 19. SUMA TEALOGICA PARS PRIMA INITIAL QUESTIONS SUMA TEALOGICA PARS PRIMA INITIAL QUESTIONS By Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 19. The Will of God. After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself. The second about what belongs strictly to his will. The third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to his will. About his will itself there are twelve points of inquiry. First, whether there is will in God. Second, whether God wills things apart from himself. Third, whether whatever God wills, he wills necessarily. Fourth, whether the will of God is the cause of things. Fifth, whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will. Sixth, whether the divine will is always fulfilled. Seventh, whether the will of God is mutable. Eighth, whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. Ninth, whether there is in God the will of evil. Tenth, whether God has free will. Eleventh, whether the will of expression is distinguished in God. And twelfth, whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will. First article, whether there is will in God. Objection one, it seems that there is not will in God, for the object of will is the end and the good, but we cannot assign to God any end, therefore there is not will in God. Objection two, further, will is a kind of appetite, but appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection which cannot be imputed to God, therefore there is not will in God. Objection three, further, according to the philosopher, the will moves and is moved, but God is the first cause of movement and himself is unmoved, as proved in physics. Therefore, there is not will in God. On the contrary, the apostle says that you may prove what is the will of God. I answer that there is will in God, as there is intellect, since will follows upon intellect, for as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it, and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite, whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form, so as to rest therein when possessed and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence, in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite, and so there must be will in God since there is intellect in him, and as his will is his own existence, so is his will. Reply to Objection two. Although nothing apart from God is his end, yet he himself is the end with respect to all things made by him, and this by his essence, for by his essence he is good, as shown above, for the end has the aspect of good. Reply to Objection two. Will in us belongs to the appetitive part which although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess, but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God as having always good which is its object, since as already said it is not distinct from his essence. Reply to Objection three. A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself must be moved by another, but the object of the divine will is his goodness which is his essence, and since the will of God is his essence it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself. Second article whether God wills things apart from himself. Objection one. It seems that God does not will things apart from himself, for the divine will is the divine existence, but God is not other than himself, therefore he does not will things other than himself. Objection two. Further the willed moves the willer as the apetable the appetite as stated in Deonima. If therefore God wills anything apart from himself his will must be moved by another, which is impossible. Objection three. Further if what is willed suffices the willer he seeks nothing beyond it, but his own goodness suffices God and completely satisfies his will therefore God does not will anything apart from himself. Objection four. Further acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If therefore God wills himself and things apart from himself it follows that the act of his will is manifold and consequently his existence which is his will, but this is impossible therefore God does not will things apart from himself. On the contrary the apostle says this is the will of God your sanctification. I answer that God wills not only himself, but other things apart from himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above for natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good to acquire it if it is not possessed and if possessed to rest therein, but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent in so far as it is perfect and enact produces its like. It pertains therefore to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed and especially does this pertain to the divine will from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence if natural things in so far as they are perfect communicate their good to others much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus then he wills both himself to be and other things to be, but himself as the end and other things as ordained to that end in as much as it be fits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein. Reply to objection one. The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them as is clear from what has already been said. For when we say that God exists no relation to any other object is implied as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore although he is not anything apart from himself yet he does will things apart from himself. Reply to objection two. In things willed for the sake of the end the whole reason for our being moved is the end and this it is that moves the will as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draft in doing so wills nothing else than health and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draft that is pleasant which anyone may will to do not only for the sake of health but also for its own sake. Hence although God wills things apart from himself only for the sake of the end which is his own goodness it does not follow that anything else moves his will except his goodness. So as he understands things apart from himself by understanding his own essence so he wills things apart from himself by willing his own goodness. Reply to objection three. From the fact that his own goodness suffices the divine will it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus to the divine intellect though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence yet in that essence knows other things. Reply to objection four. As the divine intellect is one and seeing the many only in the one in the same way the divine will is one and simple as willing the many only through the one that is through its own goodness. Third article whether whatever God wills he wills necessarily. Objection one it seems that whatever God wills he wills necessarily for everything eternal is necessary but whatever God wills he wills from eternity for otherwise his will would be mutable therefore whatever he wills he wills necessarily. Objection two. Further God wills things apart from himself in as much as he wills his own goodness now God wills his own goodness necessarily therefore he wills things apart from himself necessarily. Objection three. Further whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary for God is of himself necessary being and the principle of all necessity as above shown but it belongs to his nature to will whatever he wills. Since in God there can be nothing over and above his nature as stated in metaphysics therefore whatever he wills he wills necessarily. Objection four. Further being that is not necessary and being that is possible not to be are one in the same thing. If therefore God does not necessarily will a thing that he wills it is possible for him not to will it and therefore possible for him to will what he does not will and so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things and imperfect since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable. Objection five. Further on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power as the commentator says in the physics. If then the will of God is indifferent with regard to anything it follows that his determination to act comes from another and thus he has some cause prior to himself. Objection six. Further whatever God knows he knows necessarily but as the divine knowledge is his essence so is the divine will therefore whatever God wills he wills necessarily. On the contrary the apostle says who worketh all things according to the council of his will. Now what we work according to the council of the will we do not will necessarily therefore God does not will necessarily whatever he wills. I answer that there are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary namely absolutely and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject. Thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate. Thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits. Wherefore it is not necessary absolutely though it may be so by supposition. For granted that he is sitting he must necessarily sit as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things will by God we must observe that he wills something of absolute necessity but this is not true of all that he wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness since that is its proper object. And God wills his own goodness necessarily even as we will our own happiness necessarily and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object. For instance the sight to color since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from himself insofar as they are ordered to his own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them as we will to take food to preserve life or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means hence since the goodness of God is perfect and can exist without other things in as much as no perfection can accrue to