 All right, so we're gonna go and get started and thank you so much for joining us despite the rain I know is very difficult for many of you My name is Frank on welcome to US IP For those of you that are not familiar with a US IP. We're a non-partisan independent Institute that is dedicated their proposition that peace is possible We're funded by Congress and we're focused on preventing mitigating a resolving conflict One of the global hotspots that has eluded peace for many years of the Korean Peninsula and as you know recently President Trump and Chairman Kim met at the border between North and South Korea Which has rekindled the the prospects for returning back to negotiations and breaking the current Diplomatic stalemate and in fact the two leaders agreed to resume working-level negotiations in the coming weeks And try to make progress on denuclearization in peace One of the sticking points has been North Korea asking for sanctions relief in order for the Kim regime to survive and thrive and needs to generate hard Currency and develop its economy and sanctions have impeded these goals On the other hand the Trump administration has stated consistently that it will not provide sanctions relief Until North Korea denuclearizes or at least takes significant steps towards denuclearization So this is the key question. How do we offer sanctions relief to incentivize diplomacy and Denuclearization but the same at the same time not minimize our leverage too quickly And so to address these questions and others we've assembled this fantastic panel of speakers One of them is running a few minutes late, so we'll just have him join when he arrives But I've asked them as a group to help explain the scope of the sanctions regime against North Korea including both Multilateral and US sanctions the process for providing partial and complete sanctions relief Some potential practical pass for providing relief taking into account the constraints and opportunities and then any lessons from Sanctions regimes on other countries and that can be applied to the North Korea case So let me introduce the panelists in the order that but they'll be speaking First again Dan words, but he's not here So we'll have him probably speak second or third But Dan is a program manager at the National Committee on North Korea where he manages research and publications He's also the lead researcher and editor for North Korea in the world Which is an interactive website exploring North Korea's external economic and diplomatic relations to my left. We have Josh Stanton He's a DC based lawyer who played a very significant role in drafting North Korea related to sanctions laws including the North Korea sanctions and policy enhancement act and The Korean interdiction and modernization of sanctions act which is titled 300 Katza Josh also served in the US Army Judge Advocates Generals Corps in South Korea, and he runs the website one free Korea Next we have Stephanie client Albron Right there. She's the finance expert on the UN panel of experts, which was established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874 she's responsible for monitoring and analyzing North Korea's global financial activities and Providing recommendations to the Security Council on implementing sanctions She also has had a long career as a UN official as a director of the Northeast Asia program at the international crisis group And she was a director of the Asia Pacific program here at USIP So we'll come back to our USIP alum and then last but not least we have Liz Rosenberg She's senior fellow and director of the energy economic and security program at the Center for a new American security She focuses on the national security and foreign policy implications of the use of the use of sanctions and economic Straitcraft as well as shifts in the energy market Previously she was a senior advisor at the Treasury Department overseeing the development and tightening of global sanctions on Iran, Libya and Syria as well as the Modification of sanctions on Burma in the context of diplomatic normalization I've asked each of them to speak for about eight minutes or so and then I will Ask a couple questions to get the discussion going and then we can open up the remaining time for Q&A So I was gonna have Dan start, but I think Josh can also provide a great overview. So we'll start with Josh first Thank you. Good morning the comments that I'm going to make this morning are my personal views They don't represent the opinions of any government agency member of Congress or committee of Congress Unlike the other panelists here. My job has nothing to do with North Korea. I am here on my own time Nonetheless a few years ago It was my great honor to be asked to come to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and draft what became known as the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act it passed the House by a vote of 418 to 3 and the Senate by a vote of 96 to 0 That may give you some idea of the bipartisan breadth of Congress's in patience with the way American presidents have conducted North Korea policy They looked back on years of bad faith and cheating and mandacity by the North Korean government And they looked back on American presidents who had pursued the diplomacy of instant gratification Often prematurely throwing away the nonviolent peaceful leverage of sanctions, which is really the only Avenue we have left to disarm North Korea without war What we have learned through our experiences since 2005 is that North Korea is surprisingly dependent on Access to our financial system the dollar is the world's reserve currency And most of the money that sustains Kim Jong-un's regime has to be cleared through banks in New York That gives the Treasury Department and the Justice Department the jurisdiction to regulate to block and to prosecute people Who are behind those transactions? North Korea has no sovereign right to access to our financial system and as long as it threatens our core national security interests We should deny it that right that is the philosophy behind the sanctions legislation Which is nothing more than the denial of North Korea's access to the financial system until such time as it lives in peace with us Congress's power to control the president's authority to lift sanctions is constitutional It's an enumerated power in article one section eight of the Constitution Which says that Congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations What Congress expects from a North Korea that is repeatedly reneged on its past agreements is that it must regain our trust By accepting basic and fundamental Transparency so while I believe it is never too early to begin thinking about the conditions For the relaxation the suspension and the lifting of sanctions I suspect we're having this conversation about two years too early Because it's going to take so much political pressure on the cohesion of the North Korean regime That Kim Jong-un is presented with the choice between reforming and disarming Or perhaps seeing the cohesion of his regime undermined at which point he will have a diplomatic Incentive to reach an agreement that meets our fundamental security interest in his complete verifiable and irreversible disarmament Why do we insist on this? Because we're dealing with the government that has exported missile technology to Iran Syria Egypt Yemen and Burma among others That built a nuclear reactor in Syria that has helped Assad use chemical weapons against innocent civilians in Syria That sold man portable surface to air missiles to terrorists That has sent assassins to kill dissidents in exile and to murder Kim Jong-un's half brother in a crowded airport terminal with Vx nerve agent that cyber attacks the United States and threatens the bedrock of our political system our freedom of Expression that stole 81 million dollars out of the Bangladesh Bank So clearly North Korea must make significant changes and accept the Transparency necessary to verify its disarmament or coexistence will not be possible North Korea is a regime that lives on a small amount of cash overhead and even a small relaxation of financial pressure We'll give it the option to continue at status quo That is not an option that will be acceptable to Congress which is imposed strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions Section 104a of the North Korea sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act sets out 15 categories of conduct including arms trafficking proliferation the perpetuation or Facilitation of human rights abuses that require mandatory sanctions Section 208 is a bypass around the sanctions for humanitarian assistance or for those cases Where imposing mandatory sanctions would harm our own national security in other words? We should not require the president to collapse the Chinese financial system when there are other enforcement options sections 401 and 402 Allow for the temporary suspension and the ultimate lifting of sanctions once North Korea accepts Transparency and allows for us to verify its disarmament to those who say that North Korea cannot possibly accept nuclear disarmament I would answer that this argument is ahistorical North Korea survived for decades without nuclear weapons and it can survive without them again The threat to North Korea is internal. It is the misappropriation of its wealth It is fundamentally a kleptocracy problem if Donald Trump were to attempt to unilaterally lift sanctions now I suspect the response would be something like it was in 1986 When Congress passed the comprehensive anti-apartheid act over President Reagan's veto We already see several bills in Congress including the Asia reassurance act, which is law the brink act Which is past the Senate the North Korea policy oversight act, which is co-sponsored by Senator Menendez and Elliot Engel foreign policy heavyweights in the Democratic Party in Congress and We have the lead act by senators Gardner and Markey The direction in Congress is toward more strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions not less and all of this legislation affirms that our goal is Complete verifiable and irreversible the nuclearization of North Korea We have always Missed I think the root of all evil in North Korea, which is money The goal of sanctions must not simply be to put Excuse me to put temporary pressure on Kim Jong-un until he comes back for another photo op It has to be to disarm the country, but also to force Kim Jong-un to make better choices for his people at this time The only form of sanctions relief that is appropriate is sanctions relief in the form of humanitarian aid That is carefully monitored to ensure that it feeds the hungry and by the way regardless of what Kim Jong-un does Whether he behaves well or badly because the North Korean people are in no way responsible for his decisions until then We need a long game for sanctions and the long game means coalition financial diplomacy in Concert with US allies who issue convertible currencies to ensure that only those financial Transactions involving North Korea that directly benefit the North Korean people can clear the financial system. Thank you Thank you, Josh, and we have Dan arriving right now, but I'll give him some time to settle in first So maybe we can go to Stephanie So My comments today do not in any way bind or represent the United Nations United Nations Security Council the 1718 Committee under the Security