 Good morning I'm David burto. I'm a senior vice president here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on behalf of our President and CEO dr. John. Hamery. I want to welcome you all to this outstanding conference today I'd also like to welcome our viewers on the web We're sorry. You can't be here with us. It's a lot more fun here than it is where you are But we're delighted that you can join us anyway Dr. Hamery is actually disappointed that he's not here this morning to be able to to start this off He's actually in Tokyo on his way to Korea. I'm sure he will come back with a solution and make this entire conference useless exercise in that in thinking but in case he does not We actually have quite an outstanding Line up here today. I'd like to remind you from administrative purposes If you're in the room here to please turn off or silence your cell phones and and other devices So that or if you're not going to silence them turn them up real loud so that when they go off We can know who you are very quickly and and assist you Today's conference strengthening US strategic cooperation with the Republic of Korea with a particular focus on nuclear governance and the North Korea problem is Is a co-hosted conference It's the second in a series that we're doing in collaboration with the East Asia Institute and it's really quite a an honor to be aligned and affiliated with another think tank that is Nonpartisan in its approach and objective in its analysis and we're delighted to be partnering with the East Asia Institute here today The topic we have has really been around for quite some time In fact, you go back almost 64 years to September 26th 1949 that's the day that the US government Announced that we were no longer the sole nuclear power on the planet and we acknowledged that the Soviet Union also had what we then Called atomic bombs Ever since then the question has been how do we manage both as a nation and as a globe? The proliferation of nuclear weapons Nowhere is that issue more focused and important than it is today with the with North Korea So our panels today are full of experts. You've got the agenda. I won't go through the whole thing You have a morning panel. You have a break. You have a second panel We have a distinguished luncheon speaker then we close out the day all of it is worthwhile The first two are kind of setting the stage For the last one which will say what we do going forward. So it's really quite a quite an array if you will I also want to thank President Lee of the East Asia Institute and Chairman Hoffer their partnership in co-hosting this event But in addition, it's important to recognize one other Contributor, you know, we're a not-for-profit organization, but that does not mean we're pro-loss So we actually do have to have funding and it's with the generous support of Samsung Electronics America That this platform event in this series is made possible and we're very grateful to Samsung for that support if you will I'd like to invite Chairman Ha up to make some additional opening remarks Young Sun Ha is the chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute He's also an emeritus professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University He has a long and distinguished career both as an academic and as a proponent For cooperation and the advancement of civilization on the Korean Peninsula Chairman How would you like to come up, please? Thank you very much On behalf of East Asia Institute as a co-organizer of these meetings I would like to say thanks to the CSIS For the excellent arrangement of today's conference and ROK us strategy cooperation with special emphasis on the nuclear governance and North Korean problems I also would like to welcome all the participants of this meeting The first topic we will discuss today as Mutual efforts for strengthening ROK US nuclear cooperation as we all know both governments Agreed recently two years extension of ROK US one to three agreement However to avoid another two years extension of this arrangement. It is urgent to have an imaginative and also constructive discussion for the idea of win-win strategy Both countries and three major issues first We need further discussions on nuclear fuel cycle management including future oriented development proliferation resistant pyro processing technology and The long-term reliable supply of enriched uranium for the domestic and exported ROK nuclear power plants Second we have to solve together a new equation of competition and cooperation and the global nuclear business Constructing more than 200 nuclear power plants over the world in the next several decades Third we need to put together collective wisdom on the development of the sophisticated mechanism Global regional inter-Korean and domestic governance for non proliferation It is clear that three major questions We have to answer is not an easy homework But I do believe today's conference will contribute to opening the window opportunity for strengthening ROK US nuclear proliferation the The second topic is North Korean problems After the missile launch in last December and third nuclear test in February this year Kim Jong-un government announced the new strategic line of concurrently development of nuclear arsenal and economy in March third 31st it is not yet clear To decipher the nature of Kim Jong-un's new strategic line in comparison with his father's military military first policy However, because of the incompatibility of economic development with nuclear weapons and the minister non-negotiable non-proliferation policies of us, China and South Korea Kim Jong-un's new strategic line will face the risk of vegetable state It means that the only survival strategy will be Another new two-track strategic line of security and economy without nuclear weapon under the current situation we have to share the in-depth analysis of North Korean Kim Jong-un's two-track strategic line and also collaborate together to Produce the co-evolution strategy of relative relevant countries South Korea, United China and other major powers for the beginning of North Korea's new strategic line of Security and economy without nuclear weapon Finally, I believe that right after the successful summit meeting between two countries Today's conference will contribute to Developing ideas for father's training strengthening ROK US strategy cooperation. Thank you Thank You, Dr. Ha that is a nice Opening for today's Meeting I'm Sharon squasoni. I direct the proliferation prevention Program here at CSIS. I'm actually standing in for dr. Victor Chah who is right now At Georgetown University. They have some graduation ceremonies, but he's going to be joining us for lunch. So I'm standing in for him, but this first panel Is a terrific one. We're going to talk first about South Korean nuclear policy and then The implications for us South Korean nuclear cooperation We have three terrific speakers followed by two discussants, and I'm going to just very briefly introduce them We'll have 10 to 15 minutes from each speaker five to ten minutes from the discussants And then we'll open it up to the floor for your questions So our first speaker is dr. Sango sheen who is with Seoul National University By the way, you have everyone's bio in your packet Dr. Sheen has a lot of experience actually in us think tanks Both at the east-west center from the Brookings institution and IFPA up in Cambridge And we were last together at a panel in Seoul, I think At the Asan Institute. He's going to be talking about North Korean nuclear crisis and the South Korean nuclear policy Dr. Sheen will be followed by Dr. Bangun Joon who's a professor at the Korean National Diplomatic Academy and Dr. Joon has Held a lot of different government in positions inside and outside government And you may know him from his work at particularly at the keto New York headquarters for several years Following dr. Joon is Tom Moore who is the deputy director at the proliferation prevention program We're very excited to he joined us in March And for those of you who know him he was a professional senior professional staff member on the Center for relations committee has a lot of Experience dealing with nuclear cooperation agreements as well as many other Defense and security related topics Following Tom. We have two discussants dr. Chesham Chun Who is? Also at Seoul National University He's on the advisory committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and trade and the Ministry of reunification And following dr. Chun is will Toby Who almost needs no introduction he's a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for science and international affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and prior to joining Belfer Will was the deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at NNSA at DOE as well as having held positions at the National Security Council staff, so I'm gonna get out of the way and give the floor over to our first speaker dr. Thank You so Thank You very much Coming into this session in the morning Today I'm going to talk about I'm not going to talk about by the way one two three agreement My colleague will talk about it later on But I'm this morning. I'm going to talk about some kind of it's not that South Korea nuclear policy per se is more like a debate or small controversy In the aftermath of North Korea's certain nuclear tests that is February that is there is a small voices emerging voices maybe But maybe if South Korea has to think about our own nuclear Development not