 Hi everyone. I'm Kathleen Hicks. I run the international security program here at CSIS. It's great to have such a wonderful crowd here despite the two-hour delay of the federal government today and the massive snowstorm you all had to endure to get here, so I'm glad you made it through the melting half-inch of snow that we had here in Washington. It's with great pleasure that I'm here today to introduce General David Rodriguez. This is our first military strategy forum of 2015, and with great thanks to Rolls-Royce North America for making this series possible, we couldn't hope to begin with a better representative from the Uniform Services. General Rodriguez says, I think everyone here knows, is the commander of U.S. Africa Command, U.S. AFRICOM, which is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, so maybe a little more snow there than here. And of course, AFRICOM has been at the center of many, many of the major issues affecting the world in this past year, from Ebola to Libya to Mali to Somalia, and that's just the very northern part of this very large continent for which General Rodriguez has responsibility for the U.S. military. He has served really at every level of the military and in many different components from the Joint Staff to OSD to the combatant commands, and of course, having served in Afghanistan as well. Without further ado, let me introduce General Rodriguez. Thank you, Kathleen. Good afternoon to all of you, and thanks for the invitation to speak to you today about U.S. Africa Command's contributions to U.S. security efforts in Africa. Africa continues to present a broad and complex spectrum of opportunities and challenges to the United States, our allies, and partners. Several factors contribute to this complexity. Africa is diverse. The continent contains a mere 54 countries and over 800 ethnic groups and more than one billion people that speak over 1,000 languages. Africa is young and growing. 41 percent of Africans are under the age of 15, in contrast to 15 percent here in the United States. Based on current demographic trends, in 2050, one out of four people on the planet will live in Africa. Africa's security environment is dynamic and uncertain. Many African nations are challenged by weak leadership, ineffective governance, and systemic corruption. These factors combine to fuel instability that can be exploited by criminal networks and violent extremist organizations. 15 U.S. embassies and consulates designed as high risk or high threat are in the Africa Command area of responsibility, and nine in the United Nations 16 peacekeeping missions are located in Africa, with nearly 80 percent of U.N. peacekeeping forces deployed on the continent in support of these missions. And, of course, Africa is immense three and a half times the size of the United States. Infrastructure is limited across much of the continent, presenting both opportunities and challenges for development and security. Looking across this vast and complex landscape, our African partners and the international community face several challenges. In East Africa, security in Somalia has improved, but al-Shabaab continues to present an acute threat to U.S. and allied interests. In North Africa, violent extremist groups are building capacity and exploiting poorest borders to train and move fighters. Boko Haram is an increasing threat in Nigeria, and has expanded its reach into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Maritime criminals remain active in the Gulf of Guinea, threatening critical maritime trade routes, and Central Africa faces sectarian violence and destabilizing activities of armed rebel groups. Despite these challenges, Africa abounds with opportunities. The continent contains tremendous resource wealth, eight of the world's 15 fastest-growing economies, and a growing middle class. The potential for future economic engagement and investment is bright. African partners are demonstrating increasing willingness and capacity to lead counterterrorism, peacekeeping, maritime security, and disaster response efforts. We are expanding our cooperation with allies and African partners based on trust, shared interests, and mutual responsibility. All these factors combine to present a complex and dynamic operating environment for Africa command and our partners. Our mission is to advance U.S. national interest by disrupting transnational threats, protecting U.S. personnel and facilities, preventing and mitigating conflict, and building defense capabilities in order to promote regional stability and prosperity. Accomplishing our mission supports our national strategy by denying adversaries the opportunity to plan and carry out catastrophic attacks against U.S. territory, helping to ensure the security of the global economic system, building secure, confident relationships with reliable allies, and protecting American citizens abroad, and where possible by expanding universal values and support of fundamental human rights and freedoms. We accomplish our mission by building partner capacity, enabling allies and partners, and one appropriate taking unilateral action. We work closely with multinational and interagency partners to align strategies, leverage and support allies and partners, and ensure we effectively support comprehensive U.S. government efforts led by our U.S. ambassadors. We work closely with other combatant commands, especially U.S. European Command, Central Command, Spential Operations Command, and Transportation Command. Five immediate priorities guide Africa command's efforts on the continent. The first is countering the violent extremism and enhancing stability in East Africa. Our East African partners are leading efforts to neutralize al-Shabaab in Somalia and increase opportunities for the Somali government and people to make progress in state formation, developing a sense of national identity, and building national institutions including security forces that are representative of the population. Off the coast of Somalia, collaborative efforts of military forces, international organizations, and the private sector continue to sustain maritime security progress made over the past few years, and no ships were successfully