Council Or the panel of experts So the goal of the sanctions regime according to the United Nations So we're speaking about UN and not any of the bilateral or national regimes like that under OFAC treasury and other U.S. Agencies which might be the subject here today The goals are to persuade the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction The goal is to reach the diplomatic solution through negotiation and dialogue and that's something that was articulated very specifically Following resolution 2270 when the sanctions were described as not the final objective The goal of sanctions is to catalyze quote effective dialogue and originally that was seen as a six-party talks process And now obviously the six-party talks are long gone so we're looking at different forms of dialogue and Finally the goal of the sanctions regime is to limit the negative impact of sanctions on the economy and civilian population of the country the sanctions regime is governed by a committee that's Falls under the Security Council. It's called the 1718 committee is established by resolution 1718 and that was Set up deliberately for the execution of the sanctions regime on North Korea And there are over a dozen other sanctions regimes which have their own committees This committee has the same composition of the Security Council. So 15 members of which five are permanent members and the committee is Set up to implement the resolutions on the DPRK which 2000 since 2006 are over over 10 10 11 10 only and the last three of which were in 2017 and we'll talk a little bit of that about that and Underneath the 1718 committee sits the panel of experts of which I am a member in my personal capacity There are eight members and they represent the five permanent members They are not representing because we are independent experts but we have we come from the five permanent members and in addition to that we have members from the Republic of Korea Singapore and Japan and the experts have They bring expertise in different areas. My expertise is in finance and economics and We also have experts on ballistic missile technology Nonproliferation customs and export control maritime Air transport and the like and the panel's mandate is to assist the committee in carrying out its mandate and function and mostly to investigate cases of alleged violation of Sanctions as articulated in the resolutions of the Security Council, so that means gathering examining and analyzing information that's provided to us by very different various different sources whether it's member states or Experts or organizations UN bodies and other Interested parties we make recommendations on actions to the council To the 1718 committee and to member states in order to improve implementation and then we report so our You know largest function our reports, which are public our last report was dated 6 March You can find it online. They are very extensive with lots and lots of annexes and that is a summary of the panel's investigations For the period. It's we report twice a year so for the six months prior and we investigate through on-site inspections We are we visit member states at their invitation we Interview we ask questions. We write letters to companies and member states and we do our own research So in 2017 there were the last There's a last spate of resolutions and we'll just focus on the last two What what you've seen in the DPRK sanctions regime is a move away from a narrow Targeted focus only on for example nuclear and WMD to a broader Let's say broader regime encapsulating a huge amount of the former sort of North Korean economy looking at sectoral sanctions Regime that prohibits a whole swath of activities in the maritime space vessels and otherwise So it's become a rather comprehensive regime What the panel has found in its reports is that the expansion of the regime has not been matched by the requisite political will of Member states to actually implement the regime It has not been matched by the requisite international coordination Prioritization and resource allocation to actually drive effective implementation So the resolutions resolution 2375 adopted in response to the DPRK's largest ever nuclear test of August 2017 and resolution 2397 adopted in response to the ICBM launch of November 2017 really introduced very very sweeping sanctions including a ban on work authorizations on all DPRK Nationals and that actually comes into Full force on 22nd December 2019 It's a requirement of Member States to repatriate all North Korean Individuals working in other countries so you can get a sense of how broad the regime has become prohibits all joint ventures or cooperative entities with DPRK entities or individuals Strengthens measures regarding the supply and sale of all petroleum products. It introduced a crude oil cap a ban on all DPRK exports of textiles food and agricultural products and A ban on the transfer to DPRK of all industrial machinery Transport vehicles iron steel and other materials with the exception of spare parts to maintain commercial civilian operations so The panel has found that the not only have Member States Insufficiently implemented this regime, but that evasion tactics by North Korean entities and individuals have effectively Undermined implementation as well and the networks behind the illicit activity consist of a core of Very skilled agents who are highly experienced and they can cross borders. They can mobilize money They can mobilize people and goods they can engage in sales and trafficking of arms and related materials They can conceal financial activity by using complicit foreign nationals front companies and other Other methods to obfuscate the flow of funds and through that they North Korean actors have full access to the global Financial system right now despite all the efforts put forward by OFAC and others and The business conducted by some of these networks is generating significant revenue And one of the recent areas of investigation of the panel is into Actors North Korean actors activities in cyber space. So that includes Attacks on financial institutions attacks on cryptocurrency exchange laundering of proceeds from attacks through cryptocurrency exchanges and even mining of currency Which has been done through like taking illegal control of companies to to create Literally create money is what's happening and the panel has determined that these types of activities are an evasion of financial sanctions Because by going in like to Bangladesh Bank and reaching in and stealing money from a bank The asset freeze provision is rendered meaningless because the bank never has an opportunity to freeze those assets because they're being Stolen from under sort of the the watch of the bank So it is the view of many member states that this kind of activity given that the pie has sort of The way in which North Korea is able to gain gain foreign currency is that is shrinking Obviously given the wide-ranging sanctions on a swath of areas of an economic importance And yet this activity in cyberspace is taking on a larger and larger proportionate Larger larger proportion of the ability of DPRK to make To to generate revenue which under the resolutions if that revenue is applied to its prohibited programs is by by virtue illegal With that I'll Turn it over. Thanks Stephanie and just to clarify. So the sectoral sanctions they cover, you know, the prohibition on North Korean exports of like coal and textiles and seafood and labor all that and that's Pretty much 95% plus of North Korea's entire export economy, right? Yeah. Thank you. Okay, Dan Well, thanks Frank for inviting me to speak today in my apologies for coming in late There are a few road closures and heavy rain is folks might have noticed Frank asked me to start off by kind of giving the the purpose of the sanctions regime And I think this is an important kind of first order question I think it's useful to view most sanctions regime certainly including the North Korea regime is having implicitly a three-fold purpose That are signaling constraining and coercing Signaling in the North Korean context that North Korean provocative actions such as nuclear and missile tests Will come with the cost and that future such provocations will come with even higher costs Constraining meaning that sanctions are meant to impede North Korea's development of WMD and its military capabilities And finally coercing which is I think the most important part of the sanctions regime The idea that sanctions pressure Will force the North Korean government to make concessions to abandon its nuclear program In return for the promise of sanctions relief So the course of part of sanctions, I think that's the most difficult to get right getting course of bargaining, right? Because it's difficult to translate Economic pressure into political concessions and even with maximum economic pressure That's not going to necessarily translate into achieving maximalist objectives So sanctions policy necessarily has to be part of a broader strategy sanctions are not a strategy in themselves But have to be used in conjunction with diplomacy and with other tools of foreign policy Enable to be most effective So what are the explicit goals of the sanctions regime? I think there is there are some key differences between the UN sanctions and the US sanctions regime the UN security council resolutions are premised North Korea's abandonment of its nuclear ballistic missile and other WMD programs The US sanctions specifically through Nyxpia the North Korea sanctions and policy enhancement act of 2016 Which my co-panelist mr. Santon had a significant role in drafting that's premised not only on North Korea's WMD activities But also on its human rights abuses illicit activities such as currency counterfeiting cyber attacks etc so for The UN sanctions to be lifted according to the various resolutions The security council is quote prepared to strengthen modify Suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance And that is to say that the security council if there is a political consensus for doing so and that's a big if Can adjust the sanctions regime in accordance with North Korean behavior on its WMD program for US sanctions to be modified The Executive branch has some leeway in how it administers sanctions and waving sanctions on a case-by-case basis But under Nyxpia for sanctions to be suspended in block The White House has to certify to Congress not only that North Korea has begun the process of denuclearization But has also made progress left undefined on issues including human rights illicit activities etc and for sanctions Under the US law to be lifted North Korea must meet an even higher standard so in theory there could be a clash between these two the UN and US sanctions regimes if North Korea is to totally abandon its nuclear program but not change on human rights or other matters you could have a situation where According to the text of the UN security council resolutions UN sanctions should be lifted But US sanctions would remain in place including secondary sanctions on North Korea's foreign trade partners I think that possibility is pretty remote though and not necessarily Something to worry about. I think there's certainly reason to be skeptical that North Korea will ever completely denuclearize But I think if it does that decision will almost certainly come in the broad broader context of a strategic shift in North Korea's Foreign