in terms of peaceful energy, but in terms of also welcome as a kind of tip for tap for the North Korea's nuclear program so it's My conclusion at the end would be it's not a major opinion or It's a really the major debate in Korea at the moment But still there's a some growing concern in the United States about that comment or statement made by some Opinion leaders in South Korea, so I'm going to talk about that issue this morning So but before that if I may I'd like to show you some general public sense about What they how they perceive about recent North Korean nuclear development and also in seeing Tension on the Korean Peninsula, so first this one was done by the Gallup in the right in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear test and as you can see here this people says Perceived is a major threat to Korean Peninsula and the second line is quite interesting as many Reporters already talked about it in the right immediate after most of all the test when they ask so what do you think? Do we have to also think about developing our own nuclear weapon and 64% said yes, so it calls a kind of some alarm bell in this part of world and Then the other some other interesting poll you can just read. I'm not going to Go through all that and the second poll which was done in the height of Kind of nuclear crisis or Korean crisis this March in the aftermath of a UN resolution against that the nuclear test by North Korea North Korean authority really indeed Ratched up is a war matrix saying that they will Again see a fire in Seoul and both Washington They say the armistice is not effective anymore. It's a war situation all kinds of water trick and you may remember really the swath of foreign reporters were gathering into Seoul looking for some trouble and That moment. Yes The first line of many Koreans are worried about There might be a military provocation indeed 46% says yes, but still 47% says no and The others you can read it But and then then months after in April This year again. We also have another Stage of a kind of crisis which was the Kesson the time North Korean authorities Decide to withdraw all its labels from Kesson practically shutting down the Kesson Industrial Park, which was by the way one of the still the only Things that connected both north and south in the midst of all this tension, right? North Korea never touched upon this Kesson even during the Imyeong-Bagwa demonstration the both government made it they Wanted to keep it as a kind of still last line of defense in this continuing crisis on between the two careers and After that again the people said but interestingly enough and if you remember previously They said the military provocation the possibility was 46% but after months still they say it cut down to half only 24% says There will be a kind of North Korean military provocation and the next line is quite interesting Again, the foreign reporters was talking about as if though some you know kind of military Clash imminent, but 95% of Korean said They haven't prepared for anything for kind of any kind of military trouble So there was a quite very kind of different situation in the Korean Peninsula while there is a kind of war Concern and rhetoric going on in the United States people on the Korean play especially South Korea. They say it's just a Business as user. North Korea has done it before. I mean, this is again another round of the just rhetoric We are not ready to pack and leave the country. So this is just a one Set of things on the one hand. Yeah, they're worried about North Korea's nuclear test yet at the same time that The sense of these things going on in the Korean Peninsula is quite complicated and in a way Quite realistic Assessment of situation So in the in this background There's a some people saying that maybe we should think about developing our own. I mean the South Korea to think about possibility of Introducing some kind of nuclear weapon in the Korean and the part of South as People like and that includes some prominent figures like congressman Jeongbong Joon who is a seven-term Congressman and the governing party he was a former presidential candidate or like a journalist Kim Dae-joon He's like a Korean version of Krause-Hemmer so representing very conservative voices in Korean media and So these people are talking about, you know, we should think about seriously about arming ourself as a really kind of Ourself deterrence against North Korea and Some others also says Maybe that's too dangerous. That's way over too much But still maybe we have to really think about redeploying the tactical nuclear weapon With Americans, which was withdrawn in the early 90s and of course the public Paul, you know, not only the Gallup Paul also Asan, which is or by the way established by the congressman MJ Came up with the 66% it's like a 70% Korean people support for nuclear armament and the case for this Nuclear weapon program is like goes like this first of all There's a kind of a doubt about the debate about where we can really trust American commitment on this extended nuclear deterrence and if that we cannot Trust maybe we have to go for our own self for deterrence and also there's all the other Reasonings such as like it could create more leveraging nuclear negotiation with North Korea Or it could really force us to really commit on its own Extended deterrence over Korea or even it can force China to to be much more aggressive and active in this Dissuading North Korea's nuclear program. Those are the some rational behind those And I say there are some fallacy first of all about the concern of US nuclear extended deterrence Which was quite controversial during the Cold War in the European front and I don't think that applies to Korean case because Obviously, North Korea is not so big Union during the Cold War and US. I mean has absolute dominance over this nuclear Parity vis-à-vis North Korea. I mean North Korea nuclear capability They try to make it in the case that they can attack United States with this success of long-range Missile and you know many authorizing nuclear warhead all that but you know experts people believe that still It is years. I mean if not decades away For North Korea from you know being able to do that. I mean attack actually United States with the nuclear weapon So in that case simply US doesn't have that kind of dilemma of you know covering its ally with the nuclear deterrence In fact, it is a quite opposite if there's anything happened if really North Korea crossed the red line We have to South Korea has to worry about the US willingness to use nuclear weapon over this tiny Korean penancella, which was Emphasized by professors like Scott Sagan and Stanford. So in that case, we don't need extra nuclear Or commitment from the US It only damages the alliance partnership. It only creates a more security dilemma by for example Inducing nuclear domino who knows Japan Taiwan and of course it damages our Negotiation leverage vis-a-vis North Korea will use it as a more excuse to deepen their strength in their nuclear development Of course, China. I don't think we'll be very happy about it. So My conclusion is that The simply the nuclear option at the moment South Korea is not an option. I mean and The in that sense It's not useful. It doesn't help at all for both South Korea's national security interest and the US security interest So in that case the people who talks about it So often you should know better about it at the same time the public power the 70 percent I mean 66 percent or 64 percent about you know, so public support It can be also a little bit misleading I should say because I mean the way they asked in the aftermath of a nuclear test Any country will come up with the same kind of public opinion if you are in the same kind of position I mean, it's simply they asked so do you think we have to develop a nuclear weapon? People will say yes most of people under the circumstances at the same time If you make the question like a little bit differently So do you think we have to make a develop our nuclear weapon at the expense of the US out of K alliance? I think the answer would be quite different or if you do the same poll in Two months after right now when people say 95 percent of Korea and says I don't worry about war on the Korean Peninsula It might be quite also different So we should be a little bit careful about you know interpreting those kind of Paul or opinion by those Korean So instead of what we have to do is you know, we have to really build more trust and Come up with you know Common front in dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue rather than Thinking having a second thought about each other's commitment over this issue So in that sense what this of a new administration to park in a says a trust-based politics or trust politics It's really kind of you know It strikes a right note at the moment in in in this US out of K coordination Cooperation on dealing with the new North Korea's nuclear crisis And then not I will stop here and I will be more than happy to talk more about this issue later on. Thank you Thank you so much We'll save questions Until we've heard from all our speakers and discussants so now Thank you Thank you for giving me an opportunity to share my my thoughts on this very important issue In fact, I I used to follow North Korea nuclear issue for a long long time and that did not end You know did not produce good results so and while I was and then While I was somewhat tired of North Korea nuclear issues I thought that