hijacked by pirates in the region last year. Several years of modest U.S. security assistance in East Africa, including advice and assistance to military forces, have helped our partners gradually strengthen their capacity and cooperation to conduct peacekeeping operations and counter violent extremist organizations in Somalia. In the past year, with advice and assistance from U.S. forces, African Union forces have improved their operational planning and demonstrated increased proficiency on the battlefield. They have seized key terrain from al-Shabaab, reducing the group's ability to train, conduct operations, and resource itself. The African Union mission in Somalia, the United Nations mission, and our East African partners have improved their coordination and planning for offensive and stability operations. U.S. forces also conducted successful unilateral operations against al-Shabaab leaders this year, including its former emir Ghadani and his intelligence chief. Although al-Shabaab is weaker today than it was a year ago, it continues to conduct attacks against regional and western targets in East Africa, and is continuing to try to rebuild additional operation capacity if given the opportunity. Over the past year, al-Shabaab has planned or executed increasingly complex and lethal attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. These attacks are aimed at impeding Somali's political development and discouraging African Union mission in Somalia troop contributing countries from sustaining security commitments to Somalia. Increasing military pressure on al-Shabaab and strengthening governance in Somalia will help to finally neutralize this group. Our multinational coordination will be necessary to increase pressure on al-Shabaab and to accelerate the Somali federal government's progress in governance and development. The federal government of Somalia's ability to hold terrain, govern effectively, and deliver services to the Somali people will ultimately determine its ability to sustain security gains and stabilize the country. Our second immediate priority is countering violent extremism and enhancing security in North and West Africa. Our allies and partners are increasing their capacity and collaboration in addressing security threats across the Maghreb, Sahel, and the Lake Chad basin regions. Conditions in Libya have declined significantly in recent months as competition between rival to brook and Tripoli-based governments and allied militias have fueled conflict and disrupted oil exports. Libya's insecurity has negative consequences for its people, its neighbors, Europe's southern flank, and our peace and security objectives in the Middle East. Foreign fighters, arms, and illegal migrants are flowing from and through Libya, supplying fighters to the Syrian conflict and stressing North African partners and southern European allies. In Mali, security has declined and the North's terrorist organizations have taken advantage of reduced military pressure and the flow of arms and fighters from Libya to continue to strengthen their capacity. Terrorist organizations and insurgent groups have increased attacks against Mali and French and United Nations forces in the northern part of the country. While security has declined in Libya and Mali, the international community's coordination in addressing regional security challenges has increased. Algeria and Morocco are building the capacity of NATO partner African countries. Algeria, Tunisia, Niger, Chad, and France have strengthened counterterrorism and border security efforts, often in collaboration with partners. NATO countries are working together more closely to address threats to Europe's southern flank, including foreign fighter flows emanating from North Africa. U.S. engagement and assistance have facilitated the strengthening of regional dialogue, partnerships, and capacity, and we have enabled partners to disrupt criminal and terrorist threat networks. We have also helped partners prepare for deployment to multinational peacekeeper operations in Mali, where 11 African countries are contributing to military forces, contributing military forces to the U.N. mission. Africa Command is also working with U.S. European Command and Central Command to monitor transregional threats, including foreign fighter flows associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other terrorist organizations. Africa Command has also supported law enforcement operations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to help bring the justice to perpetrators of violence against American citizens and interests. Last year, U.S. forces captured Ahmed Abu Katala and Abu Anas al-Libi. Abu Katala is a suspected ringleader in a 2012 attack against U.S. facilities in Benghazi that resulted in the deaths of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans. Al-Libi, who recently died in custody, was suspected of planning the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Although the security situation in Libya has limited the international community's ability to support the development of security institutions and forces, we continue to look for opportunities to constructively influence the situation in Libya and the region. As conditions improve, we will be prepared to support the development of Libyan defense capacities and executive functions generating forces and operating forces. In Nigeria, Boko Haram is conducting increasingly complex and lethal attacks aimed at terrorizing civilians and destabilizing a government that is also facing significant political violence and economic challenges heightened by falling oil revenues. In the past year, we have continued to partner with the Nigerian military in areas like counterterrorism and maritime security and have increased information sharing to support Nigerian military efforts against Boko Haram. In addition to its campaign of violence in Nigeria, Boko Haram is expanding its activities into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. We are working with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria and allies to support regional efforts against Boko Haram and to facilitate the development of the late Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force. Our third priority is supporting the State Department and protecting U.S. personnel and facilities. As I mentioned earlier, 15 of the State Department's high risk, high threat diplomatic posts are located in the area of responsibility. To increase our ability to preposition forces closer and reduce response times when there are indications and warnings of crisis, we are developing additional infrastructure at cooperative security locations in Africa. Our response forces include Army and Air Force elements staged in Djibouti, a Marine Corps crisis response force and fleet anti-terrorism support teams based in Spain, and other crisis response forces stationed in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. With limited infrastructure, with limited forces and infrastructure, and a large area of responsibility, we are working with allies and partners to maximize our adaptability and flexibility. We are also repositioning and flexibly using intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets so that they can be utilized more effectively to increase our situation awareness and support operations. In the last year, Africa Command and our component commands have reinforced the security of U.S. embassies in both South Sudan and Libya, supported the departure of U.S. and allied personnel from Libya, and provided security to enable the resumption of U.S. embassy operations in the Central African Republic. Our fourth priority is enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Regional partners are gradually strengthening their capacity and cooperation in addressing maritime security challenges. The scope of maritime threats makes regional cooperation and interoperability essential to effective maritime surveillance and interdiction efforts. We are helping partners strengthen their capacity and interoperability through multinational training programs like the African Partnership Station, combined operations like the AFRICOM Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, and regional maritime exercises that have included have included significant participation by European and South American navies, as well as the private sector. We continue to support regional maritime security initiatives and to look for opportunities to complement civilian initiatives that address the root causes of maritime crime by strengthening governance and promoting economic development. Our fifth priority is countering the Lord's Resistance Army or the LRA. Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan have contributed some forces to the African Union Regional Task Force against the LRA, which has led military efforts to reduce the group's safe havens, capture key leaders, and promote defections. The African Union Regional Task Force, with advice and assistance from U.S. forces, has made significant progress in weakening the LRA and reducing its ability to threaten civilian populations. As the combined result of efforts by military forces, civilian agencies, and non-governmental organizations, the LRA no longer threatens regional stability and its capacity to harm civilian populations has been greatly diminished. Today, there are approximately 200 LRA fighters remaining in communities in the LRA-affected areas are better prepared to respond to attacks from the LRA and other armed groups. It is unclear whether the LRA is likely to rebuild, but any potential regrowth will be gradual and will face local populations that are more resistant and resilient to attacks. You may have noted that I continue to reference our efforts to build partner capacity and enable allies and partners in conjunction with all of our immediate priorities. Now, T. Lawrence once wrote about working with partners that it is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly than to do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way, and our time is short. Eighty years after his death, Lawrence's advice still makes sense. Sustainable security in Africa depends on African nations and regional organizations who can develop the institutional, operational, and tactical capacities to provide for their own security on an enduring basis. Our activities should account for this principle in every way. Our recent activities in West Africa supporting the U.S. Agency for International Development and their Ebola response demonstrate how we can address mutual threats with partners while simultaneously building relationships and capacity. Nearly 3,000 Department of Defense personnel, including civilians and contractors, deployed the Operation United Assistance last fall to support the Liberian government and USAID in addressing the complex humanitarian emergency associated with the largest Ebola epidemic in history. Under the superb leadership of Major General Williams and U.S. Army Africa, followed by Major General Valesky and the 101st Airborne Division Air Assault, the men and women of Joint Force Command United Assistance provided communication and coordination support, logistics, engineering, and health worker training. By supporting efforts to control the epidemic, Liberian and U.S. personnel helped save the lives, helped save lives, and potentially averted a global health crisis. When called to assist, the Liberian military responded in a tremendous manner, reflecting Liberian leadership and the impact of modest and sustained U.S. investments in building the capacity of the Liberian armed forces. The U.S. military's response demonstrated our flexibility and capabilities step in when others cannot and ensured that critical initial gaps were filled while civilian partners built their capacities. I believe the deployment of U.S. forces boosted the confidence and courage of others to join the effort and help to catalyze the robust international response required to turn the tide of the epidemic. Joint Forces Command United Assistance has successfully transitioning military support tasks to civilian partners as they develop sufficient capacity. We're also retaining and building capabilities that will allow our regional partners to respond more effectively to future health crises and humanitarian disasters. I'd like to wrap up by noting that