 Good afternoon everyone. I'm Joshua White with the Stimson Center and it's my pleasure to welcome you to the New America Foundation for this panel. It's a real pleasure to be here. As many of you probably know, New America has really been at the forefront over the last several years in discussing changes particularly in the Islamic political landscape in South Asia and very pleased that they've taken the initiative today to invite Arv Jamal to launch his new book and to share. I'm sure it will be just a small fraction of his many insights on Lashkiri Taiba and the affiliated movement. So we're very pleased to have him here today. Also joining us today is Dr. Mohamed Taki to my right who's going to be providing some some commentary about sort of the wider Islamic political landscape. Many of you know him for being a prolific writer for the Daily Times in Pakistan and one of the real outsized Twitter personalities who regularly comments on what's happening in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the wider region. So the way we're going to structure this this afternoon is I'm going to ask RF to present for about 15 minutes and then ask Dr. Taki to respond for about 15 minutes and then I'll use my prerogative as the moderator to present a few questions and then we'll open it up to what I'm sure will be a very lively and interesting debate. Discussion, Q&A. So that's where we're going today and with that I'd like to turn it over to RF to share some initial thoughts about his book and then we'll get the discussion going from there. Thank you very much. Good afternoon everybody. Thank you for coming and I thank New America Foundation for hosting me here and also Josh White and Dr. Taki for coming along. I will be briefly talking about first the relationship between Lashkaratabha and Jamatudawa and their global organization and then I will be talking about their relationship with the Pakistani state or Pakistan army. My book gives a very rich and detailed context for the birth of this group and those who are really interested they can read the book. Jamatudawa was founded in August 1987 in Lahore by the remnants of Juhamans Ikhwan the group which rebelled against the House of South in 1979 and occupied the Kaaba for several days. This group was very global in perspective and membership because people had been coming to Makkah or all Muslims go to Makkah in their lifetimes and that is where they were recruited in the group. But after the Saudis crushed that group the remnants spread around the world and many of them came to take part in Afghan jihad in 1980 the year after the Makkah rebellion. However they founded the group in 87 and they put a front of a Pakistani group led by Hafiz Said. At that time Hafiz Said's status in the group was just that of a Muthi it is kind of office manager it is not a very elevated status. From the very beginning the group Jamatudawa had at that time named Marquis Dawatwal Irshad that is MDI. MDI set up several departments and one of those department was Lashkaratayaba. Lashkaratayaba was meant to wage jihad just in Kashmir. It did not have the mandate to wage jihad in rest of the world. For rest of the world Marquis Dawatwal Irshad which was the predecessor of Jamatudawa created the department of international jihad which was headed by Mahmood Bahazek who was mostly known as Abu Abdul Aziz Barbarosa. Abu Abdul Aziz was and is actually he is still alive and living in Saudi Arabia is the most dynamic jihadist I have come across and he has done more to spread jihadist infrastructure in the world than anybody else. Mahmood Bahazek headed the department of international jihad and he went out to wage jihad in several countries. He fought in Afghanistan personally he went to Philippines and fought in Southern Philippines and he went to many other countries and physically to part in jihad. In 1972 he set up a sub department of department of international jihad Muslim forces in Bosnia. The Bosnian jihad was fought under the name of Muslim forces but it was an entirely 100 percent Jamatudawa operation. A lot of experts here and elsewhere gave credit to Al Qaeda for that jihad but actually the role of Al Qaeda in the Bosnian jihad was very limited. A few people from Al Qaeda from Al Qaeda did participate but they were under the command of Mahmood Bahazek. The Jihayman's Ikhwan set up several affiliates all over the world to coordinate international jihadist activities and Marqis Dawatwal Irshad in Pakistan was kind of the center for all those jihadist groups in the world. For example, Marqis Dawatwal Irshad sent aid and fighters in Chechnya, in Tajikistan, in Uzbekistan, in Maldives and they have set up units in some hundred countries and I identified dozens of them. In all over the world they work under different names. The idea is that even if you crush Jamatudawa today in Pakistan, which is not easy, the party will survive. Now, briefly I will now touch upon the relationship between Pakistan state and Jamatudawa. Marqis Dawatwal Irshad was set up in August 87. However, there is very little evidence of ISI support to Marqis Dawatwal Irshad till 1991. Yes, Pakistani state tolerated the group but then they were tolerating every jihadist group at that time. In 1991 the ISI started supporting the Pakistani group, which was headed by Hafiz Said to take over the command of the group. So, that they can push the group into Kashmir where they had already started jihad. Between 1991 and 1993 there was a huge power struggle within the group and Hafiz Said supported with the resources and support from the ISI and took over command in practically in 1994. The real Amir of Marqis Dawatwal Irshad, who was a Pakistani alem, Allama Rashidi, he was sidelined but most of them were from his followers, his group and Arabs were sidelined. Rashidi died in 1996 and then Hafiz Said took the command fully. From that time onward ISI has been controlling the group very, very closely and the only objective for the ISI or for the Pakistani military is to wage jihad in Kashmir and some in India. Pakistani military does not have a global jihadist agenda but it does have an Indian centric jihadist agenda. But the problem is when they tolerate such groups these groups usually want to do more than what the ISI mandate is and the ISI pays the price of tolerating them and letting them do their jihadist work. The ISI or Pakistani military does not pay fully as a lot of commentators say, they pay only as much as is required to wage jihad in Kashmir. For other operations in the world or even in Pakistan JUD raises its own funds and now it has become a real, real big, big group. I have calculated that it has trained something like between 300,000 to half a million people. When I say trained it means that these people have gone, undergone basic 21 day training. Now this is a very very scary figure and most people would be skeptical. Let me give you a few examples to say that the leader is not all that unreal. Current their biggest mass training camp which is Umulkara it was set up in 1992 approximately and since then it has been training, giving training to approximately 200 men every week. At one time there are 600 boys taking training at one center and at one time they had four big training camps in Pakistan and Pakistani Kashmir. Jamaatudawa is not just a jihadi group as we understand. It is a group which wants to run a modern state. It has recruited from