this you know US Korea nuclear cooperation is Issue could be very interesting. So I pick up a few years ago and it's not really Coming dead well so far. So I I hope about the eye in in two years We come up with much better results instead of another extension Today my type is US Korea a strategic alliance and how it has each influence on US ROK a nuclear cooperation That is my issue and I I prepared my slide and I will go Over right okay The title is a strategic alliance and the global partnership for nuclear energy and non-proliferation and I will start with the By raising questions. What is that then a strategic alliance? We use this word probably the first time in 2009 when President Lee Myung-bak and the print Obama met Have a summit in Washington and they come up with a joint vision for the alliance of the US and ROK 2009 and it reflects that the Korea's a quite a successful Economic growth and successful democratization and it's a willingness to go abroad so the Alliance alliance changed its scope its relationship and it's a field so the scope was it used to be a Korean peninsula specific in fact against North Korea, but now We are expanding to the region and to the globe and that it was it started with the military alliance But now we are expanding our field of cooperation to much broader area including political economy social culture even cooperation and also the relationship used to be a Unilateral and it is a tutelage and sponsorship, but now it's a more of a mutually beneficial two-way relationship and at that there they said that They are they want to expand their cooperation into the fields of even the civil space cooperation and Clean energy security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but I somewhat doubt that Didn't produce much a concrete result since our space program mostly rely on Russian technology I hope that we could get some when we are testing rocket. We could do you know bottle by US technology, but However that the cooperation space a Civil space program was not quite enough and I hope that the breakthrough in this nuclear energy field could have some spill-off effect the civil space cooperation program and Also, they said that they're going to ready to deal with a lot of global International and international security issues including double-ended proliferation and the human rights issues and now we have a comprehensive a strategic alliance and Adding that comprehensive and also a global partnership. That is what we could hear last A few weeks that when the president of Park Gun-ae came to Washington and and made a speech And also they produced in the summit a joint a declaration on the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the alliance and The Korea was quite happy and I expect the US insane have the same feeling that our 60th success could produce another another life cycle of a successful cooperation in every field. So here they said that We continue to strengthen and adapt our alliance to serve as a linchpin of peace and stability in the Korea Pacific and to meet the security challenges of the 21st century So they they they brought this alliance into the much wider scope and they want to carry the success into the future I I think that that means a lot, but however some in Korean journalists though how they are There was some debate. What is this linchpin and it's different from cornerstone? And I don't know how they are different It used to be you know, you know describing the Japan US alliance as a linchpin now it's a they more or less says about the cornerstones So now people are saying linchpin could be one and the cornerstone could be a few so I don't know and the US ROK alliance includes increasing global partnership So us welcomes allocates leadership and active engagement in the world on the world stage including international fora and they also come up with a lot of fields for the cooperation including ODA climate change energy security, of course including non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy And then it's another a just This strategic a comprehensive strategic alliance comes out of nowhere We have a few reasons and the evidences and the cases of this very mutually beneficial alliance relationship that was witnessed at 2012 so nuclear and nuclear security cooperative Nuclear security summit And also and we are exporting Lightwater reactor to UAE. There was of course A serious cooperation with the United States and we are working together at the six fire talks And the koreas and our forces to iraq and afghanistan and we are somewhat proud that we are participating in US anti-terrorism war and we were also we were somewhat Very well known at the beginning as an it kind of it the first non-western Forces coming to help the United States And also we have FTA and it's a Last year and korea was Quite a strong and active player in a lot of non-proliferation field and I I heard that Korea the gnc gi cnt a global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism The general conference was held a year ago in Seoul in Daejeon and also korea was taking chairmanship Next year and currently korea is taking the chairmanship of the UN Security Council 1540 committee So we are working very closely with the united states and very actively on these issues And and also korea was supporting in our speech at our president park speech at the congress that korea is supporting us Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy This shows that we are really ready to work with the united states on various issues And then i'm not going to move that how this u.s. korea strategic Alliance and the relationship is reflected in our nuclear partnership Open I we are hearing that this The goal goal of us new us r.o.k Cooperation agreement or that this partnership is about getting Especially from the south korea point of view to getting ENR technology enrichment and Paraprocessing or enrichment technology. I don't think they are strategic goals They could be just one element. I I think we are aiming at the much broader and much higher strategic goals the goals could be a common commercial interest And when we when we join our competitive edge, we could come up with a much complementary Cooperation is possible and also We are aiming at the sustainable nuclear energy for stronger energy security by having sustainability of our energy systems I think we could be Contributing to our prosperity And that includes not only spent fuel management problem, but also Economic and the secure supply of nuclear fuel and also why is it not popular in in in the united states? korea was quite eager to to have a serious research program on Next generation nuclear energy system Together with advanced fuel cycle And also we are aiming at the stronger global nuclear non-proliferation security and the safety regimes I we expect that Somehow this global nuclear governance is not strong enough as they used to be And and as we are going to have a new comparator and the new entrance led by some, you know, a new nuclear exporting states And it could be somehow in the u.s. Korea role in that field could be beneficial to strengthen and maintain Our higher standards of nuclear safety and security and non-proliferation And also in that case the u.s. Could extend its nuclear control through joint exports together with us Korea and also we are presenting a model a model to new emerging nuclear power states and also Middle-level middle-level nuclear power states and we didn't need we didn't need any eni capacity until we are We thought that we are having 20 or 10 to plus nuclear power plants So when a country new or newly entering countries are asking for You know nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, you know, Korea could be an example that That it could live without them And also Korea has been showing very strong international compliance and cooperation And so we we are showing a model to any of these new countries to be able to maintain or Or middle-level nuclear power states, nuclear power generating states And here I want to present that when we Assess the success or lack of success of a u.s. Korea nuclear partnership We need to apply Multiple criteria instead of only one criteria. I think I think those criteria could be Safety and the security And and you know when we are coming to a certain field we tend to have a one A very narrow the focus but from the perspective of National security or international interest or global interest. We could apply much wider criteria So I better skip this when I'm saying environment it includes the waste management and the climate change These are also very serious issues and when I say peace criteria it includes non-proliferation nuclear security issues And also this prosperity criteria is also very important when we are having much weak economy And and this economics and the creation by exporting nuclear power plants could be Another benefit of having cooperation And here is what then the president box said on Rokk us nuclear cooperation. I thought it's a little bit lengthy. I have this full quotation of from her remarks She used to say in her presidential election pledge that we need to revise the outdated rokk us Nuclear cooperation agreement And also When she was here she she made a speech to congress there She said that Korea has been using peaceful use of nuclear energy And now we need a modernized mutually beneficial successor to all the existing nuclear agreement And also this is something new that I saw the other day at the korean