as we look to the future, Africa's significance to U.S. national interests of security, prosperity, international order, and values are likely to continue to grow. Comprehensive and multinational approaches will be required to advance our enduring interests. We will continue to sharpen our prioritization, aligning our resources to strategy, and seek ways to enhance our operational flexibility as we make informed decisions to minimize risks and further the national interests of the United States and our allies and partners. Thank you again for the opportunity to speak to you today, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thanks for all that. Hopefully the microphone's on. There we go. You know, you were the third AFRICOM commander, and when AFRICOM was firsted up, I think it's fair to say there had been some concern about whether AFRICOM denoted the beginning of a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. That was something people worried about on the continent, but it was also something people worried about in the development community and maybe even in the diplomacy community. When you took over and as you've encountered the job to date, do you find that those suspicions are still there? And if so, how do you best approach them? And if you think they're have really dissipated, why do you think that is? I don't see that information nearly as much as we used to. I think it's dissipated for a couple of reasons. First off, you know, when we split from UCOM, it really changed the ability of the U.S. military to focus its energy. And I think also our relationships that we've developed over the years and the way we've gone about supporting the U.S. embassies as well as the countries themselves and supporting them really where they need it, not where we want to do it. I think that has led to a change in attitude from almost all the players that you mentioned. What do you think is AFRICOM's compare of advantage? What do you provide to the U.S. government and then also to partners and allies that really make you a valued partner? Well, I think the things that we bring the most are the capabilities and capacities that the people in the African countries need most. So I think it's really, it's their demand that has driven anything that we're able to do. On the African continent and in most armies throughout Africa as well as navies and marine and air forces, you know, they usually need the same type of help. It's in command and control, intelligence, logistics, mobility, specialty skills like counter IED or special operations forces. And again, it's their demand that drives what we do and how we conduct our business. And you know, we like to say that, you know, first it's a host nation plan, then it's a country team plan, then it's our plan. You mentioned capabilities and capacity. You have an extremely busy AOR and yet it's also one in theory where we have less priority maybe than, for instance, in the Asia Pacific in terms of military force. So I'm sure that creates some asset squeezes for you. What are the areas where you feel the most concern about what you're able to bring to bear versus what that demand signal is? Most of it is built around the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. When you're in a theater that doesn't have a long, you know, well developed network of information. So that's one continuing challenge. But the other important part I think to make is we do this with a very small number of people in just the right places. And again, if we're filling the demands that they need, we're looked at as value added and you know, helping them where they need it most. So that's why I think that they appreciate the most. You also mentioned in your remarks, of course, the support to the State Department and Embassy Security. I think that was your third priority. And that's something that's always been there, of course, but in a post Benghazi environment. It's a real challenge for area like Africa. The distances are unimaginable really for most people. Can you talk a little bit about some of those challenges and maybe some specific either countries or situations that worry you the most in terms of your ability to provide that support? Well, as you can imagine, just in the last year, we had the challenges in both South Sudan and then Libya itself. Again, so I think there's the Defense Department and the order that they put out to protect U.S. personnel facilities across the world has given us some flexibility where we can adjust and access forces. So we have a force sharing agreement with the European Command so we can share those forces much quicker than we had in the past, as well as the one for the new normal where we actually accessed CENTCOM forces in South Sudan. Plus, as I mentioned, the cooperative security locations are places where we can move those forces to get closer to the challenging areas that change every day. And we're really, as we continue to watch the security situation as you can imagine right now, Nigeria is up on the list just based on the situation. And it's flexible and, like I said, the indication and warnings lead us to where we need to go. And the close cooperation and coordination with the State Department and Diplomatic Security, I think, has enhanced our ability to support them. On Ebola, which obviously has been a high priority mission for the United States in the last year, seems to be that the crisis has largely passed, the immediate crisis has largely passed, but we all know and have known even before Ebola that these kinds of health security threats are going to emerge more and more in a globalized world. What do you think are the lessons that you take away from your experience with Ebola that can be applied in the future in terms of the U.S. military's role and assistance? Well, I think that, you know, we were called in to bring some unique capabilities in a rapid manner that, you know, people need to help with again. And I think that was about the communications and the coordination. It was about engineering skills, especially out in the field and the distant stations. It was about logistic support, again, one that's always needed in the African nations. And then lastly, on