 Let's try to deal with the China question, since it was the question at lunch, it seems to be on quite a lot of people's minds. Mr. Vadrin, do you think that Enrico kind of laid it out in fairly stark terms? I mean, do you think Europe really does have to choose somehow between the US and China, or is this a false choice, do you think? Well, ideally, Europe shouldn't have to choose. Europe should have its own position, and according to the subjects, it would agree or not with the United States, agree or not with China, it could even play a constructive role on the new rules of globalization that need to be set up a little more. But it is supposed that Europe has its own position, so if it can't have its own own position, it will indeed be condemned to choose or to submit, in terms of technology. So it is very important that Europeans manage to define a common vision, it is supposed to have the same evaluation, which is not obvious, of the problem that China represents. Is it a problem, is it a threat, is it an opportunity, is it just a partnership that is bigger than the others? Already, there is not quite an agreement on the level of evaluation and diagnostics. If we came to that, if we had some common positions and some priorities as a European, it is obvious that almost every day in London, we would find on this particular point a real power that would need to be used intelligently. Because when we talk about power, a theme that is finally developed, it is a reasonable power, of course, rational, etc. And it starts with an effort between Europeans on the exact evaluation, which is not yet done. Yes, exactly. Would others like to come in on this question? In the 10 points highlighted by Kevin lunchtime, from Xi Jinping's perspective, the 10th is our priority as Westerners and in particular as Europeans. And I would say as Europeans, because our strength, and we are not any longer on this priority of the soft power and the 21st century being the era or the beginning of the era of law, but we are wired in legal terms, we are wired in institutional terms, which means that I absolutely agree with Kevin, the position of China is to infuse new values to the existing framework, not to shake it as Russia has tried to do sometimes, but in the end sharing the core issues and bringing into a legal, Western approach, rational context, concepts like harmony. Okay, you know, we have to understand this and to just be very clear about what this means. It's not just a nice word put into, and taking just one example. So I think that for us, this idea of power, and it was very interesting, this idea that this privacy or ownership of data, we bet on the citizens. We have millions or billions of allies that are concerned that the data. We need to be consequent to be meant to have to get the consequences of what we mean and stand by them. And just on this issue of China, counter the subtle idea because when they establish other institutions, okay, you see that, but when they come and they infuse different concepts, values, principles in the existing institutions, this is not perceived. Right. Poker, please. Steve, I think if we were to accept this binary choice that we had, if we were to accept that we have to choose the one side or the other, we would already have lost. We would have lost our whatever aspiration of some form, any form of strategic autonomy or European sovereignty or whatever you call it. And therefore, I think we simply must not accept it and lay out. And I think we have good reasons and good arguments and good instruments to lay out that there are alternatives. Of course, China is a competitor. But the question is how do you compete? Do you simply geopolitize and militarize competition? Or do we say it is competition over a whole range of policy issues which includes that you cooperate on some issues where you have a common interest, climate change, for example, but you compete over technology or you compete over social models. And I think the European Commission got it right in that strategic paper which it issued earlier that year and which probably doesn't have 100% consensus in Europe, but a very, very wide-ranging consensus where they actually split sort of the policy fields and said, yes, China is an economic partner. China is a partner on some global affairs like working on climate change. China is also a technological competitor, no doubts about it. And what probably didn't go down too well in Beijing, China is a systemic rival when it comes to issues of governance. I think saying that clearly and making sure that being a systemic rival would not keep us from cooperating on climate change. I mean, why should we sort of give up, cooperate on issues of mankind because we have a competition about models of governance? That is the way Europe has to go if it wants to assert itself. And my last point, we are not alone here. I mean, go to Southeast Asia, go to India, go to Latin America. And I guess there are a lot of actors here. I mean, it's young people who would like to have Huawei and Apple or Apple with Chinese characteristics. It's also a lot of elites who would like to have American arms with Chinese financing if that was possible. I mean, no one wants to choose. So why should we be pushed into that binary choice just by the US and China? Because, I mean, sometimes what worries me is, I mean, a long time ago I wrote a piece called Needing an Enemy and Finding China. And I think there's this great risk of creating something that doesn't have to be there. And if you're thinking about climate change, I mean, China is now responsible for 40% of CO2. I mean, people in Europe could heat their coffee by blowing on it. And it would make almost no difference to the state of the planet. So dealing with China on these things, India matters terribly. Enrico, sorry, please. Just one point about the fact that this binary choice in my thought is the consequence of 28 Brexit. Interesting. In case of 28 Brexit, each country has only a binary choice to be a colony of the US or a colony of China. Being together, we can