press when she was making Having a press conference in seoul She said that I I believe that the current agreement is not equitable or fair Since it was made when we had no nuclear power plants Therefore revision in a modernized and the mutual beneficial way would also help strengthen our alliance The new agreement should be able to address the spent fuel management problem urgently Secure stable supply of fuel and strengthen our nuclear export competitiveness And also she added that I said I told the president obama as such and he shared My understanding and the misunderstandings There was what she said to the korean press Then what korea wants or through enr capacity or kyle and I said I present a few criteria and also strategic goals here One minute I want to just ask that We are not seeking status prestige or military security, but economics it's all about economics energy security and environment and the export competitiveness So also we are not demanding a special exceptional treatment to our needs But we want a fair and equitable treatment That's what I'm asking and also korea is not a japan not in india not yuratom But we need a unique korea specific korea us Cooperation model it's something new it may take time to make new ideas, but We need a new cooperative model When we do pursue this so we have certainly some obstacles those nuclear sovereignty nuclear armament issues that has been raised. I'm going to skip that And and here is what the korea cannot and we lack a nuclear And here's a summary The success of a nuclear energy program result from two factors in korea a us korea nuclear cooperation and korea decision to solely pursue A civilian nuclear energy program I think we need to carry that success story to the world and to the future And the new expanded the us korea nuclear cooperation under the strategic alliance and global partnership would help The us increase its commercial gains acquire all the benefits of joint research while avoiding risk and the cost of otherwise And it and to expand its nuclear control to new Important countries and maintain a high nuclear standard globally and compete with other and contain other less complying states And also I'd like to argue that the multifaceted benefits Bilaterally and globally of the new Cooperation nuclear cooperation at the should not be underestimated and penalized by a single criteria of non-proliferation And also by an old and the prejudice the image of Old korea in the 70s And I better stop there and also I want to suggest a couple of Ideas and some of the joint studies to have a much better understanding of each other and we have a so far very high level strategic Idea about how both countries should behave and should cooperate But I don't think that that kind of that kind of a cooperative spirit It came down to the specific issues of nuclear Field, so I think we need how That kind of a a a high level a cooperative agreement is should be reflected in our Each of our issues that we are dealing with here. I better stop there. Thank you Okay, thanks very much Thanks bangun. Uh, next we're going to turn to tom more for a us perspective Uh, morning everybody. Thank you for uh, let me speak this morning Sharon I'm going to give you a sort of abbreviated set of my remarks so that we can move to what I'm sure is going to be a really good set of discussion and uh questions Um by way of just quick introduction I was the staff member for senator luger on the foreign relations committee for 10 years that had to deal with 123 agreements under section 123 of the atomic energy act I'm not going to be talking today about a lot of how congress will proceed now to consider an extension with south korea Aside from saying that congress will have a role And it will need to pass some sort of statutory Relief for the administration if it wants that done Before the current agreement expires next year and my understanding is those discussions are in a very early set of Talks and I I don't really want to discuss them because I don't have to anymore Um, so let me just say with regard to generally peaceful civilian nuclear trade I don't think there aren't any American policy and lawmakers that don't support the negotiation and maintenance of american nuclear cooperative agreements with every nation With which we now have those agreements And I'd say including and particularly with the republic of korea Now as everyone here knows and it's been said the united states decided to seek an extension of the current 123 agreement with the south To 2016 in order to give negotiators more time to address the issue on which agreement seemed unlikely before it expired Now sharon and I noted in a piece we did for our proliferation program blog That this isn't necessarily a solution And I'd point out that in 2016 in the united states will be in another election cycle By 2016 it's likely we'll have seen how events in iran have either positively or negatively influenced perceptions regarding the durability and credibility of the npt Which has its next review conference in 2015 And coming back to my old haunt congress will also have to consider other 123 agreements in the next three years Much of which or two of which and big ones are taiwan and china and those are in the same region with south korea Now I think my colleagues slides and presentations all provide a very good Excellent summary as to why u.s south korean civilian nuclear cooperation attracts Appropriate and a lot more attention than we have in other agreements I can't think of another spot on the map Or another agreement in the 123 agreement area that we have with anybody where we have the potential to make More interesting and more meaningful choices for how nuclear cooperative agreements Are going to be perceived coming down the line with other countries Now I think the summit the park obama summit was a success in that regard because Negotiation of our bilateral terms for peaceful cooperation By dint of the decision to defer became neither about south korea's past Nor about north korea's present nuclear weapons programs I think this was an entirely sensible decision made jointly by the park and obama administrations And it was a very tricky thing to manage given the penchant for political overstatement Reflected out of the press on the agreement Now from an americans perspective I think it's certainly reassuring That president park agreed to this path as it took this issue out of the zero sum perspective And provided ability for us to step back and acknowledge our united our alliances lynchpin or cornerstone Unique and enduring nature. I'd leave it at that. I don't work at the state department So I don't have to come up with new terms for alliances every three weeks, but we do have one And that seems good enough for me in plain english But the decision to defer doesn't solve the problem leading to it Which is I think most everyone here is familiar with and that's that the united states has resisted to Provide its consent to further process our material in south korea And the question now is whether we ought to create an exception for south korea to our long-standing policy that restricts Broad programmatic not specific consents to alter informant content our material to japan iradam in india And as I said at the beginning of my remarks your perspective on that question varies as to whether you think this agreement will have direct Import for future agreements that might come down the road So let me just say an extremist there are two very strong views in the united states as far as I can tell One suggests strongly that creating such an exception would do tremendous harm as it would detract from efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing to reprocessing to new nations And based on the experience of other nations would likely not result in cooperation that would benefit south korea in the long run Another view suggests the united states ought to acknowledge our allies ambitions And proceed with cooperation that would enable the south to develop Possess and market nuclear technology to include permission to further process american materials in south korea and to cooperate on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle The administration has generally and I say generally because I don't know where its policy review has ended up Decided that when considering whether or not to give consent to alter informant content american materials The united states will do so on a quote case by case basis rather than apply a uniform standard to all new agreements for cooperation That uniform standard or gold standard would mirror the approach taken in the 2009 agreement with the united arab Emirates Which as my friend and master tom graham wrote in 2009 Codifies unprecedented steps the ua is taking to prevent proliferation The amarotti decision was not to develop or possess facilities for the enrichment or reprocessing of material in UAE, but to send it spent nuclear fuel abroad President obama and his submission of that agreement Congress was quite specific that quote the united states and the UAE are entering into this in the context of a stated intention By the UAE to rely on existing international markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing Article 7 will transform this UAE policy into a legally binding obligation from the UAE to the united states upon entry into force Now let me just depart here for a second and say Something that at least in my observation not too many people have noticed South korea is