down on the right hand of the throne of God and how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert that the holy and excellent temper and behavior of Jesus Christ and that obedience which he performed under such great trials was not virtuous or praiseworthy because his will was not free ad utrum quay to either holding this or sin but was unalterably determined to one that upon this account there is no virtue at all in all Christ's humility, meekness patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world heavenly mindedness, submission to the will of God, perfect obedience to his commands unto death, even the death of the cross his great compassion to the afflicted his unparalleled love to mankind his faithfulness to God and man under such great trials his praying for his enemies even when nailing him to the cross that virtue when applied to these things is but an empty name that there was no merit in any of these things that is that Christ was worthy of nothing at all on account of them worthy of no reward, no praise, no honor or respect from God or man because his will was not indifferent and free either to these things or the contrary but under such a strong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent as made it impossible that he should choose the contrary that upon this account to use Dr. Whitby's language it would be sensibly unreasonable that the human nature be rewarded for any of these things according to this doctrine that creature who is evidently set forth in Scripture as the firstborn of every creature as having in all things the preeminence and as the highest of all creatures in virtue honor and worthiness of esteem praise and glory on account of his virtue is less worthy of reward or praise than the very least of saints yea no more worthy than a clock or mere machine that is purely passive and moved by natural necessity if we judge by Scripture representations of things we have reason to suppose that Christ took on him our nature and dealt with us in this world in a suffering state not only to satisfy for our sins but that he being in our nature in circumstances and under our trials might be our most fit and proper example leader and captain in the exercise of glorious and victorious virtue and might be a visible instance of the glorious and and reward of it that we might see in him the beauty, amiableness and true honor and glory and exceeding benefit of that virtue which is proper for us human beings to practice and might thereby learn and be animated to seek the light, glory and honor and to obtain the light, glorious reward see Hebrews 2 9 to 14 with verse 8 9 and 12 1 2 3 John 15 10 Romans 8 17 2 Timothy 2 11 12 1 Peter 2 19 20 and 4 13 but if there was nothing of any virtue or merit or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise or commendation at all in all that he did because it was all necessary and he could not help it then how is here anything so proper to animate and incite us free creatures by patient continuance and well-doing to seek for honor, glory and virtue God speaks of himself as peculiarly well pleased with the righteousness of this distinguished servant Isaiah 42 21 the Lord is well pleased for his righteousness sake the sacrifices of old are spoken of as a sweet savor to God but the obedience of Christ is far more acceptable than they Psalms 46 7 sacrifice an offering thou didst not desire mine ear hast thou open as thy servant performing willing obedience burnt offering and sin offering hast thou not required then said I low I come as a servant as thy servant frankly answers the cause of his master I delight to do thy will oh my God and thy law is within my heart Matthew 17 5 this is my beloved son in whom I am well pleased and Christ tells us expressly that the father loves him for that wonderful instance of his obedience his voluntary yielding himself to death in compliance with the father's command John 10 17 18 therefore death my father love me my life. No man takeeth it from me, but I lay it down of myself. This commandment received I of my Father." And if it was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death, if it was not worthy of praise, and of the most glorious rewards the heavenly hosts were exceedingly mistaken by the account that is given of them, revelations 5, 8 to 12, the four beasts and the four and twenty elders fell down before the land, having every one of them harps and golden vows full of odors. And they sung a new song saying about art worthy to take the book and to open the seals thereof. For thou was slain, and I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne, and the beasts and the elders and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands, saying with a loud voice worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power and riches and wisdom and strength and honor and glory and blessing. Christ speaks of the eternal life which he was to receive as the reward of his obedience to the Father's commandments. John 12, 49, 50, I have not spoken of myself but the Father which sent me. He gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak, and I know that his commandment is life everlasting. Whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak. God promises to divide him apportion with the great, etc., for his being his righteous servant, for his glorious virtue under such great trials and afflictions. Isaiah 53, 11, 12, he shall see the travail of his soul and be satisfied. By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him apportion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul unto death. The scriptures represent God as rewarding him for above all his other servants, Philippians 2, 7, 9. He took on him the form of a servant and was made in the likeness of men. In being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherever God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name. Psalms 45, 7. Thou lovest righteousness and hatest wickedness. Therefore God thy