 Dyma ydych chi'n mynd i. Mae'n neud ffarnol ar gyfer Rotherham Ddech. Rwy'n gw�liannol gyda gwylliant o'r troi deoliadau a'u cherdd. Efallai byddwch adroddau Yfarrn Ffarnol Cymru a'r Ynwrddol Cymru. Dyma'r Yfarrn Ffarnol Cymru a'r Ynwrddol Cymru a'r Ynwrddol Cymru a'r Ynwrddol Cysybodaeth... Mae'n te du fynd i siom wneud yn dweud cryf yn y ddefnyddio i fod o fath oedd yn ffryd i'n cynnig o gydag i ddechrau'r fath o'r addwaith. a 21 yma'r model. Felly, mae'n gweithio'r panlwys, y pwyntau o gweithio'r pwyntau, yw'r hynny'n gweithio'r pwyntau, mae'n gweithio'r pwyntau i'r pwyntau, ac yn dweud o'r pwyntau, ac yn dweud o'r cyffredinol, mae'n gweithio'r pwyntau i'r cyffredinol o'r cyffredinol o'r IIEA. Yn ymgyrchau ymgyrch yn y record, gan dweud y cwanaethau'r ysgol siaradau, ydw i'r ddim yn cym...) sy'n ddweud o'r rhania behaviour o'r eu ddim yn dweud, a ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r llyfe cyffredinol, oherwydd o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r gweithio. Mae'n olygu rŷnodd gyda'r llwy, i weld yn eich gwaith, a dda онfyd. Yn y cwanaeth yma'r Run Llywodraeth yn gweithio'r un Uniom, Cynllunio a'r bwysig i'r gwirionedd iawn yn cael ei gweithio'r rhagleniaeth, iawn i'r rhagleniaeth hefyd o'u cyffredinol, i'r rhagleniaeth yn cyfrifiadau cyfrifiadau a'r rhagleniaeth yn unigol o'r gwaith. Mae'r llyfodol yn canolwyr o'r cyfrifiadau i'r ardal i'r llwyddoedd, ac yn gweithio'r environment cyfrifiadau, mae'r gweithio'r gweithio'r cyfrifiadau o'r cyfrifiadau i'r cyfrifiadau newid a'r cyfrifiadau newid. However, the concept of security has brought in considerably in the decades since the end of the Cold War, and a more diverse range of issues are now seen as recognized as posing security threats, including the pressure on the planet's resources arising from phenomena such as climate change, energy security. The physical security of citizens is threatened by new and more atavistic forms of international terrorism, and liberal democracies face other tests of their resilience, including from state actors, targeting the integrity and transparency of the functioning of fair political competition, a public discourse, and the technological infrastructure on which delivery of public services and a great deal of global economic activity relies. Our contributes today will focus on the revitalization of collective security and the use of modern deterrents involving the defence forces, the wider government, industry, and population. Our first speaker is Elizabeth Braugh, native of Sweden. She directs the modern deterrents programme at the Royal United Services Institute, which focuses on how government, businesses, and civil society can work together to strengthen countries' defence against existing and emerging threats. Previously, Elizabeth worked at control risks following a career as a journalist and was a visiting fellow at the University of Oxford. Perhaps Elizabeth, I could ask you to take the floor. Thank you, Barry. I will take the floor. I understand. Or even take the podium. So that I can see the screens as well. Thank you very much for inviting me. I'd like to start by showing you a video, and I hope it works. I was reminded of technology a few weeks ago in the perils of technology. Apparently Twitter went down for 15 minutes. I missed this monumental event, but Twitter did go down for 15 minutes. And the reason I found out was that when I went on Twitter, it had already come back up, and somebody tweeted this, chatted to my wife while Twitter was down. She seems nice. So, but I do chat to my husband even when Twitter is working. But so I will stop by showing you a video here. Let's see what this is. You all know what it is, right? So that's the Stenaeon Perot. And the reason I want to show this video is that Stenaeon Perot is part of a company, obviously a shipping company that operates in the straight of our moves and in fact around the world. And nobody really hates Stenaeon Perot, the 23 crew members of different nationalities that were on board at that time. But still the Stenaeon Perot was seized. And it was seized as part of a geopolitical game. So the fate of these 23 seamen and crew members on board is tied to the JCPOA. And in fact that is the reality that we are seeing today that companies are targets in geopolitical games. And of course we can say companies have always been targets and factories were bombed during World War II. Well today we are not at war, but companies are being targeted not because of anything they do but simply because they are convenient targets. And as a result of for example the seizure of ships in the straight of our moves insurance rates have gone up for companies operating ships in the straight of our moves. Now what does that lead you to? Which conclusion does that lead to? Companies will think twice about sailing through the straight of our moves. And that means that we, the end recipients of whatever it is they are shipping including oil and other necessities, we may feel the pain if they decide not to ship. Which they will if these acts of aggression continue. Now I want to show you a completely different video. Here is the gentleman. I don't know if you haven't heard of Jim Hageman-Snabir. Is anybody familiar with him? His title is after chairman of MASC, which is the world's largest shipping company. MASC ships 20% of all goods that travel around the world. And we should remember that 80% of the world's trade travels by sea. So