all walks of life. Wherever you go in Pakistan you will find that Jamaatudawa members are present in that department. They are in the army, they are in the police, they are in the intelligence agencies, they are in customs, they are in among doctors, they are among engineers, they are among all sorts of experts. Jamaatudawa holds annual doctors convention for example and they gather something like 600 doctors, medical doctors and they are not ordinary PCBs. Many of them are the leading doctors in Pakistan, zoologists, cardiologists, ophthalmologists, they have engineers. One of the strongest Jamaatudawa unit is in the Lahore's University of Engineering and Technology where Hafiz used to teach Islamic studies and the members graduate, they are not sent for jihad. They are asked to join government jobs and many of these engineers have joined Pakistan's nuclear establishment that I have shown in the book. I have given some names also. Then they have units in the ordinary universities. They graduate and they do not go to jihad. They go to other professions and they do missionary work. At one time I think not more than 2000 boys are engaged in practical armed jihad. Every time I spoke to JUD leaders, they insisted one point that they are not a jihadi group as such. They are training themselves to run a modern state and they will be able to take over every job a state does when they take over power in any country. This is the Jamaatudawa Central and then they have affiliates all over the world and all those groups in the rest of the world, they are also evolving in the same manner. I think I will stop here and I think cover the rest in the question and answer session. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Josh. Thank you New America and thank you everyone for coming initially. No financial disclosure and no association disclosure views are my own. The breaking news today was the appointment of the ISI director in Pakistan and General Rizwan Akhtar has been appointed and there is a nice chapter in the book which says the holy own subsidy of the ISI. So I guess a lot of you will be asking what happens next. I was sitting in the back room and I saw a little plaque from some years ago where another ISI director had taken over and there was a lot of goodwill and enthusiasm about that particular ISI director taking over because he had trained in U.S. just like General Akhtar has done. That was General Kiani and that was back in 2006 or something like that. So we will have to see how that pans out. I want to segue quickly into the numbers that RF talked about. The camp Umul Qara has been producing these hundreds and thousands of people and at this point maybe half a million Jamaatudawa members are under arms. We saw in Islamabad over the last six weeks that less than 20,000 people, less than 20,000 people who are unarmed untrained could bring the Pakistani government to a practical standstill if a jihadi organization decided to bring any Pakistani city to a standstill like this. For example Lahore where next to Lahore is Murid Kedi headquarters of Jamaatudawa. I think it will be a very tough situation. So one has to think really long and hard about what the motives of this particular organization are. And like I have said, L.E.T. is one of the brand names. You know if General Motor was the enterprise I would say this is the Chevy of General Motors. That's kind of what it is. You know they make many other models. They have a Kerala of jihad also which is their international jihadist organization. So the idea is bigger and much older than some of the other jihadist groups that have been out there in the market and by design and by default individuals and governments and organizations have been setting analysts and counter-terrorism experts on a wild goose chase where things which were done by the Jamaatudawa were actually put into the Al-Qaeda basket to make things relatively easier and simpler for people to assimilate and not worry that much about it. The gentleman that he mentioned Mahmood Bahazek. He was the guy who actually led the Bosnian jihad in 1992 and he is called Barbarossa for a reason. He patterned himself after the Ottoman admiral Hayroddin Barbarossa and one of the Jamaatudawa strategies is to encircle India and the Indian and Pacific oceans kind of a reverse of the strength of pearls analogy that the Chinese use something along those lines starting from the Maldives all the way up to the Philippines and they have a very interesting name which is an associated group, MILF, M-I-L-F, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. So I wish somebody brought it to their attention that it might be something that has to be changed. So it is an organization which is huge, which has cut its ideological teeth much before any other organization has done and it has worldwide reach. Hafiz Said has visited United States, seven states including my state Florida. He has visited UK, Mahmood Bahazek has been all over the world and unfortunately the West and the US still see it as a Pakistani and an Indian problem. For India it could actually be an existential problem but the way things are unraveling in the larger Middle East one has to look at the ideology of Jamaatudawa as a pioneer Salafi group in Pakistan to think what kind of threat it can pose to the world at large not just India. So it is not going to be a regional India, Afghanistan, Pakistan problem and sometimes groups like JUD like to tactically underplay their strengths and objectives. They do not want to pick unnecessary battles at unnecessary time. I was talking earlier that back in the day the Marxist dictum used to be that you don't want a premature revolution. You want to do it at the right time. So whenever the time is right things might happen that people may or may not like. The question is whether the Pakistani state can reign these guys in. Whether the new ISI chief and his outfit, the Pakistani army, whatever relationship they may or may not have, are they in a position, I am not here to say whether they actually control them or not. I have written extensive review of the book. You can Google it and read it and definitely read the book. But is that going to be something that we should look forward to? RF has addressed that from primary source, from the Pakistani army is writing how they look at some of these groups. The groups which attack Pakistan only. They are the ones who are to be tackled primarily and with the state might and with the immediate urgency. Then there are groups which attack both Pakistan and US and India for example. Those are dealt with on a case by case basis. And depending upon what kind of carrot or what kind of stick is dangled from the TC area, action may take place. It may take almost a decade just like we saw in the case of Harkani network. But it did happen a little bit. Maybe wishy-washy, maybe not as effective, but it does. And then there are groups which do not attack Pakistan. And Jamatudawa is classified as one of those group which has not conducted operations inside Pakistan. Even the fundamental Salafi creed of Takfir is not professed openly by Jamatudawa. Takfir meaning apostatizing the other Muslims to the extent that they are considered liable to murder. This is something that JUD does not do openly. But if you look, read the book carefully, you would see that it has actually practiced the fear in the Indian Kashmir where it