 The title alludes to my infatuation with the philosophy of Husser, the European philosopher, and his phenomenology. And some decades ago I developed an interest in this theme, but I had never the time to develop it, and still I don't have the time to develop it. This is why I call it polygamina, but I think nevertheless it will be of some interest. And the question I'm going to ask, I claim, has not been addressed yet in the literature on Jainism, but I'm happy to be corrected on this point, and I would actually be delighted, because then that would save me a lot of work. Look at these things. So it can be very quick. I mean there are some sources which everyone knows here in this room which are discussing these things, time, conceptions and so on. A few studies which I will refer to in the brief time remaining are these, the latest one by Christoph Emmerich in the volume edited by Piotr, the latest one that I considered. And Emmerich there says, so far research concerning time has concentrated on a rather late phase without considering earlier developments, i.e. late phase means classical Jainism, and he focuses on earlier conceptual developments. The terminology he says in all of Jain literature on time, nevertheless acquires not the strictness of the Buddhist works. And therefore he refrains from constructing a coherent theory of time, that means reconstructing it, and rather focuses on some strategies of explanation and varying degrees of integration. Basically the impression one gets is that according to this latest research on this issue, that the Jain conception of time is not very well developed, it is the multiplicity of views which are not well integrated and therefore one has to look at each and every single view and it is in a way a side issue of the Jain philosophy. Now my paper will argue somewhat differently that first the conception of time is fundamental to Jain's sociology and philosophy both early and late. Theories of action for instance, in time we heard about the problems of causation, etc. And it would be interesting to hear Johannes' views on the implications of time for the theories on causation in Indian philosophy, but of course also for philosophical perspectivism, Adikantavada, time is of the essence. Second point to be made, without systematization of the concept of time, classical Jainism, and I focus on that, could not have been established as a recognizable philosophical school. Third point, problems in the philosophy of time inevitably affect Jaina logic. And lastly, the logical reconstruction of the constitution of Jaina concepts of time as objects of time consciousness could be the theme of a new research programme. I mean I cannot solve things here, I ask some questions. I give five examples first before I say something about the concept of time and probably run out of time by then. Example one, and I take this from Himaltrika's work which I am very impressed by and I can say that he will arrive at about lunchtime, he has caught a plane, this is the latest news so we can all inquire personally later. He points out that in the Sabta Bangi, on which we will hear many papers today, an object is looked at at a variety of perspectives. But also, by implication, the perspectives that are not mentioned are implied. So the distinction between Swarparaya and Paraparaya is very important. And I think his work is one of the few commentary works which focus on this aspect. And he mentions, as I highlighted there, that the two aspects can only be sequentially expressed. And this is of course a general point that can be made about perspectivism. Each perspective, from the conventional point of view of a mortal human being that is not omniscient, has to be taken one at a time. Of course that leads to a potentially infinite amount of time and we have no time. So how can we solve this? Is this just a heuristic, the perspectivism? And if one looks at European philosophy, who sell, etc., object, constitution, one finds similar problems and that is quite interesting to explore from a comparative point of view. But the point is, there's no, in a way, Jane philosophy, perspectivism, shifts the problem from logic. You know, I agree with Piotr, this is all more about ontology than inference and logic, but it shifts the problem to the question of time. Kicking it into the long grass, as the English say. Second example, Pramana and Naya, again from Himaltrika. Method of Naya can only be subsequent to the method of Pramana and the previous paper was addressing issues like that. Again, this was highlighted by Him. Again, the problem of time is flagged up. Example three, Vyavahara and Nishchaya Naya. The alternation of perspectives can also be only performed in time. And Bansita Bhatt and Shalini Sinha have started to investigate how the perspective, which perspective was behind a particular verse in the Samayasara, for instance, but research is going on, there are many controversies. Example four, I will linger a little bit longer on that. I've written a bit in a paper on sacred matter in the Journal of Indian Philosophy