MASC is a crucial part of our globalised economy. I'm not sure actually how much food is imported in Ireland. But I do know that 50% of food in the UK is imported. And of course a lot of other goods. And MASC transports a lot of those goods. So now we'll see, we'll let Jim Hageman-Snabir explain what happened to. But does anybody know what happened to MASC? I should ask you before, two summers ago. Does anybody remember? No, in that case I'll let you hear from the chairman himself. Never forget it was the 27th of June when I was woken up at 4 o'clock in the morning. A call came from the office that we had suffered a cyber attack. And then a process started, which I'll talk a little bit about. Now, before we go into the details of the attack itself, AP Milan MASC is the largest container shipping company in the world. We transport roughly 20% of world trade and containers. So we're a very significant part of the infrastructure of making the world actually run. And every 15 minutes, in average, a container ship will come to a port somewhere with between 10,000 and 20,000 containers. So now you understand the criticality of infrastructure. We were hit by the non-petsha virus. In fact, that meant that we were actually collateral damage of a probably a state attack situation. And the impact of that was that we basically found that we had to reinstall our entire infrastructure. So there you heard what happened to MASC. MASC was attacked by non-petsha, which was a virus that the Russian government had unleashed against Ukraine. You're smiling, you probably remember. So the Russian government unleashed against Ukraine to take down Ukrainian government institutions and companies, which it did. But then this virus travelled on and brought down MASC, which went essentially dark for six days. And a number of other companies as well. MASC lost $300 million in the process. Mandalay, which is the maker of Oreo cookies. For example, an American confectionary giant, enormous company, lost $188 million. Merck, which is an American pharmaceutical giant, lost $870 million. And it's not like anybody hates MASC. In fact, we all love MASC because they bring us our daily goods. And it's not like anybody hates Mandalay or Merck either. They were just convenient targets for this virus that had been unleashed as it turned out by Russia. Now, crucially, so there are viruses that go around all the time and most of the time they are not attributed to anybody in particular. But in this particular case, the UK government and the US government did attribute it to Russia. And what happened after that was that when Mandalay claimed on its insurance policy with Zurich, Zurich said, no, we are not paying because it was an act of war. It had been attributed to the government. So this is the situation we live in today where companies are targeted, or are, as Jim Snaven and Hager said, the Hadman Snager rather said, are the collateral damage of state attacks even though nobody really hates them. And then that is what one might call an act of war. Now, the question is, what constitutes war? Well, Mandalay, the maker of Oreo cookies, is currently fighting out the nature of warfare with Zurich. It's in short, they are doing that in the court in Illinois. That's the new nature of warfare where a confectionary giant and insurance company and a judge in Illinois are trying to decide what constitutes an act of war. And I'm mentioning that because it's something we have to get used to. Now, it's very common today to talk, as you all know, to talk about hybrid warfare. And I think the term is being thrown around a bit too lightly because what we really mean is sub-threshold aggression or what I call blended aggression where these sort of acts that are not kinetic in nature that don't involve any soldiers on the ground but simply sneaky attacks on civil society where they are proliferating simply because our civil societies are so vulnerable because we are so advanced and because we rely on the globalised economy that until now has been a very strong force for good. And because we are so ill-prepared for it, how could mask anticipate a government-sponsored or government-initiated virus hitting its IT system? IT system companies don't, until now, they haven't thought of themselves as being in the line of fire for foreign governments. Well, they are. And so are we if we think about this information. I don't know if anybody here feels qualified to identify what constitutes this information. I'm sure we have all consumed this information without knowing that that's what it was. And there was recently a survey among, I think, British 16 and 17-year-olds where 98% of them declared themselves able to identify this information. Well, then they were shown this information and real information and lo and behold, they couldn't identify this information. We have just been spoiled for, I would argue, 30 years since the end of the Cold War. We as citizens of Western democracies, of liberal democracies have been spoiled. We haven't really faced any acts of aggression other than terrorism, which is easy to define. But this information does it harm us, it harms us in the accumulation. So the challenge we face as liberal democracies, is whether or not we have a strong and aggressive country on any of our borders. And so, by the way, I think that changes the political calculation or the strategic calculations for countries like Ireland and the UK as well, because