Relations and domestic political economy not necessarily a whole-scale reform and opening But certainly would involve the North Korean government going on a very different trajectory than the one it's hitherto been on Nonetheless, I do think there is value in taking steps that would reduce The immediate threat of North Korea's nuclear program that would lead to reduction or end of its production of fissile material and other components for nuclear weapons that would stop its development of more or more advanced ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons and I think that a program of phased sanctions relief and In return for meaningful North Korean concessions on its nuclear program Could be in the US interest and in the US in the interest of US allies and could perhaps push North Korea in the direction of Going on that different trajectory down the road So if there is negotiations Trading sanctions relief for North Korean concessions on its nuclear program. I'd articulate five principles about how that should go forward first Any trade of sanctions relief for North Korean nuclear concessions should be premised on the ultimate goal of denuclearization But it should also make sense on its own terms assuming the process doesn't go any further Second I would start with sanctions that have the least connect direct connection To the North Korean nuclear program and that can be most easily adjusted or snapped back I think sanctions relief to facilitate things like cultural or educational exchanges are an easy first step Certainly sanctions relief to facilitate greater humanitarian access to North Korea is important though I don't think that should be tied to North Korean actions on its nuclear program That should just go ahead regardless But beyond those easy first steps. I think the UN sectoral sanctions are probably Prime candidate for the first major tranche of sanctions relief in return for meaningful North Korean steps Towards denuclearization. I think that sanctions on commercial trade are more easily adjusted up or down They're more easily snapped back with the right UN mechanism in place then sanctions on things like North Korean access to the international financial system Then things like investment in North Korea, which are really difficult to turn honor off Third principle don't ease up on measures intended to deny hard currency to Pyongyang Until we can be reasonably confident that that hard currency won't be funneled directly into producing more nuclear weapons That is to say until there's a freeze on North Korean physical material production And ideally at key facilities for ICBM production as well That's not to say that no sectoral sanctions should be wound back Until the point where a total freeze is in place I think you could perhaps start out with adjustment of some of the sanctions on North Korean commercial imports on things like fuel Metals machinery vehicles that do not have a direct military purpose Since relief of those sanctions would have certainly benefit to Pyongyang But at the end of the day if North Korea if all of its avenues to Access hard currency are blocked and those sanctions are effectively enforced You know, it doesn't matter how much fuel you can import if you don't have the money to pay for it Fourth sanctions relief should be structured in a way that pushes North Korea towards opening its economy and Showing a minimal level of respect for labor rights For example, if the K-Song industrial complex is to be reopened It should be premised on the North Korean workers there receiving their wages directly among other things Rather than payments going to the North Korean government and the North Korean workers there essentially being paid in rations and Finally if a program of sanctions relief Is to go forward the US and like-minded countries should continue to implement and enforce the sanctions That remain in place But they should be clear in communicating their intentions about sanctions enforcement and shouldn't expand the scope of the sanctions regime Well negotiations Meaningful negotiations are underway So with working-level Negotiations set to resume after President Trump's impromptu visit to the DMZ I think it's hard to say whether Pyongyang will ultimately be willing to give more on its nuclear program than it offered in Hanoi and To accept less in sanctions relief in return But at a minimum I think that having a high but reasonable standard for phased sanctions relief Would be a good diplomatic tactic leaving less room for Pyongyang to pin the blame on Washington if talks collapse And if on the other hand North Korea is actually ready for serious Negotiations that leads to a tangible rollback of its nuclear program. I think the US should be ready as well So thanks. Thank you, Dan, and I appreciate you proposing Affirmative leave those five principles. I hope we can talk about that a little bit later Liz Thank you, and thanks for having me here to participate with you all in this important conversation So I it's great to go After you all have gone so I can respond to some of the things you've already said actually I Have appreciated how you all have laid out some of the Purpose of the sanctions as they are in place including the law and the authorities that underlie them at the UN And in the US system and some of the modalities of their use and indeed Potential ideas or principles for unwinding them through their modalities but I want to Make a point about the politics of this and the practicality that the United States and indeed other international players must bear in mind in order to Proceed or operate in this legal environment in this heavily legal environment with lots of constrictions and the first practical point that I want to the first point I want to make on practicality here is that What you say for example makes good sense for people who are familiar with The laws and have a lot of awareness and strong compliance programs in in place But as has been said including by you Stephanie, we see a world of a lack of awareness inadequate if Consistent compliance programs for all of the including in the riskiest of jurisdictions and industries so For example, the shipping industry is sort of just beginning to wake up to the challenge that has been outlined explicitly over a long period of time in publicly available information by the UN and by investigative journalists by Advisories from the US government from the Japanese government with photos I mean, there's there's actually a good amount of information out there if you're able to look but there hasn't been enough awareness and compliance protocols in Industry internationally with the exception of the biggest money center banks globally who are pretty hip to this situation But everybody else all other industries that have a requirement and other national governments that are bound as member states to carry out these sanctions and manage their enforcement are functioning with willful or in some cases or willful blindness and inadequate political political attention to Dealing with these laws and enforcing them So that's a major challenge to thinking about an environment of sanctions unwind is that there's tremendous lack of knowledge and lack of formal coordinating mechanisms to manage an unwind scenario So the point I want to make is that It's Valuable to think about what an unwinding of sanctions could look like and in fact, it's necessary as a diplomatic Measure to lay out a future where relief from these sanctions could occur in exchange for North Korean denuclearization But it's impractical to set expectations around What would be a small for small? Incremental future of removing these sanctions for a variety of reasons The first of which is that lack of knowledge and compliance basis Which means that it will be very difficult to execute something that is small for small or incremental There are other challenges with a small for small slowly phased incremental approach to sanctions One other point I want to make before explaining why I think it has to be big for big instead of small for small And that's the practical framework that should underlie any thinking about removal of sanctions The point I want to make is coming back to the premise which was Frank you said sanctions relief to incentivize denuclearization and not minimize leverage So sanctions can't be removed Just as a matter or rather they they should not Be removed and it would take a lot of lawyering to remove them for our bird for an arbitrary whim Which is to say you can't pull them down just as an incentive Rather, you have to see behavior change because they are put in place Based on a specific concern and there are many concerns that underlie North Korea sanctions of course proliferation and nuclear Activities and then a whole host of others At the UN and in the United States and in other jurisdictions as well Which have to do with other destabilizing activities human rights abuses and and other reasons so to incentivize That may be in incentivize behavior change and denuclearization on the part of North Korea That may be the domain for other kinds of engagement and not sanctions relief. This is the the confidence building the establishment of communication between the North Korea and a variety of other important players in this and in this diplomacy The establishment of multilateral forums for effective communication and those kinds of engagements Can certainly include with has have been mentioned already a diplomacy particular kinds of exchanges cultural or educational diplomatic as well particular support for humanitarian rather particular humanitarian support none of which requires sanctions relief that may involve Exceptions to sanctions authorities as they are in place But that kind of communication and confidence building on a road to denuclearization Is not the domain of sanctions relief. We're we're keen to think of that Because of historical precedent Not least because of the Iran example, but there too there wasn't a Removal of sanctions as an incentive for behavior change and in fact, I think it's very dangerous to think about that as such and to set a new precedent for the North Korea program To offer relief to cancel sanctions in hope for and hopes for Policy or behavioral change on the part of North Korea will have ramifications across all other kinds of use of sanctions by the United States and by the UN for any other kind of security Threat to the global community or to the United States and that is not something that the United States or the UN should trade away as dire as the potential threat of North Korean destabilization and Nuclear chemical biological weapon use may be So I'll say just one or two other things about Not why not a small for small and incremental and why it has to be big for big And then we can look forward to engaging with you all and you all in a conversation So why not small for small and incremental? This is a methodological Approach that some people have favored and we heard a lot about it in the run up to the Iran nuclear deal or in the period of the JpoA the predecessor to the JCPOA the what we know as the Iran nuclear deal and in addition to what I mentioned earlier about the difficulty in coordinating International community around small for small In an environment of lack of awareness and knowledge and excellent compliance programs There are other problems that are very familiar to any North Korea watcher over