 All right, thanks, everybody. Good afternoon, and thank you for joining us to talk about the state of AI and the Department of Defense. So earlier this week, President Biden and Vice President Harris spoke eloquently about the Administration's commitment to advancing the safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence. And the President signed an executive order that lays out strong positive vision for government-wide responsible AI adoption, setting a model for industry and the world. As part of that, we here in DOD look forward to working with the White House and other national security agencies on a national security memorandum on AI that we expect will build on the responsible AI work we've done here at DOD. Because this is a topic, we care a lot about a DOD, and we've been working on it for quite some time. For not only is AI on the minds of many Americans today, it's a key part of the comprehensive warfighter-centric approach to innovation that Secretary Austin and I have been driving from day one. After all, DOD is hardly a newcomer to AI. The Pentagon has been investing in AI and fielding data and AI-enabled systems for over 60 years. From DARPA funding for the first academic research hubs of AI at MIT, Stanford, and Carnegie Mellon in the 1960s, to the Cold War-era SAGE air defense system, which could ingest vast amounts of data from multiple radars, process it in real time, and produce targeting information for intercepting aircraft and missiles, to the Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool DART that DOD started using in the early 1990s, saving millions of dollars and logistical headaches in moving forces to the Middle East for operations, desert shield and desert storm. More recently, Apple's Siri has roots not just in decades of DOD-driven research on AI and voice recognition, but also in a specific DARPA project to create a virtual assistant for military personnel. Of course, increasingly over the last dozen years, advances in machine learning have heralded and accelerated new generations at AI breakthroughs with much of the innovation happening outside DOD in government. And so our task in DOD is to adopt these innovations wherever they can add the most military value. That's why we've been rapidly iterating and investing over the past two-plus years to develop a more modernized, data-driven, and AI-empowered military now. In DOD, we always succeed through teamwork and here we're fortunate to work closely with a strong network of partners in national labs, universities, the intelligence community, the national defense industry, and also non-traditional companies in Silicon Valley and hubs of AI innovation all across the country. In several of those, we're physically present, including through offices of the Defense Innovation Unit, which we recently elevated to report directly to the Secretary. As we focused on integrating AI into our operations responsibly and at speed, our main reason for doing so has been straightforward, because it improves our decision advantage. From the standpoint of deterring and defending against aggression, AI-enabled systems can help accelerate the speed of commander's decisions and improve the quality and accuracy of those decisions, which can be decisive in deterring a fight and in winning a fight. And from the standpoint of managing across the world's largest enterprise, since our vast scale can make it difficult for DOD to see itself clearly, spot problems, and solve them, leveraging data and AI can help leaders make choices that are smarter, faster, and even lead to better stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Since the spring of 2021, we've undertaken many foundational efforts to enable all of this, spanning data and talent and procurement and governance. For instance, we issued data decrees to mandate all DOD data be visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure. Our ADA initiative deployed data scientists to every combatant command, where they're integrating data across applications, systems, and users. We awarded Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability Contracts to four leading-edge commercial cloud providers, ensuring we have computing, storage, network infrastructure, and advanced data analytics to scale on demand. We stood up DOD's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, or CDAO, to accelerate adoption of data, analytics, and AI from the boardroom to the battlefield. The Secretary and I are ensuring CDAO is empowered to lead change with urgency, from the e-ring to the tactical edge. We've also invested steadily and smartly in accompanying talent and technology, more than $1.8 billion in AI and machine learning capabilities alone over the coming fiscal year. And today, we're releasing a new data analytics and AI adoption strategy, which not only builds on DOD's prior year AI and data strategies, but also includes updates to account for recent industry advances in federated environments, decentralized data management, generative AI, and more. I'm sure our CDAO, Dr. Craig Martel, will say more about that when you all speak with him later this afternoon. All this and more is helping realize combined joint all-domain command and control, CJADC2. To be clear, CJADC2 isn't a platform or single system we're buying. It's a whole set of concepts, technologies, policies, and talent that are advancing a core U.S. warfighting function, the ability to command and control forces. So we're integrating sensors and fusing data across every domain, while leveraging cutting-edge decision support tools to enable high op-tempo operations. It's making us even better than we already are at joint operations and combat integration. CJADC2 is not some futuristic dream. Based on multiple global information dominance experiments, work in the combatant commands like in OPACOM and CENTCOM, as well as work in the military services, it's clear these investments are rapidly yielding returns. That's the beauty of what software can do for hard power. Delivery doesn't take several years or a decade. Our investments in data, AI, and compute are empowering warfighters in here and now, in a matter of months, weeks, and even days. We've worked tirelessly for over a decade to be a global leader in the fast and responsible development and use of AI technologies in the military sphere, creating policies appropriate for their specific use. Technology is critical because unsafe systems are ineffective systems. The Pentagon first issued a responsible use policy for autonomous systems in 2012. And we've maintained our commitment since, as technology has evolved, adopting and affirming ethical principles for using AI, issuing a new strategy and implementation pathway last year, focused on responsible use of AI technologies, and updating that original 2012 directive earlier this