threats today don't know any geographical boundaries. Of course, conventional military threats do, but cyber threats don't. And if an adversary is intent on disrupting our supply chains, and thus forcing us to starve, it's very easy. You just attack a mask and all of a sudden, not all of a sudden, but after a while, we will find supermarket shelves emptying out. So the question is, and this is something that my, the program I lead at the Roosi deals with, that's called modern deterrence, how do we deter those sort of threats? We are very good at deterring traditional threats. We have our armed forces, we have the nuclear deterrent, the umbrella that protects American allies. And that has worked very well, clearly since there haven't been any attacks or conventional military attacks on NATO territory or the territory of NATO's friends and allies. But how do we deter threats that are not in that category? We are clearly not very good at it because otherwise they wouldn't be proliferating. And yet that is something we have to establish and we can't establish it with what we currently have available, which is really only the armed forces. So deterrence against seizure of ships, deterrence against cyber attacks, against companies with a realization that no company can defend itself against the hostile nation state and of course companies are at any rate not allowed to engage in offensive cyber against anybody. So unconventional attacks like seizure of ships, cyber attacks, disinformation, even hostile investments, I don't know if you have been following in Finland, some mysterious buyers have been buying islands. Well, why would anybody buy islands in strategic locations? Who are these buyers? Should the government prevent the purchase of property on strategically located islands? These are issues we should worry about in a national security context. While each issue may seem small, it doesn't really matter whether we have consumed a bit of disinformation because our democracy is strong, but in accumulation they form a very subversive threat to our societies that can result in citizens losing faith in our institutions, in crucial services going down, power, the internet, and in fact our way of life is easily disrupted by the accumulation of these threats. So the question then is how to build up deterrents and that's what I wanted to come to in my last five minutes or so. So our armed forces are very good, they do conventional deterrents, they do nuclear deterrents in the case of the UK and certain other countries, well, a very small number of other countries. But the rest of society I would submit has huge potential to add to the deterrents. In the UK a few weeks ago we had a power cut that was limited in nature even though the news coverage around it made it seem like it was a catastrophic power cut. It was in fact only 15 minutes long, but chaos ensued because nobody is used to power cuts. Well, that signals to our adversaries that attacking the power grid, hacking the power grid is a very good idea because we wouldn't know the first thing about what to do. We as civil society, as ordinary residents and citizens, we also don't know how to handle this information which is why in the UK for example there is a big and divisive debate about the influence of Russia on the Brexit debate. That invalidates, in essence, the result, can invalidate the result of democratic elections. If you can't be sure that the basis on which people voted was one of truth and straight facts, I would argue the first step is for business leaders to become educated about national security threats. I think that includes business leaders here in Ireland as well who may not have never thought about national security threats simply because it's not part of the daily considerations of running a company. School children, maybe they can be educated, taught about national security threats because they will feel, they will be among the first to notice that power goes down and the internet goes down. All of this should amount to a situation where disruption of daily life which is really the goal of our adversaries is not such a big deal. Obviously we should hope that it doesn't happen but if it does happen it shouldn't be a big deal and if we can show that sort of resilience, societal resilience as a backup to the armed forces then we become less attractive as a target. I'll leave it at that and welcome your questions later. I'll just give a couple of examples of countries or individual steps that individual countries are taking. Latvia has, I think, a pioneering and very interesting new secondary school curriculum that includes something called the National Defence Curriculum that is being rolled out in all secondary schools in the country where teenagers learn about national security threats to the country, how the country is about to defend itself and crucially what they can do in case of disruption so that when something happens, for example, an extended power cut or a disinformation campaign that they then know what to do instead of sitting back and hoping for somebody, for the government to come in and help them, the government ain't going to come and help them in every situation and I think it illustrates what a significant role the population can play if it's just educated and asked to contribute to society even if it's that small step of knowing what to do in case of an extended power cut or in case of a disinformation campaign and