avoid the choice because we can be at the same level on many issues. We can take the leadership of some of these issues. And we have to change our narrative on Europe on that because our narrative is still on some issues, the same narrative of the 60s and the 70s, the Cold War narrative about peace, stability, and so on. That is no more, I think, the narrative with which you can deal with young people and the new generation. I have to clearly tell them there are issues where we can take the leadership only if we are united. If not, it's impossible to take this leadership. And at the end of the day, the choice for all the different member states will be to be closer to the one or to other one. This is why at the end of the day, I think our choice is a very political choice. And it's a political choice in terms of delivery because if we are not able to deliver on some of these issues, it's quite impossible. For instance, on many of these issues, delivery means also the way in which we decided to take decisions. For instance, I am in that period, I know it's very difficult to say, I know it's very divisive, but we can't continue thinking that we have on all the different issues to be at 28 or at 27. I am a big fan of considering that Two Speeds Europe was a success on many issues. Europe and Schengen, two successes, two Two Speeds Europe. So it is not a blasphemy to say Two Speeds Europe on some subject. But we have to be very, very concrete, effective in saying that we need delivery. If we continue to be two orthodox, saying that we can't have Two Speeds Europe because it is heterodox, at the end of the day, citizens will not be happy of the decisions and they will decide to vote for Le Pen or for Salvino or whatever. So it's a problem of delivery, of how to be effective in our decisions. In some way, some decisions, we have to take these decisions out of the treaties. I know it's a sort of blasphemy, but ESM was a decision taken outside the treaties because it was necessary in one night to take a decision and the European Union needs to give the citizens the idea that we can protect them because we are able to decide and not just to wait because of treaties, difficulties, unanimous decisions and so on and so forth. Well, blasphemy is good here, I think. I'd actually want to ask Artemis a question, if I may, and then Michael, I'll come to you. Artem, do you think Russia's kind of knew what we call this, what Kevin called the strategic condominium with China? Is this tactical or strategic? I mean, is it out of current sense of weakness or is it some... I talked to Alexander Dugan the other day, believe it or not, a sort of slightly mad theorist of Eurasia and I can't tell how seriously anyone takes this in Russia. So do you think maybe Russia bends too far toward China and is it tactical or is it a long-term partnership, do you think? Look, I guess in this kind of condominium only you, the Europeans, you believe in this condominium. We don't, since we are much closer to China and even us, we don't know China to be good predictors, to have really adequate forecasts. If you look, you and us, the Russians, we overlooked all dramatic changes through the post-Second World War history of China. It shows how we understand and this perfect report, this perfect sketch of Prime Minister Rod shows to what extent of understanding of China we are. Not upon any other country we can imagine such a speech, brilliant speech at a launch. Because generally the grand lines of the French Foreign Policy or German or Austrian or even Russian, it shows that our understanding of China is still tremendous, less official. We talk about binary choice but whether Chinese do choose in the same way. They have India, they have Southeast Asia, they have many times more developed relations with the United States, they have the African policy, they've been overlooked by everyone, by the Europeans, by the Russians, by the Americans and I guess our point of view upon the China here from Europe or from Moscow, I guess for the Chinese, it's still the same Europe. It's inadequate and I guess here about condemnation, where it's condemnation? In Central Asia, in the Caucasus, over Mongolia, I see no space for this condemnation. Relations with China, to my mind, are going to be much more complex, not European or Euro-Atlantic style. It's one point and another, we still have to understand what is driving force for the Chinese economic growth and when and because of what it can stop, potentially. And since we overlooked so many changes in Chinese developments, I guess probably we also overlooked the margins, the barriers, the constraints of this economic growth and if there are some of these constraints, it ruins the whole picture, this very frightening picture of nowadays China's relations with the rest of the world. Thank you, Michael. I'm a bit puzzled by this, I think you've said it twice now, what do you call the binary choice of the decision on Brexit between China on the one hand and America on the other? Because if you came to London or anywhere in the United Kingdom and you said that was your view of what Brexit was about, they'd look at you in total confusion. Because if that was the question, the British would vote for neither. The whole point about Brexit was to give ourselves more room for maneuvering without being tied to major blocs. So I think if you say that this is the question that Europe has got to take into account, I would say to you that is not a valid question. We genuinely, somebody said to me, why have you always appeared to be anti-European? My answer has always been, we're not anti-European, we're part of Europe. We've always been part of Europe, our history is European. We are anti-overdone bureaucracy. And if you want to see in the world the best example I can think of, overdone bureaucracy, you find it in Brussels. And the feeling in Britain was that to be told you could do certain things, you could eat certain things, or you could dress in a certain way was a decision for Europe, was something that got under their skin. When