God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows. There is no room to pretend that the glorious benefits bestowed in consequence of Christ's obedience are not properly of the nature of a reward. What is a reward in the most proper sense but a benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent in quality or behavior, in testimony of well-pleasiveness, in that moral excellency, and of respect and favor on that account? If we consider the nature of a reward most strictly and make the utmost of it and add to the things contained in this description proper merit or worthiness and the bestowment of the benefit in consequence of a promise, still it will be found there is nothing belonging to it but what the Scripture most expressly ascribes to the glory bestowed on Christ after his sufferings as appears from what has been already observed. There was a glorious benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent being called righteousness and obedience. There was great favor, love and well-pleasiveness for this righteousness and obedience in the bestower. There was proper merit or worthiness of the benefit in the obedience. It was bestowed in fulfillment of promises made to that obedience and was bestowed therefore or because he had performed that obedience. I may add to all these things that Jesus Christ while here in the flesh was manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam as Christ is called first Corinthians 1545 Romans 514 taking on him the human nature and so the form of a servant and being under the law to stand and act for us was put into a state of trial as the first Adam was. Dr. Whitby mentions these three things as evidence of persons being in a state of trial on the five points page 298 to 99 namely their afflictions being spoken of as their trials or temptations there being the subjects of promises and there being exposed to Satan's temptations. The Christ was apparently the subjects of each of these concerning promises made to him. I've spoken already the difficulties and afflictions he met within the course of his obedience are called these temptations or trials Luke 22 28. He are they which have continued with me in my temptations or trials Hebrews 2 18 for in that he himself has suffered being tempted or tried he is able to sucker them that are tempted and chapter 4 15 we have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities but was in all points tempted like as we are yet without sin and as to as being tempted by Satan it is what none will dispute. End of part 3 section 2 part 3 section 3 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. The case of such as are given up of God to sin and of fallen man in general proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blame worthiness. Doctor would be asserts freedom not only from correction but necessity to be essential to anything deserving the name of sin and to an action being culpable in these words discourse on five points. Addition 3 page 348 if they be thus necessitated then neither their sins of omission or commission could deserve that name. It being essential to the nature of sin according to Saint Austin's definition that it be an action a quo liberum as obstinary three things seem plainly necessary to make an action or omission culpable one that it be in our power to perform or forbear it for as origin and all the fathers say no man is blame worthy for not doing what he could not do. And elsewhere the doctor insists that when any do evil of necessity what they do is no vice that they are guilty of no fault are worthy of no blame dispraise or dishonor but are unblameable. If these things are true and doctor would be sense of necessity they will prove all such to be blameless who are given up of God to sin in what they commit after they are thus given up that there is such a thing as men being judicially given up to sin is certain if the scripture rightly informs us such a thing being often there spoken of as in Psalms 81 12 so I gave them up to their own hearts lust and they walked in their own councils acts 742 then God turned and gave them up to worship the host of heaven Romans 1 24 where for God also gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts to dishonor their own bodies between themselves verse 26 for this cause God gave them up to vile affections verse 28 and even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge God gave them over to a rope probate mind to do those things that are not convenient it is needless to stand particularly to inquire what God's giving men up to their own hearts lusts signifies it is sufficient to observe that hereby is certainly meant God so ordering or disposing things in some respect or other either by doing or forbearing to do as that the consequence should be men continuing in their sins so much as men are given up to so much as the consequence of their being given up whether that be less or more if God does not order things so by action or permission that sin will be the consequence then the event proves that they are not given up to that consequence it could be the consequence instead of evil then God's mercy is to be acknowledged in that good which mercy must be contrary to God's judgment in giving up to evil if the event must prove that they are given up to evil as the consequence then the persons who are the subjects of this judgment must be the subjects of such an event and so the event is necessary if not only co-action but all necessity will prove men blameless then Judas was blameless after Christ had given him over and had already declared his certain damnation and that he should barely betray him he was guilty of no sin in betraying his master on this supposition though his so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin more heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him and the Jews in Egypt and Jeremiah's time were guilty of no sin in their not worshiping the true God after God had sworn by his great name that his name