if we start with that, I think people will feel that they have a role to play in national security even if it's a small one. Some of us will play larger roles, some will have careers in the armed forces or blue light services, but everybody does have a role to play so I'll stop there and look forward to your questions later. First of all, thank you very much Elizabeth for that very thought provoking contribution with a particular focus on the impact of disruption on civil society and the contribution civil society can make to try and address it. I'd now like to introduce General Richard Barons who has a very distinguished military career serving as commander of the Joint Forces Command, one of the six Chiefs of Staff of the UK Armed Forces. He has extensive field experience, leading operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. He read Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford University. He's a distinguished fellow at the Royal, at the Royal United Services Institute and noted authority on digital transformation of armed forces and on senior leadership. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. I have essentially 20 minutes to change your lives. I'm going to go a bit of a clip. The first one I want to make to every single one of us in this room is obviously a prisoner of our education, our experience and our preferences. Our whole discussion about security is dominated by how the last 30, 40 years have played out slightly longer arguably in my case. The first thing I'm going to ask you to do in considering why European security has to change is to start to recognise most of that presumption is deeply unhelpful in the way that we need to think about the future because nothing lasts forever and our world is changing and will change profoundly. I'm going to give you three reasons why the world will feel very different. The first of these things, we all grew up in the comfortable US-led Western world and we now live in the foothills of what will become the Asian Century, a world dominated by China in ways that are really hard to articulate but will be unavoidable. That's going to raise massive questions across not just economy but also security and law. The second aspect is that we're going to have this discussion about how our world will be dominated by China and how this will play out in the context of the relative decline of the US and you may or may not subscribe to a Thucydides trap moment but this will play out as for the first time in the history of our world we bump into the limits of our planet's ability to meet our demands and expectations whether that's population growth or urbanisation or water scarcity or resource shortages or of course climate change and we are going to live in a world where ways of life will be in jeopardy and we're going to expand on this the popularity of quinoa eroded the livelihood of 40,000 people who depended on the lake in another country whose water disappeared to service our demand for this rather unpleasant stuff that appears with a salad. We saw this just in the last couple of weeks in the confrontation with Brazil about the burning of the rain forest where we're saying our oxygen comes from your forest you'll need to stop burning it down and Brazil says it's our forest we'll do with it as we wish. The third reason why our world is changing is we're in the foothills of the profoundly significant industrial revolution of the digital age powered by waves of artificial intelligence and I subscribe to the four waves of AI internet AI, business AI we've been out perception AI as machines see, hear, smell the world and then autonomous AI this will play out over decades it will disrupt entire industries countries, ways of life in ways that we can't break it is as fundamental as the development of electricity and it is the combination of these three things the Asian century, the limits on the planet and the AI fueled industrial revolution that's going to make our world feel so very different to the passage of the last 40, 50 years and when this happens there is no supranational authority that's going to define new rules of the road there is no reason that there will be a continuing consensus about what the rules of the roads are the so-called rules-based international desires it's not everybody's clearly the restraints of globalization on why people fight are not immutable I accept that they raise the bar to conflict but they are fraying and there is no script to this period there are no guarantees so your collective sense of entitlement about your security and your prosperity rooted in the comfortable passage of the post-Cold War era doesn't matter to many billions of people around the world who think it's now their time the second reason, big reason why European security has to change is I subscribe to the view that the nature of war never changes very clouds bits and we need to remember that brutal, furrow, disruptive normally disappointing, normally unsuccessful but look at what happened to Aleppo that's the true nature of war that doesn't change how war is fought changes all the time with thinking and technology and military technology has already changed in ways that the west has been slow to recognise now of course I could talk about nuclear proliferation that matters but set that aside we live once again in the era of the missile it is the precision conventional missile that dominates military conflict you can see this