already a gold standard country By dent of the joint direct tuition of 1992 south korea has said it will not possess enrichment for reprocessing facilities on its peninsula It has an additional protocol with the ia and a full scope safeguards agreement By any measure south korea is already a gold standard state And i'd further point out that the only other country with which it has substantial nuclear cooperation is the united emirates Which also is the original gold standard state in its agreement So to the extent that we consider that going forward and i hope today will talk more about that How can we improve on that leadership? And how can we make sure that whatever we decide in the future doesn't detract from it given this unique trilateral relationship? Now the UAE agreement reflected desire over the course of both the bush and obama administrations To send messages to countries in the middle east that when a nation pursues nuclear power and a responsible matter The united states is willing to cooperate Now at that time responsible pursuit has generally taken to mean that facilities for enrichment and reprocessing aren't necessary As president bush said in 2004 for the enjoyment of peaceful uses of nuclear energy Now the decision to defer in south korea ought to allow us to be a lot more reasonable than we've here to foreseen public comment allow It's worth reiterating the position the united states has consistently taken We are prepared to jointly cooperate and evaluate fuel cycle technologies with the south in the united states Now there's more in this offer than might be appreciated In my own view facilities for the production of special nuclear material in regions of instability ought to be seen as strategic facilities Since they are whether during in crisis or peacetime facilities of special interest to neighboring states To the extent that any two such countries are allies of this country Even if the building and operating of such facilities presents no problem to the united states It could to another country in that region To the extent that our foreign policy would become complicated by latent or explicit antagonism between or among our allies The united states must walk a careful line that does not create situations Wherein it might face the incredibly difficult task of being seen as siting with one over another Particularly when nuclear threats are made Now our offer to continue cooperation with the south outlined above takes into account much more than north korea It's a refined and careful policy that reflects a painstaking calibration of many decades The test of american resolve against north korea Cannot and must not now be measured by whether north korea has or retains nuclear weapons Equally important our strength of commitment to the south ought not to be measured on the narrow ground in of all things Programmatic consent as i think my colleagues have alluded to But if we are to navigate our way through the next two years together with our ally Then we ought to understand that we should never let our bilateral nuclear cooperation be framed as either too permissive By our common foes nor mislabeled as unfair To the extent the south is now an exemplar of the things that we would want other countries to do And does not possess things that we have here to fore persuaded people to forego We ought to leave it at that. Thank you Thanks tom, uh, we will now turn to our discussants Dr. Chun first Thank you Well, I try to uh address one question uh to each presenters First to uh, professor shin, uh, he talked about south korea public's response to Uh, mainly from north korea provocations and how we should prepare for uh before the provocations And there is is true that there is a public opinion which Uh claims that we have to go to the nuclear armaments. That's that's fine But you know, I think every specialist or the government officials know that It is not an option because it entails a lot of you know disastrous results coming from That kind of option But it's it's it's a true fact among the public. It's an emotional response to north korea provocations Especially in the first half of this year. Uh, it's emotional. Uh, and also but it's uh, uh, I'm not saying it is Is unworthy, you know, uh, it's a response to north korea provocations that we should do something Uh And uh, we should be prepared by having a better option as to cope with north korea provocations So what should we do? Uh, you know, uh, first thing is that we have to prepare for a very rational north korea nuclear policies with Uh, the very coordinated Stands with united states if we have a very good development in dealing with north korea diplomatically then I think Uh, not just south korean public, but also many people will think that This kind of option will not be, uh, a very effective So the question is always combined with our, uh, coordinated very effective policy toward the north Uh, the second thing is that well in dealing with nuclear cooperation, uh, the u.s. Officials or new U.S. Specialists, it's very natural, but Uh, they say that uh, this kind of public opinion is not a good factor in Uh, going forward in nuclear cooperation between two countries I think this this two issue should be uh, the linked this this is not really a linkage issue. So, uh, So, uh, we just hope that united states will say to the south korea public maybe that there will be a very Steady and strong stance for extended deterrence to south korea public Uh, nuclear cooperation, uh, is another issue Uh, so we have to be very rational in dealing with this issue Uh, so there there should be some rationale or the contents to uh, south korea public How can we deal with this issue? So, uh Uh, comments and question to professor shin is, uh, what kind of message should we prepare for the south korea public with a A good plan, uh, for, uh, preparing for even north korea and provocations Uh, okay second to professor chun Uh, it's more complex and also the same question to, uh, dr. Moore The same question when i'm not i'm not a really specialist about nuclear energy or nuclear science. I'm a political scientist But when I look at all the process of negotiating, uh, for the renewal of the of the treaty Uh, very interestingly, uh, we have very complex situation in which different actors inside one country have different Interests for example, uh, we have four actors. I think, uh, the government officials from foreign ministry Who are very much, uh, strategically rented the second is nuclear scientists a, uh, who has a very strong value For the global non-perforation And nuclear industry people who are motivated by economic interests mainly and the public Uh, south korea public for example, they have a very strong nationalist feeling that we have to be very sovereign in dealing with these issues Uh, for both south korea and the united states, they Have some problems in aggregating their national interests. We should should result in the concept of national interests So if you look at textbook type of definition of national interest It's very hard to find one national interest because you know national interest is just a concept in which There are many different, uh ideas of sector interests as a democracy So this long process of negotiation, I think it's a very good learning process for south korea and also united states that Uh, we have to, uh, go through sometimes painful but, uh, very necessary process of aggregating all this Uh, sector interests, which should be very effective in consolidating As a professor john said a comprehensive alliance So we should set this problem from the perspective of comprehensive alliance So if we have some, uh, this delay of the negotiations for two years, I think we will have more learning process How can we combine a different sector's interest into a one national interest? The second thing is that, uh Now, uh, the negotiators are the the officials of foreign ministry They have a lot of burdens and I I don't think they can deal with all the problems and issues in a very short period of time and, uh If we want to develop this alliance into a more comprehensive, you know The comprehensive alliance based on common values then there should be more A multi-layered contact among the different players for example scientists to scientists Uh, you know security officials and security specialists to security officials in two in two countries that that is a real Uh concept of a model alliance for the 20th century, but we lack, uh, that kind of you know multi-layered Uh process of cooperation and negotiations which will Put more burdens to the Negotiating government officials for two countries if you look back upon the process of fta negotiations That's also belong to a the concept of comprehensive alliance because we think that FTA has some security external externalities in Both countries if we don't do the fta negotiations Effectively then there is also a voice in both countries that we have to renegotiate the agreement, which is very, uh Unfortunate situation to to the countries and also There is a the problem of burden sharing after the fta's for different sectors of the society So if we cannot complete the negotiations for one to three agreement Then there will be that kind of thing happening. So we have to Be very careful and deal with this Negotiating process from the perspective of comprehensive alliance and also Uh, it was 40 years of the duration for the for the initial treaty But as you know, the situation changes very quickly. We might have a technical