you say why did they vote the way they did, in a sense they were blaming the British politicians for not talking to them. It's only now after the referendum is over we're discovering had we gone down and talked to them, you might have discovered a lot of these things earlier. Precisely. Henry, do you want to answer quickly? No, just to say that my point is not that this is the discussion about the referendum. My point is that will be the consequence in ten years time. In ten years time, with separation, with split of Europe, each country in ten years time, not today, will have only to decide whether to be an American colony or a Chinese colony, with the split of the European Union. Well, that is my point. Maybe I'm wrong. I can't see with the evolution, demographic, in terms of economic power, the possibility of any of the European country to be able to deal alone with China or with the US. The only possibility to stand all together. And this is why I think for the UK it would be a problem. Not today, I'm sure, and I know very well that the debate was on other issues. No, that's fine. I mean, this is all understood. Michael, you have explained the divide between the elite and the people. I mean, what you are saying on the Brussels being the big bureaucratic, it's what the elite in your country has been. This has been the anthem of your elite. So, I mean, I think that you as elite, you should revise what you have been telling and what this idea of not having the right, I mean, being forbidden to have coffee or tea bags, not coffee. I mean, mind you, not coffee, tea bags or this kind of thing. Hey, this is not the reality. We are not going to discuss bureaucracy in Brussels and its successes. But I think that there you have, hey, honestly, you as elites, you have to look at yourself. It's not that we do not have to do it in other countries, but frankly, on the Brexit issue, I had to say that. Okay. Well done. Let's actually not keep going too much on Brexit because I mean, we're in a kind of interesting moment where things might get resolved nicely. I suspect my own guess is there'll be a technical extension and for not very long, because one of the things quite clear to me is Boris Johnson would like it done before he has an election, which he also needs. But, you know, everybody's got their own views. And Minister Bedrin makes his apologies. He had an appointment he couldn't avoid, and we got started a bit late. So I just wanted to express to you from him his deep regrets for having to leave early. So we still have about half an hour. I'd like to, given Poland, I'd love to talk a little bit about Hungary, Poland, rule of law. You know, this is one of the great, perhaps it's tied to the migration issue. It's tied to the identity issue. It's tied to lots of things. But can Europe at 28, 27, can Europe deal with this question? What are the instruments? Can it do better or is it better to somehow rethink the idea of what European federalism is to allow for more sovereignty, which might have kept Britain in the European Union had it been done earlier? So would anyone like to deal with this question? Michael, why don't you start? I can only speak for myself. But I voted to leave because after 40 years of being told that Europe was going to reform, I got fed up with waiting for it. But had somebody come along with a proper reform proposed, which would have given less power to Brussels and more power to the individual nations and their peoples, I would probably have supported that. The goal used to speak of the Europe de Patrie, the Europe des Nations. I was a fervent European in those days. I am a fan of Jacques Delors' brand federation des Tannations, because I think it was a good synthesis. My point, and I continue on the blasphemy mood, my point is that, for instance, on migrations and in the relationship with Visigrad countries, frankly speaking, we can't think we will have any positive and concrete effective solution having Orban at the table with the veto right. This is my point. If someone is convincing on this point, I would be more than happy. But I think it's very complicated. So, for instance, on these topics, we need to have another treaty, a treaty outside of EU treaties signed by willing countries without Hungary or without Poland. I don't know the other Visigrad countries position. We need the idea to have a treaty with tools, with relocation framework, with meanings, and with rules, and with the majority rule to decide. Until now, we had evolutions on this topic, and at the end of the day, they are unaffected. They are not working. My point is that if we continue allowing those countries to stop the decisions of the others, it will be a problem for us and it will be an European Union non-effective. So, it is just one example. Just to tell you that at the end of the day, I think it's the only way to be very assertive and to be also clear with them. I know that there's a big difference between the funding members of the European Union and Visigrad countries in terms of demographics. Funding members of the European Union, we used to be around 10% of our population is from an immigrant origin, around 10%. Less, more, but it is around 10%. If I'm not wrong, in Poland, Hungary, these figures are 99 versus 1%. And the 1% is not coming from Africa or from Latin America, it's coming from the rest of Central Europe. So, at the end of the day, there's a very big point of starting that is so different. This is why I say we can't wait, we have to have new tools and we have to decide. So, this new treaty for me is one of the urgencies of this new political religion. It is worth saying, by the way, that Poland has many more immigrants than you imagined, but most of them are Ukrainian. So, Anna and then Volker. Honestly, I agree with Enrico and I think that the only way forward is a geography variable. So, distinct groupings in distinct issues. The problem we have here is not migration. I think that what you were referring is more the principles and values that are enshrined in Article 2 of the treaty. And in particular, let