beginning to play out both in a defensive sense and let's be clear the US Navy will get no closer than a thousand miles to the Chinese coast and probably no closer than 300 miles to the Russian coast as we live in the era in which anti-access aerial denial technology developed over the last 20 years is designed to keep us at range and secondly much as we might worry about building fifth and sixth generation manned aircraft for some mad reason in order to bomb our opponent the fact is London is 90 minutes by cruise missile from Russia and that cruise missile will sortly come at hypersonic speeds and be accompanied by its ballistic counterparts with a 2 metre accuracy and a 400 kilogram payload so how do you keep that out and how do you do that we live in the era where the western investment in platform-centric capability ships, aircraft, bases headcourses above ground all of that is now hostage to an era which will be dominated by the precision conventional missile and of course the battle for space the cyber arena and the powerful maybe pivotal arena of how you can touch the population of your opponent at an individual level through social media in a way that can be highly manipulative and effective you bundle all that together our armed forces and indeed our security architectures are rooted in a 20th century security paradigm which technology has already washed away and there have been accompanying changes in method and Elizabeth very eloquently described some of the asymmetry that is playing out in the Gulf and elsewhere but we need to recognise that two powerful things have happened just in the last 10 years the first is the reinvention if that was necessary of proxy war where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps sets the pace so war prosecuted in a way where not many uniforms involved but it's still really powerful and the west has had a go failed absolutely in the creation of proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan but has recently learnt to do a little better in Syria on the hybrid conflict or grace space or tolerance or whatever you want to call it that this fusion of all the levers of a nation's power set aside their military capability to disable, disrupt, discombobulate your opponent and we see that's what Russia has done to the US and to the UK and others none of it yet strategically successful but it is now a feature of the everyday landscape and if you combine those two things the missile age and the power of all other levers of power to shape and influence your opponent people like me will construct a 21st century military strategy so I'm going to call to you decisive influence from range so if I want to break France and it's an abiding thought as an Englishman then I believe I can do that without any form of 20th century physical intervention I will break a country like France through the application of precision missiles against critical national infrastructure I will bring their daily life to a halt I will magnify that by offensive cyber to the bits I can reach and I know that's really really difficult I will employ proxies to sow discord and sabotage and I will amplify all of that by the manipulation of social media so that every single French citizen thinks their life is about to go to Helena Handcart and I know how to do that and I don't have to put a boot on the ground and I'm not saying that's the only military strategy I'm not a silver bullet fanatic I'm saying it's a credible 21st century approach we do not know how to deal with people like me doing that other countries have thought it through more thoughtfully so why European security so what about Russia well if you're in NATO and in the British military Russia's a really big thing for all the reasons I've described to you we need to see Russia as just a little speed bump on the way to the problem of China Russia is what it is it's a declining, massive country driven by problems massively over talking its game and allowed to be successful because it's not encumbered by our laws and values but it's not going to invade Europe it may have localised territorial ambitions but frankly we need to ask begin to ask ourselves a much bigger question which is how is the US going to manage the dual challenge of Russia and China and it accepts it can't do with both and the answer to that question the only answer to that question is it will come to some form of accommodation with Russia on the way to China and we're probably all going to be in that space and wouldn't that be more sensible and where is Europe in this well as I've described comfortably gazing at our navels in my case obsessing over Brexit worrying about our social models fatigued by our discretionary interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and trying to persuade ourselves that all war is now discretionary and we can choose not to be touched by it if it doesn't bother us or it's very far away we want to be in a place where we can worry about the effects of austerity our social model our relationships with our neighbours in a trading sense and have no thought to our security we are running on the comfort zone of the post Cold War era and we are utterly incapable of breaking out of that no political dynamic no civil society pressure because nothing bad has happened yet and everything I'm talking about would require societies and governments to take really quite difficult decisions about investment and capability the reset