on Dwai Kriya, Ninava and Traivashika Ninava. Piotr also addressed this issue. And today I look at this problem. The Ninavas, these are heretics and they are rebutted by some implicitly proposed orthodox Jain position. And I would argue, and I have done so in Lumbini in the paper a month ago, that all the Ninavas deal with problems of part-whole relationships and also the relationship of part-whole relationships in terms of time moments, the integration of a time moment and a time whole, as it were. The Dwai Kriya doctrine is associated with the story of Arya Ganga and Arya Danagiri, his teacher and is well-known, I don't know to most of you here, while crossing the waters to meet his guru, Ganga, experienced the cold water and the hot sun at the same time. And he said, the Jain doctrine, propounded in the scriptures, must be wrong because he has this experience. The Jain doctrine is that each perception can be cognized only at a particular moment. And his teacher then replies, rebuts him and says, your perception is wrong, it creates an illusion, it's based on an illusion, because you're not able to perceive that your perception actually is based on a very fast alternation of the two perceptions. They do not occur simultaneously, but your mind is switching very, very quickly, imperceptible to the common mind between one and the other. So again, the problem is kicked into the question of time. And that is a very interesting example, which I have to skip because of the... So this is the verse cited, this is in the Visheshavashika Tikka of Malayagiri. The non-production of many cognitions at one time is the essential quality of mind. This is cited as the key Jain tenet, which the heretics, such as in this case Ganga, do not accept. So if this is the key of Jainism, then of course we need to know more about time. And the cognition of time, and this is where time consciousness and the phenomenology of time consciousness comes in. You need an observer, and you need to theorize the role of an observer in the conceptualization of time, and there are many things to be said about that. So the Jains have made a number of propositions. I'm running quickly out of time, this is why I summarized them without giving you much evidence. Basically, one argument is that there is a synthetic point of view, and you know the seven Nayas, and the Samgraha point of view. So from that point of view, you can take the whole in perspective without looking at the parts. For instance, you can look at the time sequence as a whole, as a picture as it were, you see a line with dots and an arrow or whatever, without looking at every instance. But from another perspective, from the real perspective as it were, from the empirical perspective, you have to look at each instance. But of course we have to switch in time again from one perspective to the other to get the whole picture. So we have again the usual problem, and the ultimate solution is of course to posit some omniscient. I mean this is a purely theoretical fix, I think, because you have to take a leap of faith to come from a conventional perspective, if you like, to a transcendental perspective, to the determinate real perspective Nishchaya Naya. You cannot incrementally come from one to the other. And we discussed this problem in Lumbini as well. So I think the omniscient is just posited and attributed to the mystical legendary story of Mahavira. We know that Mahavira was a historical person, but not everything that was said about him was surely historical. So he was attributed with Kevalajnana, etc., etc. And that I think does not solve the problems of time. And how much time do I have? Because according to my watch we started at 10.35 after the technical problems. So you have about 15 minutes? Oh, you're very generous. Well, I mean that means we are getting lead, but I mean it's okay. Well, let me go straight to example five. This is the most interesting, also well known. I'm not giving you new data at all. I'm just pointing out, I'm asking a question and pointing out directions which I think I was well investigating. In the mind of the omniscient, how do Kevalajnana absolute perception and Kevalajnana absolute knowledge relate to one another? It's a very famous controversy in Jain literature. And I give you just a table. There are basically three positions. One is even the omniscient, although he knows everything or it knows everything, has to look at each and every cognition in a succession. This is position A. And interestingly enough, this is a position of the Jaina Agamas, the Shwetambra Agamas. I give you a few famous references there. And Siddhasen Haganin's commentary on the Tatvarta Sutra, Otto commentary of Umaswati, is also supporting this view. And Ijina Bhattra in the Visheshavashikabhashya also. The opposite position is, I mean if these things are really relative to time, then there is of course the whole question of omniscience is put into question. And some, mainly Digambra, but not only Digambra philosophers have said, even the omniscient must have a simultaneous perception and knowledge