 I think that during the prior session, somebody mentioned the SDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals, and I've been implicated in that as part of the Committee for Development Policies. I see some other members of the committee, and the whole idea is that the MDGs, they at least in my view, they generated an unexpectedly positive results, perhaps because of China but also because of the changes in policies of the donors and the public expenditure in developing countries. Now, the SDGs I found are framed in an exhortational way, so that nobody should be like behind them, and of course it's true. At the same time, I teach macroeconomics, and then I see that our financial crisis, that the inequality is worsening, and so the question is will they made it? Because I was not sure that they could made it for the MDGs. MDGs they made because China made a huge progress, but Africa was not on schedule on everything. So, we tried to see what is the consistency between the SDG goals, particularly SDG number one, which is eradication of poverty by the year 2030. In doing that, we built not the model, but basically we enlarged the bourguignon, the composition, by adding something else in a way, so as to bring in also population, and the ratio of food prices to consumer price index. Then we simulate the variables, which are growth plus improvement in population policies, which means the per capita is smaller and inequality. Then we look at food prices, simulating whether they should be stable in relation to inflation or not. Now, what do we simulate? Well, we simulate the best possible improvement which we have observed during the last 30 years. For instance, for inequality, the largest improvement we saw was in Brazil between 1998 and 2012, which was about 15 percent from the initial period. For growth, we take the IMF growth projection to 2022, then we extend it to 2030 because nobody knows what will be growth in these countries in 2030. For population, we do the same. We say, well, we take the medium variant of the United Nations population projection, and they say, which is the country which improved, reduced the fastest population growth? Well, during the last 30 years, China. Then we assign to every single country of the 78 countries which are poverty bigger than zero in 2015 or 13, and then we see if with these improvements, actually they can eradicate poverty. The answer is, well, many African countries and some Latin American countries actually do not meet, do not hit the target. So out of 78 countries, depending on the values you simulate, between 2030, they are not there. They are not there in particular because the growth projections by the IMF are extremely anemic, and they come up with, for instance, for Latin America 2 percent, for Africa 3 percent, and population growth is 20 percent. So basically, my view is that the eradication of poverty raises a growth issue, and in many developing countries, particularly in Africa, I mean, I think that the way the debate is going on is ignoring to a large extent growth, and it takes into account inequality, population, and so on and so forth, but it ignores growth. Now, to do that, we go back to the evolution of the measurement of poverty. So poverty at countries shown, I think that Martin, I saw him here somewhere, you will remember that back in the 90s, there was a paper by Lee Squire and so which was saying, well, inequality is constant over time. So poverty basically, which is delta Z over Z minus one, depends on YC, delta YC over C1. So growth. So in order to eradicate poverty, you must grow. Then there is the bulging out of the composition, and so we see that the poverty depends on the level of the poverty line which we will keep constant, depends on growth and distribution. Now, if you split the population growth per capita and population growth per capita, then you have three elements, and then this is done normally at current prices, and normally if you look at countries where the food price rises faster than the consumer price index, and then you take into consideration the poor consume more food than the others, the poverty line is biased. So we introduce a ratio just as a scholar, which is the, so we found it empirically, and there we show it, that Gini rises by another two points if the food price index rises by 25% more than the consumer price index. Now, this is the bulging on the growth effect and the distribution effect. So basically in explicit term, we get that the poverty, the change in the poverty of countries depends negatively on alpha on the growth rate, and then end the growth rate of the, positive on the growth rate of the population, and then of course if Gini rises, poverty will rise, but Gini falls, and then we have the scholar that, so omega which is in Gini terms, which is normally two points if the FBI rises by more than 25% and that. Where do I get the coefficients? I don't estimate anything. I go to Kacwani and Son, which I think is a very nice paper. We assume that his own elasticity is, which are this one, so they're tabulated on theoretical distributions, the alpha and the beta, so for different level of Ginis, and for different ratios of Z, which is the party line divided by GDP. So if you are in a country with 0.33, means that there's quite a bit, can be redistributed. If you have a Z, Y, C, which is equal to one, it means the party line is equal to GDP per cover, so there is not much to be redistributed. Then we do that for the poverty elasticity of growth, and then we do that for the poverty elasticity of inequality, and then the red ones, elasticity, are those that are the biggest. So you will see that in countries where Z over Y, C is low, the elasticity is much bigger, so there is plenty to be redistributed. Then in the countries where the Z over Y, C is very low, is very high, not close to one, then actually there is no escape then growing. Now, what are the data? Well, for GDP, we said we used the IMFW World Economic Outlook 2017, which go to 2022, then we extend that to the same growth rate to the 2030. Now, what do they show? Well, it shows a rapid expansion of Asia. Asia is assigned an 8 percent growth rate, Latin America 3.3, and Maina. So basically, the assumption that we made, which reflect what IMF says, is 2 percent growth for Latin America, 3.3 for Africa, Black Africa, and Maina, and Maina includes Pakistan and Afghanistan, 2.1 percent for the CIS country, and then sustained growth for the Asian countries. Now, party line, 190 per day in 2011 PPPs, and the World Bank data that probably been cooked up by Martin in the incidence of poverty or countries in 2013. I don't know if there are updates, but this is what we use. Then the genie data. The genie data, as a producer of genie data myself, I would have liked to use the world income in a quality database of WIDER, but WIDER has a lower coverage than the global consumption in income project, which produces data which are quite different, but they are standardized in a way. The standardization ensures covering a bigger number of country, but brings in some biases which we have tested. Population data, medium variant of the population prospect, and the full price index divided by CPI, we took it from