 Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Before taking your questions, I wish to highlight a few points. The main focus of IAEA spending on technical cooperation last year was on nuclear safety and security, health and nutrition, and food and agriculture. These are the priorities determined by our member states. Together remains an important focus of our work, an internal audit identified certain shortcomings and weakness in relation to the division in charge of a program of action for cancer therapy. I am taking action to ensure that these concerns are addressed. PACT is one of the parts of the comprehensive and life-saving assistance which we continue to provide to member states in the cancer field. The modernization of nuclear applications and laboratories at Cyberstove is progressing well. In the coming months, new laboratory buildings and a new linear accelerator facility will be inaugurated. Funding is still needed to equip the laboratories. According to the agency's verification and monitoring activities in Iran, as you know, the United States announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA last month. The agency continues to verify and monitor Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA as requested by the UN Security Council and authorized by the Board of Governors. We continue to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under a safeguard agreement, evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran continue. We are closely following the development related to the nuclear program of the North Korea. We will be ready to act promptly and play an essential role in verifying North Korea's nuclear program if a political agreement is reached among countries concerned subject to authorization by our Board of Governors. I again call upon North Korea to comply with some fully with its obligations and to cooperate promptly with the agency. Finally, ladies and gentlemen, I informed the Board that our Chief First Chief of Ethics, Mr. Alessandro Magy, has taken up his position. He will assist me in promoting the highest standards of integrity in the agency and fostering a culture of ethics, transparency and accountability. Thank you very much. You used very similar language in your statement to the Board today to the language that's in the report on Iran. I've got it in front of me. You said the timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in providing access would facilitate implementation of this proposal and enhance confidence. What does that tell us about your current level of confidence about Iran's cooperation with the agency? I am not saying that we have concerns over Iran's implementation of the JCPOA or the additional protocol. To the contrary, we stated that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments and that we had access to all sites and locations that we needed to have access. Nonetheless, we think that there exists room for Iran to provide us with more proactive and timely cooperation. This is not an expression of concerns or complaints, but rather an encouragement to Iran. I've got two questions. First question is regarding the Democratic People's Republic Courier, you mentioned in your statement about the... Excuse me. Please. All right here, sir. Oh, I'm sorry. Sorry, sir. Say it again. If you could give us a little bit more detail about the executive group that you mentioned for the DPRK team. Maybe it's just that I'm not studying enough, but you mentioned about the DPRK team, but you also about the executive group. Could you tell us a little bit about what their role is and what they're doing towards the upcoming or foreseeable role? Let's see. There is a team in the Department of Safety Guard dedicated for DPRK. This is the group of inspectors and they are permanent members of this group and they are following the North Korean issue permanently. The executive group is some herit led by my office, DGOC, and encompasses some other departments, not only the Safety Guard Department, but let's say Management Department, Legal Department, because once or if we start the activities in Iran, we do not only need inspectors, but of course we need funds and we have to address the legal aspect. So this is the executive group is the coordination body, agency-wide coordination body. And this team is dedicated to monitor the program of North Korea and remain ready to resume the verification activities. One follow-up to that. So my understanding is that if in case that the denuclearization for North Korea or the Korean Peninsula commences, it will be an unprecedented program. Is this executive group there to be able to cope with this, I would say, unprecedented situation? Is it more so to be able to prepare for a situation that the IEAEA has never been tackled before? We have to organize the work, not only get prepared for the verification. I mean mobilize some inspectors, train them, update. In reality, we have been already doing that, the training the inspectors, upgrade, update and upgrade the verification plan, and upgrade the verification equipment. This is done by the Safety Guard Department. Also we need to coordinate activities, and that is already in progress. Albert Otti, DPA Chairman, Press Agency. Sir, are you getting signals ahead of the plan summit from either side that they are for seeing a role for the IEAEAEAEAEA in whatever they come up with? It is very clear for me that if the agreement is reached, we will have the role to verify. For the agreement itself, we do not have the indication. It is not a role to intervene into policy matters and political matters. Our role is to provide expertise and expertise when political development allows us to start on the verification. Thanks. This is Jonathan Tyrone from Bloomberg News. Back to the Iran item, you used the conditional tense by saying would, would facilitate implementation. And so my question, Mr. Amano, is were you trying to invite speculation that Iran is perhaps not cooperating as much as you would like? You said that you don't have any concerns, but how happy are you with the level of cooperation that Iran is providing? Because the way I'm reading this, you're inviting speculation that they're perhaps not. We are not speculating. What I wanted to