year to ensure we remain the global leader of not just development and deployment, but also safety. As I said before, our policy for autonomy in weapon systems is clear and well established. There is always a human responsible for the use of force. Full stop. Because even as we are swiftly embedding AI in many aspects of our mission, from battle space awareness, cyber and reconnaissance, to logistics for support, and other back office functions, we are mindful of AI's potential dangers and determined to avoid them. Unlike some of our strategic competitors, we don't use AI to censor, constrain, repress, or disempower people. By putting our values first and playing to our strengths, the greatest of which is our people. We've taken a responsible approach to AI that will ensure America continues to come out ahead. Meanwhile, as commercial tech companies and others continue to push forward the frontiers of AI, we're making sure we stay at the cutting edge with foresight, responsibility, and a deep understanding of the broader implications for our nation. For instance, mindful of the potential risks and benefits offered by large language models and other generative AI tools, we stood up Task Force Lima to ensure DOD responsibly adopts, implements, and secures these technologies. Candidly, most commercially available systems enabled by large language models aren't yet technically mature enough to comply with our ethical AI principles, which is required for responsible operational use. But we have found over 180 instances where such generative AI tools could add value for us with oversight, like helping to debug and develop software faster, speeding analysis of battle damage assessments, and verifiably summarizing tax from both open source and classified data sets. Not all of these use cases are notional. Some DOD components started exploring generative AI tools before chat GBT and similar products captured the world's attention. A few even made their own models, isolating foundational models, fine-tuning them for specific tasks with clean, reliable, secure DOD data, and taking the time to further test and refine the tools. While we have much more evaluating to do, it's possible some might make fewer factual errors than publicly available tools, in part because with effort they can be designed to cite their sources clearly and proactively. Although it would be premature to call most of them operational, it's true that some are actively being experimented with and even used as part of people's regular workflows, of course with appropriate human supervision and judgment, not just to validate but also to continue improving them. We are confident in the alignment of our innovation goals with our responsible AI principles. Our country's vibrant innovation ecosystem is second to none, precisely because it's powered by a free and open society committed to responsible use, values, and ideals. We are world leaders in the promotion of the responsible use of AI and autonomy with our allies and partners. One example is the political declaration that we launched back in February and that Vice President Harris highlighted in London this week, which creates strong norms for responsible behavior. As the Vice President noted, over 30 countries have endorsed the declaration ranging from members of the G7 to countries in the global south. Another example is our AI partnership for defense, where we work with allies and partners to US military have many capable allies and partners around the world and why growing dumps of world leading commercial tech innovators want to work with us. Our strategic competitors can't say that and we are better off for it. Those nations take a different approach. It's deeply concerning, for instance, to see some countries using generative AI for disinformation campaigns against America, as has been reported by tech companies and the press. But there is still time to work toward more responsible approaches. For example, in the 2022 nuclear posture review, the United States made clear that in all cases we will maintain a human in the loop for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate or terminate nuclear weapons. Other nations have drawn similar bright lines. We call on and would welcome more countries to do the same. And we should be able to sit down, talk, and try to figure out how to make such commitments credible. And we hope all nations would agree. As we've said previously, the United States does not seek an AI arms race with any country, including the PRC, just as we do not see conflict. With AI and all our capabilities, we seek only to deter aggression and defend our country, our allies and partners, and our interests. That's why we will continue to encourage all countries to commit to responsible norms of military use of AI, and we will continue to ensure our own actions clearly live up to that commitment. From here at the Pentagon and across all our commands and bases worldwide to the flotilla of uncrewed ships that recently steamed across the entire Pacific, to the thousands of all domain attributable autonomous systems we aimed to field in the next two years through DoD's recently announced replicator initiative. The state of AI in DoD is not a short story, nor is it static. We must keep doing more safely and swiftly given the nature of strategic competition with the PRC or pacing challenge. At the same time, we benefit from a national position of strength and our own uses grow stronger every day. And we will be keeping up the momentum, ensuring we make the best possible use of AI technology responsibly and at speed. With that, I'll take your questions. Okay, we're going to start with Tara Kopp, AP. Hi, thanks for doing this. One question on some current events, and then I can have a couple of AI questions for you on the holds. Senator Chippaville has said that his holds do not affect military readiness. He said that they don't add stress to the officers who have had to do two jobs at once. And I just wanted to ask from your point of view when you walk the halls, is that your experience? Does this not affect your readiness to have the officers been just fine filling two roles at the same time? So we've said many times in the last six plus months that the hold is unnecessary, unprecedented, and unsafe. And that it's bad for our military. It's bad for our military families. It's bad for the country. We have seen tragic effects to that stress, but in a day-to-day sense, we've also seen the stress at the individual human level. And I think that's been well communicated on Capitol Hill. We're pleased to see today Admiral Frankeady and General Alvin having already been confirmed. We understand General Mahoney will be confirmed. We very much hope by the end of the day. But even then, you have 370, I think, is the number of officers who've dedicated their