 Thank you very much for the invitation. It's a big pleasure and honor for me to speak to you about Ukraine. I'm very happy that despite the weather and the mid of July, you all made it here. It says a lot to me that there is interest over my country. I think that I will talk a little bit about domestic developments in Ukraine and then go to foreign policy and then we'll conclude about elections that are coming in October in Ukraine. Speaking about today, today is a memorable day. The president, the first president of Ukraine is celebrating his 62nd birthday and it's a person who could become a hero of Ukraine as he could bring stability and also set the right course for the country. When President Yanukovych was coming to power, he actually promised stability and he said that he would unite east and west around a certain project. I think over the two years he did succeed in that. Unfortunately, the east and west are now united in his in the disliking of him rather than around certain other projects. And I will try to tell you basically to walk you through this last two years leading to today why Ukraine is a gray zone unfortunately and where it may go within the next few years. So in 2010 we had three presidential elections that brought to power Viktor Yanukovych and unfortunately very fast after that Ukraine started going the wrong direction. We see that Ukraine is not scoring well in international ratings be that the Freedom House nations and transit freedom index be that the World Bank ease of doing business before the visa transparency international where Ukraine is almost sadly sitting on the 152nd place out of 183 countries both in terms of corruption and in terms of ease of doing business. In 2010 in autumn we saw local elections that were not compliant with international norms. Later on we saw the constitutional overhaul which basically meant that Ukrainian constitution was Ukraine being more of a parliamentary public was returned to the constitution of the 90s was president gaining again more power. But that was done through the constitutional court which was under control of the president. The judiciary was also put under control of the presidential administration and we saw that president's people were put in key positions in the administration from central bank to ministry of interior and other ministries. We also saw very set development after the orange evolution that first time Ukrainian media started self-censorship just basically for owners being afraid of prosecution from the administration that were no direct demands from the administration as it was in the 90s but the self-censorship was in very new development. We also saw that the economy was not doing well as you probably know Ukraine was among the most hit economies of the crisis of 2008-2009. It did recover slowly with the help of IMF and the activities of the government but at the same time we saw that the reforms that were started they benefited mostly the big businesses the oligarchs close to the president and his family rather than ordinary people and for instance an interesting development that the president's family started in reaching itself over the last two years was for instance president's son growing his valves 18 times in just one year. And the last set development is that the police and security forces are gaining more power but also more budget and that raises a big question in Ukraine. The lucky the healthy development that you mentioned was the Euro 2012 which again was a lot of efforts from the government not always successful. I think that it was a good sign that it was successful because for me it was a sign of Ukrainians basically stepping in and being those hospitable people who welcomed the European fence and that was again about the people's power which I will talk a bit later. So while this set developments why Ukraine after the Orange Revolution hopeful of the European Union hopeful of the Western world why did it go this way. My reading of this is simple that basically the president's vision for Ukraine is not of a statesman but more of a clansman with his family being a center of his thinking. We saw that as I said that there was an enrichment of his family members and himself we saw this consolidation of power we saw the distribution of assets first for oligarchs close to him but now more to family and we saw tightening of control in almost all public spheres. I would not agree with those who say that Ukraine is now a Belarus or on the way to Belarus it's a very very much of a development of its own but it's quite a boring sign. Now I'll move to the foreign policy. As I said the title says Ukraine to an Eastern West and that Ukraine is a grey zone. That's basically where Ukraine again ended up with the with the help of administration when Yanukovych came to power he said that foreign policy will be pragmatic that it will be based on national interests and it will be not more no more about dreaming European dreams but building Europe at home. In reality at the beginning it was more about corporate interests which basically interests of the oligarchs close to him and now it's about family interests that are growing within the country. Again the grey zone is about reactionist foreign policy quite often and often misreading the partners. I will talk about three partners because the west the Ukrainians don't see the west as a homogeneous obviously actor the US would be perhaps the most important foreign policy partner and it's perhaps the most respected partner by the by the Ukrainian administration. Obviously there were a number of steps towards the US like Ukraine giving up enriched uranium or Ukraine was participating in NATO operations or US companies got access to extraction of gas on Ukrainian territory just recently and most of these actions were made to basically shut up the US on democracy on the problems with democracy in Ukraine and the belief in Kiev is such that when we give all the things to the US administration they will simply forget about values about their respect for democracy. Now moving to Russia it's the partner and competitor which has a very long history of difficult relations with Ukraine. Obviously it's perhaps the most feared partner by the administration and the initial desire when the coach came to power was to get to change the contract that was signed in 2009 on gas supplies from Russia and to get basically cheaper gas and on the other hand to be left alone. The talks continue for two years with very little result but we saw that the Ukrainian administration tried to give gifts to presence to the to the Russian administration first of all by declaring Ukraine as a non-block country which basically meant that we would not aspire to become a member of NATO and then