should be no more named in the mouth of any man of Judah in all the land of Egypt Jeremiah 4426 Dr. Whitby discourse on five points pages 302 and 303 denies that men in this world are ever so given up by God to sin that their wills should be necessarily determined to evil though he owns that hereby it may become exceeding difficult for men to do good having a strong bent and powerful inclination to what is evil but if we should allow the case to be just as he represents the judgment of giving up to sin will no better agree with his notions of that liberty which is essential to phrase or blame than if we should suppose it to render the avoiding of sin impossible for if an impossibility of avoiding sin wholly excuses a man then for the same reason it's being difficult to avoid it excuses him in part and this just in proportion to the degree of difficulty if the influence of moral impossibility or inability be the same to excuse persons and not doing or not avoiding anything as that of natural inability which is supposed then undoubtedly in like manner moral difficulty has the same influence to excuse with natural difficulty but all allow that natural impossibility wholly excuses and also that natural difficulty excuses in part and makes the act or omission less blameable in proportion to the difficulty all natural difficulty according to the plainest dictates of the light of nature excuses and some degree so that the neglect is not so blameable as if there had been no difficulty in the case and so the greater the difficulty is still the more excusable in proportion to the increase of the difficulty and as natural impossibility wholly excuses and excludes all blame so the nearer the difficulty approaches to impossibility still the nearer a person is to blamelessness in proportion to that approach and if the case of moral impossibility or necessity be just the same with natural necessity or co-action as to its influence to excuse and neglect then also for the same reason the case of natural difficulty does not differ in influence to excuse and neglect from moral difficulty arising from a strong bias or bent to evil such as doctor would be owns in the case of those that are given up to their own hearts lusts so that the fault of such persons must be lessened in proportion to the difficulty and approach to impossibility if 10 degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite impossible and so wholly excused then if there be nine degrees of difficulty the person is in great part excused and is nine degrees intend less blame worthy than if there have been no difficulty at all and he is but one degree of blame worthiness the reason is playing on Armenian principles these because as difficulty by antecedent bent and bias on the will is increased liberty of indifference and self-determination in the will is diminished so much hindrance impediment is there in the way of the will acting freely by mere self-determination and if 10 degrees of such hindrance take away all such liberty then nine degrees take away nine parts in 10 and leave but one degree of liberty and therefore there is but one degree of blameableness satara's a parable in the neglect the man being no further blameable in what he does or neglects then he has liberty in that affair for blame or praise say they rise as holy from a good use or abuse of liberty from all which it follows that a strong bent and bias one way and difficulty of going the contrary never causes a person to be at all more exposed to sin or anything blameable because as the difficulty is increased so much the less is required and expected though in one respect expositeness to sin is increased these by an increase of expositeness to the evil action or omission yet it is diminished in another respect to balance it namely as the sinfulness or blameableness of the action or omission is diminished in the same proportion so that on the whole the affair as to expositeness to guilt or blame is left just as it was to illustrate this let us suppose a scale of a balance to be intelligent and a free agent and in dude with a self-moving power by virtue of which it could act and produce effects to a certain degree x gravus to move itself upward down with a force equal to a weight of 10 pounds and that it might therefore be required of it in ordinary circumstances to move itself down with that force for which it has power and full liberty and therefore would be blamed worthy if it failed at it but then let us suppose a weight of 10 pounds to be put in the opposite scale which enforce entirely counter balances itself moving power and so renders it impossible for it to move down at all and therefore holy excuses it from any such motion but if we suppose there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale this renders its motion not impossible but yet more difficult so that it can now only move down with the force of one pound but however this is all that is required of it under these circumstances it is wholly excused from nine parts of its motion and if the scale under these circumstances neglect to move and remain at rest all that it will be blamed for will be its neglect of that one-tenth part of its motion for which it had as much liberty and advantage as in usual circumstances it has for the greater motion which in such a case would be required so that this new difficulty does not at all increase its explosiveness to anything blame worthy and thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a man's duty or proclivity to sin through being given up to hardness of heart or indeed by any other means whatsoever is an inconsistence according to Dr Whitby's notions of liberty virtue and vice blame and praise the avoiding of sin and blame and the doing of what is virtuous and praise worthy must be always equally easy Dr Whitby's notions of liberty obligation virtue sin etc led him into another great inconsistence he abundantly insists that necessity is inconsistent with the nature of sin or fault he says in