him from them it follows that his willing things apart from himself is not absolutely necessary yet it can be necessary by supposition for supposing that he wills a thing then he is unable not to will it as his will cannot change. Reply to objection one from the fact that God wills from eternity whatever he wills it does not follow that he wills necessarily except by supposition. Reply to objection two although God necessarily wills his own goodness he does not necessarily will things willed on account of his goodness for it can exist without other things. Reply to objection three it is not natural to God to will any of those other things that he does not will necessarily and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to his nature but voluntary. Reply to objection four sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect owing to a deficiency in the effect and not in the cause even so the son's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth owing to defect not in the solar power but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way that God does not necessarily will some of the things that he wills does not result from defect in the divine will but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing will namely that the perfect goodness of God can be without it and such defect accompanies all created good. Reply to objection five a naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power the divine will which by its nature is necessary determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. Reply to objection six as the divine essence is necessary of itself so is the divine will and the divine knowledge but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known not the divine will to the thing will. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves since then all other things have necessary existence in as much as they exist in God but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves and so far as they exist in themselves it follows that God knows necessarily whatever he wills but does not will necessarily whatever he wills. Fourth article whether the will of God is the cause of things. Objection one it seems that the will of God is not the cause of things for Dionysia says as our son not by reason or by pre-election but by its very being enlightens all things that can participate in its light so the divine goodness by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists but every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election therefore God does not act by will and so his will is not the cause of things. Objection two further the first in any order is that which is essentially so thus in the order burning things that comes first which is fire by its essence but God is the first agent therefore he acts by his essence and that is his nature he acts then by nature and not by will therefore the divine will is not the cause of things. Objection three further whatever is the cause of anything through being such a thing is the cause by nature and not by will for fire is the cause of heat as being itself hot whereas an architect is the cause of a house because he wills to build it now Augustine says because God is good we exist therefore God is the cause of things by his nature and not by his will Objection four further of one thing there is one cause but the cause of created things is the knowledge of God as said before therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things on the contrary it is said how could anything endure if thou wouldst not I answer that we must hold that the will of God is the cause of things and that he acts by the will and not as some have supposed by necessity of his nature this can be shown in three ways first from the order itself of active causes since both intellect and nature act for an end as proved in physics the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature hence since cod is first in the order of agents he must act by intellect and will this is shown secondly from the character of a natural agent of which the property is to produce one in the same effect for nature operates and one in the same way unless it be prevented this is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent and hence as long as it has that nature its acts will be in accordance with that nature for every natural agent has a determinant being since then the divine being is undetermined and contains in himself the full perfection of being it cannot be that he acts by a necessity of his nature unless he were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being and that this is impossible has been already shown he does not therefore act by a necessity of his nature but determined effects proceed from his own infinite perfection according to the determination of his will and intellect thirdly it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause for effects proceed from the agent that causes them insofar as they pre-exist in the agent since every agent produces its like now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause wherefore since the divine being is his own intellect effects pre-exist in him after the mode of intellect and therefore proceed from him after the same mode consequently they proceed from him after the mode of will for his inclination to put in act what his intellect has conceived appertains to the will therefore the will of god is the cause of things replied to objection one Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from god absolutely but only in a certain sense and so far that is as he communicates his goodness not merely to certain things but to all and as election implies a certain distinction replied to objection two because the essence of god is his intellect and will from the fact of his acting by his essence it follows that he acts after the mode of intellect and will replied to objection three good is the object of the will the words therefore because god is good we exist are true in as much as his goodness is the reason of his willing all other things as said before replied to objection four even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it whereby the form of the work is conceived and will as commanding it since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect except by the will hence the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation but the power is cause as executing the effect since it denotes the immediate principle of operation but in god all these things are one fifth article whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will objection one it seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will for augustin says who would venture to say that god made all things irrationally but to a voluntary agent what is the reason of operating is the cause of willing therefore the will of god has some cause objection two further in things made by one who wills to make them and whose will is influenced by no cause there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills but the will of god is the cause of all things has been already shown if then there is no cause of his will we cannot seek in any natural things any cause except the divine will alone thus all science would be in vain since science seeks to assign causes to effects this seems inadmissible and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will objection three further what is done by the willer on account of no cause depends simply on his will if therefore the will of god has no cause it follows that all things made depend simply on his will and have no other cause but this is also not admissible on the contrary augustin says every efficient cause is greater than the thing affected but nothing is greater than the will of god we must not then seek for a cause of it i answer that in no wise has the will of god a cause in proof of which we must consider that since the will follows from the intellect there is cause of the will and the person who wills in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding in the person that understands the case with the understanding is this that if the premise and its conclusion are understood separately from each other the understanding the premise is the cause that the conclusion is known if the understanding perceived the conclusion in the premise itself apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premises since the thing cannot be its own cause and yet it would be true that the thinker would understand the premises to be the cause of the conclusion it is the same with the will with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end as do the premises to the conclusion with regard to the understanding hence if anyone in one act wills an end and in another act the means to that end his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means this cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means where a thing cannot be its own cause yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end now as God by one act understands all things in his essence so by one act he wills all things in his goodness hence as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of his understanding the effect for he understands the effect in the cause so in him to will and end is not the cause of his willing the means yet he wills the ordering of the means to the end therefore he wills this to be as means to that but does not will this on account of that reply to objection one the will of God is reasonable not because anything to God is to God a cause of his willing but insofar as he wills one thing to be on account of another reply to objection two since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes for the preservation of order in the universe it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will it would however be unreasonable to do so if such were considered as primary and not as