a study we did for 18 African countries, which is, no, okay, when you come back. Now, on inequality, which data did we simulate? Well, there is the Latin American miracle. Well, this is the trend in the genie coefficient up to 2015. So you see that from 2002 to 2015, there is a huge drop. And not all the countries, they follow the same speed, but Brazil, particularly the southern corner, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, they have a major decline. So we looked at country by country, we say which one is the best, and it looked like it was Brazil, 1998 to 2012. Now things are changing probably a little bit, but this was like a 15% decline from high level. And then we applied this rate of decline to all the 78 countries. Now, growth rate of the population. Now, this is the southern, basically is a point which normally is ignored in the debate. And I think that my view is that it should be brought in into the development debate for poverty eradication. So you see that South Africa, basically, there is no declining growth rate to the population between the 80s and 2015. Mainly there is a decline, and the others are all on the way down. And so we use this growth rate. And now this is total fertility. So Southeast Asia red line, China the yellow line, and then total fertility also in Europe and Latin America and Northern Africa, same. Now, this is Africa, fertility in Africa. Now, I've been to Niger in 2007 to study the one of the latest famine. And Niger despite the fact that there's a famine every two or three years, basically is rising fertility over time. And that is something which is difficult to understand and all micro economically you can explain it, but there is a sort of a huge contrast between collective well-being and individual decisions. Africa is falling, but it's falling slowly. And Nigeria, which is a large country, is falling very shortly. Now, Africa, however, presents some good examples of declining inequality. The main one is Rwanda, the red line. So basically this fertility rate goes from eight to four in 15 years. And Ethiopia as well, as it shows a very large decline in fertility. So what did we simulate TFR? No, we simulated population growth. Which one did we take? Well, we took the medium variant projections from the United Nations Population Division and we applied to that minus 13% to the year 2030. Why? Because this is what happened in China, which was one of the countries which recorded the fastest population growth. Now, for the ratio, this is what we had estimated. So you have on the horizontal axis X, which is the ratio of food price index to consumer price index. And the changes in genie. So there are two first differences. So you see that if the food price index rises by 20%, 25%, which is the maximum we have seen, genie goes up by one and a half point almost. Then we say, okay, two points. So if you have a penalty, if food price index rises faster than consumer price index. Now, we simulated this in the following way. We took the elasticity which correspond to the initial values of the variables in the countries. And we take them initially as constant. Then we simulate growth and inequality. And if we include improvements both in inequality and growth, then we'll energize the elasticities, then they become more favorable basically. So genie drop 20%, population slower than 13%. Food price index assume no change in, first no change or change by 2030. Now, these are the results. What do they show? Well, show that you have 78 countries in total. And the first column is the distribution. 41 are in Africa, in sub-Saharan Africa, 15 in Latin America, six in Asia, and so on and so forth. So first scenario, only IMF. Will we eradicate poverty by 2030 with the growth rate that the IMF has estimated? And we see that the impact, the marginal effect is minus 14. So only 14 countries that will grow out of poverty with no other changes. Then we say, well, we do growth plus 13% slower population growth. And we see that the marginal effect is close to zero, it's minus one, only one country. And then we say, oh, Corny, you are having, I'm almost done, you're having a sort of a, you have, now why does it happen? It took us a while. Now, if you go to Angola, for instance, the increase in population projected to the year 2030 by the United Nations population division is plus 60% in relation to 2015. So if you take away 13% of a very large increase, the fact is very small. Which means that you have to keep population policies in place for longer or a bigger decline than those recorded in China. Then we say, okay, at Genie, and the fact of the genius, so Genie takes away 13 countries out of poverty. Then we endogenize, so we, since we improve GDP per capita and reduce the Genie, then we endogenize that. So we reduce the, we change the elasticity, the alpha and the beta, we see that another 13. So despite all that, there are still 37 out 78 countries which they're not hitting the target. Then say, oh God, 37 out of 78. So this SDGs are exhortational, but basically they're not consistent with what goes on in the real economy. And then, so what we said, well, okay, perhaps there is a growth problem. So let us increase the growth rate by 1.1%, in relation to what the IMF has simulated. And you see that there is an effect, nine countries that exit poverty with an additional growth of 1%. But still, you're still remaining there, you know? And so by and large, I mean, with all the simulation, and, sorry, and then the last one, the last column, we assume that this happens with no changes in food prices in relation to the consumer price index. So if we do that, basically you see that you still get stuck with 14 countries out of 78, which will not make it. But this under very optimistic hypothesis about inequality, population, growth, et cetera, et cetera. And this brings me to the composition. You see the brown are the Latinos at the beginning, and then the blue one are the Africans. So in the end, the scenario six, you see that I think there is one Latino from Latin America, which is Haiti. And then they are mostly from Africa, sub-Saharan Africa. So what does this tell me? Well, it tells me that there is a growth issue. I mean, at least for the countries that are, even in scenario number six, with all these positive hypotheses, it will be impossible to exit poverty unless you grow faster. Now the question is, which growth? And I think that while everybody is in agreement about reducing poverty, there is no agreement about the pattern of growth. So some examples. For instance, we in another work we did, I mean, we see that trade liberalization in Malawi has basically increased inequality. And so my main conclusion is that SDGs are inconsistent with, for many countries with the achievement of the eradication of poverty by the year 2030. And that brings us back to the old tried problem of what type of growth. And I think that with the current pattern of growth, which has reduced growth rate in Africa and Latin America tremendously, according to the IMF, we will not make it. We have comments on which policies are needed, but I think I should stop here, otherwise the chair will beat me up. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.