 We will start right here on my left with Jean-Claude Cruffaut who is a banker by background and who is now the chairman of the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington. Jean-Claude. Good afternoon, thank you very much. I'll start by apologizing for not wearing a tie. I'm the victim of transit of luggage between two airlines. Good lesson, always take the same airlines, make sure that your luggage follows. Having said that, I will try to be brief and essentially cover three points. First of all, we have the constant, I would say, of the US policies since World War II and we have several periods and several themes. We're all driven by the United States. The first one was the Cold War, you just made a reference to that. That Cold War was specific in a sense that it was purely military. There was no other type of relationship between Russia and the Soviet bloc and the rest of the world. It was purely military, there was no investment, there was no trade. There were two different worlds. The Cold War we're talking about potentially between China and the rest of the world or part of the world is a very different nature. Then the Cold War was followed by the war on terror. The war on terror was a mixed bag and the result was, in a way, and you mentioned Afghanistan. Personally, I think it was a mistake to be in Afghanistan for more than taking care of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and tried regime change. We've seen that the basic failure of the war on terror was the attempt to change regimes and impose a different type of institution, democratic institution on societies and culture that were not ready for that. We can mention that's clearly the case in Afghanistan, that's clearly the case in Iraq, that's the case in Libya and probably the case in Egypt as well. Then followed the Trump period, if you will, and the Trump period was essentially characterized by the fact that I'm quoting someone else. Trump's foreign policy was both immoral and transactional. He had no ideology. Trump had never had any type of ideology. He had, if you will, sort of opt-to-curve reflex. He has fixation. He's a person with narcissists and psychopath type of attitude. I can say some negative things on Trump because I'm also gonna say some positive things about Trump. But the fact of the matter is that Trump, with America first, essentially didn't change fundamentally the relationship with the rest of the world, but the style changed dramatically. And there was this fascination for authoritarian regime. And that was also the fact that he wanted to abolish, go back on some of the engagement that had been taken by previous administration, whether the Paris Accord on climate change or the so-called Joint Cooperative Agreement on the G2PA, which is the nuclear bill, with Iran. So we had this policy, and then there was a change, and then there is the renegotiation of NAFTA with the new Mexican-Canada trade agreement. So that's the first point. The second point is, in spite of the change of administration, there is a continuity of policies in term of foreign relation. And I can only, I refer you to a paper just been published by Richard Haas that I'm sure many of you are familiar with from the Council of Foreign Relations in the last issue of Foreign Affairs, where it basically says there's not much difference between go back to Bush, 43, then Obama, then Trump, then now Biden. Essentially, as you mentioned, there's been no real change in term of the protectionist measures that were taken by the Trump administration, the tariffs that were imposed on China, but also on European product, the limitation that we've seen in term of international trade. These policies have not really been modified substantially. The only thing that you can say, there might be a difference of style, and I'm not even sure of that. And the second point is that we've seen, effectively, that Biden is trying, and you mentioned it for China, Biden is trying to rebuild the relationship, saying we may be in disagreement on all the things, but at least we're in agreement on climate change. And then he sent Kerry to China recently, as you well know, and that was not a big success, to be perfectly honest. So there is some uncertainty about that. The other point that I want to mention is the building frustration that have occurred over the last decade and again, over many presidencies. And we can talk about the percentage of contribution to the NATO budget. The US administration started with Bill Gates, but continued with other administration, during other administration, wants to see at least a contribution of 2% of the members of NATO to the budget. And we're only an average at 0.170, 180. The only two countries that are spending more than 2% are the US and the UK, that explain a number of things. There was also some frustration on the other side. The European final agreement with China, just at the time of the change of administration in Washington in December 2020. And that was not very well received by the administration. On the other hand, on the other hand, you have, as you mentioned, Afghanistan, where clearly the decision and the logistic of the pullback was purely an American decision without any consultation with allies or even the member of the coalition. And the result is what we've seen, which is a complete debacle. So when you put all of that into perspective, you shouldn't be surprised if things are not going well between the different parties to the transatlantic alliance. And the result of that can be seen in some of the things that we've observed recently, the story of the submarines. I'm told that the story of the submarines is largely the fact that the Australian became very well aware of the assertive policy of China and were concerned that the solution brought by the French were not necessarily what was needed. They went to the bridge and the bridge went to the Americans. And then happened what you want to know. I'll finish by just talking briefly about the new Cold War. The new Cold War in my sense does not really exist as a Cold War because the other relations are too important. And they are particularly important, and I'll stop here for China because just two numbers to keep in mind. The import export of goods and services represent 25% of the American GDP and 35% of the Chinese GDP. So the trade relation is much more important for China than for the US. Particularly because the balance between import and import is much more in favor of China. China export, for the US we export about 11%. The Chinese export half of the 35%. So they're much more dependent on that. So I'll stop here and I'll be happy to take questions.