leeway to Deal with a change very rapidly changing situations. For example, we can Shorten the period of duration of the treaty as so that we can reform Or adjust to the changing situations And also for south korea, I think, uh, you know, we have We are still a relatively weak country in the region, but The national power is growing. That's also a fact. So we have a very different self image or self perception of our roles Um, so we want more at south korean public, but it's also true that we have to have more responsibilities as a These days in middle power a kind of diplomacy. So In terms of nuclear cooperation issue We have to define this issue from very different perspectives such as south korea's role or responsibilities for the global non-perforation and then think about our different, you know differing some claims for south korea's future so Actually, this is common, but uh, it's thankful to hear some comments from the presenters. Thank you Thank you. Dr. Chun. We're gonna Turn the mic over to will toby. Oh, do you? Well, what do you think panelists? Would you like to? Respond now or wait until after wills, okay All right. Thank you It's a pleasure to be here With this this terrific panel. Um, my impression is that if the negotiations were turned over to them, it would be solved relatively quickly Um I drew four observations and a hope from what I heard this morning And the first was that strategic interests should be paramount Too often in these negotiations They sort of get hung up on on details And I think all of the speakers were admirable In their adherence to the importance of strategic interests peace prosperity security environmental protection The second conclusion I drew was that an independent r. Okay nuclear deterrent is not the answer to the problems That um conventional deterrence remains strong That extended deterrence is the ultimate guarantor And my own personal belief is that the r. Okay will prevail over the db rk The only questions that are remaining are when and at what cost So it's up to us to try and shape the answers to those questions And in part the policies being discussed this morning will affect that third that us R. Okay, civil nuclear cooperation greatly benefits both countries professor june's list of both current Activities and potential new ones. I thought was most effective in bringing home that point And then fourth the hope my hope is that As the r. Okay's global interests broaden and deepen and there's no doubt that they are in terms of trade and other issues That the us and korean Perspectives on this matter will converge The enrichment and reprocessing problem is not about the r. Okay, but about the precedent that As korea and a soul Increases its standing as a nuclear leader. It will be an example for others And the precedent will be sought And so it's very important to the united states that we find an answer to this that both meets South korea's strategic interests in terms of economic competitiveness And environmental protection And energy security But also in ways that help to shape the environment outside of east asia and as souls both roles and responsibilities outside of east asia increase I think that that will be of greater concern to the r. Okay government Um the spread of enrichment and reprocessing would likely very likely hurt The r. Okay, at least as much as it would the united states And in fact, I noted that professor june's prescription For examples would minimize that so I think that that recognition is already there The question is are there ways in which we can creatively Um cooperate between the two countries That would advance these objectives simultaneously I think that there probably are in terms of guarantees of Availability of enriched uranium to ensure that r. Okay nuclear power plants continue in operation I'd note parenthetically that no nuclear power plant has ever ceased operation because of fuel was not available similarly, I think in in In fossil fuel There could be more cooperation which would help to to increase Energy security the united states is very likely going to go from an energy Importer to an energy exporter in the next five to ten years that will dramatically change world energy markets And allow us for some flexibility in terms of perhaps long-term Contracts that might be available to the r. Okay for natural gas So I guess with that I would Offer a question also to each of the panelists to professor sheen Does extended deterrence remain Credible and in the r. Okay, and are there ways to strengthen it to professor june If it could be proven that closing the fuel cycle were not economic Would the r. Okay choose not to pursue that as a policy end and to tom more Are there ways in which we could improve the fuel security and economic Competitiveness interests of the r. Okay while achieving our non proliferation interests All right. Thank you Will Dr. Sheen do you would you like to start first? Yes, uh, by the way, you are asking so what what else can be done to Make you sure that extended deterrence or First is it because it remains still credible. Yes Okay, sure. Sure right Yeah, I think my short answer to you is uh, yes I do think the extended deterrence by us over south korea is very credible at the moment So the problem is that the south korean public doesn't Really, I mean there's not enough enlightened information. There is lots of misinformation about this extended deterrence On the south korean media or forum So It is connected to professor john's question What can be done to make you sure that there will be no such a kind of unnecessary Discussion of south korea going for its own independent nuclear option Uh, first one is yes, you have to have more enlightened and the clear Uh information about all this issue. Uh, it's What one of the problem is a very technical issue. So it's it's not that easy for you know Average people to understand all this what is extended. I mean as was the case during the cold war But it's very clear and simple in case of korea korean is not the uh, you know west germany during the cold war so The media can play certain or uh, the intellectual community can play certain or to give accurate status information about what is U.s extended deterrence of korean peninsula, which is quite firm and solid I do think and there is also for example redeployment of for you know, new us a tactical nuclear missile Simply the fact that is u.s. Doesn't have Tactical nuclear missile these days. I mean there are only a few hundred left in, you know Europe and here so simply there's no tactical nuclear missile that can brought back into south korea at the moment. So those kind of Uh Information is also need to be disseminated and and the korean public But I think bottom line is When we talk about south korea going for its own nuclear capability I would say it should be simply i mean it's just it's not a nuclear option for south korea It is north korea option for south korea Is it do you want to be another north korea for south korea? I mean if you ask good question to the korean public they will definitely say no I mean our economy our political system all situation Is it very opposite of north korean situation at the moment? So North korean option is not for the south korea So that's one thing and the second thing then what Should still if there is a concern about south korean public about this north korea's nuclear issue Maybe from now we should frame it Not only as a nuclear issue. It is more about again. It's north korean problem Yes, uh It is more and more clear that It is quite unlikely that current north korean regime will Simply give up nuclear weapon in near future. So if you just stick to only to the nuclear problem The the future or answer to that looks quite, you know, uh, gloomy So if you so that is one of the reason why some of these people who talks about this nuclear independent nuclear option saying that they say United States is not interested in the nuclearization of north korea anymore So that's why we have to think about another option. No, that's not the case. We should Emphasize that both u.s. And south korea still The basic objective is denuclearization of north korea and for their method denuclearization of the whole korean peninsula But to just focus on nuclear issue makes a very difficult case for both government That there is a Near-term solution on that we have to acknowledge that it's it's not that near-term solution Maybe we have to think about the more medium long-term perspective And which we have to make a much more comprehensive discussion and coordination and cooperation That in dealing with north korean problem It's not just north korean nuclear problem anymore because the north korea's nuclear program is very much closely connected to the nature of the regime And the fate of the regime in the future So we need to make the things a little more broadened and that we have to have a more comprehensive dialogue on that issue Can I just ask a follow-up question and that is you know the asan institute polls In have been Criticized by some because of where they come from right so Um, but but the gallop polls show similar results Um And my question is are there Polls that have been done in korea, which may not be available in the english language But that might be more nuanced on this because it seems to me that I agree entirely it completely depends on what question you ask As to the response you get And I would almost I would take issue with how you frame that which is do you want to be another