me say independence of the justice of the judiciary system, independence of justice. And this is something that we have to rethink. And maybe, you know what, diminish the area where we have judicial cooperation. This is something that we will have to address with open eyes. I think that the days have changed and you know what, it could be done. We could go shrinking and it should not be perceived. And I think that we can explain it to our population. So, absolutely clear in new areas, we can address the 28. And Schengen and the Euro are good examples of things that Schengen is clear. It was thought outside and then it was incorporated. And this incorporation probably should be revisited. And we have to do it. We have to do it. This is my perspective because the rule of law is also changing because the law is changing. I mean, we have to defend it in this context of China of just weakening of the value of the law of other instruments. International treaties. Paris is not legally binding. This is a new system. And we need to understand that incorporation and I'm a died-in-the-wool lawyer, European continental lawyer. But, you know, we have to be realistic. And in terms of European Union, let's rethink certain sensitive areas. Okay, Poland, you don't want, okay, then you don't. You are not in the Schengen area. You are not in the cooperation, in the judicial cooperation. And we negotiate and we decide the alternative. Do these reforms to have an independent justice? Okay, Volcker, please. Well, three short points. One I think on Europe being so unreformable, that's a little bit of a myth which probably helped to win the Brexit referendum in Britain. But I think the British Prime Minister at that time, David Cameron, was the one who proved that you can renegotiate a couple of important issues. Like the question of social benefits to immigrants and their children who live in other countries. Cameron, he had a sound argument and he got the consensus from the others. So things could be changed and that is what happens. I mean, it's a living body and the European Union has always worked in progress and things do change. And the bureaucracy in Brussels is not much bigger than that of a big city in Europe, actually. I remember a Canadian friend once coming and saying, well, we are so envious that you are having something like Brussels because it means that your nation states don't have to have all this trade bureaucracy 27 or 28 times. So I guess you would have a little bit more bureaucracy in Britain after Brexit because you need your own trade negotiators now, rather than sourcing that out to Brussels, who is doing it in the common European interest. But more importantly, I think on the other issues. Either we actually have a sort of flexible geography or we have qualified majority voting on more things, including foreign policy. And I think both would be a way to overcome this embarrassing situation that in the U.N. or in the Human Rights Council, we have a statement read by one European Council for 26 or for 27 out of 28. The U.K. is always with the majority here. And then of Hungary or Greece saying, oh, we cannot share that because it is against China or so. So why not have qualitative majority voting also on foreign policy issues? I think that would be the way forward. And sort of the dialectic conclusion of that is, I mean, we complain so much about people saying that elites don't listen to them. But here we have something, if we would go forward with a stronger foreign policy, where the majority of the people in Europe, and we know that from opinion polls all over the place, would be with us. So one thing where people want more integration is foreign policy and security policy. They don't want it in cultural policies. They don't want it in social policies necessarily. But foreign policy, security, they do all want more integrated Europe. Great. I would like, I've got one more question, and I'd like to go then to the audience. So please think of some questions you might have for our panel. Archon, did you... Just a comment a little bit upon Poland. I guess I'll tell you just a short anecdote. A friend of mine from Italy once, it was before 2004. He said, look, it was a talk between two Italians. Look, the polls going to join EU, and another one he commented. Yeah, the polls are such Russians are those who write in Latin alphabet. And you should understand the difference between these parts of Europe. They don't feel responsibility for the migrants that are not theirs. They don't feel responsibility for these regions. They never had in common with the Middle East or Africa. It's as simple as that. Do believe me, I can tell this because my children, they're 50% Polish. Inside the countries, they say in the West, in absolutely Russian meaning, in your part of Europe, most of you from the Western part of Europe. That is why they need much more time to get used to this solidarity. Probably Germany has not so much in common with Middle East as France, as Italy as Britain, but you already got used to this kind of sovereignty, to this kind of solidarity and joint commoner's responsibility. The polls they didn't use. But at the same time, they consider as ours, them, those who come from, even from the Caucasus, from Central Asia, since it's not something alien, they simply have their family histories, family memory, that okay, we had a Polish origin governor in Georgia. By the way, he's a great grandson. He's a professor of our university, Professor Baranowski. So it's another history. You could not force them. I'm not such a specialist. No, no, no. It's good. And also, let me just add one sentence. That's, I mean, and you don't mind if I say this, under Soviet Union, they were under a bell jar for 70 years. There was no immigration and emigration under the Soviet Union from Poland. I mean, maybe you could emigrate a bitch, but there was no immigration much. So it's all a bit of a shock, I think. And it does feed people who want to play on fears of identity and what's happening to the family and all the rest of it.