lives to service to the nation. It's just, it's wrong. And it is unsafe, and it is absolutely hurting readiness. Just a quick follow-up on the AI. Just when you say you've seen the tragic effects, do you think that this added stress and workload may have contributed to General Smith's illness? Yeah, I'm not going to comment on my personal views on that. I will only say that General Smith has indicated that he's trying to work two jobs that he's working from 6 a.m. to 11 at night. I think it speaks for itself. You touched on this in your remarks. But for the international norms for responsible use, are there red lines for which the member countries that want to sign on will and will not use AI for? I'm not sure how to answer that. I think what I would say is the United States position of making sure that there's always a human that's in control is vital for kinetic effects. And we're going to stand by that. That's where we're coming from. And we think we have a lot of nations to join us with this. We would invite all nations to join that. OK, and then two on the replicator. Can you give us a ballpark cost of what it will cost to fulfill replicator? Did you want to ask the second? And I'll do them together. And then is it mostly going to be UAVs? Is it Z drones? What's kind of the product? Sure, so cost is the wrong way to think about it. I'm sure when all is said and done, we would be able to retrospectively tell you everything that goes through replicator, what the value is, much as I talked about the $1.8 billion value, for instance, of our AI machine learning programs. But the reality is replicator is removing kinks in the hose of the system that is innovation and DOD. There are a multitude of programs that already exist in the department that need help to get from where they are to delivery at scale. That is where replicator is focused. So again, I think we could be able to go back and retrospectively capture the cost of that. But I think it's the wrong way to think about program. It's not a program. It's a process for improving our ability to scale. So as to the types of systems, as I've said before, what I will say at this point is we are looking across multiple domains. We are seeing systems that fit that definition I just gave you, which is on the delivery pathway, but facing some challenges delivering at scale in all of the domains. And that's what we're going to be focused on. Thank you. Next, we'll go to Brandy Vincent from FedSkip. Thanks, Eric, for doing this. Two lines of questions for you. First, top tech experts have warned that DOD must be AI ready by 2025. What does that really mean to you and what will it take for the department to meet that aim? Can you speak to any tangible actions in this new strategy from the CDAO that will really ensure that the US military reaches near-term AI readiness goals? Sure, I think the number one thing I would say we need is on-time appropriations and predictable resourcing to the plans that we've already put out. Our 2024 budget request has this really healthy, focused investment on AI, for example. I think that's a major plus-up once we can get those appropriations to getting to those goals. But absent any predictability in our funding stream is very difficult for us to be able to project with accuracy what we can and will deliver. What I can tell you is we are making strides every single day, and our experimental approach, the strategy you'll hear from Craig later today really building out that iterative learning as we go and improving as we go is great. And I think that's a key piece of how we get there. The other key piece, as I mentioned in my remarks, is the partnerships. We have leading-edge companies, researchers, ready and willing to work with the United States. They see the value proposition. They see the challenges that authoritarian states are putting forward with their approach to AI, and they want to work with us. That's really what's going to help propel us as well. And then can you speak to how the CDAO and DOD has been advising and supporting Ukraine's experimentation and application of AI in this conflict? Is the team at CDAO providing algorithms or other capabilities to Ukraine? Sure, what I would say is CDAO is part of our whole team effort here in the department to provide assistance and support to Ukrainian partners. So they are part of the team. I think what we've seen play out in Ukraine is instructive for where the department in general is going, which you've got to have really good quality data. And then you've got to take that decision quality data and move it to the either operator, or logistician, decision-maker. And that's what we're doing here at DOD. Thank you. Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg. Replicator, can you segue replicator and AI? Where does AI fit into the program? You're envisioning masses of thousands of autonomous, intrudable kamikaze drones, basically. Where would AI fit in? Targeting information or command and control architecture? Yeah, let me say first, I don't think kamikaze drone is the right way to think about it. You need to think, again, well beyond the kinetic side of this, into the ability to deliver logistics, command and control ISR, if you will, and, again, multiple domains. So the idea that this is all about sort of kinetic swarms, I think, is very misleading. But I do think back to my example on Ukraine, again, and everything that we're already doing today in DOD, it is really in the command and control, the ability to take information, fuse it together, whatever the purpose of it is, and use that to create decision advantage. And that replicator is going to help with that, regardless of which domain it's operating. And that's where the AI would intersect with the autonomy. What would be like sending in my mission, or programming missions into the various drones that it would be a planning of the overall use of that? It could be either. Yeah, but both of those are perfectly routine ways to think about the use of AI as you push it out through systems, whether those are attributable systems, in the case of this replicator first tronch that we're doing, or any other kind of military application. Yeah. Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to thank the deputy secretary. Unfortunately, we're out of time today. We're going to take one second to reset as the deputy secretary steps out, and then Brigadier General Ryder's going to come up in brief news of the day. Thank you very much. Everyone. Thank you, sir. All right. Just a few things to pass along, and then we'll get right to your questions. I'm cognizant of your time today. So first of all, the Department of Defense continues to closely monitor the situation in the Middle East, and maintain a steady focus on our critical lines of effort. As you've heard, Secretary Austin reinforced earlier this week, foremost, we will continue to protect American forces and citizens in the region. Second, we continue to flow critical security assistance to Israel as they defend themselves against further Hamas terrorist attacks. Third, we're coordinating closely with the Israelis to help secure the release of hostages held by Hamas, including American citizens. And fourth, we've strengthened our force posture across the region to deter any state or non-state actors from escalating this crisis beyond Gaza. Secretary Austin and DOD leaders are actively engaged in frequent communication with our partners in the region to discuss the situation, as we work to prevent this from broadening into a larger regional conflict. And in those discussions, the Secretary has also reaffirmed the U.S. emphasis on the protection of civilians and unfettered access for the delivery of humanitarian aid for civilians in Gaza. Separately next week, Secretary Austin will travel to India, the Republic of Korea, and Indonesia for several important engagements to further bolster our strong relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. The Secretary and India's Defense Minister will participate in the fifth 2-plus-2 Ministerial Dialogue alongside Secretary of State Blinken and India's Minister of External Affairs. Secretary Austin will then travel to the ROK for meetings with the ROK Minister of National Defense, which include the 55th Annual Security Consultative Meeting, and the inaugural ROK United Nations Command Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting. Finally, Secretary Austin will participate in the 10th ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting, plus or ADMM, plus in Jakarta, Indonesia. This will be the Secretary's fourth trip to the Indo-Pacific region this year and his ninth since becoming Secretary of Defense. The trip comes as the United States, along with U.S. allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific, continues to deliver historic momentum toward a shared regional vision for peace, stability, and prosperity. Finally, I know there has been some interest in whether Secretary Austin has had the opportunity to meet with the new Speaker of the House yet. As an update, both Secretary Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, had a chance to meet with Speaker Johnson yesterday. As always, the Secretary and the Department look forward to working closely with the Speaker and the Congress to ensure that the U.S. military has what it needs to carry out our important mission of defending our nation. And with that, I'd be happy to take your questions. Go to AP, to our cup. Thanks, General Ratter. So we've begun to see both from President Biden and from some members of Congress that there is interest in a ceasefire or a pause in operations in Gaza to allow some humanitarian aid to get through. Does the Secretary think that a ceasefire or a pause would also be beneficial at this point, and is he communicating that to his Israeli counterparts? Yeah, so a couple of things there. As it relates to a ceasefire, I think you've heard the White House speak to this as well. We do not support a ceasefire in that that gives time for Hamas to regroup, which is something that, again, would put Israeli citizens and others in danger. You have heard, however, the President say that the U.S. government does support humanitarian pauses to enable humanitarian aid to get in for hostages to get out, as well as other citizens. So in the Secretary's discussion with his counterparts, as I mentioned at the top, the discussion of ensuring that Palestinian civilians, Gazans, innocent civilians in Gaza are able to get humanitarian assistance, whether that be water, fuel, medical aid, that continues to be something that we continue to emphasize regularly. So the Secretary is advocating for potentially a humanitarian pause as the White House suggests? So, again, I'd refer you to the White House to talk broadly the DOD focus. Again, our focus is on the things that I highlighted at the top, which is deterring a broader conflict, ensuring force protection, and also ensuring that Israel has what it needs to defend itself. Thank you very much. Idris. Two quick questions. Firstly, on the – I think it was last week, the intercepts by the Carney of the missiles from Yemen. Now that you've had some time to study it, do you definitively believe that the missiles were heading to Israel and the U.S. – that the warship was not a target? Again, we know that these have the ability, by virtue of the missiles that they're employing, to range targets in Israel. As it relates to the USS Carney, again, what we know is that those missiles were in the vicinity of the Carney, and so they took appropriate action to take those missiles down. But the broader point here is, again, we know that they have this capability, the missiles that can reach targets in Israel. And as you saw earlier this week, Israel did take one of those missiles down. But as it relates to Israeli missile defense and air defense, I'd refer you to them to talk about them. Yeah, I don't have that information to pass along. And then just a simple question. Do you believe Israel's response so far has been proportionate? Look, I'm not going to speak about Israel's operations. You've heard us say that we continue to talk with them about the importance of applying the laws of war, which includes proportionality, which includes taking into account civilians on the ground. But you've also heard us talk about the challenging situation that they're in as it relates to Hamas and their extensive network of command and control, operational nodes, rockets, all – and oh, by the way, tunnels deeply embedded underneath Gaza all wrapped around innocent civilians. And so, again, I don't think any of us can question the complexity of the urban warfare that is taking place in Gaza, but we will continue. And we do expect our Israeli partners to abide by and take into account the laws of war as they conduct their operations. Let me move over here to Will. Two questions. First, in terms of U.S. end-use monitoring of military supplies or aid supply to Israel, have there been any instances of concern or that raised concerns on the U.S. side in terms of civilian casualties? And second, can we just pick an update on the number of attacks on U.S. forces in the region? Sure. So whenever we provide military assistance to partners, including Israel, we do make clear that that support must be used consistent with international law to include the law of war and obligations related to protecting civilians. So that is standard with any partner that we provide. And again, this is part of the conversation that we continue to have with our Israeli partners, recognizing that they do have an inherent right and a duty to protect their citizens. As it relates to attacks, since October 26th, there have been eight attacks, three in Syria, or excuse me, three in Iraq, five in Syria. And I would say just one, the last one was on October 31st, and that was one attack in Syria. What's the total now in light of those? 