the years, which is that there's a An excellent track record of North Korean cheating on sanctions and there's They are very skilled as Stephanie was saying and I think everyone here who's dug into this issue would agree and to pursue a path that favors small and incremental it may just be a facade for Allowing North Korea to do whatever it wants not just in cheating on these sectoral sanctions But also in that more insidious and threatening Proliferation activity, which is of course the original basis for these sanctions in the international community is concerned about North Korea Circo the last dozen years this sanctions regime in particular Another issue That I want to highlight is that This small for small small incremental concessions will touch a dangerous nerve in the US political system that may undermine and unravel any progress a constructive progress towards Denuclearization and that is that in Washington we have two important power centers to attend to when it comes to the Execution of foreign policy and sanctions in particular of course I'm talking about the White House or the administration and Congress so as you all well know and At the time of the right around the time when Congress Took its opportunity to Offer its approval or not on the Iran nuclear deal it created for itself or it created a precedent for itself Which is absolutely in the living memories and the voting record of most members of Congress today Where it would decide whether a removal of sanctions in the case of Iran was okay with Congress or not and that Congress has improved upon that authority and enshrined it in law A couple of years ago with respect to the potential for removal of Russia sanctions And so what we have now is a Congress that is highly attuned to the idea that they should have the the final say About whether any sanctions can be removed and it if there is to be removal of sanctions in this case on North Korea it must be to Congress's satisfaction and That does it would be by a supermajority of Congress. It would have to be by An amount to override a presidential veto, but there are the bills in Congress There's also a number of members who have staked their claim on this issue and who are Very serious about wanting a big for big exchange And what I mean by that is a whole lot of North Korean concessions that have been Proved and verified and only thereafter would they be willing to offer major sanctions relief from the United States and even then I suppose it would People would be most comfortable with it following a progression as the Iran sanctions relief did which is to say you're starting with a lot of Transparency including on how money flows and how it's Underseen and understood in the international system international financial system before there's really true freedom for it to flow for the North Korean government and economy so It's for those reasons. I think the only politically viable Way ahead for the United States notwithstanding what President Trump may suggest by tweet or Related to in in summit diplomacy for his close friend. Mr. Kim There is only a politically practical way forward in the United States for major sanctions relief after North Korea makes major and verified concessions on its nuclear and probably CBW program Missile as well. Excuse me program as well Thank you, Liz and thank you to all the panelists for providing which is a what is a very sobering perspective on on Not only the the legal but also the political obstacles for providing sanctions relief and maybe we can start there with that point because you talk about political viability and what's Possible from the US perspective, but I would also point out the North Korean perspective What's politically viable for them? And and they would argue that step by step is the only way that's viable for them because they need to build trust and you can They can't give up all of their or even a significant portion of the nuclear program without gaining certain concessions and as we know from Hanoi that they prioritize Sanctions relief in those particular sectoral sanctions that the sectoral areas that affect their civilian economy, right? so maybe we can start I want to start with the UN sanctions because That's what North Korea specifically asked for in terms of relief at Hanoi and this may be just sort of an easy question But the UN Security Council resolution language is a bit vague on on the requirements for lifting sanctions And they basically say that the Security Council will continuously review the North Korean actions And they can take steps to strengthen modify or suspend measures as needed So is this just a political calculation or are there? You know Are the things that North Korea needs to do that are sufficient to merit sanctions exemptions or lifting maybe Well, so it's definitely that's what you read is simply You need agreement in the p5 and that's it Whatever the p5 agrees they put through the Security Council and that's in that you know within that political discussion Yeah, and because China and Russia have already called called for sanctions relief and they're already in support of that It really looks like it's the US and maybe you know Other like-minded partners who really have a say right? Well, yeah, I mean the I think the important principle is that Since you need all five on board That one or two that are not on board can block it So, yeah, okay, let's turn to the humanitarian side because There are humanitarian carve-outs. Yeah as part of the UN sanctions Can you talk a little bit more about how those come into play? Yeah, so this is more 1718 committee Related but there is an important What they call a comprehensive humanitarian exemption mechanism, which is established by the 1718 committee And this was deliberately done to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the DPRK And this is under the third principle that I told you that sanctions operate under which sanctions operate Which is to ensure that you're limiting the negative impact on the civilian population of the given country and that is the result of Decades of research about impact of sanctions on civilian populations across the board and a sort of a Focus in recent years on targeting these sanctions regimes to the extent possible to prevent harm to the civilian population So the basis for this exemption mechanism is para 25 of resolution 2397 the one that I spoke of the last resolution in 2017 and it gives the committee very broad authority to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis in order to facilitate this Humanitarian assistance and it reaffirms that sanctions measures are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population Or in any way to restrict legitimate activities including food aid humanitarian assistance and other economic activities in cooperation The sanctions are also not intended to negatively affect the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out humanitarian assistance and relief and It stresses the resolution also at the same time stresses the primary responsibility of the DPRK government to meet the needs the livelihood needs of its people right and The resolution then decides that the committee may on a case-by-case basis exempt any activities from the measures imposed by the Resolutions if the committee deems that that exemption is necessary Now added to this Was an implementation assistance notice number seven that was adopted in August 2018 so just less than a year after the paragraph which formalized this practice and The IANs are very important because they clarify, you know resolutions are compromise language. It's often Difficult to decipher It's things that that you could get security council members to agree on but they weren't necessarily looking at what it meant to people in the Field so the implementation assistance notice gives very specific requirements for Member states international organizations and NGOs that carry out assistance and how they submit requests for exemption and There's very specific requirements including that You know all requests for exemption need to be submitted either by member states themselves or The office of the United Nations resident coordinator, so Non-governmental organizations have to get a member state or United Nations resident coordinators office to submit the exemption which is a sort of a step before the exemption even gets to the committee and The exception for that are United Nations agencies international committee the Red Cross IFRC and others But most non-governmental organizations have to do it in this very formal process And then they have to they're they're encouraged to do it only once every six months and The requirements are all very specific and laid out So, you know obviously an explanation of who are the recipients the criteria that was used to select these recipients Detailed description of quantities Specifications of the goods and the like the planned dates of transfer routes and methods all parties involved Financial transactions and then an annex containing an itemized list of all planned transfers of good and services with the quantities and planned shipment dates so You know after the committee has this information it then Decides whether or not to give an approval letter The approval letter then is usually published on the 1718 committee website unless the organization has a problem with that and Then the organization that submitted the exemption request is required to undertake whatever was agreed in the approval letter So the panel does not have any the panel of experts has no role in that process It's an entirely a committee process So it's determined by the member states that are sitting on the Security Council the same member states the five permanent members plus the non-permanent members that decided to Essentially adopt resolutions that are trying to convince the DPRK to come into conformity with international law and principles So the panel does not have a role in that process all that the panel does is it reports in all of its reports to the Security Council on unintended consequences of sanctions for the civilian population unintended consequences on humanitarian Humanitarian operations and in the panel's last report there was a substantial section included which was It was derived from discussions with more than 20 non-governmental organizations that are administering assistance directly to the DPRK civilian population within the DPRK with the United Nations country team and with all other actors that are actually involved in Distributing the assistance because as I said before the panel's mandate is to undertake investigations So if we are unable to investigate a matter, generally, we're not going to report on it So in this case we had to rely on those actors that are themselves subject to this process and from that the panel was able to glean six areas of concern with regard to this exemption process that that have made it difficult for Humanitarian assistance to continue to be delivered to again the civilian population I think this is all relevant to this discussion because there's ways in which the existing sanctions can be better Implemented such that you can create good will And certainly providing assistance to the civilian population or ensuring that their assistance is not diminished would be one of the ways to do that So the panel Had found that the process is very it requires a very generous lead