 Okay, so thanks a lot everyone for being here today and for giving us the opportunity to share our work with you. And of course, thanks a lot to the organizers of this event. And I hope you will enjoy our panel and our, you are enjoying our panel and will enjoy our research too. So the title of our research is how assimilative primary school education affects insurgency in areas of ethnic conflict. And this is a co-authored work with my colleague, Elsie Johnson from the University of Washington. I will start this presentation with a story which will show you two sides of the same coin. So this is, this woman on the picture is Sudika Avar, who was once upon a time a heroic national figure by Turkish nationalists because she was a prominent teacher and education administrator in the newly founded Republic of Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. And of course, as you can imagine, these are times where school attendance and school enrollment rates were extremely low, particularly in rural areas. And if you look at Avar's personal bibliography, you'll notice that Avar or other people like her so educating and modernizing these children as a mission. And to make sure children are enrolled to school, she was even commuting from village to village to find children that are not enrolled and giving, she was giving them a right to the school, to the boarding school nearby. So she was really like a heroic education administrator by these nationalist accounts. But if you take a closer look at various bibliographies or studies about that period, we can also understand that one of the biggest motivations of Avar and many educators like her was actually to create Turkish citizens and nations from a very diversely populated area, particularly the southeastern Turkey because this was the area where the region where she was serving, where the majority of Kurdish population in Turkey is located. And of course, this expectation of or this motivation of her is not surprising because education is of course a very important public service that is known not to only really use inequalities and increase social mobility. As you will see in the coming slides, it's also being used by states to create nations and to gain citizens loyalty, which are all factors that help a state to sustain peace in a country in the long run. Okay, so the puzzle here is despite the pacifying effect of education, we still observe high levels of insurgency in even in countries with like free and compulsory education and where almost 100% of students are enrolled to an education institution and can get primary school education. This outcome is particularly surprising due to the quote unquote indoctrination impact of education curricula because we know that by many studies, states have been using education as a tool to imbue national values upon society or to create loyal citizens and they also mention very various stories of success such as French Catalans or creating Italians after creating Italy. So that's why considering this indoctrination or nation making impact of education curricula, the increased level of insurgencies today in these countries is still puzzling. And therefore, we are revisiting this question of how does mass and compulsory primary education, particularly the state building era as that is our scope condition here, affect insurgency participation. When we look at the literature, we see that education's impact on insurgency participation operates mainly through three channels and they mostly find a negative and pacifying effect with a few exceptions. First education can reduce, of course, relative deprivation and grievances by reducing inequalities and greater levels of educational attainment may increase the opportunity cost of joining insurgency and therefore leading to decreased levels of insurgency participation. And finally, some studies argue that higher educational attainment decreases the risk of violence by encouraging political participation or by promoting a culture of peace or norms of social cohesion. However, of course, from the perspective of ethnic minorities, equally crucial to these economic decisions or grievances in ethnically and socially divided societies is the threat of losing group identity and your descriptive privilege and power. And we therefore argue that another impact of education can be its threat to group identity for ethnic minority populations which may lead to increased levels of insurgency participation. And therefore, we think despite the overall pacifying effect of primary education in the literature, the overall impact of primary education on insurgency participation is not really conclusive. Therefore we are reexamining this hypothesis that primary education decreases the likelihood of insurgency. And the empirical setting we are using is Turkey, which is a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian country. In this country, Kurds form the majority, the major minority group, which is an ethnic and linguistic group indigenous to the Mesopotamian area. And Alevis are heterodox Muslim communities with links to Shia, Islam, and Sufism. But I should say that although these are also minority groups, they have been politically very much integrated into the founding party of Turkey, the Republican People's Party. And finally, the dominant ethnic religious group is Sunni Turks. And when it comes to the structure of the primary school education in Turkey, we can say that everything was centralized. The financial sources were centralized, they were centrally financed. The curriculum was financially determined and administered and monitored through monitors. And of course it was compulsory and free and in Turkish. So all classes that you are taking in these schools, regardless of where you are or regardless of