28, 28 total, OK. Since October 17th? Since October 17th, correct. Eastern time. Chris. Thanks, Pat. Two questions. One on the attacks and one on the prey training. I'd just like to clarify what an attack on U.S. forces is, just so we're all speaking the same language. Counting attempted attacks that may fail at launch and is your assessment of an attack consistent with how you've categorized these incidents in the past? Yeah, so it's a great point, and thanks for bringing it up. And so I think part of the challenge here, and I know that you all wrestle with this as well, is defining an attack. And for those of you that have spent any significant time in places like Iraq and Syria, particularly during the height of combat operations, whether it be OIF or the counter-ISIS campaign, you know it was not unusual back in the day, so to speak, to have indirect fire on a daily basis, sometimes multiple times a day. My own experience sitting in Baghdad, the first couple weeks of the deployment, it was a significant psychological event. By the end of the deployment, it barely registered an eyebrow raise. That said, it's dangerous. And so in some cases, you have a couple of rockets maybe impacting somewhere near the fence line or inside the fence line. In other cases, you have drones that may impact a facility. As you saw on October 17th and 18th, we had some folks that experienced some injuries. Since then, no injuries of US personnel, to my knowledge. But again, it doesn't minimize the potential risk and the danger of these. And so as we put these lists together, that these numbers together, we're working with CJTF-OIR, US Central Command, to try to be as conservative as possible to identify if US forces in Iraq and Syria were threatened. But again, it's going to be an art, not a science, and for the sake of transparency, trying to ensure that we're providing what we can as quickly as we can. And so I'll just leave it there. So what is the definition? Is there a distance it has to be or is it? No, again, like I said, it's US forces essentially being threatened. But again, it's going to be more of an art and a science, depending on the situation. My second question. On Tuesday, you said the timeline for training the Ukrainian pilots and F-16 would be roughly five to nine months. Is that a pre-existing DOD estimate, or is that an assessment that came after the pilots got to Arizona? That's an assessment that essentially is tailored to the current situation based on our conversations with the Air National Guard. And again, very much predicated on the skill level of the individual pilots that are going through that training. So just today, last question. I just to clarify. It's not an Air Force briefing. Although I do appreciate it. I do appreciate it. So again, is that before they got to the US or a conversation that happened once the pilots were assessed in the United States? Yeah. So my understanding is Ukraine identifies the pilots that they're going to send. They come to the US. Part of that initial discussion is evaluating their skill level where they stand in terms of English language skills, pilot skills. And so it would be tailored to the individual pilot. And so there can be some variance there in terms of one pilot may finish sooner than another pilot, if that makes sense. Laura. Thank you. One quick question and then a follow-up. Do you have any role in making sure that aid can continue to flow into Gaza? Is DOD actually doing anything to do that? So right now, the Department of Defense is not physically part of that process. But again, it's part of the broader US government. And as I mentioned, this is a discussion that the Secretary does have with his counterparts in terms of particularly encouraging Israel to ensure that that aid can get in. And then my follow-up is, what is DOD's assessment as to whether the IDF has taken the advice that US special operators offered in terms of targeting innocent civilians and that type of thing? You mentioned special operators, would you mean? Yeah, the special operations team that was in Israel giving advice on targeting and civilian casualties, what is DOD's assessment of whether the IDF has actually put that into practice? Yeah, so just to clarify, the special operations forces that you're talking about are those individuals that shortly after the October 7 attacks are helping to advise on hostage recovery. They are not participating. And we, the US military, are not participating in IDF target development, helping them run their campaign just to be crystal clear that it is their operation. They're running their operation. So that planning element is providing planning and intelligence support as it relates to hostage recovery. So is it not accurate then? I know that I've seen some reports that that group was advising on urban combat and lessons learned from that. I think Lieutenant General Glenn, as an expert in urban warfare, had been advising as part of things to take into account in terms of operational planning, in terms of second and third order effects, as well as civilian harm mitigation as part of that process. My question was, does DODSS, the IDF, has actually taken that advice and put it into practice? I think they are. And again, I'm not going to speak to their individual operations or individual strikes, but we do know in our conversations with them that they do take law of war into account and that they do take this into consideration into their operational planning. But again, as far as individual operations go, I'd refer you to them. Sir. General, thanks. We talked a couple of days ago about how the department views the attacks on the positions in Iraq and Syria as separate from what's ongoing in and around Gaza. But so much of the accounting, I mean, these attacks have been going on for years, but so much of the recent bump in accounting starts October 17th when the hospital bombing played out and the accusations against Israel and then the assessment that came afterwards showing it came from within Gaza. Does the department possess that that hospital bombing had anything to do with inspiring war attacks against American positions? Yeah, I can't necessarily corroborate or connect dots between why one terrorist organization would do one thing versus another. I think that we are all sensitive to the fact that there are tensions in the region. And as I mentioned earlier, a major focus for the Department of Defense is to deter a broader regional conflict. And so you are seeing, and we probably will continue to see groups that may try to exploit the situation to benefit