 Can I talk to Sébastien? Thank you. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Yes, I'd like to share a few thoughts about the way the world economy interacts with world politics somehow. My starting point would be to observe that what makes probably the present situation quite unique is the intensification of grid power competition in the context of close economic and financial interdependence. This has translated recently in a situation where we see that the multilateral frameworks are somehow destabilised and overwhelmed, as witnessed by the spread of economic restrictions on trade and investment flows, of exceptional duties, the tariff duties, on the spread of economic sanctions and so on. On the witness also by the spread of uncoordinated industrial policies and increased state interventionism. So this is a situation marked by increasing geopolitical tensions, but I think it's fair to say that at least until now the result has not been, at least not to a large extent, it has not been decoupling or fragmentation. We've seen a kind of plateauing, and Gabriel showed it in figures a moment ago, in terms of the intensity of world trade. But there is no established trend toward decline in economic and financial relations at the dual level. There are some cases, some specific places where this is indeed, there is a decline, and this is, for instance, the case in terms of the bilateral trade relationship between the US and China for well understood reasons. But it is remarkable that even in that case, for instance, study after study, it is shown that when the intensity of direct trade between the US and China is declining, indirect trade is actually increasing, meaning that the US is sourcing less imports from China, it will be sourcing more from a variety of countries, say, Vietnam, Mexico for instance, and these countries themselves are sourcing more components from China. Meaning that aiming at decoupling what we are observing actually is not decoupling a fragmentation, it's more diversion with ensuring cost and opacity. And questions about whether this is reducing in any meaningful terms, risk or degree of dependence. So, I think somehow we have to live with this inter-economic and financial interdependence. Of course, the situation of geopolitical tensions and economic interdependence create a very strong temptation to leverage interdependences for political purposes, to weaponise them, and I think that's really a defining feature of the present situation. But it's also a very difficult objective. Difficult because economic and financial exchanges are defined by a principle of mutual benefits. They are taking place because they are benefiting both parties, meaning that it is very difficult for one of them to usefully leverage them. When is it possible? Well, when there is a situation with a very pronounced asymmetry. And only in such case is it possible really to efficiently leverage these economic and financial interdependences. And I think this is a reason why in the recent examples of weaponisation of economic dependencies, we are seeing the increasing importance, the overwhelming importance of finance, of information and knowledge. Because these are interdependences, these are activities that rely upon very concentrated networks. Think about the monetary system with the role of the dollar. Think about international banking transaction with the role of the SWIFT system. Think about information with social networks or about high tech and semiconductors, for instance, with intellectual properties. In each of these cases, you have very complex networks where a few short points, as Henry Farrell and Abe Newman have called them, are taking a central importance and can be leveraged and have been leveraged for many of them recently. So it's a situation that in a recent paper published together with Thomas Gommard, we define as geo-finance, meaning to reflect the fact that it is marked by an increasing politicisation of financial and information flows. And it's somehow different from what we used to think in terms of geo-economic competition in the 1990s or the 2000s, which was mainly taking place within the framework of multilateral institutions. In many cases, this competition and this weaponisation is in breach of international commitments. So I think it is not surprising, given this situation, that economic security is becoming an overarching concern for governments. With mainly two objectives, the first one is to reduce vulnerability and build leverage with regard to these short points, to these critical notes in the world economy. And the second one is to control or at least master, to some extent, foundational technologies. And here I think the interaction is very strong with climate change because climate change is already an ongoing revolution in terms of for industry, for trade, for raw materials and energy. It's redefining the key technologies. It's redefining the way markets are working. So the challenge today for many governments is how to improve economic security. In a context where increasingly, for the reasons I described, they are not considering international markets, world markets aren't secure enough. In a context as well, I think it's worth emphasising that where isolation is clearly not a solution for two main reasons. The first one is efficiency. International division of labour is a sine qua non of efficiency today, especially for sophisticated technologies. And the second one could be term, was term a relational power by Susan Strange. The need to have allies or at least to have partners to support your views. And we see that in this context of tension, this is increasingly important. So relational power requires openness, requires significant economic and financial relationships. So this is a challenge. I think it is really important to emphasise as well that increasingly the response of governments is using more ambitions, more widespread industrial policies. And it's worth as well emphasising that while in the 80s, for instance, economists were commenting a lot the fact that some policies were used as a way to kind of appropriate rents as rent shifting policies. The typical example for that was the competition between Airbus and Boeing as the efforts of governments to somehow appropriate the oligopolistic rent in this sector. Today it's more about control, about power than about rent. But the same kind of logic is taking place. A logic where everyone is trying to appropriate and everyone needs to somehow to retaliate to what others are doing. So I'll conclude just by emphasising the threats involved in this trend. The threats, of course, are additional and useless costs from an economic point of view linked to these additional obstacles and constraints. It's also in the additional rigidities ensuing from this constraint and I think that means a lot in terms of adjustment capacity for the world economy in the time to come with, of course, a significant risk of escalation. All this for a benefit which we can discuss but I think so far is very limited in terms of de-risquing as the term, the fashionable term, put it. And finally, the last and probably most dangerous threat is that all these constraints jeopardise the capacity of coordination at the world level. So I think this is a very important challenge in terms of economic governance globally and I think part of the response should lie around somehow ring fencing the security concerns in the world economy and the world finance and as a precondition probably to update coordination and rules in other sectors. Thank you. Thank you, thank you very much indeed. Sébastien, I take it that your exploration of the impact on global economy and trade in particular and also the overall industrial diversification associated with the tensions associated with this will to de-risque to have a world in which we would incorporate precisely these major changes in the global tensions is something which is very important. I take it that with global trade being under the impact of this French shoring, re-shoring or whatever of course it has a cost first and second it has an impact on global growth and it has also an impact on inflation to be frank. So all this is intertwined in a way which is very striking. Sébastien.