dependent on the will of God in this sense Augustine says philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others the will of God reply to objection three since God wills effects to come from causes all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God but on something else besides but the first effect depends on the divine will alone thus for example we may say that God will man to have hands to serve as intellect by their work and intellect that he might be man and willed him to be man that he might enjoy him or for the completion of the universe but this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends and such things depend on the simple will of God but the others on the order of other causes sixth article whether the will of God is always fulfilled objection one it seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled for the apostle says God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth but this does not happen therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled objection two further as is the relation of knowledge to truth so is that of the will to good now God knows all truth therefore he wills all good but not all good actually exists for much more good might exist therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled objection three further since the will of God is the first cause it does not exclude intermediate causes but the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause as the effect of the motor power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes the will of God therefore is not always fulfilled on the contrary it is said God hath done all things whatsoever he would I answer that the will of God must need always be fulfilled and proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes the rule informs is this that although a thing may fall short of any particular form it cannot fall short of the universal form for though a thing may fail to be for example a man or a living being it cannot fail to be a being hence the same must happen in active causes something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause but not outside the order of the universal cause under which all particular causes are included and if any particular cause fails of its effect this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause which is included in the order of the universal cause therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause even in corporeal things this is clearly seen for it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects yet whatever effect does result in corporeal things from this hindrance of a corporeal cause must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven since then the will of god is the universal cause of all things it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order returns into it in another order as does the sinner who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him yet falls back into the order of that will when by its justice he is punished reply to objection one the words of the apostle god will have all men to be saved and so forth can be understood in three ways first by a restricted application in which case they would mean as augustin says god wills all men to be saved that are saved not because there is no man whom he does not wish to save but because there is no man saved whose salvation he does not will secondly they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals not to every individual in each class in which case they mean that god wills some men of every class and condition to be saved males and females jews and gentiles great and small but not all of every condition thirdly according to damascene they are understood of the antecedent will of god not of the consequent will this distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself in which there is nothing antecedent or consequent but to the things willed to understand this we must consider that everything in so far as it is good is willed by god a thing taken in its primary sense and absolutely considered may be good or evil and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary thus that a man should live is good and that a man should be killed as evil absolutely considered but if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society to kill him as good that he live is an evil hence it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he wills all men to live but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged in the same way god antecedently wills all men to be saved but consequently wills some to be damned as his justice exacts nor do we will simply what we will antecedently but rather we will it in a qualified manner for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications as we will a thing simply in as much as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered and this is what is meant by willing consequently thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer but in a qualified manner he would will him to live to it in as much as he is a man such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will thus it is clear that whatever god simply wills takes place although what he wills antecedently may not take place replied to objection to an act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known as in the knower while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves but all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in god though it does not all exist in created things therefore god knows all truth but does not will all good except in so far as he wills himself in whom all good virtually exists replied to objection three a first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause when it is not the universal first cause including within itself all causes for then the effect could in no way escape its order and thus it is with the will of god as said above seventh article whether the will of god is changeable objection one it seems that the will of god is changeable for the lord says it repenteth me that i have made man but whoever repents of what he has done has a changeable will therefore god has a changeable will objection two further it is said in the person of the lord i will speak against a nation and against a kingdom to root out to pull down and to destroy it but if that nation should repent of its evil i also will repent of the evil that i have thought to do to them therefore god has a changeable will objection three further whatever god does he does voluntarily but god does not always do the same thing for one time he ordered the law to be observed and at another time for about it therefore he has a changeable will objection four further god does not will of necessity what he wills as said before therefore he can both will and not will the same thing but whatever can incline to either of two opposites is changeable substantially and that which can exist in a place or not in that place is changeable locally therefore god is changeable as regards his will on the contrary it is said god is not as a man that he should lie nor as the son of man that he should be changed i answer that the will of god is entirely unchangeable on this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing to will that certain things should be changed is another it is possible to will a thing to be done now and it's contrary afterwards and yet for the will to remain permanently the same whereas the will would be changed if one should begin to will what before he had not willed or cease to will what he had willed before this cannot happen unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer for since the will regards good a man may in two ways begin to will a thing in one way when that thing begins to be good for him and this does not take place without a change in him thus when the cold weather begins it becomes good to sit by the fire though it was not so before in another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him though he did not know it before hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us now it has been already shown that both the substance of God and his knowledge are entirely unchangeable therefore his will must be entirely unchangeable replied to objection one these words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically and according to the likeness of our nature for when we repent we destroy what we have made although we may even do so without change of will as when a man wills to make a thing at the same time intending to destroy it later therefore God is said to have repented by way of comparison with our mode of acting and so far as by the deluge he destroyed from the face of the earth man whom he had made reply to objection two the will of God as it is the first and universal cause does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause there are many things in the divine power knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus one who looked only on inferior causes might have said Lazarus will not rise again but looking at the divine first cause might have said Lazarus will rise again and God wills both that is that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen or he may will conversely we may say then that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes as of nature or merit which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause thus he foretold to Ezekiahs take order with thy house where thou shalt die and not live yet this did not take place since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will which is unchangeable hence Gregory says the sentence of God changes but not his counsel that is to say the counsel of his will when therefore he says I also will repent his words must be understood metaphorically for men seem to repent when they do not fulfill what they have threatened reply to objection three it