attacked Sufi shrines such as the famous Charashree shrine, Shanuruddin Wali's shrine and a couple of other major Sufi shrines. So it is not that the ideology is not there. It is probably a tactical maneuver. And at times they are presented as a counter way to the unruly the Obandor and the militant groups which are getting out of the Pakistani state's hand or attacking, say for example, the GHQ. The point is that JUD actually gained battlefield experience initially with some of those the Obandu groups such as the Hakani network. The first battlefield experience that Zakir Rahman Lakhvi got was in the town of Rahum in Paktika. This is the same town that was bombed three months back, right around the Eid time when people were shopping and about 80 people died there. This is exactly the same time where Jalaluddin Hakani started his own original campaign back in the August of 1975. So there has been some cross-pollination but there is a very slight doctrinal difference that this book very keenly highlights between the Salafism and Wahhabism and where that has practical relevance to what the policy makers and counter-terrorism experts have to do is where exactly do these Salafis and Wahhabis differ. For all practical purposes the Salafi groups like Jamaatudawa they are not much different than the Wahhabi or the Obandu organizations but they take it all the way back to the time of the first two caliphs and this is the pristine Islam that they want to reproduce. This is the caliphate that they want to reproduce and when they object to the Obandus or Wahhabis even in case of for example the Saudi state they think of them as heretics and therein lies the rub that we look at many things from the perspective of whether the ISI can or cannot control these groups. Maybe they can maybe they cannot but what this book does is it actually looks at JUD from its own individual perspective its ideology and not the ISI prism and the ISI blinders. I think that is the strength of the book. This is very important and I think one of the most important aspects that RF has highlighted is the original primary source work called Jihad in the present time which highlights eight points some of which actually have a bit of an overlap and at the expense of maybe boring you with that I will just have to read those out to you. The points one four five and six are sort of interrelated so I would go through that. Ending the persecution of Muslims anywhere everywhere. Help the weak and oppressed Muslims anywhere and everywhere. Seek revenge for the murder of a Muslim by a non-Muslim and here the key is the revenge the death or blood money as was done in the case of the spy guy caught in Pakistan that is something which was not acceptable to people like JUD so it has to be an eye for an eye and then punish those who violate the oaths or agreements with the Muslim governments. So that is a very interesting phenomenon that they develop and then ultimate goal like he mentioned is establishing not just a small fortress somewhere but an actual caliphate state replicating the state of Medina but they don't go back all the way although they claim going back to the times of the prophet they actually stop short of that and they move towards the time of the first two caliphs they don't even consider the within the Islamic context the four rightly guided caliphs are supposed to be you know the revered ones but they discount the last two because that is considered the time of strife and they look at the prime of Islam as the expansion of the the empire in the time of first two caliphs and one of the points related to that is the recapturing of those lands which were once under Muslim domination which includes Spain and India so that's the gist of the the JUD ideology now why is it problematic to have groups like these as tools of foreign policy persecution and I would say that since the 2001 the JUD had a very clear anti-US agenda it came out with a clear cut fatwa a decree from its Darul Ifta which is the house that issues decrees in support of Osama bin Laden in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan despite their doctrinal differences with the given the Taliban and relative differences with the Osama bin Laden and despite that they were well tolerated by the Pakistani security establishment and not only that they were given battlefield access and as the the war in Afghanistan and I'm talking from after October 2001 it started picking up the Indian presence in Afghanistan was used as a pretext where these groups which had consulted before and JUD back in the first post-Soviet Afghanistan war it had a huge presence in the northeastern Afghan states of Nuristan and Kunar which were under Salafi influence and they actually had established a Salafi state under the leadership of a guy called Jamil Rahman and those camps were inherited by JUD after the collapse of the Mujahideen regime and they maintained Taliban kicked them out but then they had access to that so once again these groups were brought into contact with the Ubandi groups like the Haqqani network and as late as the swearing-in of Indian Prime Minister Modi where the Indian councillor in Herat was attacked the blame was again laid at the door of JUD and most likely in conjunction the access was provided by one of the Ubandi groups so they are not necessarily mutually exclusive and the problem arises when the states use these groups and they spin out of their control we all know that it has happened before the Pakistani security establishment has used both secular and doctrinal ideological jihadist groups in Kashmir Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front whose original founder one of the original founders came from my hometown of Peshawar that spun out of Pakistan's control another layer was created the Afghan Mujahideen the first seven parties they spun out of the control and another layer was created it does happen it has happened with the Saudis also the in the early 20th century the Saudi Iqwan rebellion against the House of Saud was a was a prime example of why there can't be two centers of power because within the Wahhabist and Salafist doctrine and and that is right from the text of the Labneh Wahhab that there can be nothing but one ruler one authority one mosque that is the crux of the Salafi creed and this is where things become more relevant today after 1979 to be precise November 20th 1979 which was the Makkah rebellion that was Muharram first the year 1400 in the Islamic calendar so this millenarian tendency had existed in the Saudi Salafis and Juhayman al-Utaibi who was one of the key ideologues he along with the promised messiah he took over the holy mosque in Kaaba and as I have mentioned some of those people were captured and killed including Utaibi but a lot of them survived and JUD happens to be a direct extension of that creed and now what we are reading today is that ISIS in their core curriculum is teaching what the letters of Juhayman al-Utaibi and the text from original text from of the Labneh Wahhab so I'll just quickly stop here that there's so much in this book which is relevant to what is happening today and why it is not just a regional problem present in 52 countries going on from Maldives all the way to Philippines Australia US you remember the paintball jihadist plot here in Virginia the reaches there 3 or 7 of the brothers of Hafiz Sayeed and one of his comrades they were