training. So I think that those were hugely important to getting everything moving forward there. And then, you know, USAID and the Liberian military and the Liberian leadership really did a great job of, you know, informing the people how to protect themselves and everything. And that was probably the number one thing that made the biggest difference. Is there a long-term capacity building that AFRICOM assists with maybe in support of USAID on the health security structure side inside these countries? Or is that really over to the civilians? It's mainly led by the civilians. But yes, we have a responsibility to help with the African partners. And we have a capacity building program for all of West Africa now to help give them the capacity to better handle these things. It was also interesting, as you can imagine, the Liberian military, which I talked about, has had a long-term relationship with us and built into about a 2,500 man force. And, you know, they learned to do infantry skills very, very quickly and everything. But about three months before the Ebola broke out, I was talking to their chief staff, the Air Force, and he said, we need help in logistics and engineering. So when I was down there talking to him, I said, you're going to get a crash course in both those things. But the investment we had made over those, you know, 12 or 13 years of being working for them was really paid off and everything. They're very, very well disciplined, very well respected, and they did a pretty doggone good job figuring out logistics and engineering and, you know, that capacity is now there now. That's great. With all the crises that you've had in the time since you've been in Africa, are there issues that you feel like we're overlooking and we haven't had the time to develop as well as we should in terms of dealing with security threats or emergent threats on the African continent? Are there things maybe not keeping you up at night? It's maybe too strong, but issue areas where you really wish you could dig even further if not for the constant demand on your time. Well, I think the challenges are in places that we, you know, can't understand or see what's going on well enough. So when you look at some of the challenges that the whole international community is facing in Libya right now or in Nigeria, those are the challenging situations that you always wish you could know more about. And that gets in some ways to skill sets, too, because I would imagine part of that is, you know, your ability to have the systems in place that the U.S., maybe it's U.S. military, but also U.S. government writ large that the military can tap into that has the cultural expertise, it has the knowledge. How do you think we're doing as both inside the military and then more broadly in terms of having the right skill sets available? Well, I think we're learning a lot and we're learning quickly and we're also tapping into a great bunch of allies and partners as well as host nations who, you know, understand it better than anybody. Yeah, and actually you've probably had as much experience in Africa working with the French, the Brits and others as maybe the Yukon commander has had. How has that experience been? Do you feel that the United States and its allies have common cause in Africa in their dealings? And is there some advantage to be had for us working together? Oh, yeah, I think we do have a common cause, as I mentioned, they're worried about terrorism on their southern flanks, illegal immigration, drugs, and yeah, we have a very, very common cause and I think we have great relationships. First of all, the relationships have been built over many, many years of fighting in the counter-terrorism challenges that we've all faced. And when we go around to see all our, especially the southern European partners and everything, they're very interested in working with us. They do a great job and we've seen, we have several multinational planning efforts with our partners, both African as well as European, where, you know, rather than, you know, each going our own way, we all work together to make sure the plan is consistent. We're all working together. And I think the relationship that we have with both the French and the Brits is as good as it's ever been in a place like Africa. There has been over the past, say, five years, some folks who get worried about the Chinese, for instance, in Africa and into the Western Hemisphere. But in the Ebola case, there have been some opportunities to, again, have common cause with the Chinese. Are there other examples where you found that they've participated in several of the UN missions? So they participate in UN peacekeeping missions. And of course they do a significant amount of infrastructure development, which helps everybody in Africa. And off the coast of Somalia, they also participated in some of the maritime security things that have improved that over there too. Well, very good. I'm going to open it up to questions now. And as the mics come around, please make sure you make it a question. And we're going to ask for your name and affiliation. So let's see. We've got some mics around the room. We're going to start right over here. Good afternoon, General. Thank you, Kath. Eric Lecklin from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And sir, we had the pleasure of serving together in Afghanistan when you're IJC commander. My question is about the lessons that you learned from that experience in Afghanistan and how you think about your role as combatant commander. If you think back to the experience of ground forces command when you were IJC commander, and we were working with the Afghans to establish a three star operational command that really didn't fit in the history of their way of doing command and control. There's some evidence now post-2014 in full transition that ground forces command will fade into the sunset, and Afghan support is no longer there for that command. In retrospect, now in your new role, how do you look back on that experience? And was it the right call at the time? What are you learning from it now as combatant commander? Well, I think the most important thing is to first, to totally understand the situation