of everything that there is. And the idea is if all karmas are removed, there is no time consideration, but you see everything at once and future and past of course. And that is an interesting issue to consider in terms of determinism. There are so many issues that I was developing and I cannot show you all my own 250 slides. So Kunda Kunda and famously Umaswati argues that point. The third position is basically only taken by Siddhasena Divakara, the most famous Ritambara philosopher who had his own mind. And he argued that in the position B, perception and knowledge are still distinguished by different cognitive functions, but they actually merge in the state of omniscience. There is no distinction anymore between perception and knowledge. The position B said, okay there are still different qualities, but that occurs simultaneously, but they remain different qualities. Siddhasena has basically merged into one, they are indistinct, and this is the Abheda Vada position in contrast to the Sahavada and Krama Vada position. So it's a real problem for Jain philosophers, particularly the Gamba philosophers. This is at the apex as it were, the whole edifice of Jain philosophy. And there is no agreement and I think quite rightly so, because if one looks at the problem of time, you see that there is no solution there. It is universally agreed that non-omniscient observers can only perceive everything in succession. So there is no disagreement there, but with regard to the omniscient, we have these three options. But the Agamas, of course, are in favor of that. I skip all that stuff here, which is quite well known and move on to a few things about time. I thought in my brief reading of the literature on concepts of time in philosophy, the brief work of Shaya, which has been republished I think last year in Warsaw, is the most useful for the purpose of this talk. He proposed a hypothetical reconstruction of the development of concepts of time in Indian philosophy in general, so not looking at just one school, but focusing on Buddhism. He says, first, the oldest layer posits substantial time called kalavada, i.e. a kind of a fluid or quasi-material substance that pervades all space. And this perception is apparently shared, according to him, by all schools. And it can only be inferred, it cannot be observed, and so on and so forth. This is a very rudimentary conception, of course. But we are familiar with this conception from the Jain philosophy still. So they must have carried some baggage from the very, very early times in India. The second and next phase is the Tricalia Vada, the doctrine, i.e. the view that there is a past, present and future. And that is an issue that is also reflected, of course, in Jain philosophy in the famous definition, for instance, of gumaswati, of existence as origination and duration and cessation. I mean, it is another level. And finally, and of course Shaya says, the Buddhist position is the most important one, the most advanced one. Only the present is real, not past, present and future. I mean, these are all intellectual constructions, you know, what is past and what is future. Only the present can be experienced. And these are the basic, very broad alternatives in Indian philosophy. The Jains are usually classified under realists, i.e. those who accept a substantive notion of time. But for them, time is a substance, one of six substances, but a substance that has no mass. It is therefore not seen as belonging to the astikayas. It is a massless substance and therefore it is special and not accepted by all Shwetambara thinkers as a proper substance, but basically most agree it is a substance but a substance without mass. The Buddhists, of course, strictly, most of them, not all, so many complexities, non-realistic schools. And here are some characteristics of time as a substance, subtlety, omnipenetrability, omnipresence, eternity, unity, indivisibility, etc. And that is an interesting observation of Shaya, I think, that time and space stand in the middle of a scale between spiritual and costly material substances. And that was the conclusion of the paper in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, which I worked on recently, that the notion of space, akasha, and time is reduced in space, I can say that because of lack of time. Time is spatialized in the Jain conception, as in other conceptions, is, in a way, the third between jiva and arjiva, or the third element, which anchors the whole Jain cosmology, the whole Jain system. And Shaya's observation here, I think, fits this quite well, or my little footnote supports his perspective, and this is a very, very interesting thing. Now, what are the foundations of realist time theories? Shaya says, and this can be all substantiated with slides, which I have from Jain text. Number one, real-time color must be postulated as a necessary correlate of time terms and time relations. This is exactly what Johannes Broncos has said a minute ago, in a different context. It simply has to be, there has to be something, because what are our words otherwise