your ethnicity, are Turkish. And elective Kurdish classes were only recently added to the curriculum. And of course, in addition to these, there is also an enormous emphasis on national pride and Turkishness in official school books in that era. And it includes everyday rituals such as singing the national anthem or reading the student oath. And if you look at the English translation of this, you will see that this is a very strong anthem actually, which includes words such as, I'm dedicating myself to the Turkish existence or how happy is the one who says I am Turkish. And when we look at this education structure from the perspective of Kurds, I think this code from an official CIA report is very indicative because it says the Kurds sense of separate identity has not been significantly reduced by the Turkish government's attempt to co-opt and suppress them. If anything, it's got even stronger and this is something I think we can all personally agree looking at the recent history. So we are analyzing this question with quantitative data where the majority of data comes from historical archives, specifically village-level inventory, district-level village inventories and education sensors. And more specifically, the variables we are using are school enrollment rates, teachers and schools from village inventories and education sensors data we compiled. Of course, these were like archives, but we wrote these different inventories together and digitized them in order to bring them to a form suitable for quantitative analysis. The second data we are using is the Kurdish insurgents data set, which is an original data set made by Ganesh Tezger in 2016, which shows the number of insurgents, number of Kurdish insurgents by birth year. We also use an original at city census. Unfortunately, there is no official data in Turkey on the ethnicity of settlements or neighborhoods and therefore we are using an original village-level census data that lists the names of all religious minorities settlements in Turkey. And finally, we use village inventories for many control variables such as landless farmer ratio, land genie, or economic development indicators such as tractors and population. And we also use some geospatial controls such as person-to-job villages with road access and person-to-job villages with railway access. I'm not going to go through this model, but basically we are using a two-period fix effects model where the outcome is the number of insurgents at primary school age in time T and the unit of analysis is district I and the main independent variable here is S, which indicates the proportion of villages with a school or in an alternative specification teachers per village in district I. And of course X is a number of control variables. Of course, we had to identify Kurdish districts in order to see the effect of education on insurgency participation. As I said, we used our original ethnicity settlement, ethnicity census or let's say village level ethnicity census for this. So we basically identified the districts in which 100% of villages were Kurdish. As you can see, these are indicated in black on this map. And of course, there are also some mixed districts where you have both Kurdish villages and Turkish villages. And therefore we also tried alternative specifications for our sample to form our sample. And finally, I also want to show you that when it comes to the expansion of schools to ethnic minority settlements, we see an enormous increase between 50s and 60s, which is the two time periods we are covering in our panel data design. And if you pay attention to the purple area here, you will see that the density of schools was highest in the western part of Turkey, while at the end of 60s, you will see that the density is actually highest in Southeastern Turkey, which can give you some ideas about how much education infrastructure expanded to ethnic minority settlements in Southeastern Turkey to Kurdish districts. And I will come to the results. So controlling for all the control variables and district fixed effects, we find that actually the number of schools per village has a positive relationship with the number of insurgents. So basically this means that if the state does school like built schools in half of the Kurdish villages in this district, that will lead to around 60% increase in the number of insurgents from that district, which is a pretty substantial number. And we also check the effect of teachers, which gave us a similar number, although it has the effect sizes a little smaller, which means like a 40% change for if you send teachers to half of the villages in the district in the strict eye, that will lead to 40% increase in the number of insurgents. And finally, we tried these results with alternative specifications. For example, we mean in one of them, our sample included Kurdish majority provinces. In another sample, we included Kurdish majority districts. And in the main sample we are using, we used only Kurdish districts and excluded all the mixed districts and the results didn't change. And this was the same when it comes to the effect of teachers per village. So in conclusion, we can say that centralized education based on national curricula in the national language may create a backlash effect and instigate political exclusion and increase insurgency participation. This is what we find here. And more importantly, I think it shows that the effect of educational insurgency is not necessarily negative or pacifying. Maybe this may be changing by context or setting, but we can definitely say that because it operates through multiple mechanisms, education doesn't necessarily lead to a decrease in insurgency participation and it can even lead to an increase in insurgency participation according to these numbers. Thank you.