and understand what's best for them. And I think that whatever nation we're working with, they usually have a way of doing business and everything. And it's right for them. So we ought to support that as best we can. And again, we have not only the host nations, but also a bunch of allies who understand that because of their long history in Africa and everything. So I think the lesson learned is really you have to do what's right for those organizations in those countries. Okay. Thank you. Let's see, we've got a couple over here. I've got one way in the back over here. Thank you. Thank you very much. My name is Ni Akwete. General, I'm struck by the contrast between support for Nigeria to fight Boko Haram and what's going on with ISIS. It seems to me Nigeria is not getting as much help as you would think given that Boko Haram has been there for five years. And with the Chibok girls, several international powers said they will help. So can you talk about why we don't see as much support and why the fight against Boko Haram from the international front is not as vigorous as we might expect? Thank you. Well, I think there's a tremendous effort to combat Boko Haram in the multinational task force that I've said is getting built. And the efforts in all four of the nations, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, there have been some long-term capacity building efforts that are helping out. In Nigeria, we have continued to build their naval security apparatus that's going very, very well. And we have expanded our intelligence and information sharing efforts with them over the challenges with Boko Haram. And as you know, they canceled one of our latest training efforts. And we continue to look at ways to constructively support the Nigerian military and their efforts and continue to work with all the nations around there. Because again, it's a regional challenge and it's going to continue to be that way. And we hope that that gets better and we hope we start to train and equip more more. Okay, very good. Let's see. I've got one right here. Thank you, sir. Lieutenant Colonel John Oakley, National War College. My question, sir, is really about natural resources. And obviously from rare earths to precious metals, water, timber, the animals, things like that. Do you see a role for AFRICOM in terms of a part of a U.S. strategy dealing with the natural resources in Africa? The part that we've been helping out is both in counter illicit trafficking and helping building the partner's capacity to secure those things. But that's really what we work and I'll focus on so we don't get out of that lane in that situation. Okay? Thank you. Come back over this way. I've got one back here. Do I have a mic? Thank you. My name is Hermes. I just wanted to know if you envision in your fight against terrorism in Africa a component, an ideological component, if you envision to fight them through ideas, through strategies that speak about their way of thinking? Yeah, I think that the challenge against the ideology is a huge one. And we support our interagency partners and really that's normally led by the State Department. And we support those efforts and compliment those efforts. But countering the ideology is a big part of how we have to counter the terrorism effects overall. What are your thoughts on how the relative roles of government versus non-government sectors in that realm? Because it strikes me that anything that comes out of an official U.S. government counter ideology campaign is already suspect from many folks. How do you think about how to bring in other sectors and what role the military can play in that? Well, I think a huge example that quite frankly has what was done against the counter LRA. I mean, the efforts of the non-governmental organizations, the efforts of international aid organizations was a huge part of that. And what we did was help try to support those efforts and try to expand those messages that those communities were working very hard to do to help take care of the people that were taken advantage of by the LRA. So I think you're right, Kath. I mean, it's really the host nation and the people and the leadership. And another positive note was really the piece about the Ebola in that it was the Liberian leadership that got all the way down to the local leaders who passed the messages out about how to best protect yourself. And I think it's the same thing. It was really a thing, a situation in the LRA about protecting their own selves from the LRA. And I think that's how we best do that. That's how the interagency and State Department leads that effort. I mean, it's not coming from us because, as you mentioned, it's really got to come from the political and military leadership of those nations. Great. Okay, let's see. I've got one right here. Oh, the microphone's coming. Thank you very much. My name is Mohammed Bashir I come from Eduguri Borno State, Northeast Nigeria, the epicenter of the Boko Haram crisis. We know how it feels being from that part of the country in Nigeria. The international community has closed its eyes. No international reporters are there. No media is there to take the news of what is happening around Northeast Nigeria to the world. As of today, most of the people in that area live in the cities. It seems like the world has abandoned that area to the Boko Haram. Boko Haram, by its definition, means Western education is seen. Today, most of the pupils, students, and those who are interested in going to school are no longer going to school because they are displaced. They live in centers like Meduguri, which is currently also under attack. For the past seven months or so or last five years, no educational activity is taking place in that region. The government of Nigeria is not taking any concern or paying attention to that. All those pupils and students who are losing quality education time are no longer in school. So it looks as though that area is being left for the Boko Haram to succeed. So let me just stop you there. So I think the question is, is the international community, again, the question is, is the international community paying attention sufficiently to the crisis that's going on in Nigeria? I think