say is that in some cases, there exists a room for Iran to provide us with more proactive and timely access, but such cases are not uncommon in safeguard implementation. And in light of that, Iran would provide us more timely and more proactive cooperation. Coming back to North Korea, if I may, you said when you asked about the IAEA's role once a political solution has been reached, you said it is very clear for me that if the agreement is reached, we will have the role to verify. So is that an indication that you have received, just following up on the question there from the parties involved, or are you simply saying you believe that would be your role? And also, if I may, there's been a lot of speculation about the size of the job in North Korea. Could you give us some sense of how much manpower, how much time would be required to verify the outlines of whatever deal would need to be reached? Last question, if there is any indication or not, no one said if we reach agreement, please do the verification job. That's not like that. However, we have liaised with some stakeholders and had a number of exchanges and through these exchanges it is very clear that if there is anybody, any organization that can do the verification, it is only us, the IAEA. That is why I said once the political development allows, the IAEA will resume the verification activities. Second question about the size of operation is difficult. It is not yet an agreement and we do not know how will be the development. So it is not possible to say what will be the size of the operation. But we have some 10 staff, 10 permanent members of the task force and there are others who are supporting and we can mobilize many if the real needs arises. One follow-up on Iran, these cases where room for more timely and proactive cooperation existed. Were these timed in vicinity to Trump's decision to withdraw from the deal? I'm asking because I'm wondering whether you feel that maybe there is a risk that Iran would be not as timely and proactive because of the decision. There is no relation with the statement by President Trump. This is independent. Nippon TV, in your statement this time on the DPRK, in the past you have been always saying that you have a great concern of what's happening at the DPRK and in this case you didn't mention any of it. Does that reflect sort of your hope, your expectations? Why did you not express your concern but rather sort of said something a little more encouraging? Can you just elaborate on this one and then the second, well, maybe I'll do the second question later. Since some other Winter Olympics we have been observing the development, positive development and we hope that this development will lead to concrete results. That is why I express my views in that context. And then the second question is that in the past the DPRK had from one-sided sort of disagreement or the feelings not liking IAEA perhaps because IAEA is very strict and there's a possibility of IAEA going back only to monitor but not to inspect. Do you think if that happens that is what is needed for you to play the essential role? What do you think? First, the IAEA is the only international organization that has the experience and capability to monitor and verify the nuclear related activities. And so I do not have any problem with any country and if requested IAEA is ready to undertake the verification activities. Thanks, Jonathan Tavern again. In line with undertaking verification activities the UK and Germany, if I'm not mistaken, has requested the IAEA review the data presented by Israel last month relative to Iranian activities. Have you been, has IAEA been contacted directly about reviewing that material and what is the position right now? And just briefly also, you mentioned last month after your meeting with Mr. Putin that you were dealing with very sensitive issues. Does the request to look at that information count among the sensitive issues that you're happy to deal with and safeguards right now? We have viewed the press conference given by Prime Minister Natanier carefully and we had the initial exchange of views as a follow-up. But we have just started to look into the information and it will take a long time. In case of the PMD it took us some years to look into the information. So it will take time before we have some idea. That is where we stand now. One follow-up to previous question. If I may recall my memory, I think the IAEA issued a statement regarding Netanyahu's report mentioning that it was an issue that has been dealt with or looked into by the warden governors and also been affirmed by it. But what you're saying now is that it's more than that extent. You're saying that it is new evidence that is presented to you and it's something that the IAEA needs to take time to look into? No, I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is that we have viewed the press conference. We had the initial exchange of views and we are starting to look into the information and it will take time to analyze the information. That is what I'm saying. With respect to the past information, it took us a long time to analyze and that is what I meant. My name is Tsuchi from Kyoto News. Simple question. Has IAEA secured enough budget, I mean the money to resume the activities in DPRK? It's only the size of the work but do you think you have enough money, enough budget? The agreement has not yet been reached. Board has not yet authorized us to do the activities. We have not yet raised funds. But once political agreement is reached, it is necessary to receive funds and I'm confident that Member States will support us. Mr. Amano and Nippon TV once again. How soon, of course the DPRK is not a member of IAEA, so you need an invitation or some request from somebody involving this possible agreement if there is one, but you need an invitation. If you are invited, how soon would you be able to travel to the DPRK? It is difficult to foresee how will be the development, but we will be able to resume our verification activities at short notice within weeks, not months, once board authorization is given. I have to stress that board authorization is needed and once the board authorization is given, we can resume our verification activities within weeks.