time because the non-governmental organization has to seize first a member state or the resident coordinator that can take weeks Right to get a member state. You have to liaise with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc You have to know exactly, you know, you're planning shipments You're looking at locating suppliers financial agents willing to bid or contract All of that has to be lined up many many months in advance and agreed Any changes to plan suppliers shipping routes item specifications or quantities? Can render the exemption completely invalid. That's just these are just practical issues, right? And then the long lead time Can also make it difficult for humanitarian agents to respond to what are humanitarian crises, right? The whole nature of humanitarian crises is sometimes they're unpredicted, right? There's Nat natural events acts of God that that precipitate this so the panel Was articulating a view amongst organizations that are delivering aid on the ground that in particularly the sectoral sanctions Imposed pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 have had unintended Consequences on humanitarian delivery and that is a that is a prohibition for transfer the DPRK of all industrial machinery transport vehicles iron steel and other metals and Obviously this type of a wide swath is going to affect a number of humanitarian sensitive items, right? That includes food processing factories pumps filters pipes drilling equipment to address critical humanitarian needs such as providing clean water and You know just the entire distribution equipment system even spare parts for vehicles that we're delivering TB assistance as we know DPRK is is a Problematic in the global community in terms of TB and resistance for TB I think that they only have the ability to diagnose 14% of cases due to lack of equipment So you can just that's just one practical example is how one sanctions measure can affect a wide swath of humanitarian and What you get is ironically after you know Articulating how badly sanctions are implemented you get you know suppliers in neighboring countries that won't touch anything North Korea related right or there's nail clippers going in to packages that are helping TB patients or something like this and the Nail clippers are falling a rye of the prohibition on anything that's iron, you know this type of thing So it's very easy to see that along with de-risking in Banks and that's essentially a phenomenon whereby a bank sees anything related to Pyongyang DPRK North Korea and it decides not to not to help it and that that's linked to a Humanitarian banking channel, which was established in part just to get money to United Nations agencies for their operations on the ground and They are having they had a very difficult time until a banking channel was established It was very circuitous it the money went from the United Nations headquarters to a German bank transferred to euros then to a Russian bank transferred to Rubles and then the Russian Bank was responsible for providing getting cash to Pyongyang So you can imagine a lot of middlemen along the way But that was working until it broke down and right now you have you know a lot of difficulties Due to the fact that diplomats are carrying cash in on their bodies So these are you know again these are ways that there are provisions. It's laid out This is you know something that's articulated very clearly in the resolution that they shouldn't have these impacts there's a process for it and so you know having faithful implementation and ensuring that the delays are not too not too Stringent or to The delays are not too excessive And that means the delay between you know member states receiving member states submitting committee deliver deliberations approval letter, etc those are always to To ensure that the parts of the resolutions that aren't necessarily focused on just sanctioning But that are focused on ensuring a principle I think that underlines sanctions which is let's punish the people that are responsible for the negative behavior and not have Consequences for other civilians that are unrelated. It's an important principle. Thank you, Stephanie Yeah, I do want to leave enough time for audience Q&A, but I had these two pressing questions I really want to ask so I'll ask them really quickly and hopefully I can get quick answers and these are directed to Liz and Josh So Liz you mentioned not wanting to set a bad precedent in terms of doing sanctions reliefs In a small from all small or step-by-step fashion So I want to segue that into snapback provisions. So It seems like there isn't a long history on using snapback provisions at least in terms of sanctions enforcement Do we know how effective they were in the case of JCPOA or did the US withdrawal from that agreement prevent us from testing the effectiveness of something like snapback provisions Yes, so To be brief, okay The JCPOA example of the you excuse me the Trump administration reimposing or snapping back Sanctions that had been relief sanctions on Iran US sanctions that had been imposed on Iran but removed pursuant to the JCPOA That That's the most recent example that we can look at there are other examples of reversals that are smaller scale But this is not a not a bad parallel to look to the effect that that had was Much stronger than many people anticipated which is to say it was much more effective for the sanctions the community of financial institutions and Significantly commodity traders and shippers and insurers and ship brokers and port authorities and anyone connected to Iran's Financial system and its significant trade in petroleum and refined product they got the message from the United States and significantly complied with the reimposition or the snapback of those sanctions and that suggests to many people that it's possible and effective to Snap them back or reimpose them with great effect, but this is the really important distinction The Iranian economy is very different than the North Korean economy in many respects To be brief its size is much smaller than the the North Korean economy is much smaller than the Iranian economy And it's much less connected to the broad international financial system than Iran's is most of those International economic or rather financial connections flow through China, which is different than Iran where it is much more has been much more diversified internationally And also North Korea has as we have discussed a very effective history of evasion of sanctions which may which makes it less susceptible or vulnerable to the use of US essentially Correspondent banking restrictions, which are what we know as financial sanctions on Iran so North Korea is likely to be more capable of functioning in a Removal and snapback scenario than Iran is for various reasons So we should not over learn the lesson of Iran with respect to North Korea Thank you, and thank you for being very concise Last question that Josh before we open up and then don't want you to feel left out dense Or maybe you can take the first question from the audience Not to get too much into the weeds of the North Korea sanctions and policy enhancement act But Josh you talked about sections 401 and 402 which are which provide a very high bar for providing a temporary suspension or Determination of those sanctions and this so it's not only North Korean behaviors related to denuclearization, but it's also you know North Korea taking the actions on counterfeiting on human rights on on financial transparency So that's the high bar 401 402 then you also talked about section 208 C which is the president has an ability to wave Sanctions under that act if that waiver would be important for national security interests now That's a very vague term, and it seems like that's a lower bar. Why wouldn't The president give sanctions relief to North Korea on that basis the vague, you know saying hey diplomatic Negotiations are important for national security interest So I'm gonna do a waiver on that rather than try to get North Korea to meet all the onerous Requirements under 401 or 402 because that's not what Congress intended and when Congress enacted Section 208, which is sort of the bypass to mandatory sanctions It specified that this was a case-by-case waiver authority now There is a broader humanitarian waiver of course I think everyone here thankfully agrees that we should not That we should do everything we can to spare the people Right the poor and the hungry from the effects of sanctions But with regard to Donald Trump simply invoking the national interest waiver of section 208 C There are a few reasons why that would be problematic and one is that it says case-by-case The clear intent of Congress here is to say that we impose mandatory sanctions for money laundering But by the way that doesn't mean that you are required to crash the Bank of China Because it was laundering money for Chinpo shipping company in Singapore actual case Doesn't mean that you are necessarily required to crash the three Chinese banks that are currently Subject to a contempt of court order in the district of Columbia district federal district court It says in essence that We have other interests in addition to North Korea that we don't want to affect and so the president has a temporary Limited case-by-case authority and if the president were to exceed that again I think what you would see is a reaction by Congress to legislatively reimpose the sanctions Sections 401 and 402 do set a higher bar and that was intentional Let me talk about a place called camp 16 Camp 16 is a political prison camp as large as the district of Columbia that holds Estimates anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000 people One survivor from the camp said that people there were buried up to their necks and killed with hammers And that women in the camp were raped and then murdered to silence them forever Now leave aside the question of whether the American people Choose to give the government of North Korea which perpetrates these crimes against humanity access to our financial system and Perpetrate that system and I would argue as a child of the 80s when we all grew up boycotting apartheid That it is far far Less morally defensible to perpetuate a system like this But fine be completely pragmatic How many a flow forming lays or computer Computer numerically controlled lays or how much fissile material can you hide in a camp that size? It's not the only such camp. We have camps 14 18 and 15 still in operation and any number of other places inside North Korea So what those conditions are designed to do is to extract transparency from North Korea? I'd also like to just associate myself with Elizabeth's comments on snapping back With North Korea it is an in the financial intelligence and enforcement and a Diplomacy problem to get countries to enforce the sanctions in the first place and that requires years of patient diplomacy and law enforcement You have to put this in the context of the fact that until 2016 our North Korea sanctions were Quantitatively and qualitatively weaker than our sanctions against Belarus and Zimbabwe. Yes, I counted the designations so to say That we can that there is a magic lever behind the curtains in the Oval Office where we can turn the sanctions on And off again and bypass all of the coalition diplomacy. We will need to a enforce and be to lift sanctions Completely regardless of what Congress