the second was the extension of the Black Sea Fleet for the next few decades but again this concessions led to nowhere that the contracts are not revised and basically this the last one was what you mentioned the language law which was adopted by the parliament last week it's not the only reason Russia is not the only reason for the adoption of this law and I'll talk a little bit about that later but basically the assumption was that before the meeting of President Yanukovych and President Putin on July 12th again to discuss gas issues and other bilateral issues that would be a nice present my my reading is that it will not help to solve the gas problem but that's that that has been done on the bigger demands of Russia which is Ukrainian pipeline and and the storages for gas and the membership of Ukrainian the customs union I don't think that the Ukrainian administration is ready for that for very pragmatic reasons because it will not be good economically for oligarchs and the family in the short run and in the long run it will not be good politically for the president and his family so I would not I would perhaps come down those who are afraid to lose Ukraine to Russia I think that the the most scary situation is if we lose Ukraine to this grave zone than to to to Russia I would say that perhaps relations with Russia will always be difficult but with this particular administration they will not get easier despite all the hopes initially when Yanukovych came to power but again to remind that Russia is perhaps the only partner with which Ukrainians have real negotiations and it was the misinterpretation of Russia's intentions that desires we see that it leads nowhere because Russia doesn't want to agree with this small gift it wants a bigger a bigger gift now moving to the European Union for a long time the European Union was declared as an ultimate goal of every Ukrainian administration and as was mentioned here the Ukrainians started negotiations on the association agreement and deep and comprehensive free trade agreement in 2007-2008 the negotiations were quite painful basically for both sides first of all for the EU it was the first time when such a broad and comprehensive agreement was negotiated with a third country for Ukrainians it meant that if agreement is signed and implemented Ukraine would be politically associated and economically integrated with the European Union which meant taking on a lot of EUA key in various spheres and it wouldn't be only about just free trade in goods but it also basically freedom for movement of services and capital and lesser extent of mobility of people but still it would it would integrate Ukraine significantly significantly into the European Union in parallel there were also very positive developments on Ukraine joining energy community of the European Union with the Vulcan states it's been one year of Ukrainian membership but unfortunately Ukraine didn't move much on implementing its commitments Ukraine is negotiating an open sky agreement with the EU which would allow for more free travel for the people to and from Ukraine Ukraine got budget support for reform initiatives and obviously Ukraine started Ukraine signed visa facilitation agreement and started a visa free dialogue with the European Union I think that the the package that the EU offered to Ukraine was quite generous and it could work if the administration and the leadership would really want to use these tools that are offered but unfortunately neither those that are already given nor those that may be given will work and I think that the peer the problem is for the EU EU 27 is that the EU is basing its policy on the assumption that Ukraine is like us like Poland that it wants to integrate and unfortunately that's that's a wrong assumption people of Ukraine may want to be European may they want may want to be democratic but unfortunately the elite and the leadership do not want to give up today's pleasures for the sake of country becoming more close to the European Union so the problems with Ukraine started obviously not with the prosecution of opposition they started with the bad local elections constitutional overhaul and others but the reaction strong reaction came from the European Union as we saw once the opposition leaders started being prosecuted on political grounds I have to mention that last week there was a decision of European Court of Human Rights suggesting that the case against Yuri Lucenko former interior minister was politically motivated and that his arrest was not done according to to the law to international practices but the the fate of about 20 people from the previous administration is clear that they will probably remain in prison and new cases against them will be open and of course that causes a lot of reaction negative reaction from the European Union at the moment the use line and I would like to hear more more from you on this on the Irish position is to release to the the request of administration to release the opposition and hold the free and fair parliamentary elections also to conduct to organize the constitutional and judicial reform but I think that at this moment the messages that come from the EU to Kiev they are quite mixed mixed signals and part of the conditions that are put on Ukraine are difficult to implement again because for the administration it's too costly to release political prisoners for domestic reasons and to unclear what to do with constitutional reform and judicial reform because it's quite a comprehensive task and then can be interpreted in this or that way my fear is that the EU will have to revise its policy on Ukraine I'm not sure if the EU is ready for that because obviously we have very different views within the EU on what Ukraine is for the EU and what we want from the EU and I think the first question is to to discuss what do we want from Ukraine and to start building policy from there but at the moment unfortunately the agreement which has been negotiated for five years is put on the shelf and the likelihood of it being unfrozen is very little because obviously for the for the Ukrainian side whereas the elections may be free and fair and I'll talk about them in a minute if I still have time but the the fate of political prisoners is quite gloomy and I wouldn't see the Ukrainian administration making steps towards the solution of this problem so on the parliamentary elections Ukraine will have parliamentary elections in October this year there are two good news about these elections first of all that the law that was that will regulate the conduct of these elections was changed a year before the elections and that's a good news for Ukraine because we usually try to do just two or one week before the elections as it happened