that the international community understands very well what's happening in northern Nigeria and has seen the negative impacts of Boko Haram, which has grown over the last six years. And I think that several of our international partners are working with Nigerians to support their efforts to combat this threat. But I totally agree that it has to be much more effective all the way around to change what's going on there. The negative impact on the people, as you mentioned, the number of people displaced is just staggering and continues to go in the wrong direction. And I think it's going to take a huge international and multinational effort there to change the trajectory of that, which continues to go in the wrong direction. I think the Nigerian leadership and the Nigerian military are going to have to really improve their capacities to be able to handle that. And I think that they're all going to need help to do that. And I hope that they let us help them more and more. Sorry to have interrupted you. I was going to ask, what are your priorities for working with your Nigerian military partners? What are you trying to get them? Well, first of all, at the head of list, really, is a real strategy, a long-term interagency coherent strategy to change what's going on in there. The initial challenges that the Nigerian military had in their response was not working very effectively, which actually, in some places, actually made it worse. So we're working very hard with them to help build their capacity, to build a comprehensive strategy across the board, not just military. Because as you said, it's about economic, it's about education, it's about medical efforts, it's about taking care of the people up in the north road in a way that's representative of how everybody gets taken care of in Nigeria. And then, of course, the intelligence effort on what their military needs to be able to do that is a big focus of effort. We've built some capacity at the national level, and hope to build some more capacity down at the local level to do that. Hi, Scott Masionium, a reporter with Inside the Pentagon. I was just wondering in the past how have you been affected by sequestration, and if sequestration were to return in 2016, what kind of programs or other things within your command do you see being affected by that? When the sequestration hit, of course, we got less forces to participate in all of our programs. We had to cancel several exercises, and then some of the capacities that we had been using before were reduced. So, just like the whole Defense Department, if sequestration comes back, it's going to be tough on all of us, and we'll have to change our strategies and readjust what we're doing. Thank you. Good afternoon, General. William Watson with the Security Association for the Maritime Industry. In West Africa, the issue of commercial crime and piracy against commercial vessels operating in the Gulf of Guinea, I was wondering if you could address the strategies being implemented by the coastal states and the reticence of those same states to allow the industry to use the same private security teams that have been successful against Somali piracy? Yeah, great question, sir. Thank you. We have first of all, as far as bringing all those partners together, we do that through multiple capacity building efforts, exercises, and as I mentioned, the exercises we do in the Gulf of Guinea include both European as well as South American navies. We also have brought in many of the civilians and the energy sector who also talk about the issues. We're building the capacity of many of those nations to build Maritime Operations Center and help their capacity to do lawful see-going seizures of both people as well as contraband, and then I think bringing all them together and also getting some of the bigger partners to help each other, that is starting to take shape and I think having a positive effect. And then lastly, we have shared the lessons learned and the positive effects that were attained over off of the Somalia Coast, which included several industry best practices, as you mentioned, and working on them to develop those same type of agreements. Some of the challenges, of course, just on the Gulf of Guinea that you don't have on the east is the number of countries you have to get agreed to do them, but that's what we'll continue to work on and everything. I'll also say that the Secretary of Navy has an international cease symposium each year up at Newport, Rhode Island, and this year he dedicated a half a day to the region, which brought all the regional chief of naval operations together to talk about the Gulf of Guinea. And we've developed and helped several of the West African nations develop a maritime strategy and how they should go about this. Thank you. Okay, and I've got one all the way to the right here. Hi, General Kevin Baron from Defense One. Back on Nigeria, short of a multinational, international, large-scale effort that you just described, what could be done or is there any is there any middle ground there? There's a lot of questioning of where is the U.S., where is the West as, especially in the last couple of weeks that that region and Boko Haram just get more and more embroiled in violence. What can be done that's something that's short of that large scale, which honestly just sounds like coin all over again to change something there? Well, I think, again, the ones who have to lead this effort are the Nigerian government and everything. I mean, they're going to do the lion's share of their work anyhow, but your question though is really a policy decision on how much people are going to get involved. As you saw, Secretary Kerry has been out there just recently and everything and will continue to participate in the policy discussions as the leadership determines how they're really going to respond and what we can do and what we're willing to do. When you laid out your priorities at the beginning, you sort of walked, I'm simplifying, but you walked sort of from east to west. East to northwest, right? Has that been consistent since your time at AFRICOM or has that shifted over time those priorities? No, that's been pretty consistent since I've been there. That's