of resilience and the way we approach our security in this much more demanding world at the expense of the things we're obsessing over now and want to spend our money on and believe in some entitled way and we didn't all go to eat and that's how the world is always going to be I don't think that holds water so the way forward well what do we need to do well the first thing is we have to refame the strategic discussion not about peace and war we have to call the Four Seas we compete with some we cooperate with some countries we compete with others we confront and we occasionally conflict and we move along a dynamic spectrum so the paradigm of peace and war except in a legal sense is I think very unhelpful in that dialogue we must throw away our touchstones and our preferences from the post Cold War era and think about the implications of this much more demanding world and that discussion frankly is nowhere the second thing we have to recognise is we will only secure ourselves through collective security we have demobilized our major military alliances in the case of NATO and the EU which has tremendous soft power potential remains stodgy to say the least so how do you mobilize the potential power of Europe to protect its security and advance its interest in this much more difficult world and the only way that's going to happen is by rethinking hard power I'll come back to that gathering together public sector soft power all the things the government does and crucially uniting it with private sector power if you're in the UK and you want to make an effect on the world it's not what the military do it's not even what the government does some impact there on what the US does or the Premier League does or our entertainment does or our tourism does and we have to express ourselves in the world by this thoughtful union of hard power, public sector soft power and private sector power if we are not to be done over the next thing we actually need to do is to understand that in the way we think about conflict we cover the whole game the asymmetry that Elizabeth Trive is here to say proxy war is here to say the battle for space is here to stay the battle for cyberspace is here to stay and then we need to think about and I'll go into more detail the reframing of military power for the digital age and that means we have to think about hybrid campaigning not event management in our relationship with Russia and China in the future and do that not as nations where we can picked off but as a collective spirit the discussion about how does Europe do hybrid campaigning is nowhere there is no academic leadership of this there is no political leadership of this and states are still trying to raise their own game the battle in Whitehall to organise for collective hybrid campaigning is stuck in a Whitehall preference for collegiate operations rather than a unity of purpose or even of command the next thing we must do is reframe national resilience Elizabeth has described this this is about the resilience of civil society of the role of the citizen it's not so much about the armed forces in the face of decisive influence from range if it comes to conflict but definitely hybrid tweaking and the bad things that may come with a world that's running out of energy and water and all those other things and the final thing and my core sport is the need to transform our militaries for the digital age by the application of combinations of digital age technology data, processing, connectivity AI, robotics nanoscience, gene engineering all of these things in combinations the UK the chief of the department last week has for the first time set out what this begins to look like and it is the most profound change of military organisation method and process for more than 150 years the reshaping of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance away from answering a question by writing an essay to making your intelligence organisation operate like a newsroom the reframing of commander control on AI and data we are all capable of halving the number of military headquarters we currently have and halving the size of those that remain and in there there's a phenomenal saving and a major effectiveness boost we will reframe combat power combat support and combat service support power away from a combination of very expensive people in uniform and platforms which we can barely afford in small numbers can't afford to replace definitely can't afford to lose to a thoughtful, manned, unmanned and autonomous mix we will break our people paradigm and we will break our equipment paradigm because we won't need to buy formula 1 cars in the shape of aircraft carriers or we'll do this in a much more thoughtful much more thoughtful with our allies and we will underpin all of that with a digital backbone of cloud AI connectivity and a single synthetic environment the application of gaming technology to government and defence from situational understanding decision support, conduct operations training in a way that frankly will actually pay for itself we need to do all of those things I would argue if we are to make our way in this more challenging world we are currently doing hardly any of those things and so I think you can you could judge Europe is going to right now is stuck in what I'll call strategic neuro syndrome and if we don't break out of it then we are going to feel in the coming decades like a snowflake in a dust storm thank you very much