imams in US including in Boston how why who's dropping the ball where are we being taken for a ride by an English speaking cigar smoking scotch drinking general somewhere who might be saying something in a language that we don't understand is there is there a problem I think we need to really introspect so that's my spiel for today do buy the book highly recommended you want to read my review you can drop it up on the Google thank you thank you both for provocative comments and it leaves me with this image of a scotch drinking general in a Chevy driving somewhere in South Asia what I'd like to do is open up by asking are a couple of questions that take what is a very rich book full of historical material and ask him to think out a little bit toward the future in two areas that I think are areas in which he's highly qualified to do so and I think there's also interest by those of us who think about this movement in terms of what it means for for policy decisions in the first place the book traces in some very interesting detail the early leadership struggles of this movement and the way in which Hafiz Sayeed eventually comes to lead the movement and so I wanted to ask are if he could look to the future and imagine what scenarios what situations what events might precipitate either a leadership change or some fragmentation of leadership within the broader movement which I think he quite correctly identifies as labels as as MDI JUD but which we commonly call luxury Tyba and I think this is important because there's been a lot of speculation here in Washington about whether there might be parts of this movement that take on a different agenda than the core so the first question is what would it take to see that happen the second question has to do with the broader premise of the book which is that this is not a movement that is localized to Pakistan and India but one that has deep roots in the Gulf and has broadened out throughout throughout the world from the U.K. to Bangladesh United States and elsewhere and you know it's very interesting how the book traces this sort of globalization of the movement looking at Chechnya and other places but it strikes me as I as I read it that however dispersed the group may be and however broad its recruiting network might be the target set is actually been rather consistently narrow with the exception of some of the group's early engagements in Afghanistan perhaps some activity in the Maldives a foil plot in Copenhagen by and large this is a group that seems to care about going after Indians and that the sort of anywhere everywhere motif broadly applies to Indian targets so again the question looking to the future is this a movement that may eventually truly broaden that sense of who needs to be targeted and what would it take to see that change come about in the group given such a long history focusing on India as a state and as a people group that need to be challenged in South Asia and more widely so I'll ask our to address those questions and then I'm going to open the floor to your question I think people can hear okay first lead well the MDI and JUD people are very well trained in the dog trains and their belief system is such that once you join the group once you go through 21 day training where actually you don't learn much of using Clashnikov but the ideological dog trains and during those 21 days you basically learn or accept to kill and die in the name of Islam and once you undergo that training I see that it's almost impossible for anybody to leave the group they have been some groups half a dozen a dozen people leaving or being pushed out of the group but the group has remained very solidly intact and I don't see even if you eliminate the entire JUD leadership today the group is likely to stay united and I don't see honestly any fragmentation happening in this group particularly also they affiliates work in such a way that if you eliminate one group the others will survive because you don't know who they are working on and which name and where in even in Pakistan let me give you example Jamathudabha runs something like 1000 so called secular schools as I said they want to run a modern state not madrasa let's state and they own only 200 schools which are named as adhava system of schools adhava system of schools only the enrollment in the adhava schools is almost 50,000 50,000 and there are 800 other schools which we don't know under which names they are working the second point was targeting and how they their global movement but their targets have seemed to be rather yes actually Lashkaratabha became famous and known because over these years Lashkaratabha was doing jihad in India and only Indian media was talking about it the rest of the world unfortunately ignored the group and whenever the group was involved in any jihad for example in Bosnia the world unfortunately gave credit to Al Qaeda as I said I have shown in the book that Bosnia jihad was an Jabhatudabha jihad not an Al Qaeda jihad and but the world gave credit to Al Qaeda that is why we don't know much about their jihad in Bosnia, in Chechnya, in Tajikistan, in Philippines for example we don't know that in Sudan they are working under which name. Jabhatudabha is very much present in Afghanistan in Kunar and Nuristan along the Pakistan border they are they are virtually under their control. So, we do actually we don't know much about their global activities and that is this is my first attempt to show that. Let me give you one example when Dr. Thakir was talking about their doctrines one of the doctrines of Jabhatudabha is that they that all Muslims should wait jihad to take back the lands which were once occupied by Muslims they they have I think eight or ten doctrines to wait jihad to justify jihad and America according to their doctrine was once occupied by the Muslims. There is an article which shows that at one point Muslims had come here to rule although although they could not but they did come here since they came now it is duty for Jabhatudabha to take back this land for Muslims I I can see the faces but that is what they doctrine says and there are so many other very very interesting doctrines that we all need to study. Can I quickly add I will just quickly add to this that you know sort of like the Trotsky notion of a perpetual revolution or something along those lines you start with 1979 you have the Juhaymans Ikhwan and right before that in 1978 we had the Sauer revolution in Afghanistan and the remnants of Juhaymans Ikhwan including Bahazik were moving to Afghanistan and they were waging war there so this is this is the late 20th century first major jihad where the Salafis are getting involved then from that point on they moved 1992 to Bosnia from 1992 major jihad in Bosnia they moved to Chechnya 94-96 they are working this is JUD working with Shamil Basayev in Chechnya and logistic support or whether actual participation they are there and again in 1996 they are back in Afghanistan then 2001 they moved on onwards they are in Afghanistan and some of the areas that we talk about the Nuristan and Qunar which are the areas under the Salafi control they also happened to be the areas where Pakistan claims that the TTP the Tariq-e-Taliban Pakistan leadership is there I am not insinuating anything but the question is well those areas which are out of the Afghan government's control is there any sort of consulting going on between the