the aforementioned treatise page 14 who can blame a person for doing what he could not help and page 15 it being sensibly unjust to punish any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid and page 341 to confirm his opinion he quotes one of the fathers saying why death god command if man hath not free will and power to obey and again in the same in the next page who will not cry out that it is folly to command him that hath not liberty to do what is commanded and that it is unjust to condemn him that has it not in his power to do what is required and page 373 he cites another saying a law is given to him that can turn to both parts that is obey or transgress it but no law can be against him who is bound by nature and yet the same Dr Whitby asserts that fallen man is not able to perform perfect obedience in page 165 he has these words the nature of adam had power to continue innocent and without sin whereas it is certain our nature never had but if we have not power to continue innocent and without sin then sin is not inconsistent with necessity and we may be sinful in that which we have not power to avoid and those things cannot be true which he asserts elsewhere namely that if we be necessitated neither sins of omission nor commission would deserve that name page 348 if we have it not in our power to be innocent then we have it not in our power to be blameless and if so we are under a necessity of being blame worthy and how does this consist with what he so often asserts that necessity is inconsistent with blame or praise if we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience to all the commands of God then we are under a necessity of breaking some commands in some degree having no power to perform so much as is commanded and if so why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of commanding beyond what men have power to do. Armenians in general are very inconsistent with themselves in what they say of the inability of fallen man in this respect they strenuously maintain that it would be unjust in God to require anything of us beyond our present power and ability to perform and also hold that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience and that Christ died to satisfy for the imperfections of our obedience and has made way that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of perfect wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves into the grossest inconsistence for as I have observed elsewhere they hold that God in mercy to mankind has abolished that rigorous constitution or law that they were under originally and instead of it has introduced a more mild constitution and put us under a new law which requires no more than imperfect sincere obedience in compliance with our poor infirm impotent circumstances since the fall now how can these things be made consistent I would ask of what law are these imperfections of our obedience a breach if they are a breach of no law that we were ever under then they are not sins and if they be not sins what need of Christ dying to satisfy for them but if they are sins and the breach of some law what law is it they cannot be a breach of their new law for that requires no other than imperfect obedience or obedience with imperfections and therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections is no breach of it for it is as much as it requires and they cannot be a breach of their old law for that they say is entirely abolished and we never were under it they say it would not be just in God to require of us perfect obedience because it would not be just to require more than we can perform or to punish us for failing of it and therefore by their own scheme the imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be punished what need therefore of Christ dying to satisfy for them what need of his suffering to satisfy for that which is no fault and in its own nature deserves no suffering what need of Christ dying to purchase that our imperfect obedience should be accepted when according to their scheme it would be unjust in itself that any other obedience than imperfect should be required what need of Christ dying to make way for God's accepting of such obedience as it would be unjust in him not to accept is there any need of Christ dying to prevail with God not to do unrighteously if it be said that Christ died to satisfy that old law for us that so we might not be under it but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law still I would inquire what need of Christ dying that we might not be under a law which by their principles it would be in itself unjust that we should be under whether Christ did died or no because in our present state we are not able to keep it so the Armenians are inconsistent with themselves not only in what they say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone for those imperfections which we cannot avoid but also in what they say of the grace of God granted to enable men to perform the sincere obedience of the new law I grant indeed says Dr. Stebbing that by original sin we are utterly disabled for the performance of the condition without new grace from God but I say then that he gives such a grace to all of us by which the performance of the condition is truly possible and upon this ground he may and doth most righteously require it if Dr. Stebbing intends to speak properly by grace he must mean that assistance which is of grace or of free favor and kindness be it in the same place he speaks of it as very unreasonable unjust and cruel for God to require that as the condition of pardon that is become impossible by original sin if it be so what grace is there in giving assistance and ability to perform the condition of pardon or why is that called by the name of grace that is an absolute debt which God is bound to bestow and which it would be unjust and cruel in him to withhold seeing he requires that as the condition of pardon which he cannot perform without it end of part three section three