thinks of all this I think it's just out of context and would not work in this one Thank you, and so with that I will turn to the audience we have Paul there with the microphone Please raise your hands if you have a question And when you do introduce yourself your name and your affiliation You're so stunned by the the riveting remarks a question right here at third row. Hi. Thank you I've been marks with NHK Japan broadcasting It seems that Hanoi the Trump administration tried to get the big deal for big deal But failed and now we're waiting for a working-level negotiations to start Does the panel think that now the administration is going to try? Small for small approach and if so I mean Elizabeth mentioned sort of the roadblocks for that Do you think that that will be any more effective than trying to go for a big for big and I'll direct that to Dan first Because it gets at the the central problem of how do you overcome this? This fundamental tension about Small for small, which is what North Korea wants and then what Liz says is you can only go big for big Yeah, thanks for the question. I think I mean, I don't I don't know what the administration's Internal strategy is for work-level negotiations right now if you look at the remarks from Stephen Meaghan the special representative from North Korea of a week or two ago, you know, he said that you know one Basically the US is willing to talk about what's essentially a phased approach. I don't think that's an exact wording But essentially what he said and number two he reiterated that, you know, although things like, you know exchanges might be possible, you know, saying no sanctions relief at this time I Think if we do get You know serious working-level dialogue going though The question might be, you know, the Trump administration's found that big for big at Hanoi isn't going to get them anywhere What might be a reasonable for a reasonable approach, you know, what's enough that North Korea could do that justifies some suspension of Certain sanctions while keeping other elements of the sanctions regime in place I think that, you know, North Korean actions like a Shutdown of physical material production not only at Yongbyon, but also at other known in Uranium enrichment sites. I think that would have some value and I think that, you know, kind of foreclosing on the possibility of getting those kind of actions and Holding up for the hope of, you know, getting everything all at once. I think that would be short-sighted Can I just respond to this too? I think that The appropriate thing for the United States Government to do in the face of that, you know, there was not immediate smashing success and capitulation You know based on this first proposal, that's okay This is certainly we've been at this for a very long time, but I think that's a An impetus to get creative and thoughtful instead of to back down on the US position and by creative and thoughtful I mean Thinking about the kind of concessions that the US can give that are not sanctions but that are still meaningful So for example the freeze for freeze that we have right now that has enabled a period of Can I say stability? Is that is that too strong? But For this summit diplomacy, it actually doesn't have anything to do with sanctions relief, right? So In the areas of diplomatic engagement, perhaps cultural humanitarian considering what else could occur around Modification of military exercises if there's any give there those may be meaningful as well as Political exposure and continuing with this summit diplomacy, which clearly has Social capital political capital value for the North Koreans what may happen what may be available there and So another way of saying that is can you think of a sequencing where there are Gives on the United States side or an international side that are meaningful to North Korea But that hold until a later point after which North Korea has made verifiable and substantial nuclear commitments that holds until then the relief of economic sanctions from the United States or the international community and just to say they have to Proceed in coordination. Otherwise. We have a truly difficult non-functional mess around compliance Even worse than we have right now, which is pretty bad I feel like that should be plausible, especially if you take into account what North Korea says about how they try to downplay Their desperation for sanctions relief, right? So after Hanoi you had the the foreign minister or the vice foreign minister basically say that oh well Actually, what we really want is security guarantees and not sanctionally So if you take them out the word you feel like there should be some other gives that we can give on the other hand then If we're gonna get creative on on say on on concessions that aren't necessary sanction relief Maybe North Korea might get creative and not you know And maybe ask for things that you know where they don't provide concessions on the nuclear program But it's on other things like say conventional Aspects of their of their military, right? Next question the lady in the green Hello, my name is Teresa and what now I am a Academic base at the University of Berlin. I just came for a few days for meetings about North Korea and I Saw your event. So I thought oh, that's a wonderful occasion to come here. So thank you very much for a really interesting discussions Thank you also to Stephanie for mentioning all the human nature in aspects and I had some meetings in Seoul and New York before coming here and we had some good discussions about the sectoral sanctions and what could be done in that regard and one of the ideas or one of the Thoughts was that actually if you look at the situation from the internal domestic North Korean perspective some of these sectors especially seafood and And textile industry are those who are let's say if I can use the word privatized in North Korea So, you know through the kind of black market a system. So in a way if we Sanction those areas we are sort of discouraging the internal economy developments, which we should probably You know try to make work and You know sort of which are also undermining the system from from inside, right? So that would be one one point if I may ask for some reaction to that and as a European I would also like to ask about the European sanctions which are sort of Those which should go farther than The UN sanctions and also kind of fill in some loopholes in the UN sanctions. So if we think about rolling back sanctions We could also potentially think about starting with the EU sanctions and sort of go back with that could be also in in coordination with the United States and You know, I was wondering also what what the other partner sanctions with the RK or potentially Japan, you know whether that would be some some system how to how to do it and within Iran Deal sanctions. Obviously Europeans are now trying to save the deal as much as possible One of the ways in which they are doing it through the instax mechanism, which would be providing financing to Iran Outside of the US financial system. Obviously, that's not something which the US administration longs to see But to some extent it would also be a mechanism how to finance certain issues with North Korea But at the same time keep the financial financial sanctions in place so kind of You know learn the positive lesson from instax rather than rather than the negative Lesson so thank you very much. Yeah, so any thoughts on that tension between hindering the organic growth of the private economy Versus actually hindering the nuclear program and then the thoughts about EU sanctions or you know South Korea's May 26 sanctions to Japanese all the other unilateral Sanctions that could be a part of this regime Can I talk about the seafood piece of this because I've I've looked at the seafood question actually very carefully So I am familiar with the research by Andrei Lankoff and Peter Ward and others that claim that the seafood industry is Privatized I disagree and would challenge the premise of that research and I've had Dialogue with Peter Ward about it. I think it's based on old information What has happened since the research that is the basis for those conclusions is that first the North Korean Military took over most of the boats a lot of the ghost ships that first began to arrive in Japan in 2015 before the sanctions by the way we've been strengthened Which is an important point that a lot of journalists miss where we're army boats and what you began to see about that time Is two things one is that the fishing industry came under the control of North Korean government agencies including Bureau 39 the reconnaissance general Bureau Which is UN designated which is a money laundering and intelligence agency the Ministry of State Security Which is sort of the North Korean version of the Gestapo? And you know the internal security force that guards the political prison camps and they began to push aside the army so And then the other development you began to see is that the government was selling off the fishing rights to Chinese trawlers So that the waters close to the coast were badly over fished And that's why a lot of these boats were going so far out to see that the winds which blow east in the sea of Japan caught them and blew them out into the open ocean Most of the the sanctions are against the export of fish and seafood We're talking about a country where the population is badly protein deficient The first question is why are the North Korean people not eating that seafood? Why is it being exported for hard currency and who do you suppose is really using that money if in fact the Industry has now come under the control of a few government industries that are at the apex there that sort of the apex predators of the North Korean pecking order The other point that I would make is that internal reports from North Korea Tell us that at times when the seafood export sanctions are enforced Local market prices inside North Korea for fish and seafood go down People consumers the poor in North Korea will say oh my god. I've never been able to afford fish and seafood in my lunch before You know we have I think it's the Hanzi attic league that first taught the world how to salt and preserve fish The seafood industry should be salting and drying and preserving fish trading it around the country and providing for the Nutritional needs of a population that does not have enough fish and seafood so I would say that these facts bring us to exactly the opposite conclusion that we should enforce the fish and seafood Sanctions and any frankly food export sanctions very very strictly because North Korea's food production Should be feeding a hungry population Yeah, can can I move on to the other question so regarding seeking to differentiate More than they already are the various Sanctions regimes on North Korea EU US South Korea the UN etc There's I don't I admire the the creativity and thinking about how to consider Different options or whether incrementalism is Appropriate or not. You've already heard me make my argument for why I think it's Not the strongest foot forward on on this issue, but in general I would say There's not a lot of success to be had by trying seeking to differentiate the EU sanctions significantly from the US one and that is because Virtually any company bank or non-profit aid or relief group of sufficient size to handle Connectivity permitted connectivity with North