Tariq-e-Taliban and JUD in those particular areas because Nuristan in particular and they have been the hub of the JUD activity and then the fundamental as one of the Taliban used to say that you have the watch but we cut the time that is something that they are patient people there is very little impatience waiting for the right time and if you look at it incrementally it has been becoming more sinister more violent and the culmination now is in the form of Iraq and Syria the ISIS is the prime Salafi example that we have and the problem is it is not a question of when it is not a question of if but when and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan I think in my own view those would be the two countries which could potentially be hit by a very significant rift between the former Salafi Wahhabi proxies and the state itself. I would say I saw in the news that a JUD spokesman in Pakistan came out with a very forceful statement against ISIS or ISIL or whatever we are calling it today. Did that statement surprise you or did it not surprise you? No that does not surprise me but it is too early to see how things will evolve in the coming months and years. Actually how I see is that most of the jihadist forces in South Asia and Central Asia particularly in Afghanistan will coalesce. What we have seen in the last 10 years is that the Diobandis which were initially not Takfiris have become Takfiris and the Takfiris have become more radical and the ideological difference between Taliban who were Diobandis and the Salafis is narrowing. Fazalullah who heads the Tariqe Taliban Pakistan is ideologically a lot closer to Hafiz Said than to Taliban in Afghanistan. I see a lot of forces coalescing and the same trend will probably be happening in the Middle East but one thing is also sure that there are a lot of Juhamans who are joining the ISIS in the Middle East. Now how do they handle the situation in the Middle East? We do not know. It is too early to foresee but probably there may be two caliphates or maybe there may be one caliphate. In history we have seen two caliphates coexisting very peacefully in the Middle East and in South Asia. We do not know how this situation will evolve but the scary thing is that I see a caliphate in South Asia coming in next few years. Pakistan can implode anytime and the only jihadist group which is ready to take over is Juhadi. On that optimistic note I would like to open the floor to questions. We do have a microphone and I am going to ask that you ask a question and that it be one question and that it not be a statement and with that we will start with the woman here in the striped shirt. My name is Beniz Isha I am with Newsweek Pakistan. In your book you write about how Hafid Saeed had a personal relationship with Osama bin Laden. They were constantly in contact when he was in Pakistan. How has that relationship between Jamaat Tudawa and Al Qaeda changed ever since OBL was killed? Since both these groups are Salafi groups. Let me remind you that Jamaat Tudawa MDI was founded by Juhayman's Ikhwan remnants. Now Juhayman's Ikhwan was the first real international global jihadist group not only in its membership but also in its region. Juhayman's Ikhwan did not want to occupy just Saudi Arabia but they had a global agenda because they thought Madi had come and this is the time to take over the whole world. That is what the Muslims believe I mean Sunni Muslims believe. Now that belief system has been borrowed by the Juhayman. However Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden was not against Saudi monarchy in the early years. Osama bin Laden and some of his colleagues that turned against Saudi in mid 1990s. However there were some remnants of Juhayman's Ikhwan in the Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden group. So there also we see the two groups ideologically coal as same. The new statement of al-Zawari shows we do not have much of evidence but it shows that Al Qaeda or whatever is left of Al Qaeda is coming further closer to Juhayman and I see them cooperating more and more in South Asia. Now the most important thing in Iman al-Zawari statement for me is that the countries he mentioned for example Myanmar, Bangladesh they are the countries where Juhayman is heavily present after India and Pakistan and Afghanistan. So that is very significant why he chose Bangladesh and Burma to mention. I think it is because of the two groups cooperation somewhere. Thank you very much Hassan Abbas National Defense University. Congratulations Arif. I look forward to reading the book very soon. I have two questions I promise those will be very brief Josh. First is about do you think Lashkarat Aiba and JUD can convert into a political party at some stage. When will they make that decision and what do you think will be the response? Where will they place themselves in reference to Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamaat-e-Ulma-Islam and so many other religious parties. Where will they develop their coalition or alliances if you think. And second is as a teacher I would say when I have to teach my students I have always say look for credible sources. Tell us something more about the sources of your book. Is it based upon interviews and I know of your extensive journalistic background and linkages. Who are the people you interviewed which are the books their publications. So what what are the major four or five sources of all that you're telling us. Thank you. First of all I don't think it will ever become a political party in the sense even Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan is. Although after 9-11 terrorist attacks they started posing as a political religious party but I don't think they will ever be even like Jamaat-e-Islami which is in my view a terrorist party. Second about sources I don't think I have my sources include in-house publications. A lot of interviews half is said I have interviews half is said dozens of times and I have published dozens of interviews with half is said in question and answer form in Pakistan. I think I was the first journalist who interviewed him and published in English in 1976 or 7 and that was when he was not really half is said and when he learned that some English newspaper person is coming to him he was really over odd and I have been to all the training camps lived there for days it was very difficult if you ask me to do again I won't be able to do that but then again it was my passion to work on them so I have thousands of interviews very closely watch them evolve into what they are in last 20 years. If I could just ask a follow-up question because I thought on the Hasan's point was very interesting why would this movement why would not want to enter the political process they have joined street movements with the defy Pakistan council and engaging on public issues they have a broad based network that involves both a platform on a number of public issues plus an extensive service delivery component which could make them and it could provide the framework for the sort of things that successful political parties do. What do you think would be the logic within the party for rejecting that move into the political space? Actually primarily it would be because of the doctrinal reason. The doctrine is that you cannot even impose the Quranic laws through parliament because if you say if the parliament of Pakistan say Quran is the only law