was the local elections in 2010 so the good news is that the rules are clear already for a year and that the OEC observers are already invited which was a big concern and a question for the Ukrainian administration but unfortunately there are many bad news or sad news first of all the return of this mixed system for the elections which means that 50% of the parliament will come through party lists closed party lists and 50% will come through single mandated constituencies as we call them in Ukraine and this system may work well in some member states in the EU but unfortunately the experience of Ukraine shows as Ukraine had that system in the 90s that it's a system that is open to many manipulations and that it's a possibility of rigging the elections unfortunately the way constituencies for these single mandated people were broken down do not correspond with international norms and raise many questions by domestic and international observers already there is certain pressure on the media as I said there is self censorship but also we will see that we see already that some media outlets are enjoying certain pressure and basically the last but not least bad news for Ukraine is that the opposition is pretty weak it's not that it's weak in terms of numbers or even public support but it's weak in terms of alternatives to the current administration and their connection with the public and I think that there are three key questions for the elections one is to which extent the administration will use the administrative resource basically pushing the local authorities to organize elections in a way that are comfortable for the or beneficial for the party of regions there was this funny development which which comes from Russia as we see to put CCTVs in every room where will be elections will be held that's something that Putin introduced before the last elections in Russia and again here while the day of elections itself or the voting may not be problematic because people may still come and express their their views but the problem is that the counting may be problematic and we are not sure how much both the domestic and international observers will be able to to guarantee that the count is fair the second question and concern perhaps is that can elections be free and fair if the key opposition leaders are not running even if their parties are participating in elections but can we can we consider this as free and fair elections and the third question which perhaps goes beyond the elections because the question is what will happen after the elections we may have more or less free and fair preparation more or less free and fair vote and even count and we may even have a lot of opposition people in the new parliament but then the question is what will happen next the there are rumors in Kiev in the presidential administration that the president wants to change the constitution and he tries to do that through quite legal means he changed the constitution through the constitutional court as I said in 2010 and now the plan is more to do it through the parliament so he needs a constitutional majority Ukrainian parliament is unfortunately known for people migrating between parties but also being bought by bigger parties so the question is will this parliament change the constitution to basically have the president be elected in the parliament which means no public won't know people's participation in elections with the same white competences and basically for lifetime so these are three questions that I think that important for to remember about the elections I think it's too early to say whether the elections will be free and fair and we rely on or see a report for that but elections are not everything in Ukrainian reality because they will not change whatever outcome is and whatever the process is they will not change the systemic problems basically Ukraine being in the great zone between east and west they will not go away just a few words on the people because obviously where are those Ukrainians who brought change in 2004-2005 I think they are tired of politicians they trusted too much to the orange team and they did think that they would just bring this new politicians or they sought new politicians to power and then they would retreat home and they would let the good politicians deliver on their promises which we all know didn't happen unfortunately the people both in the east and in the west they disapprove of the government actions and president's actions but at the same time they dislike the opposition so the support for both sides is quite low that may of course result also in the low turnout for the parliamentary elections and people don't trust in their own power anymore they did the the revolution once and they cannot go and protest every time and even if they go and protest as we saw over the last two years they will protest about something very important for them personally when the administration suggested to adopt a tax legislation that will that would influence negatively small and medium businesses they went out to the streets but they didn't go out to the streets for instance to protest when political opposition or when when the opposition was put behind the bars or other democratic problems appeared in Ukraine unfortunately the authorities are trying to radicalize the population and the language law is one of the one of the examples of bringing east against the west of Ukraine because there is certainly a divide between eastern western Ukraine not to the extent that that some people in the west think but obviously people have different culture different language different history different religion and it's just 20 years that they have been together and they're still trying to find their way towards each other but adoption of language law which basically is not really about the language but about making society more more radical and more negative against each other is not a good sign and the hope I think is obviously in the young people who are who are more believing in their power but I think that there is still no critical mass of them who would know what they want from their country and who would know how to take this country there and I think it will take time for us to go there and perhaps to to conclude I will say just about the the connection between Ukraine and Ireland because as we discussed over lunch Ireland is holding an OSEE chairmanship this year and Ukraine will take over next year which is perhaps a good news for Ukraine even if it may be a bit of a difficult case for the OSEE but I think that obviously Irish example of of chairmanship could be good for Ukraine however the the results of Ukrainian chairmanship are still a big question and the priorities are I think a bit