their own interests, to include Iranian proxy groups. And so our point in all of this is our forces that are in Iraq and Syria are there for one reason only, and that's the enduring defeat of ISIS. And that's what they will continue to stay focused on. But if those forces are threatened, we will not hesitate to take appropriate action at the time and place of our choosing to protect those forces. And so again, within the context, the broader strategic context of everything that's happening in the Middle East and the broader region, we will make those decisions very deliberately, very thoughtfully, again, with the broader objectives in mind of protecting our forces and making sure that this does not spin out of control into a broader regional conflict. You see more as maybe perhaps some of these groups acting in isolation or using the situation in and around Gaza as leverage or as justification or just as a broader threat environment to conduct these attacks. That's correct. And we've known for a long time that one of Iran's broader strategic goals is forcing the United States out of the region. And they've employed these proxy groups through multiple means in the past to do this, right? So they want us out of Iraq. They want us out of Syria because it doesn't suit their interests. And we're still there. And by the way, we're there at the invitation of the government of Iraq to help their security forces. And oh, by the way, it wasn't that long ago, although I guess it's relative, that ISIS was 24 kilometers outside of Baghdad. And so no one wants to see those days come back. So we're going to continue to make sure that doesn't happen. In the meantime, though, if those forces are threatened, track record proves we will take deliberate decisive action to protect those forces. Buddy, yeah. On a different issue, the Journal has a report that the Wagner Group may supply air defense to Hezbollah. I was wondering if you had a reading on that and any sense of how Russia's interest in the region may have evolved over the past month. Yeah, I've seen those reports. I don't have anything specifically on it, if true, very concerning. What we have seen here is Russia not condemn the attacks by Hamas, which, again, I think is true to brand here in terms of the kinds of activity we see them doing in Ukraine. But that's something that we'll continue to monitor. But I don't have any specific information on that. Fadi. Thank you. I have two questions on Gaza and one on Yemen. I want to start with Yemen. I saw the readout from the meeting between the Secretary and the Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia. Has there been any discussion and request by the US for the Saudis to intercept missiles, potential missiles and drones out of Yemen as part of the integrated missile defense in the region? Yeah, thanks, Fadi. So in terms of their discussion, it was a very good discussion you saw on the readout. We talked about our mutual cooperation and defense efforts. I don't have anything specifically to talk about beyond that readout other than to say that the United States will work very closely with partners in the region to ensure that we can continue to preserve security and stability throughout the region. OK, on Gaza, you maintain that Israelis are following your advice. They're adhering to the laws of war, international law. But you don't want to discuss any specific incidents or attacks. However, you're not going to be able to maintain this, especially when you have stark examples like this strike on Jabalia refugee camps. The biggest in Gaza, Israel admitted. It took that decision knowing that there's going to be civilians, but went after Habasli according to their own statements on TV. So how can you maintain they are following the laws of war and international humanitarian law when they're admitting something like this? Yeah, what I said, Fadi, is that we're having conversations with them about the importance of taking the law of war into account and that they, in our discussions with them, we believe that they are taking it into account. But again, I'm not going to get into individual specific strikes, individual specific actions. And look, as we've discussed before and as it relates particularly to what we're seeing on TV in Gaza, it's heartbreaking that any civilian, any innocent civilian is being killed. Again, whether it's Palestinian, whether it's Israeli, whether it's anyone from any nation. And so while I'm not going to comment on specific individual strikes, it's not my intent to provide an operational briefing from up here. Let me just talk a little bit about what I do know. As we talked about a little bit earlier, we know that Hamas is integrating its operations, whether it's command and control, operational centers, combat forces, putting rockets in Gaza to include this complex and sprawling tunnel network underneath infrastructure throughout Gaza, in effect, again, using civilians as human shields. We know that Israel has an inherent right to defend itself. They were brutally attacked on the 7th of October, 1400. People killed over 200 hostages, not only Israelis, but citizens from around the world that are being kept and used, again, as bargaining chips. And oh, by the way, Hamas has said repeatedly that they will continue to do these type of October 7 attacks until Israel is eliminated. And so as I mentioned, there's no question at the complexity of the challenge that is confronting the Israeli forces as they conduct operations in this urban environment. We also expect Israel to take into account the laws of war as they plan and conduct their operations. And we want them to distinguish between terrorists and civilians, and so we'll continue to have those conversations. But at the end of the day, this is their operation. This is their effort to protect their citizens. Follow-up? Sure. Thank you for the answer. I respect you. You don't want to discuss a specific incident from the podium. Are you raising specific incidents with your counterparts in Israel, like the Shabbat strike? Look, Fadi, we are, again, the secretary and other DoD officials are daily having conversations with our Israeli counterparts about the situation in Israel and, again, the importance of protecting innocent lives and taking Palestinians and others into account as they conduct their operations. And, again, I know I'm probably a believer in the point here, but we truly want a scenario here where both innocent Palestinians and innocent Israelis can live together peacefully, securely. And as I mentioned on Tuesday, unfortunately, the common denominator here is Hamas, which is putting both of these peoples in a very challenging and unfortunate situation. So for our part, we will continue to work very hard not only to support Israel but also to ensure that Gazans are able to get humanitarian assistance