north korea? That's kind of an extreme formulation of the question. There may be there's a lot of gray in between there, right? So so my question is just are there other polls available? Is this something that you know the ngo community could could actually work on is getting more Nuanced polls out there because one of the question I would ask is you know if getting nuclear weapons meant You know you're pulling out of the nuclear non proliferation treaty. You might not become north korea clearly, but you're gonna Take ahead in terms of your prestige And standing in the world community So I'll just put those Yeah, unfortunately not that I know of I try to dig up some if there is any other poll other than asan So I came up with this gallop poll But other than that I haven't found any more nuanced You know poll on this issue. So we are talking by ourselves. Maybe the eai or some other Yeah We should do the some that kind of more nuance to poll or in some other time If you just like you said if you just do that in the aftermath of nuclear tests by north korea Everybody will say yes. I mean no matter what so Maybe yes, uh, that's maybe our responsibility. I mean the government or some other think tank To come up with more balanced view of reflection of korean perception on this issue Bangun, do you would you like to Yeah Questions. Yes, I have quite a few comments to add I I'm beginning with this nuclear sovereignty and nuclear armament claims in korea And this 1991 into korean denuclearization declaration Resulted in some Regentment in korea. They produced nuclear sovereign claims since then And north korea nuclear armament Certainly and the threat Produced this nuclear armament claim in south korea. So they are pretty much a reactive at first beginning And also somehow I felt It's a little bit unfortunate that we didn't have enough A public dialogue on the what is the nuclear armament means to us At the at the at the public level, you know to people who are speaking to the public that we have to go Nuclear armament when I read all of them. They say nothing Anything about any of these Negative points of going armament what they say is it's all about prestige And and the status and and but You know when I talk to the people students And I have just asked them, you know, are you you are ready to go Nuclear say said maybe 50 60 percent say yes, but when I said only five minutes What kind of price we have to pay and what kind of International non-proliferation we are living in they change their minds and despite Leg of this public dialogue on the what is good or bad about this But however, the government has our korea government has the one of the strongest and one of the most robust non-proliferation including the security regime in In the whole world And we have I would like to go over one by one, but we have the most stringent This non-proliferation regime so it's a it's a and and also one of the most open and transparent budget and the governmental process so it's it's it's a it's not possible And the toby you said that Mr. Toby is the the precedent effect Korea could give some bad, you know sending bad message to other countries But the kind of message that I'm thinking was that korea has been one of the most A good and excellent A partner of united states and we have been the most loyal Compliant to global non-proliferation regime Then korea was still remaining Such a lower level give may give some You know wrong message to other countries who are trying to enter this nuclear energy world since they have choices In previous years, you know, they didn't have choice But now there is other competitors like russia china india And they can sell anything Without any of the constraint that the us is imposing so that when the us was Still opening or closing the korea's door to the a much a greater nuclear technology requirement, I think that's going to give another You know wrong message to the world And finally If this Closing fuel cycle is a turn out to be Not economical then korea will choose not to pursue Here is a problem that You have your own Criteria of judging what is economical and what is not and the korea since we have such a extreme high Extremely a vulnerable energy security problem We are importing 97 of our energy from abroad So people are ready to pay extra money to secure our strength to surrender our energy security So we may have some different criteria of calculation of what is the economics of energy security But however, if it's really It's not economical I don't think a korean government or a business is going to put their money You know when they saw or japan's mother, you know, no one is seeking japan's mother Korea is looking for something new mother We don't know Precisely how it's going to be turned out but the korea want to pursue our end of that mother That is what they want and the the later decision of commercialization I think that that is totally up to our own, you know, rational economic calculations that Yeah, korea are very korean people are very much Economical, so we know we follow money. We don't follow just any, you know Empty status Well, thanks for asking me the hardest question. Well, um Are there ways to Improve fuel security and cooperation in the south while achieving our non-proliferation interests I'm really glad and I think he did it intentionally that Jun spoke before me Or at least that's the way that will one of the questions answered because I was listening very carefully to those remarks And two important things came out of them that I think I'd want to highlight One was when jun said we don't want what japan has I that fuel cycle We want something new and different Whether this is pyrochemical separations or not We clearly between jun and I don't know what that might be just yet Which gets me right back to where I started on the u.s. Offer Which is that we would conduct a joint evaluation for 10 years because we don't know What we can deploy on a lab scale or even as you just said commercially for some time But you also said something extremely important Which is the notion that you are dependent on foreign suppliers for virtually all of your energy needs I don't know that domestic enrichment based on my understanding of the market and the way utility providers purchase it Um, some of the work I've done here at center and some of the things I've heard and also when I was on the hill Doesn't convince me that there's a strong economic case In south korea's case to want to pursue enrichment That said we already have assurance of uranium supply to you and our existing agreement No one is saying we would go back on that for any reason and as we've all repeated over and again You are I think a gold standard country. The south has much Nonproliferation credibility on which it can rest an extremely powerful case against its neighbor and put its credentials up against anybody else In the world in that regard right now So To will's question Yes, there are certainly things we can do When it comes to the assurance of supply There are a lot of things the bush administration talked about for countries that we could offer so that they wouldn't need to pursue their own Richmond reprocessing But I think we've got to unpack now that we've unpacked successfully on this panel This issue from our broader strategic alliance and that we not narrowly focus on programmatic consent I think that was the consensus we just got out of this panel this morning was progress I think we need to then focus on so what are the next steps either through a joint evaluation Over the next 10 years we could undertake To agree on criteria for what is economic in south korea and what is not and I hope that today this Group all of you will focus more on that question Because i'm not going to pretend to know that I know all the answers to will's question Nor am I going to step into some pretty dicey areas as I already have But I think all of us by the end of the day will have a better idea of what those criteria for what is and is not economic In the case of south korea For spent fuel management and for the production Of fuel might look like and i'm going to be listening carefully I'd like to um well first of all do do Discussance do you feel like your questions have been answered? No You were more satisfied, I don't think dr So, so was there a follow-up or or something that you wanted to pull out from our speakers here the the questionnaire The south korea's public. I think it's we have to do another questionnaire. Maybe from me and I but the other one is after the Fukushima incident there was a questionnaire about should we continue our nuclear Energy development and more than half of the south korea public that we should be nuclear free country That's still there is a very strong support for nuclear energy still but so it's it's about It's very much event-driven. So how we ask questions and and uh, you know the respondents tend to You know the answer the questions only based on that questionnaire rather than having the overall knowledge Okay, so I think our panel is in violent agreement that we should we need more research At least a more nuanced research in terms of what the public cares about um, I would just like to make I guess One or two points on this assurance of supply. I know I'm going to speak later. So, uh Tom made the point about enrichment right the assurance of supply is basically connected to south korea's nuclear exports and providing for Low-enriched uranium there are a lot of things that countries do for that. You