does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes but that he sometimes wills that things should change reply to objection four although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity yet it is necessary by supposition on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will as has been said above eighth article whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed objection one it seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things will for Augustine says no one is saved except whom God has willed to be saved he must therefore be asked to will it for if he wills it it must necessarily be objection to further every cause that cannot be hindered produces its effect necessarily because as the philosopher says nature always works in the same way if there is nothing to hinder it but the will of God cannot be hindered for the apostle says who resisteth his will therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things will objection three further whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely it is thus necessary that animals should die being compounded of contrary elements now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause whereby they have necessity for the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing it comes to pass and every true conditional statement is necessary it follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely on the contrary all good things that exist God wills to be if therefore his will imposes necessity on things willed it follows that all good happens of necessity and thus there is an end of free will council and all other such things I answer that the divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all the reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary and what he produces by contingent causes contingent this does not seem to be a sufficient explanation for two reasons first because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant but no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect secondly because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes this must be independent divine intention and will which is inadmissible it is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will for when a cause is efficacious to act the effect follows upon the cause not only as to the thing done but also as to its manner of being done or of being thus from defective active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike his father in accidental points that belong to its manner of being since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious it follows not only that things are done which God wills to be done but also that they are done in the way that he wills now God wills some things to be done necessarily some contingently to the right ordering of things for the building up of the universe therefore to some effects he has attached necessary causes that cannot fail but to others defectible and contingent causes from which arise contingent effects hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects will by God happen contingently but because God prepared contingent causes for them it being his will that they should happen contingently reply to objection one by the words of auguston we must understand a necessity in things will by God that is not absolute but conditional for the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be is necessarily true reply to objection two from the very fact that nothing resists the divine will it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to his will reply to objection three consequence have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents and things affected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have either absolute or conditional not all things therefore are absolute necessities ninth article whether God wills evils objection one it seems that God wills evils for every good that exists God wills but it is a good that evil should exist for auguston says although evil and so far as it is evil is not a good yet it is good that not only good things should exist but also evil things therefore God wills evil things objection two further dianetia says evil would conduce to the perfection of everything that is the universe and auguston says out of all things is built up the amourable beauty of the universe wherein even that which is called evil properly ordered and disposed commends the good more evidently and that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil but God wills all that appa appartains to the perfection and beauty of the universe for this is what God desires above all things in his creatures therefore God wills evil objection three further that evil should exist and should not exist are contradictory opposites but God does not will that evil should not exist otherwise since various evils do exist God's will would not always be fulfilled therefore God wills that evil should exist on the contrary auguston says no wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse now God surpasses all men in wisdom much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse and when he is said to be the cause of a thing he is said to will it therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse therefore God wills not evil things I answer that since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility as said before and since evil is opposed to good it is impossible that any evil as such should be sought for by the appetite either natural or animal or by the intellectual appetite which is the will nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally so far as it accompanies a good as appears in each of the appetites for a natural agent intends not privation or corruption but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form and the generation of one thing which implies the corruption of another also when a lion kills a stag his object is food to obtain which the killing of the animal is the only is only the means similarly the fornicator has merely pressured for his object and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment now the evil that accompanies one good is the privation of another good never therefore would evil be sought after nor even accidentally unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation now God wills no good more than his wills his own goodness yet he wills one good more than another hence he in no way wills the evil of sin which is the privation of right order towards the divine good the evil of natural defect or of punishment he does will by willing the good to which such evils are attached thus in willing justice he wills punishment and in willing the preservation of the natural order he will some things to be naturally corrupted replied to objection one some have said that although God does not will evil yet he wills that evil should be or be done because although evil is not a good yet it is good that evil should be or should be done this they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end in this order they thought was expressed in the words that evil should be or be done this however is not correct since evil is not of itself ordered to good but accidentally for it is beside the intention of the sinner that any good should follow from his sin as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions it cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally but by that which belongs to it essentially replied to objection to evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe except accidentally I said above therefore Dionysius in saying that evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity replied to objection three the statements that evil exists and that evil exists not are opposed as contradictories yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be are not so opposed since either is affirmative god therefore neither wills able to be done or wills it not to be done but wills to permit evil to be done and this is a good tenth article whether god has free will objection one it seems that god has not free will for Jerome says in a homily on the prodigal son god alone is he who is not liable to sin nor can be liable all others as having free will can be inclined to either side objection to further free will is the faculty of the reason and will by which good and evil are chosen but god does not will evil as has been said therefore there is not free will in god on the contrary ambrose says the holy spirit divided unto each one as he will namely according to the free choice of the will not in obedience to necessity i answer that we have free will with respect to what we will not have necessity nor by natural instinct for our will to be happy does not appertain to free will but to natural instinct hence other animals that are moved to act by natural instinct are not said to be moved by free will since then god necessarily wills his own goodness but other things not necessarily as shown above he has free will with respect to what he does not necessarily will reply to objection one Jerome seems to deny free will to god not simply but only as regards the inclination to sin reply to objection two since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness by which god wills all things as shown above it is manifestly impossible for him to will the evil of sin yet he can make choice of one of two opposites in as much as he can will a thing to be or not to be in the same way we ourselves without sin can will to sit down and not will to sit down 11th article 11th article whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in god objection one it seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in god for as the will of god is the cause of things so is his wisdom but no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will objection two further every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself is false if therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will they are false but if they do agree they are superfluous no expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will on the contrary the will of god is one since it is the very essence of god it sometimes it is spoken of as many as in the words of the psalms great are the works of the lord sought out according to all he wills therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will i answer that some things are said of god in their strict sense others by metaphor as appears from what has been said before when certain human passions are predicated of the godhead metaphorically this is done because of a likeness in the effect hence the thing that is in us a sign of some passion is signified metaphorically in god under the name of that passion thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish so that punishment becomes an expression of anger therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger when anger is attributed to god in the same way what is usually with us an expression of will is sometimes metaphorically called will in god just as when anyone lays down a precept it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of god as in the words thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven there is however this difference between will and anger that anger is never attributed to god properly since in its primary meaning it includes passion whereas will is attributed to him properly therefore in god there are distinguished will in its proper sense and will as attributed to him by metaphor will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression in as much as the sign itself of will is called will reply to objection one knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done unless through the will for we do not put into act what we know unless we will to do so accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge but to will reply to objection two expressions of will are called divine wills not as being signs that god wills anything but because what in us is the usual expression of our will is called the divine will in god thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in god but it is called anger in him from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves twelfth article whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will objection one it seems that five expressions of will namely prohibition precept council operation and permission are not rightly assigned to the divine will for the same things that god bids us to do by his preceptor council these he sometimes operates in us and the same things that he prohibits these he sometimes permits they are not therefore to be enumerated as distinct objection to further god works nothing unless he wills it as the scripture says but the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression objection three further operation and permission appertained to all creatures in common since god works in them all and permits some action in them all but precept council and prohibition belong to rational creatures only therefore they do not come rightly under one division not being of one order objection four further evil happens in more ways than good since good happens in one way but evil in all kinds of ways as declared by the philosopher it is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil namely prohibition and two namely council and precept in the case of good i answer that by these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something a man may show that he will something either by himself or by means of another he may show it by himself by doing something either directly or indirectly and accidentally he shows it directly when he works in his own person in that way the expression of his will is his own working he shows it indirectly by not hindering the doing of a thing for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover in this respect the expression is called permission he declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept and by prohibiting its contrary or by persuasion which is a part of council since in these ways the will of man makes itself known the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will as the expression of that will that precept council and prohibition are called the will of god is clear from the words of matthew thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven that permission and operation are called the will of god is clear from augustin who says nothing is done unless the almighty wills it to be done either by permitting it or by actually doing it or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time permission being with respect to evil operation with regard to good whilst as to future time prohibition is in respect to evil precept to good that is necessary and council to good that is of super irrigation reply to objection one there is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways thus we find many words that mean the same thing hence there is no reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept operation and council or a prohibition or permission reply to objection two as god may by metaphor be said to will what by his will properly speaking he wills not so he may by metaphor be said to will what he does properly speaking will hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure and of the will of expression but operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure whilst precept and council are not both because the former regards the present and the two latter the future and because the former is of itself the effect of the will the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another reply to objection three rational creatures are masters of their own acts and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts in as much as god ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these reply to objection four all evil of sin though happening in many ways agrees in being one out of harmony agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will hence with regard to evil only one expression is assigned that a prohibition on the other hand good stands in various relations to the divine goodness since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness and these are the subject of precept and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly and these are the subject of council or it may be said that council is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good but also with the avoiding of lesser evils the end of question 19 question 20 of summa theologica forest prima initial questions this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox dot org this recording is by jim ruddy summa theologica forest prima initial questions by saint thomas equinus translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 20 gods love we next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of god in the repetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul as joy love and the like and the habits of the moral virtues as justice fortitude and the like and we shall first consider the love of god and secondly his justice and mercy about the first there are four points of inquiry whether love exists in god whether he loves all things whether he loves one thing more than another and whether he loves more the better things first article whether love exists in god objection one it seems that love does not exist in god for in god there are no passions now love is a passion therefore love is not in god objection two further love anger sorrow and the like are mutually divided against one another but sorrow and anger are not attributed to god unless by metaphor therefore neither is love attributed to him objection three further dinecia says love is a uniting and binding force but this cannot take place in god since he is simple therefore love does not exist in god on the contrary it is written god is love by answer that we must need assert that in god there is love because love is the first movement of the will and of every repetitive faculty for since the acts of the will and of every repetitive faculty tend towards good and evil as to their proper objects and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly as opposed to good it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil thus for instance joy is prior to sorrow love to hate because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another hence the intellect is first directed to universal truths now in the second place to particular and special truths now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition as joy and delight regard good present and possessed whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed love however regards good universally whether possessed or not hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love as their root and origin for nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything except as a good that is loved nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love similarly it is clear that sorrow and other things like to it must be referred to love as to their first principle hence in whom so ever there is will and appetite there must also be love since if the first is wanting all that follows is also wanting now it has been shown that will is in god and hence we must attribute love to him reply to objection one the cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason as stated in de anema so in ourselves the intellectual appetite or the will as it is called moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite hence in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive force of our bodies some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite and this change affects especially the heart which as the philosopher says is the