and the support they need. Thank you. OK, Nancy. I had a couple of questions just to make clarification. Earlier in this briefing, you said that you, the US, have made clear to the Israelis that any support must be consistent with international law. Who within the US government determines whether the Israelis are applying international law appropriately? Yeah, so Nancy, I'm not a lawyer. Again, we'll continue to have those conversations. I'm not, again, not in a position right now to talk about individual actions, activities, or assess and provide a play-by-play assessment of Israeli operations. Again, where we are at this point in time, and I'll just leave it at that. I appreciate that about looking for incident by incident. I'm looking for bureaucratically. How do those assessments happen? Is there a way to consider taking that question so that we can understand the process by which the US makes determinations? In terms of which aspect? As I heard you correctly, US support is with the expectation that the Israelis abide by the international law rules around the conduct of war. Who decides whether the Israelis are indeed applying those laws or if they are in violation of them within the US government? I'm not looking for any specific case. I'm just trying to understand process-wise how that determination is made. Yeah, so without necessarily getting into hypotheticals, certainly there is an interagency process by which we evaluate the use of US assistance by any of our partners. And again, recognizing the complex nature of the situation on the ground in Gaza right now and what the Israelis are confronting in terms of an adversary whose stated objective is to eliminate Israel as a state. And oh, by the way, the laws of war that do highlight that if a non-military facility is now employed by military forces, it does become a legitimate target. And so again, there will be constant discussions. I think, again, the focus right now is on ensuring that Israel has what it needs to defend its people, while at the same time ensuring that we can continue to make sure that innocent civilians in Gaza can get the aid that they need. So. And then the Secretary hasn't been in this briefing room doing a conference with his, with the chairman since January of 2022 in terms of answering broad questions. Given that the US has now deployed 1,200 troops approximately, set air defenses, set two aircraft carrier groups into the region. Can we expect to hear from him directly? Does he feel that he has a responsibility to talk to the American people directly and answer questions directly given the seriousness of the situation that we're in right now? Yeah, he does. And as you know, he does engage the media on multiple occasions, especially when we're on travel. I know that right now we've got a, whether it's the Ukraine Defense Contact Groups, when we're overseas in India, Korea, and Indonesia, he will be conducting press engagements there as well. And so again, the Secretary fully understands the importance of making sure that the American public understands what the department is doing and will continue to endeavor to make sure that information's there. I participated in those, and I appreciate them, but they tend to be limited, the number of questions, and sometimes on topic. And almost two years is a pretty long period for Secretary of Defense, and the chairman to not come to this room and answer questions on a wide variety of topics more than a handful of the times I would just make the plea that, given the news events, the level view of involvement that he treats this as an opportunity to engage with the press. Thanks for that, Nancy. Appreciate it. I was wondering if you could say broadly speaking, does the US think Israel has been effective in targeting Hamas in Gaza, and does the US believe the campaign has significantly degraded Hamas? Yeah, thanks, Orrin. So it'd really be inappropriate for me to provide a battle damage assessment from the podium. This is an Israeli operation, I'd refer you to them, to talk about that. And again, we know that they have a tough task at hand, which is fighting an enemy that has warned to defeat them and destroy the state of Israel. And so we do know that they are actively going after Hamas leaders. But again, I'd refer you to them to talk about that. Just one more very quick one. The US has or is about to have two carriers in the Eastern Med, will immediate embark be allowed? If not, why not? Orrin, look, we fully understand the request. We will take it under advisement. And if an opportunity presents itself, we'll certainly make that available. Thank you very much. Time for a few more to go to Ashley. And then go to the phone. I wanted to ask about the weapons delivered to Israel. Have any constraints been placed on how they use the weapons? Look, beyond broadly speaking what I've talked about, we are not putting constraints on Israel in terms of how they conduct their operations. They are professional military, well-trained, well-led. And so I'll just leave it at that. And then I also wanted to ask the Treasury Department unveiled 130 new sanctions placed on entities and people related to Russia and the defense industry base. Could you broadly speak of observations of the defense industry base there right now and what you're seeing, their ability to regenerate, to get new equipment, whether it's like pulling from Turkey, the UAE, or other countries, or just internal? Sure, I mean broadly speaking, the energizing of the defense industrial base has been a key priority for Secretary Austin, particularly coming out of COVID. But most importantly, as we continue to look to support Ukraine and now Israel, as well as our other commitments internationally. And so our acquisitions and sustainment team has been very, very active in terms of meeting with our international allies and partners. Most notably, the National Armaments Directors have met pretty much every single month following the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to look at ways that we can capitalize on one another's industrial bases to ramp up production of key requirements as it relates not only to supporting our partners like Ukraine, but also replenishing our own stocks. And so that will continue to be an area of significant focus. But we're confident that we will be able to meet all of those needs. Thank you very much. OK, sir. Thank you, General. I just want to go to the phone, sir. Just a follow-up on the answer to Nancy's line of questioning. You said that the determination about whether international on the rules of war being followed is an interagency process. So there is no, it sounds like what you're saying is no outside agency. Now what she asked, what I thought I heard was how do we within the US government, how would we conceivably make a determination like that? So my