know the u.s. I think it's 97 percent of its enrichment from overseas Not domestic right and korea gets a lot of enrichment from china. It's diversified its sources the same way that the UAE has actually You know it put out even though korea nuclear fuel is going to be doing the fuel fabrication for the four reactors It's getting enriched uranium supply from urenco from russ adam from Arriva, so that's one way That you can do more assurance of supply the question of korean domestic enrichment really relies on Economics if you're going to rely on economics then you have to make a case somehow that you can do this cheaper than anybody else Either with your own domestic technology or with A black box urenco technology the other fact of the matter frankly is that we have excess capacity in enrichment so worldwide so You know and enrichers typically do not even Expand their cascades Until they have signed contracts for that enriched supply. So I think it's um, you know, it's a very Small market the uranium enrichment is only five billion dollars a year So in terms of looking at export competitiveness In general, I think there's been a lot more made of what nuclear exports may mean to south korea Then what it may actually produce for south korea even if you had a full nuclear fuel cycle Because the nuclear renaissance. I mean it's happening in asia, but not much else Where and so one thing I wanted to highlight is And several people here in this room participated in this We did a workshop in sol on korea as a responsible nuclear exporter. I think copies of that report are outside with the asan institute and it was really interesting discussion because we had some industry folks in the room and Even they said that you know these ideas of of you know, korea capturing 20 percent of the market 80 Exporting 80 nuclear power reactors In the next couple decades is a little bit beyond what what is reasonable I i'm sorry. I've taken so long. I want to open the floor to questions. Uh, please identify yourself and Keep it brief. We have microphones Right up front here Right up front here. Thanks. And then larry second one is Hi, I'm jinsoc bear from eai. I would like to mention about The interpreting of the public opinion survey results on the the nuclear weapon argument As I understand the nuclear weapon program With our own the weapon And the us l o k alliance cannot be compatible as I understand But as I understand the many koreans believe that they can be compatible According to our recent Survey conducted by east asia institute About 77 people supported That the maintaining us l o k alliance Is favorable to the south korean security It's very interesting Uh, so some people uh, according to the the asan institute Actually 67 percent believe that we should have our own nuclear weapon But 77 percent people believe that The us l o k alliance Is favorable favorable to the our own self Uh security problem So, uh My understanding is like this. The many south korean People doesn't have enough information about the consequence of the Our own nucleation And the reliance alliance of the l o k us So My first comment is like this and the second one is Relate to the questionary about 95 95 percent koreans believe that South korea and north korea should be unified But another survey Indicated very interesting reason About 70 percent Believe that we should have time To reunify At least after 10 years So if this case can be applied to the the asan institute's questionary Uh, yeah We ought to believe that uh many koreans ought Must have our own uh nuclear weapon On the response to the uh north korean threat but The questionary if we have the more specific and sophisticated Questionary we will have very different picture of the I don't was there a question in there? Just a comment. All right. Let's take another question right in the middle. Thank you Cs is uh Japan was mentioned only in passing But to dr. Sheen I've been following the very critical south korean responses To the statements by prime minister abe that He would favor japan responding To north korean nuclear warheading By japan developing long range military strike capabilities And also his stated priorities that he and his allies Will make a real push To amend the japanese constitution Including article nine And again, I've seen the very strong criticisms of these Priorities of prime minister abe coming out of south korea And in back of this as I think we all know are these deep South korean antagonisms Towards japan over the history issues So my question is in terms of this sentiment that we've been talking about In the south korean public in favor of South korea having at least an option for nuclear weapons And the question of how deep are these sentiments really held? Besides The recent north korean actions are these south korean attitudes towards japan An underlying factor In this seeming strengthening Of south korean public attitudes in support Of a nuclear weapons options and if in the next two to three years Prime minister abe and his government move ahead with these Programs and priorities That I have just mentioned Would these steps by japan strengthen expand and solidify South korean public attitudes supporting a nuclear weapons option And if again japan moves in these directions What kind of New security guarantees or assurances Would south korea or might south korea seek from the united states panelists Who would like to answer? Thank you very much for the comment, mr. Baer and also question from dr. Nick As far as I know I did the current south korean that the opinion or debate about Possible south korea's its own nuclear option has nothing to do with the japan The history issue or japan you as you highlighted recent The abe government moved towards japan normalizing its own self defense Of course, it is always a concern and the south korean public sentiment but that I don't think that nuclear Debate on south korea was driven any by majorly by the japan It was really a kind of instant immediate response to this north korea's nuclear test And early this year, but I think yes, there might be some potential Cause for south korean anxiety abe government Uh, we don't know yet, but somehow this fall or next year, uh, able to, you know Change its constitution and move ahead with uh, you know the peace Constitution changing it to normalizing its self defense. There might be some concern and some debate in south korea But I don't know whether that will be enough for south korea to say that all of so as a You know response to this japan. We have to go for the nuclear Still to me it's a little bit too too much for korean public to have that kind of discussion And this goes back to and so what could be the best? remedy for that kind of issue it's all comes out again is out okay us alliance and as mr Uh, uh, uh, bear loaded When I in my own, uh, presentation the gallop pole Show that 71 percent of south korean says us is always most important partner in this uh, all this ongoing nuclear saga as opposed to 18 percent China is important or two percent japan is important. So there is also genuine Uh support among the south korean About this the us out okay alliance, which is Quite in a way different from just a few years Ago, I mean early 2000 we had this difficulty or growing anti americanism within south korean society But today that is almost Just a non-issue anymore. It's it's also I think largely thanks to north korea's continuing provocation So the korean public support and their perception was this alliance that importance of alliance Is higher than any at any time. So that's just one I think Maybe it's the key thing that we need to focus and emphasize Do you have any other comments from the panelists? All right, we have one minute left So if there are additional questions, we can only take them if they're short I think we have one over here Please state your name and affiliation and make it brief. Um don't from uski. I have a brief question a few decades ago President Park Jung-in was interested in developing a nuclear weapon to think that still worries us policymakers As a former us policymaker The 2004 additional protocol disclosure to the ia pretty much Put to rest in our minds that chapter in south korea's history Um, and that again, I think ghost the point I made earlier that this is a country that was serious about showing us It's on proliferation credentials and I would just leave it at that Yeah, uh, 70s case was uh, somewhat korea was Feeling like often we have original scene But I I I said no, you shouldn't in the 70s us projected that there will be at least the 20 plus nuclear weapon countries in some years So all countries who are having serious national security riskers are thinking about nuclear weapons It was another one korea's 20 more You know, even germany, susan, the taiwan, saudi arabia, is it all the country was thinking about nuclear weapons But I would say that the korea was the best successor story in 75. We keep the nuclear weapons a Throwaway program. I think that was only in the ideas. I don't think that they really seriously pursue that And then we turn to the civilian nuclear energy program and we become the best successor story so we are not We saw that happened, but we are you should be much proud of that happened afterwards All right any before we close any final comments from either our speakers or discussants No, then please uh, join me in thanking our panelists We have a short break until 11 a.m. And then we will reconvene with the next session. Thank you