first principle of movement in animals therefore acts of the sensitive appetite in as much as they have annexed to them some bodily change are called passions whereas acts of the will are not so called love therefore and joy and delight are passions in so far as they denote acts of the intellect of appetite they are not passions it is in this latter sense that they are in god hence the philosopher says god rejoices by an operation that is one and simple for the same reason he loves without passion replied to objection two in the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element namely the bodily change and a certain formal element which is on the part of the appetite thus in anger as the philosopher says the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart but the formal the appetite for revenge again as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied as a desire which is of the good that we have not and in sorrow which is about the evil we have this applies also to anger which supposes sorrow certain other passions however as love and joy imply no imperfection since therefore none of these can be attributed to god on their material side as has been said neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to him except metaphorically and from likeness of effects as already shown whereas those that do not imply imperfection such as love and joy can be properly predicated of god though without attributing passion to him as said before replied to objection three an act of love always tends towards two things to the good that one wills and to the person for whom one wills it since to love a person is to wish that person good and sin as much as we love ourselves we wish ourselves good and so far as possible union with that good so love is called the unitive force even in god without implying composition for the good that he wills for himself is no other than himself who is good by his essence as above shown and by the fact that anyone loves another he wills good to that other thus he puts the other as it were in the place of himself and regards the good done to him as done to himself so far love is a binding force since it aggregates another to ourselves and refers his good to our own and then again the divine love is a binding force and as much as god wills good to others yet it implies no composition in god second article whether god loves all things objection one it seems that god does not love all things for according to Dionysius love places the lover outside himself and causes him to pass as it were into the object of his love but it is not admissible to say that god is placed outside of himself and passes into other things therefore it is inadmissible to say that god loves things other than himself objection two further the love of god is eternal but things apart from god are not from eternity except in god therefore god does not love anything except as it exists in himself but as existing in him it is no other than himself therefore god does not love things other than himself objection three further love is twofold the love namely of desire and the love of friendship now god does not love irrational creatures with a love of desire since he needs no creature outside himself nor with a love of friendship since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures as the philosopher shows therefore god does not love all things objection four further it is written thou hatest all the workers of iniquity now nothing is at the same time hated and loved therefore god does not love all things on the contrary it is said thou lovest all things that are and hate is none of the things which thou hast made i answer that god loves all existing things for all existing things and so far as they exist are good since the existence of a thing is itself a good and likewise whatever perfection it possesses now it has been shown above that god's will is the cause of all things it must needs be therefore that a thing has existence or any kind of good only in as much as it is willed by god to every existing thing then god wills some good hence since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing it is manifest that god loves everything that exists yet not as we love because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things but is moved by it as by its object our love whereby we will good to anything is not the cause of its goodness but conversely its goodness whether real or imaginary calls forth our love by which we will that it should preserve the good it has and receive besides the good it has not and to this end we direct our actions whereas the love of god infuses and creates goodness replied to objection two one a lover is placed outside himself and made to pass into the object of his love in as much as he wills good to the beloved and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own hence Dionysius says on behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this that he himself the cause of all things by his abounding love and goodness is placed outside himself by his providence for all existing things replied to objection two although creatures have not existed from eternity except in god yet because they have been in him from eternity god has known them eternally in their proper natures and for that reason has loved them even as we by the images of things within us know things existing in themselves replied to objection three friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures who are capable of returning love and communicating one with another in the various works of life who may fare well or ill according to the changes of fortune and happiness even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised but irrational creatures cannot attain to loving god nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that he lives strictly speaking therefore god does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship but as it were with the love of desire insofar as he orders them to rational creatures and even to himself yet this is not because he stands in need of them but only on account of his goodness and of the services they render to us for we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves replied to objection four nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect while it is hated under another god loves sinners insofar as they are existing natures for they have existence and have it from him insofar as they are sinners they have not existence at all but fall short of it and this in them is not from god hence under this aspect they are hated by him third article whether god loves all things equally objection one it seems that god loves all things equally for it is said he hath equally care of all but god's providence over things comes from the love world with he loves them therefore he loves all things equally objection two further the love of god is his essence but god's essence does not admit of degree neither therefore does his love he does not therefore love some things more than others objection three further as god's love extends to created things so do his knowledge and will extend but god is not said to know some things more than others nor will one thing more than another neither therefore does he love some things more than others on the contrary auguston says god loves all things that he has made and amongst them rational creatures more and of these especially those who are members of his only begotten son himself i answer that since to love the thing is to will it's good and a twofold way anything may be loved more or less in one way on the part of the act of the will itself which is more or less intense in this way god does not love some things more than others because he loves all things by an act of the will that is one simple and always the same in another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved and this way we are said to love that one more than another for whom we will a greater good though our will is not more intense in this way we must need say that god loves some things more than others for since god's love is the cause of goodness and things as has been said no one thing would be better than another if god did not will greater good for one than for another replied to objection one god is said to have equally care of all not because by his care he deals out equal good to all but because he administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness replied to objection two this argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will which is the divine essence but the good that god wills for his creatures is not the divine essence therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree reply to objection three to understand and to will denote the act alone and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which god may be said to know or will more or less as has been said with respect to god's love fourth article whether god always loves more the better things objection one it seems that god does not always love more the better things for it is manifested christ is better than the whole human race being god and man but god loved the human race more than he loved christ for it is said he spared not his own son but delivered him up for us all therefore god does not always love more the better things objection two further an angel is better than a man hence it is said of man thou hast made him a little less than the angels but god loved men more than he loved the angels for it is said nowhere does he take hold of the angels but of the seed of abraham he taketh hold therefore god does not always love more the better things objection three further peter was better than john since he loved christ more hence the lord knowing this to be true asked peter saying simon son of john love is thou me more than these yet christ loved john more than he loved peter for as augustin says