response was, as part of an interagency process and review, that could conceivably be a question that's answered. I'm not going to speak for any independent group or folks outside of the US government that may come to their own conclusions. Well, right. And so I guess my question is, would those conclusions be playing any role in the US government's determinations? Yeah, so again, I appreciate the question. I just don't want to get into hypothetical scenarios right now. OK. Let me go to Jeff, task and purpose. Thank you. The recent airstrikes in Syria were meant to deter attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria. Given that there have been more attacks since then, is it accurate to say that in a strategic sense the airstrikes failed? So first of all, again, Jeff, we will continue to do whatever we need to do to protect our troops. I'm not going to get into telegraphing how and when and if we may respond other than to say, again, we would do so at a time and place of our choosing. And if you're these Iranian proxy groups, which have been endeavoring to try to expel the United States from the region, then you failed. And so and then more broadly speaking, again, our broader, more strategic focus here is, again, preventing a wider conflict. Thank you. To get back to General Glenn's mission, I want to confirm he was there to provide his experience or not, you know, hints or help to Israel because of his experience over the breadth of urban warfare, how to apply fire and maneuver in that kind of environment. He wasn't there simply to push them to follow the rule. No. Look, so if you're Israel on October 8, you find yourself in a very dire situation where a significant number of your civilians have just been executed by Hamas and 200 hostages. Lying before you is, oh, by the way, where did these terrorists come from out of Gaza? So as you contemplate having to go into Gaza, having someone, you know, and again, we have a long-standing relationship with Israel, exercises, you know, sharing of information. So that in and of itself is not unusual. But by being able to say, hey, here's a guy on our team that has a deep understanding of how to do these kinds of operations. And so as you contemplate doing it, recognizing that it's going to be a tough fight, but also recognizing that we learned a lot on what these operations entail and how to do them successfully to include things like accounting for civilians, which you have to take as a strategic aspect in conducting these things. There is no such thing as conducting these in isolation. So we want you to have the benefit of that expertise. He provides, you know, be able to ask those tough questions as they, you know, kind of the Socratic method. And then, you know, he was always intended to be temporary, and so he's home. How was his mission there received by Israel? Does the Pentagon think it was well received by them? That they took it? Yeah, I mean, I don't want to speak for Israel. I will just say largely, broadly speaking, rather, I think Israel has been very appreciative across the board of the support that the United States has provided, and particularly how quickly we came to their aid in the wake of these terrorist attacks. And now that Israel is actually moving into Gaza City, now, do the US still have these urban warfare subject matter experts there? They've departed. They've all departed. OK. We go to Liam, and then we'll do one more. Thanks, General. This is a quick one on the Javalia strike. After that happened, the Israeli government said they were targeting a Hamas commander who was hiding out there. Hamas has said there was no commander, such commander. Does the D.O.D. know which side is true there? So I don't have any intelligence to pass along. I'm not going to get into intelligence again. We know that Israel is going after the leadership and the forces of Hamas. And I'll just leave it at that. OK, thank you. Yes, sir. And I'll come to you, Tony. And then you'll be the last question. Question please. One, as far as sector of defense and sector of states widget to India is concerned and as far as AI. When Prime Minister Modi was here in the White House in June, President Biden and Prime Minister Modi both discussed AI in a detailed even T-shirt was presented to Prime Minister Modi by President Biden. My question is now in the middle of two wars, Russia's war against Israel, I mean against Ukraine, sorry, and Israel's war against Hamas, the terrorist organization. This is the meeting for 2-2 in India. So you think AI and these wars will be discussed there and what we expect as far as AI concerned for common people? Yeah, sure. So as it relates to the Secretary's meetings in India, we'll certainly have much more to say in the days ahead. Broadly speaking, it will be focused on looking and exploring areas where our two countries can continue to work together to further bolster security in the region and capitalize on the unique aspects that both of our nations can bring together toward that end in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific. As it relates to AI, I don't have anything to pass along, but again, much more to follow. Another question, thank you. Indian American community is protesting that Qatar, who has no human rights, no freedom of press and all that, they have falsely accused without any charges or without any hearings aid veteran Indian Navy people and straight to death penalties because of India's support for Israel and condemning Hamas. And what you think about this, no rule of law, and that these are aid veteran Navy Indian officials in that. I appreciate the question. I'd really be inappropriate for me to get into domestic affairs in India, so I'd refer you to the government of India. All right, last question, Tony. You announced 300 additional US troops going to the region. Are any other prepared to deploy orders being converted to deploy orders? Yeah, I don't have anything new to announce in regards to deployments at this time. Israel Hamas supplemental question. Buried in the $108 billion supplemental is $3.4 billion for the US industrial base, submarine industrial base tied to AUKUS. There is a submarine industrial base report that the Pentagon will not give to members of Congress. They've classified it or CUI it or whatever. Do you have anything on why they can't, DOD cannot give the report to Congress and release an unclassified summary given you're asking for $3.4 billion for the US industrial base? Yeah, thanks, Tony. I don't have any information on that. We'll take that question and we'll get back to you. In terms of why these are secret to CUI, what plans do you have to send up to the Hill and disseminate it publicly, given the amount of money you're asking for? Yeah, I just don't know, so we'll take that. All right, thank you very much, everyone. Appreciate it.