in Pakistan even that is not acceptable to them because it's the parliament's law which is imposing Quran in Pakistan that is not acceptable and they say it has to be the Amir, the Amir-ul-Muminin who has to say Quran is the law. Going back to that why they would not it would be very hard half a say they actually got the battlefield experience along with Osama bin Laden in the battle of Jaji in the Loha-Pakthia region in 1986-87. Osama was so impressed with him he gave him actually his jeep. I don't think that we have seen many Al-Qaeda actually turn into political parties and then the fundamental doctrinal issue is like he says Amir means doing something by order if you go to the Arabic root word Amr which is by decree there's very little political process involved in that and the experiment with the DPC the DeFi Pakistan Council which was actually a conglomerate of various different ideological parties and some groups in Pakistan which was propped up against the previous Pakistan People's Party government was an engineered project basically to bring street pressure upon the Pakistan People's Party to acquiesce to certain demands that the Pakistani security establishment had that was not truly an evolutionary process in the sense of a political party evolving such as even Jamaat-Islami which had a strong ideological doctrinal base membership base this is the party which has Jamaat-U-Dawah is an active jihadist group quite unlike yes I tend to agree with RF that Jamaat-Islami has active terrorism acts under its belt right from 1979 onwards but for JUD to move towards mainstream political party would mean that everyone in Pakistan actually subscribed to their Salafist creed and that is where the problem with the Salafist and Wahhabist creed is the Takfirism excludes anyone and everyone and even within their own groups they have such fundamental disagreements that it's such a straight line that mainstream Pakistanis would find it really really hard to actually subscribe to the thought process we saw that in Saudi Arabia where even people like the chief cleric Ben-Baz actually took on the Saudi monarchy and then we have the Salafi arch-ideolog Albani who basically did Takfir or apostatized even the Wahhabist so you have a group which is exclusivist within the exclusivist and for them to go out and become mainstream I don't think that I would see that happen in my lifetime it probably would happen in certain pockets somewhere and there is an actual push there is a book out there by a scholar Humaira Eftadar which talks about Jamaat-ud-Dawah and Jamaat-Islami actually becoming the secularizing influences on the Pakistanis society God knows how actually you go about doing something like that but it's worth actually checking that out My name is Suleyri I'm from the Embassy of Pakistan now one question you talked about the 21 days course that takes place in Jamaat-ud-Dawah and it appears to be a very well crafted course which converts a person within 21 days from someone who you talked about the 21 days course that takes place at Jamaat-ud-Dawah's headquarters which converts a person from the one who had some other ideas to some radical ideas within 21 days so it has to be a well crafted course do you have any access to what kind of that literature is why because in your own words the people who are joining are from different walks of life doctors, engineers, computers and scientists etc so what is there in that that it converts very well read and educated people into something different within 21 days Yes I have very clear idea about that before 9-11 terrorist attacks everyone could freely go to those camps there was no bar you see the problem is for the world they are terrorists but for Jamaat-ud-Dawah people they are not they think what they are doing is part of their religion that they are doing it as part of their religious duties so they have nothing to hide and they never hid that and they don't hide it even now even now they can take any journalist any researcher to their camps and show them what they are doing now the problem is that foreign journalists are suspected sometimes that's why there are problems but otherwise their vision is very clear in those days you see when they recruit somebody there is a time the person who is recruiting somebody he teaches him something and then he shows something but when he goes to attending camp when somebody who has nothing to look forward to in life that is what the mass of the UD people are when he holds the Klashnikov he feels empowered and that empowerment makes him a lifelong follower the power Klashnikov gives to everybody there in the camp I have seen people changing in over three days drastically changed and then after 21 days they have read some parts of Quran and some hadiths which are suitable for them and then they are not abandoned they after 21 days they are taken to their local village or city or neighborhood unit and they are further trained so that is how and you know Jamaat to Dawah hold thousands or maybe tens of thousands of training camps and meeting in one year in Pakistan that's amazing one you they are always under training they are always under training and missionary half his side did not sleep in his bedroom for years and years and years he used to sleep in his van because he was travelling from Karachi to Peshawar and he is giving a lecture in Karachi then he is travelling in the van after two hours to another unit he is giving a lecture and that is many of them did I just like to join because I think it's a very interesting comment and can you you've been watching this movement for a while can you speak a little bit to the socio-economic basis of the people who you believe are joining there's one view that said well look they have outreach to doctors and lawyers and journalists and engineers that's certainly a middle or upper middle class socio-economic profile read other things that say well these are the poor impressionable destitute who have nothing to look forward to until they hold that Kalashnikov in their hand what have you seen in terms of the kind of people who join the movement and has it changed since the 1990s in the beginning briefly they found the Pakistani founders were Madrasa trained or were affiliated with Madrasa half his side and Zafar Iqbal and half his Maki they are not Madrasa trained they were teaching in Madrasa but other founding members most of them were Madrasa trained but the Ahle Hadith did not allow them to use their Madrasa because Ahle Hadiths in Pakistan were associated with the Saudi government and the Saudi government did not like any of them if they wanted funds from Saudi Arabia to be associated with Juhamans Iqbal now what happened after that they started recruiting from different walks of life and they set up units labor labor's unit doctors unit and they started recruiting from all from every walk of life and they succeeded in most however most of the members were from the very poor impoverished families who had really really little in life. I have done a study with the Christine Fair and Dawn Rassler on fighters it is I think the fighters of Lashkar Tawai it is available online and that is the study where we have shown the we used the published biographies of JUD martyrs and you will see how you will see their socio economic background of those who died but those who died are not exactly the representative of the group because doctors