really based on, again, the transnational threats to U.S. and U.S. interests and everything. We're looking at and watching very carefully what happens in Libya, obviously, that could cause that to change here. Okay, let's see. I want to try down the middle again. I've got one right here. Eric Schmidt from the New York Times, General. Just picking up on that last question in terms of Libya, can you perhaps give us some more detailed threat assessment, particularly now that you've got three groups that have claimed affiliation with the Islamic State? Also, do you see General Heftar and his forces as part of the problem or part of the solution in Libya? On the first part, the challenge, of course, is really the two competing governments, the General National Congress as well as the House of Representatives, and then the militias that claim allegiance to one of the other. That continues to be the challenge as you have the competing factions there. It's really a struggle over both power and resources with the oil revenues and the militias and who they really support. The challenges in security, the threat, is mainly focused, from my perspective, around the eastern part of Libya and the north part there and around Benghazi and Dharna. Then there's a challenge in the southwest also around Sebhan. The ISIL piece that you talk about and mentioned is mainly about rebranding for the people that are now supporting the allegiance to ISIL, as well as the movement of some of the facilitators and leaders who are trying to expand ISIL's reach all the way across North Africa. North Africa, as you know, also provides many, many fighters to the security challenges being faced in Syria and Iraq. We continue to work with all the commands, CENTCOM, UCOM as well as SOCOM on the challenges with foreign fighters as well as the host nations who are working very, very hard to prevent those challenges. We also, with the Libyan challenge, working hard with the boarding countries, whether it be Chad or whether it be Tunisia, we're continuing to strengthen their capacities and the border security capacities of all nations surrounding Libya. On General Haftar, we don't really know him well enough to understand where he sits and exactly who's working with him and who's not. That's part of the challenges and everything without the embassy there. We don't have quite the situational understanding we'd like. Our efforts at this point, of course, are focused on the policy and how we can diplomatically get them to start to agree and move forward together. I think the rebranding is taking advantage of the information environment, but what we're worried about is the movement of the facilitators and leaders and then follow that by the movement of arms ammunition explosives that follow the same type of networks. Let's see. How about all the way to the end there? The lady, I'm sorry, you just put your hair, yep, right there. You got it. Hi, sir. Courtney Alban with Inside the Air Force. You mentioned a little bit the demand for ISR and I wondered, can you tell us, are you currently getting the ISR that you need in AFRICOM? And then also, you talked a little bit about flexibility and kind of using the ISR that you are getting in the most effective way. Can you break that down a little bit? How do you most effectively use what you're getting right now? I think that we have on first everybody wants more ISR and always will. So that's never going to change. And I think the flexible piece of it that I mentioned was first has to do with access and locations where we can operate from. So that's got a great deal to do with working with our partners on that. The second is we have a mixture of both manned and unmanned ISR and we use them for different purposes in different locations. So we have extended legs of manned ISR by refueling and things like that to increase our range of flexibility. We're also happy that the Air Force is going to put some extended range tanks on some of them that will help out. It's also help out our capacity and the ranges that we can also, but also reduce the footprint. And that's important too because we don't want to have a footprint that is disruptive to our allies' efforts. Okay. Okay, we're going to take one last question. Let's go right here at the lady in the glasses right here. Hi. Thank you for a great talk today. I'm Bill and Joe Donald. And my question is the African Union standby force is going to be launched this year. What are you hoping to see? What are you hoping to see? Okay. Well, the challenges that the African standby forces have been challenged by us, they've built that capacity is a lot of them are being used. You know, in Somalia, you've got five African nations serving every day. In Somalia, you've got 11, down in the force integration brigade, down in the Democratic Republic of Congo, you've got three. So that's been some of the challenges that the African Union has as they put these together. But they are working hard. Each of the regional economic councils on bringing them together, bringing them the interoperability so that they can command and control and communicate together, as well as the readiness level of the forces. They're continued to be challenged, of course, by resourcing with that. But we're hoping that we'll be able to work with State Department to use some of the African standby force and the readiness money that's coming that the President announced and his new initiative to help equip them a little bit better because they're all stressed because of all the things that they're doing right now. But again, the African standby force is a great concept and the fact that the African nations are working together. So 15 years ago, you wouldn't have seen 11 African nations in another African nation trying to help each other out. So we think that's a positive effect. Okay. Well, General Rodriguez, just from the discussion, your own talk, and then the discussion here, I think it's evident the incredible span that you cover in terms of both territory, but also in terms of issues. So we appreciate you sharing that with us and, of course, taking time out of your day to come here. Please, everyone, join me in thanking General Rodriguez.