commenting on the word simon son of john love is thou me by this very mark is john distinguished from the other disciples not that he loved him only but that he loved him more than the rest therefore god does not always love more the better things objection four further the innocent man is better than the repentant since repentance is as to rome says a second plank after shipwreck but god loves the penitent more than the innocent since he rejoices over him the more for it is said i say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance more than upon ninety nine just who need not penance therefore god does not always love more the better things objection five further the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner now god loves more the predestined sinner since he wills for him a greater good life eternal therefore god does not always love more the better things on the contrary everything loves what is like it as appears from ecclesiasticus every beast loveth its like now the better thing is the more like is to god therefore the better things are more loved by god i answer it must needs be according to what has been said before that god loves more the better things for it has been shown that god's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than his willing for that thing a greater good because god's will is the cause of goodness in things and the reason why some things are better than others is that god wills for them a greater good and so follows that he loves more the better things reply to objection one god loves christ not only more than he loves the whole human race but more than he loves the entire created universe because he willed for him the greater good and giving him a name that is above all names and so far as he was true god nor did anything of his excellence diminish when god delivered him up to death for the salvation of the human race but rather did he become thereby a glorious conqueror the government was placed upon his shoulder according to isaiah reply to objection two god loves the human nature assumed by the word of god and the person of christ more than he loves all the angels for that nature is better especially on the ground of the union with the godhead but speaking of human nature in general and comparing it with the angelic the two are found equal in the order of grace and of glory since according to revelation the measure of a man and of an angel is the same yet so that in this respect some angels are found nobler than some men and some men nobler than some angels but as to natural condition an angel is better than a man god therefore did not assume human nature because he loved man absolutely speaking more but because the needs of man were greater just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant that he does not give to his own son in sound health reply to objection three this doubt concerning peter and john has been solved in various ways augustin interprets it mystically and says that the act of life signified by peter loves god more than the contemplative signified by john because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them and depart to god god he says loves more the contemplative life since he preserves it longer for it does not end as the act of life does with the life of the body some say that peter loved christ more in his members and therefore was loved more by christ also for which reason he gave him the care of the church but that john loved christ more in himself and so was loved more by him on which account christ commended his mother to his care others say that it is uncertain which of them loved christ more with the love of charity and uncertain also which of them god loved more in ordain to a greater degree of glory and eternal life peter is said to have loved more in regard to a certain promptness and fervor but john to have been more loved with respect to certain marks of familiarity which christ showed to him rather than to others on account of his youth and purity while others say that christ loved peter more from his more excellent gift of charity but john more for his gifts of intellect hence absolutely speaking peter was the better and more beloved but in a certain sense john was the better and was loved the more however it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters since the lord and no other is the wearer of spirits replied to objection four the penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded for whether innocent or penitent those are the better and better loved who have most grace other things being equal innocence is the more noble thing and the more beloved god is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent because often penitents rise from sin more cautious humble and fervent hence gregarly commenting on these words says that in battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy more than him who has never fled but has never done a brave deed or it may be answered that gifts of grace equal in themselves are more as conferred on the penitent who deserve punishment than as conferred on the innocent to whom no punishment was due just as a hundred pounds are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king replied to objection five since god's will is the cause of goodness and things the goodness of one who is loved by god is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness according therefore to the time when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good the sinner is better although according to some other time he is the worse because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad the end of question 20 question 21 of summa theologica pars prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima initial questions by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 21 the justice and mercy of God after considering the divine love we must treat of God's justice and mercy under this head there are four points of inquiry whether there is justice in God whether his justice can be called truth whether there is mercy in God and whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy first article whether there is justice in God objection one it seems that there is not justice in God for justice is divided against temperance but temperance does not exist in God therefore neither does justice objection two further he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases and pleases does not work according to justice but as the apostle says God worketh all things according to the counsel of his will therefore justice cannot be attributed to him objection three further the act of justice is to pay what is due but God is no man's debtor therefore justice does not belong to God objection four further whatever is in God is his essence but justice cannot belong to this for Boethius says good regards the essence justice the act therefore justice does not belong to God on the contrary it is said the lord is just and hath loved justice I answer that there are two kinds of justice the one consists in mutual giving and receiving as in buying and selling and other kinds of intercourse and exchange this the philosopher calls commutative justice the direct exchange and intercourse of business this does not belong to God since as the apostle says who hath first given to him and recompense shall be made him the other consists in distribution and is called distributive justice whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves as then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler so the order of the universe which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will shows forth the justice of God hence Dionysia says we must need see that God is truly just in seeing how he gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it reply to objection one certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions as temperance with concupiscence fortitude with fear and daring meekness with anger such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God since as stated above in God there are no passions nor a sensitive appetite which is as the philosopher says the subject of those virtues on the other hand certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending such as justice liberality and magnificence and these reside not in the sensitive faculty but in the will hence there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God although not in civil matters but in such acts as are not unbecoming to him for as the philosopher says it would be absurd to praise God for his political virtues reply to objection two since good as perceived by the intellect is the object of the will it is impossible for God to will anything but what his wisdom approves this is as it were his law of justice in accordance with which his will is right and just hence what he does according to his will he does justly as we do justly what we do according to law but whereas law comes to us from some higher power God is a law unto himself reply to objection three to each one is do what is his own now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own thus the master owns the servant and not conversely for that is free which is its own cause in the word debt therefore is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed now a twofold order has to be considered in things the one whereby one created thing is directed to another as the parts of the whole accident to substance and all things whatsoever to their end the other whereby all created things are ordered to God thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways as do either to God or to creatures and in either way God pays what is due it is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what his will and wisdom require and what manifests his goodness in this respect God's justice regards what befits him in as much as he renders to himself what is due to