JUD does not send doctors to fight because doctors are needed elsewhere they do not send engineers to fight and die because they are needed elsewhere so the businessmen they are a lot of businessmen in the group they do not send them as a policy to fight even when they want to quickly add to this short courses are not unique to jihadist organizations military organizations do that there is national cadet corps in Pakistan for example Pakistan army used to run a short training course at Mangla at one point OTS Mangla as it used to be called from your own travel agent you may know the taste of Italy trip you would go for a day or two or something and the next time you may end up going for ten days this Dorae Amma or the initial course is an introductory course there is about eight or so more courses which they go through but what I wanted to touch is at the broader milieu in which these people for the general Pakistani population is being primed I'm a medical doctor in the first two years of med school I read anatomy physiology and biochemistry so many other things but two other subjects that were taught for Pakistan studies in Islamiyat now what in the God's name you have to do with Islamiyat in a medical school and that is the curriculum that is being fed to every Pakistani from day one in this audience it is a small world I have two of my classmates from Pakistan Air Force school who know exactly the curriculum that we read and our houses were divided in the school we had Khalid house Kasim house Saladin house and Iqbal house and three of these are military men and then there is Iqbal who is actually the military ideologue I'll read you one Farsi verse of Iqbal which is very commonly used half of it is used and it says any land which is my lord's land is my land what they don't tell you is the first line that Iqbal said this is the Tareq that was another house in our school Tareq bin Ziyad actually landing at Gibraltar burning its boat and everyone said what are you doing and Iqbal was khandid o das tikhash basham shir bur do guft are mulk mulk maast ke mulk e khud ay maast he laughed he took his hand to his sword and said any country which is my lord's country is my country this is the ideology that you are actually grooming the Pakistani kids with this is the doctors and engineers that you are grooming through Pakistani schooling system secular schooling system and it's it's a massacre of history that is taking place there to reduce them to whatever Dora yama and khasa which is like a commando course Hi my name is Matt you've taken a large view with JUD but could you please comment on any similarities differences or convergence between Heqani network and L.E.T. The question was about any convergences between Heqani network and L.E.T. or to unpack that that relationship so far we don't see that but as I said the jihadist forces in that region are coalescing have been coalescing and may further coalesce I think that may come or may not come but Heqani network is basically for Afghanistan and I think in the beginning yes they will coalesce but if one group has to dominate survive it would be the Heqani won't survive As far as Afghanistan goes there has been certain overlap in the Heqani network and the JUD and a lot of the operations conducted against the Indian interests in Afghanistan which I mentioned Hiraat there was an Indian embassy bombing as well in which the blame was laid actually at JUD and Heqani network Heqani network is fundamentally on the Madrasa which is about 40 miles from my hometown of Peshawar but where there is operational need there certainly is an overlap and things you know they can make things happen. There's a woman in the far back you know there's a woman in the far back. Hello my name is Kavija Kumar thank you for your discussion today my question was regarding whether or not back to your discussion previously on Hafiz Said was aiming towards political legitimacy and I think that his statements in the past year and some of the interviews indicate that he's more publicly open about his position last year in the New York Times he said we need to create a political option for Kashmir instead of a militant option so I was wondering why you think that LET's doctrinal evolution doesn't indicate that it could also have a political evolution because you said previously that you think the doctrine is so severe that they couldn't have some form of political vying for a political party but I think their past has shown that they're doctrinally evolutionary and that doctrine is at the service of politics and not the other way around. If I understood your question correctly actually what I meant was it will not be political party in this sense other parties are the U.T. is trying to pose as a political party but then they also say that their politics is Islam I think it was basically a strategy to survive in the post 9-11 period when there was clamped down whatever that meant at that time on Jihadist groups. Have I answered your question? Let me just ask a quick follow-up if I could this is an organization particularly if you speak about Ashguritiba that has focused very significantly on Kashmir both in its rhetoric and its activities how does the organization see its engagements in Kashmir today as the political environment has certainly a very dynamic in Jammu and Kashmir from your reading of their current statements or literature your observation how is their view of their activities or their agenda or their approach changed over time with respect to Kashmir? Theoretically they have not moved from their initial positions on anything and they say that tactically they have irritated a little in Kashmir the Kashmir Jihad is fully funded by the ISI everybody know this is not something secret anywhere in the world and when they want to curb them they curb them after 9-11 there was a lot of pressure on Pakistan to curb these Jihadist groups in Kashmir and they did secondly there was a fence in Kashmir that created a lot of problems for Mujahideen and the result was that they started sending their boys to India proper what I have been trying to say and said in the book is that ISI Pakistan has a very limited agenda and that is Kashmir but the Jihadist group all of them have far bigger agenda and the tolerating those Jihadist groups agenda is what poses the real threat to the world and there is a question Thank you Josh and panelist Ibrahim from Johns Hopkins size very interestingly I hear being from South Asia your discussion scared me a little bit of the future given the complexity of the G.O.D. and at the same time we can see the footprint of the West by the U.S. and Afghanistan is being reduced and the West and the U.S. is encouraging a regional solution for Afghanistan and the South Asia so with the threat you see from G.O.D that you said the government of Pakistan is also unable to control them and they can overthrow the government of Pakistan anyway so how you see that who in the region should let these finding the solution or bring stability for South Asia as a whole if you see Pakistan itself as a big threat and that threat can go and expand to any country in South Asia Afghanistan as an example so how you see the future of that situation with the West having a limited footprint there briefly I don't think one single country can tackle this problem Pakistan or United States or India I think the whole world will have to seriously