referred to, you know? So it's a kind of ratification. The second argument made in favor of substantiated realist time theories is the observed changes and the impermanence of existence. And two courses are distinguished in the Jain literature as well. A specific course of change, which one can observe, and a course of change with large, with a big C, you know? Change of everything, you know, the flow of time or something like that. And these, the second course, of course, is inferred. It cannot be observed, it is inferred from the specific courses. Now I skip all this. These are nine categories of time. I'll now give you a few examples of Jain notions of time and the multiplicity which Christoph Emmerich rightly referred to. Of the nine mentioned in the Abhashika Nyugti, which may be the oldest text, four are highlighted in the Vyapanati. And basically I think there is an opposition between absolute time. This is again, you know, time with large. And number nine, the inner state is a Bava, particular changes that are experienced. And in between there's conventional time, large time measures like Iyans, Utharpini, Avassarpini, and measured time, this is civic time. So these conceptions are, in a way, objective time conceptions. And the italicized aspects could be linked to, I mean, number nine as well, to subjective time conceptions. But I think in general the Jains cannot answer the question how time is experienced very well, because they try to present an objective theory of time. And in that sense, time consciousness, this whole issue, has to be inferred by a modern observer, or this is a theme that is brought from the outside to the tradition. And there are, of course, texts which explain how one perceives change and so on. That is very interesting. It needs to be studied. Now, I'm running out of time, I suppose. Well, from the point of view of measured time, yes. Let me come finally to give you some food for thought who notes some, to this, and a final citation from Naginsha, who wrote a very good article on this. So there are different attributes of absolute time and conventional time. And the interesting thing is that Samaya, the instant observer, comes up twice. Once as a time measure, or is it not in this? It's not here. Let me see. Then the other. Ah, here. No, I'm sorry. So many slides to show. Yes, Samaya comes up there as a heading. Samaya. And here, so it's a modification of absolute time. And on the other hand, it's a unit of conventional time that is theoretically positive. And according to the text, it's the time an atom takes to move across a space point which it occupies. It's a slow movement. So that shows that there's a circular definition. Time is defined in terms of time, the time an atom takes, etc. Similarly, there's a circular definition of space. And these are problems which people like Naginsha, for instance, have addressed. But you can see absolute time, substantivized time, kala, and conventional time, etc. have been completely separated. And the question is how do both relate to one another? And that is an unsolved problem. Of course these unsolved problems lead only to one conclusion. Jane philosophy, Jane logic, is not standing on sound foundations. Basically the work has to be done to explain these, I wouldn't say contradictions, these conundrums. And this is for you to discuss. It will close with these quotations from Naginsha. Otherwise the Jane's in the audience accuse me for not representing the proper Jane point of view. He points out that according to Jane philosophy, every substance has qualities and modes. Therefore it does not need time as an additional external substance that causes the mode. The modes are already attributes of the substance. And in fact I see no logic in positing time as an independent substance, he writes. We can account for all the concerned usages with the help of the modes of the five substances. My new changes in the kala, absolute time, are eternal without beginning and end. Hence it is illogical to posit a causal condition to account for it. What is eternal, beginningless and endless, has no cause whatsoever. The description of time as atomic, these samaya atoms, seems metaphorical. Each and every material atom could be called time atom. And this very well explains the scriptural statement regarding the absence of its spatial extensions. I.e. time is not an astikaya. Why is it not conceived as one continuous whole like dharma, adharma and akasha? Time is posited to account for the minute changes in other substances. But what would account for the changes in the time substance itself? Well the answer is time and therefore the whole thing becomes circular. It would be said that the modification of time atoms is natural and hence requires no other causal condition. The logic could be applied to explain the modifications of other substances. If some other auxiliary cause is posited to explain changes in the time atom, it would involve infinite regress. Hence this view of an independent time at atomic time substance seems to be very weak and unsound. Thank you very much.