himself it is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it thus it is due to a man to have hands and that other animals should serve him thus also God exercises justice when he gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition this debt however is derived from the former since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to its according to the divine wisdom and although God in this way pays each thing it's due yet he himself is not the debtor since he is not directed to other things but rather other things to him justice therefore in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of his goodness sometimes as the reward of merit and some touches on either view when he says when thou dost punish the wicked it is just since it agrees with their desserts and when thou dost spare the wicked it is also just since it befits thy goodness reply to objection for although justice regards act this does not prevent its being the essence of God since even that which is of the essence of the thing may be the principle of action but good does not always regard act since the thing is called good not merely with respect to act but also as regards perfection in its essence for this reason it is said that the good is related to the just as the general to the special second article whether the justice of God is truth objection one it seems that the justice of God is not truth for justice resides in the will since his anselm says it is a rectitude of the will where as truth resides in the intellect as the philosopher says therefore justice does not appertain to truth objection to further according to the philosopher truth is a virtue distinct from justice truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice on the contrary it is said mercy and truth have met each other where truth stands for justice i answer that truth consists in the equation of mind and thing as said above now the mind that is the cause of the thing is related to it as its rule and measure whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things when therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing as happens in ourselves for according as a thing is or is not our thoughts or our words about it are true or false but when the mind is the rule or measure of things truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind just as the work of an artist is said to be true when it is in accordance with his art now as works of art are related to art so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord therefore god's justice which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of his wisdom which is the law of his justice is suitably called truth thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice replied to objection one justice as to the law that governs resides in the reason or intellect but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law it resides in the will replied to objection to the truth of which the philosopher is speaking in this passage is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word indeed such as he really is thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule as has been said regarding the truth of justice third article whether mercy can be attributed to god objection one it seems that mercy cannot be attributed to god for mercy is a kind of sorrow as damascene says but there is no sorrow in god and therefore there is no mercy in him objection two further mercy is a relaxation of justice but god cannot remit what appertains to his justice for it is said if we believe not he continue with faithful he cannot deny himself but he would deny himself as a gloss says if he should deny his words therefore mercy is not becoming to god on the contrary it is said he is a merciful and gracious lord I answer that mercy is especially to be attributed to god as seen in its effect but not as an affection of passion in proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful as being so to speak sorrowful at heart being affected with sorrows at the misery of another as though it were his own hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other as if it were his and this is the effect of mercy to sorrow therefore over the misery of others belongs not to god but it does most properly belong to him to dispel that misery whatever be the defect we call by that name now defects are not removed except by the perfection of some kind of goodness and the primary source of goodness is god as shown above it must however be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness but also to his justice liberality and mercy yet under different aspects the communicating of perfections absolutely considered appertains to goodness as shown above insofar as perfections are given to things in proportion the bestowal of them belongs to justice as has been already said insofar as god does not bestow them for his own use but only on account of his goodness it belongs to liberality insofar as perfections given to things by god expel defects it belongs to mercy reply to objection one the argument is based on mercy regarded as an affection of passion reply to objection two god acts mercifully not indeed by going against his justice but by doing something more than justice thus a man who pays another 200 pieces of money though owing him only 100 does nothing against justice but acts liberally or mercifully the case is the same with one who pardons an offense committed against him for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift hence the apostle calls remission a forgiving forgive one another as christ has forgiven you hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice but in a sense is the fullness thereof and thus it is said mercy exalted itself above judgment fourth article whether in every work of god there are mercy and justice objection one it seems that not in every work of god our mercy and justice for some works of god are attributed to mercy as a justification of the ungodly and others to justice as the damnation of the wicked hence it is said judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy therefore not in every work of god do mercy and justice appear objection two further the apostle attributes the conversion of the jews to justice and truth but that of the Gentiles to mercy therefore not in every work of god our justice and mercy objection three further many just persons are afflicted in this world which is unjust therefore not in every work of god our justice and mercy objection four further it is the part of justice to pay what is due but of mercy to relieve misery thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works whereas creation presupposes nothing therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found on the contrary it is said all the ways of the lord are mercy and truth i answer that mercy and truth are necessarily found in all god's works if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect not every defect however can properly be called a misery but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy for misery as opposed to happiness for this necessity there is a reason because since a debt paid according to the divine justice as one do either to god or to some creature neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of god because god can't do nothing that is not in accord with his wisdom and goodness and it is in this sense as we have said that anything is due to god likewise whatever is done by him in created things is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice thus justice must exist in all gods works now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy and is founded there upon for nothing is due to creatures except for something pre-existing in them or foreknown again if this is due to a creature it must be due on account of something that precedes and since we cannot go on to infinity we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will which is the ultimate end we may say for instance that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul and his rational soul is due to him so that he may be man and his being man is on account of the divine goodness so in every work of god viewed at its primary source there appears mercy in all that follows the power of mercy remains and works indeed with even greater force as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes for this reason does god out of abundance of his goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their desserts since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers because between creatures and god's goodness there can be no proportion reply to objection one certain works are attributed to justice and certain others to mercy because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen which though it does not totally remit yet somewhat alleviates in punishing short of what is deserved in the justification of the ungodly justice is seen when god remits sins on account of love though he himself has mercifully infused that love so we read of magdalene many sins are forgiven her because she has loved much replied to objection god's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the jews and of the gentiles but an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the jews which is not seen in the conversion of the gentiles in as much as the jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers replied to objection three justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to god as to this gregory says the evils that press upon us in this world force us to go to god reply to objection four although creation presupposes nothing in the universe yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of god in this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness and the idea of mercy also is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence the end of question 21