pooling resources and efforts to fight this threat because even if you eliminate G.U.D central the problem is still there however the real problem comes before that and that is how to stop Pakistani state in other words Pakistan army to use jihad as an instrument of its defense policy Pakistani military has used jihad as an instrument of its defense policy since 1947 it has never never stopped doing that how to stop that unless you you stop that you cannot really fully fight the jihadist group but then you can't really stop fighting just because Pakistan is not doing enough so we have to do that and remain optimist at some stage we will win thank you very much I am Tarek Parvez from Pakistan first of all let me compliment you on writing on such an important topic my I am just trying to be clear about the transformation of L.E.T from a regional terrorist organization to a global terrorist organization my perception was that it is probably regional I would be interested my question is whether there have been any attacks or any attempts to carry out terrorist acts by L.E.T in the west I am not talking about Bosnia and Chastinia they are two different another dimension altogether but I was just looking for some concrete evidence to whether there have been any specific incidents or attempts thank you actually first the J.U.D. or M.D.I. did not become from a Pakistani group into a global group actually it was vice-versa a global an international group called Germans Ichwan became a Pakistani group and then became international again well there is no incident where they succeeded as such but after Bosnia they had planned to go to Italy there are some hadiths which say that Muslims will conquer Roman empire and after they had planned to go into Italy to conquer Rome because that is what they thought God asked them in other in other places they had planned like Lodi incident in Australia they had planned but had not succeeded and I think the Virginia paintball group the Virginia paintball group here yes here also they tried but they did not succeed Virginia group was actually in London the London branch of JUD introduced American jihadist and half is said in London and then they planned I think no court document show that my book shows that how it was the plan was made in London the the spiritual leader of American jihad Ali al-Tawimi was in London with half is said they planned and some of the people like the shoe bomber for example has gone through their training camp and in certain incidences the plans were aborted like the Ellen poston attack was planned but eventually not carried out by JUD and the guy was supposed to do it kind of got disillusioned with their technical restraint that is where the JUD has become a supermarket of jihad anybody can go and get training and come back and start the jihad I would not say that if somebody goes to get trained from JUD come back and do the jihad that's not JUD agenda that's an important distinction sir in the back Tom Timberg consultant and actually this leads into my question which is what about dropouts 500,000 people have gone through the training but we have and a number of them have then gone on to careers and moved abroad and come back to the United States how many of the people go through the course and then drop out or even are alienated by it really I don't have any numbers whatever I know is in the public domain from the newspapers they don't really announce when foreign trainees come to their camps they don't announce and that was not of much interest to me either at any time there aren't many thank you your fascinating excellent presentation Jacqueline Rose here you mentioned some in passing some claims being made that Muslims came to the US and therefore it's the duty to go back and conquer the US could you expand on that in as much detail and as many places and groups that are claiming that as you can I've read only in one article a long article on America in one of the JUD publications because the doctrine is that you have to fight Jihad to take back Muslim lands and they showed that at some point I think 4 or 500 years ago some Muslims did land in America and they wanted to establish a Muslim established Muslim rule here how correct their historical sources I really don't know but that is what they believe so my knowledge is limited to their belief system please wait for the microphone and my question is Mr. Nakvi you said you are from Peshawar and let's say that you lost your relatives in drone attack would you call that Americans sponsored state terrorism similarly let's say that you have relatives in Gaza and you lost your relative where Israel killed 2,000 people just for a couple of its citizens so would you call state sponsored terrorism and similarly in India there are 70,000 Kashmiri who have lost their lives so is that state sponsored terrorism or is it a problem of Al-Dawah Islamic parties and my question to you sir is this just one question to each no please just one question sir so the question is whether I would call well I have lost a lot of friends well let's just talk about personal experience I lost 8 friends in one bombing about 2 furlongs from where I grew up in the city of Peshawar in which the IG Inspector General of Police Malik Saab who was also a good friend that bombing was carried out by the Taliban so it is very close to my heart what I talk about and it is the question is which RF alluded to whether using such groups as instruments of foreign policy or national security whether that is something that can be conducted in this day and age or at some point the Pakistani state has to take a step back and realize or understand that whether they go on rationalizing the use of such proxies and forces which backfire which hurt we have lost great officers the Pakistani officers was a wonderful officer we have lost general Alouvi again a wonderful officer so it is not necessarily that one is just blaming the Pakistani state for its sometimes it's the wrong diagnosis sometimes it's a bad prescription and I think it's a question of the state to take a deep inwards look and realize whatever has been going on up until this point whether this is something which is viable in future or not very briefly about drones actually this is not the topic today but I would like to speak about it drones are not state terrorism it's not terrorism killing terrorists with drones first Pakistani civilian government and Pakistan army has have approved those so it's cooperation between two states first of all secondly if killing Haqimullah Mahsoud is terrorism then I support that terrorism if you think that 20 people who died with one terrorist were not terrorists I'm sorry tell me what the hell what they're doing with Haqimullah you see why these terrorists are using human shields they are part of the groups so they are not terrorists the most important thing for your point from your perspective should be that Pakistan both civilians and military approve that I would commend to all of you the book which you will find outside and I think as you've heard from the conversation today does a tremendous job of tracing the evolution of a movement that we often tend to see as static and also the global dimension of a movement that we tend to see as quite localized so for those reasons and others and for his tremendous remarks today I'd ask you to join me in thanking both of the speakers thank you very much