Korea Has to we'll find itself in some way subject to at least US sanctions on North Korea And what that means is that they can't choose to Abide by a different set of measures that may be more sanctions measures and a different jurisdiction that may be more Perceived as more permissive and plan to remain a going concern, which is to say they will violate US sanctions potentially and Then put themselves out of business and face insolvency. So to try and encourage for example to take your example a rollback of European sanctions on North Korea and Encourage EU banks or companies to try and Expand internet economic connectivity with North Korea would be encouraging them to engage in Activity that would put them in a conflict of law situation and in violation of US sanctions, which is sort of the fast road to To insolvency so and and not Carrying out the the whole point of what they were doing which is to try and create economic incentives or Opportunity for North Korea or the people of North Korea on insects. I would just say it is Fragile at best and the US administration given its overwhelming hostile view towards Iran will be quick to Make insolvent everyone related to it or otherwise subject to major US criminal liability if that can be accomplished As soon as it violates Iran sanctions and to court Connectivity with North Korea would I think accelerate that process as well? So I don't expect that that is the conduit towards moving money into North Korea and the kind of leapfrogging through Jurisdiction such as Germany or Russia as problematic as that has been maybe the best kind of Modality for achieving humanitarian Financial flow into North Korea whether or not that improves upon cash couriers is a different question Let's go back to the audience Hope much popped up. All right over here. That's the first time I saw Hello, my name is rock well putta and I'm with the School of Public Service over by the National Cathedral And my question was with the recent situation with Iran where the US has reimposed sanctions and left the Iran deal despite their seeming compliance and The verified compliance with the rest of the national international community Would North Korea see this as an issue as in it's sort of the next administration can pull the rug out from under them and completely Undo everything that's been done is North Korea more skeptical of the United States's ability to keep a Steady keel in foreign policy as a result of this Yes, and so is everybody else that the United States would want to work with including our closest security allies You know I would just add that Congress passed the law that it passed in a bipartisan way in the hope that we can let North Korea know what the conditions are that it has to meet and that those conditions can hopefully go from administration to Administration despite changes of partisan political control. It can be steady Hi, my name is John, and I'm a research assistant at the Center for the National Interest And my question is now that we're gonna get the Get the working-level negotiations started What do you think the US and DPRK officials should talk about in other words? What should be the agenda be before the next summit between? President Trump and chairman Kim including ladies-in-office and the definition of the nuclear right denuclearization and Peace declaration. Thank you. I Think there was a fair bit of progress in the run-up to the Hanoi summit on some of the secondary issues in US-North Korea negotiations there was reportedly you know progress on talks about a liaison office about Enhancing remains recovery efforts getting US military back into North Korea to conduct remains recovery operations And on a number of other issues like an end of war declaration But of course what ultimately sunk the Hanoi summit was a lack of agreement on North Korea's nuclear program and what the US would offer in return for North Korean actions toward denuclearization and you know road map toward denuclearization So for working-level talks to really make progress. I think there's got to be you know something Really tangible on the nuclear issue. There's Certainly some things we could do in the short term As confidence-building measures, but if there's another summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un that's more than you know an impromptu nice to meet you kind of thing I think there would have to be some kind of deliverable on on those core issues Hi Rachel Lambert Marine Mike Mansfield foundation so based on current information What is the chance that the White House will soften their position to reach a resolution more quickly for? Political capital in the upcoming election and what is the chance that Congress would allow such a deal to occur? Can I stop and check Twitter? I? Do think that finding resolution or success broadly defined on North Korea is a key aspiration of the Trump administration and I think that there would be a great effort to Come up with conditions for what can be called success ahead of President Trump's Re-election the next general election basically but I will just point out that Achieving a trade deal with China is also one of the key foreign policy and economic benchmarks and goals for this administration and that's going there's this pretty you know tough going there And there are advisors around the president who would prefer as we all know no deal no trade deal rather than Rather than one that doesn't seem adequate to US demands and conditions And I expect that there will be the similar kind of reckoning around the action-forcing summits or conversations That will come up towards the end of this presidential term. I can't see how broad success Towards massive denuclearization could possibly occur and in a two-year time frame here Though I do think that it will be a major effort by this administration to achieve some conditions for that as far as Congress I don't think they're going to bunch much at all So success will have to be pretty squishy for the administration in order for Congress to let that go by Just as a follow-up because Congress wants to be A part of you provide input on a deal in this particularly that happens through a peace treaty because you requires two-thirds Advice and consent from the Senate. Do you think that gives the administration more? More of a reason to not pursue a peace treaty and just go with the executive agreement because that wouldn't require the Senate Absolutely, just to be brief Even though they said they've said all along that they will get Senate Consent on this. I would just add I said that on NAFTA too, so I think that this administration though well, President Trump's an office the Political stars are aligned in a way that if there is a reasonably good Treaty that goes to Congress. I think it would much be much easier for for the Trump administration To get that through then a democratic administration. I think the Trump administration Would be able to pull Some of its Republican allies on board who would be Let's say much more skeptical if a Democrat was an office, but on the other hand Assuming that President Trump has reelected the windows going to be pretty pretty tight to actually get enough ground in negotiations to submit a Realistic and good treaty to Congress in the next year More questions in the back I'm Faye I'm also with the St. Albans School of Public Service and I was just wondering what the panel's thoughts are on The extent to which China and the US can cooperate on the North Korea issue in light of the current tensions between the two countries Concerning trade and also Huawei. Thank you Good question China US cooperation The most important North Korea story that almost no one is following is Happening in the US district court for the district of Columbia right now Where prosecutors are trying to enforce three subpoenas against three major Chinese banks The record of the case is sealed and the names of the banks are not Unsealed There has been some speculation in the press about which those banks are in their large banks Two of those subpoenas are issued by grand juries One is issued under the Patriot Act all are calling for the bank to turn over records about Suspected North Korean sanctions violations the judge has Granted the government's motion to compel production of those records The banks did not comply and therefore the judge held the banks in contempt of court and fined them $50,000 a day and then stayed the fines pending appeal I would in no way say that our pressure Against North Korea has been maximum to this point. It's been medium Donald Trump has particularly been pulling the Treasury Department's punches But what the Justice Department has begun doing with these actions and with things like the seizure of the wise honest Which is maybe not such a China story I think that it is really the Justice Department that is becoming the new center of gravity In the sanctions effort and you can look for Congress Really to empower a Justice Department that is doing as much as it can to enforce the law vice the Treasury Department which hobbled by the president seems to be doing as little as possible I think that this is going to give the Chinese financial industry a negative incentive against violating North Korea sanctions as it is done and I would suspect as a matter of Chinese government policy So I think things are going to get worse before they get better Can I just add to that? Sorry Just to clarify these three unnamed banks, but reported on are presumed to be Chinese banks. Yes, right? So the I I agree with what you said except I would say it's not just the Justice Department and law enforcement mechanisms that are now a kind of leading edge to pursuit of This is what you do if you can't enforce sanctions as you try and dial up your law enforcement actions But it's also commerce. So it's just justice and commerce and you mentioned Huawei Well, so one of the reasons why we're talking so much about Huawei is because of their listing on a on a commerce list and I do think that these are going to be two tools that this administration will look to use more and more Including on North Korea to advance its policy But just as a high-level comment on China the US will have to work with China in order to achieve Success however squishy or broadly defined you may seek to make that In imposing more sanctions or in rolling them back. So it's not a it's not a nice to have It's a have to have for success But it seems like holding Chinese banks in contempt or Applying secondary sanctions on Chinese entities isn't the most cooperative way to work with China, right? Have we run out of cooperative measures with China? We're only left with some of these more coercive. No, it's no it's not a we haven't run out of cooperative measures at all There's an ample opportunity for creativity in that domain That is just not the style and MO of this administration And so there are ample opportunities to dial up pressure But if you're if you're coming at this from a fortress America America first to stain for Multilateralism and international cooperation then some of the tools you reach for first whether they be law enforcement Treasury sanctions commerce listings Criticizing NATO pulling out of the JCPOA or the Paris Accord, whatever it is you're looking for ways to actually make your allies or some of your Some of your counterparts become the pressure Valve for your enemies. So we're putting our allies and Some competitors As the focus of the pressure just a two-finger President Trump I think talks to Kim Jong-un more than he talks to presidency jim ping Just a point if you read the court's orders Ordering the records to be turned over the the basis for the prosecutors argument In its motion to compel was that we have previously tried to use our mutual legal assistance treaty with China to get them to Voluntarily cooperate and turn over records that after all those banks had agreed with the FDIC To give us access to when they were allowed to become Correspondent banks and to set up branches in the United States in 2016. There was another Investigation where we tried to invoke the MLAT to get the Chinese banks in the Chinese Justice Ministry to cooperate They pretty much gave us the middle finger We got no cooperation at all and therefore that is the basis for why now the Justice Department is using more coercive means I would also be very cautious about attributing too much Diplomatic or political incentive to what the Justice Department is doing the Justice Department And I would especially single out the southern district of New York, but also the DC district They really value their political independence in the legal profession We refer to the southern district of New York as the sovereign district of New York for the reason that they just really Push away Washington and its political considerations. I Strongly believe and that is to some extent based on the fact that I know some of the people Believe that the Justice Department is simply pursuing violations of law They don't believe that our financial system should be open for people who break the law Whether they're North Korea and Chinese or anything else We have enforced our money laundering and sanctions laws harshly against European banks We made BNP Pariba pay nine billion dollars with a B and fines penalties and forfeitures Why have the Chinese banks been given what amounts to de facto immunity until now? I think that what we're doing now is Getting the attention of the Chinese banks to the extent that we can perhaps have enough leverage To come to a future agreement on again only allowing through those transactions that serve the needs of the North Korean people Okay, so we're running out of time. So let's just take two more or actually just get to these last two questions I'll have one more as well. Thank you. I'm Ethan minkoff also with the school of public service So in any deal that we make with North Korea, there's gonna be some aspect of North Korean Denuclearization no matter how large or small that's that may be my question is with what we know of North Korea's track record of Cheating and not really denuclearizing. Is there any way that the United States or any international body can Verify that North Korea is actually following through with their Agreement, thank you. Let's take the second question to together. Thank you. My name is Yoon Hikim I'm a recent graduate of a Johns Hopkins size and before that I Worked at the Ministry of Unification of South Korea, and I'm very thank you for all the panels Talking and my question goes to Elizabeth and I'm very much impressed by your Talkings about the politics and practicality and you mentioned that to incentivize North Korea to change its behavior The solution should not be a sanctions relief, but rather it should be the people people exchange and other things But however, we all know that we also know that North Korea has shifted its national strategic policy goal Where they drop the pyeongjin policy and but shifted to focus on more economic development So even if the US does not want to give relief sanctions relief Still the North Korea wants to want the sanctions relief as its number and priority So if that happens the United States still keeps saying no things as relief That's not gonna happen then the negotiation going forward might end up being another breakdown So what how can we close the gap? So what should be or would be the United States strategy going forward? Thank you please anyone So you have very articulately laid out an impasse that the United States and North Korea could come to if North Korea Insists that there must as an initial and confidence building matter be economic Relief or or benefit to North Korea and the United States has said that that shall not be the case as we've discussed here elaborately already so That's right. That's a challenge and just to borrow from the Iranian example What we have seen in there. This may be rather extreme It's at a different point in the the arc of the progression of this conflict with the United States has made 12 Demands laid out by Pompeo about what it wants from Iran and Iran has said no and there's been on offer to a discussion of possibly negotiating Or talk speaking together and there has been no willingness on either side to make that happen And so we're seeing an escalation of tension So that is something that could occur if there is truly an impasse and a breakdown and a potential for escalation of conflict That's that's a real scenario. It's certain I think it's more real than the one we've been engaged in discussing today Which is what should it look like if there is a deal and there is denuclearization and a removal of sanctions So just to be clear from the outside on that But it's it is perhaps the case that there can be nevertheless valuable benefit to North Korea That may have a kind of economic value to engage in these other forms of or to accept these other confidence-building measures or concessions from the United States that could spend the humanitarian or educational exchange diplomatic realm possibly even not just with the United States but with other countries a discussion of peace or You know other in other domains or the political side of a conversation and into war I mean what that what we could look at in that domain as well that could If the two sides are committed to actually sticking with the process deliver some fruit So at the early stage of discussing yes, everyone must dig in and they must have strong positions that they put out there To as a beginning for a for negotiations But we haven't yet seen if either side is willing to get creative in this initial stage of confidence building and progression towards The working-level conversations Yeah, I just would ask what is the source for your claim that North Korea has abandoned the Pyongjin policy? I I haven't seen that I would I would not only question that premise But I would also ask what practical effects we see because of it all of the reports tell us That it's production of missiles and nuclear weapons is as high as it has ever been so they they still have it in their Constitution that they're a nuclear state. They're still pursuing nuclear weapons. I think as a practical matter You know the question that Congress will ask is what has North Korea done to deserve sanctions relief? I I don't know how anyone could answer that to mr. Minkoff's question By the way, we may be distant relatives. My grandmother is named Minkoff my late grandmother I Think you just nailed it this this is hard Because every member of Congress who may know less than the wonks sitting up here and in this room It's just going to look at the North Koreans and say my god. They just keep lying to us. They cheat every time Why should we go along with this? They have to earn our trust this agreement and the standards and sections 401 and 402 Are hard to meet because North Korea has thrown away our trust. It will have to win it back with transparency. I Think that you know, you're absolutely right North Korean cheating on agreement is certainly Concerned to be worried about but there are a Number of North Korean nuclear and missile production sites that are well known I mean, there have been plenty of open source researchers who've poured over, you know Every inch of Google Earth and satellite imagery finding various North Korean sites. There's a lot That's taking place at young beyond it. They're Conksman enrichment plant that Some observers have looked at and certainly the US intelligence community knows a lot more So I think being able to you know, have a first set of steps that addresses those known sites Even if it's not, you know anytime anywhere inspections that will still, you know Lead to a significant reduction In North Korea's ability to advance its WMD programs and of course, I think getting to a final deal would require something more than that But in the meantime, I think there will be a continuing need, you know For those open source researchers for the intelligence community to continue to make sure that North Korea is living up to You know, whatever initial agreement it signs on to I would add that you certainly need inspectors on the ground to Verificate to verify the shutdown of facility facilities at the same time North Korea has an extensive network of underground facilities and bunkers and sites and they simply will not provide the access that the US or You know others want to provide the level of verification and certainty that we need and that's just a problem That will have to overcome and I'll have one last question before I wrap this up because no one else raised it Which is South Korea obviously wants to get back in this game. They always throw out Sanctions relief in terms of inter Korean projects So resuming the Kessler industrial complex or the mountain come young tourism project or anything related to inter Korean railway cooperation, right? Is there a way to provide Relief whether it's you know an exemption on a UN UN resolution that allows for joint ventures or anything that allows for inter Korean projects to proceed Those are before some of those are before the committee right now Just from the US perspective, I would say technically yes But but I don't think that washes well politically you can't just make Exceptions just cuz or as a confidence building measure For one country or one set of projects in one instance here that you're setting a precedent You have to live with with all sanctions UN US or otherwise, which is That would be that would be a heck of a thing to to bank on to throw that all away Yeah, case on would be a huge hole in the sanctions that would nullify and undermine the pressure Necessary to get North Korea to make a major strategic choice about its policies Congress hates case on intensely That's liberals. That's conservatives. I met with 400 members of the house and or not members But staffers in the house many Senate staffers in the course of talking about the Nix Pia I can't tell you how many times people came up to me and said Does it close down case on this is 2013? I said no Well, I won't support it unless it closes down case on I mean there is an intense antipathy to it I have have jokingly proposed that if you were to turn the if you were to put in a yeah The Thank you a golden corral buffet in case song where the workers and their families can eat and then go to a clinic and get medical Care we could assure ourselves that the wages are going to the people who have earned it Choco pies directly to Banana milk. Yeah Other than that, I think Congress is going to see this as undermining sanctions and profiting from slave labor All right, I want to thank the panelists and as well as our usip colleagues racial Vanderbink I'm Paul League who helped put this event together. Please join me in thanking our panelists And thank you for coming as well