 Okay. Let me briefly give you the ground rules. The President will be on the record. I think he's got about two or three minutes of opening remarks. The Secretary of Defense will follow. He will be on background, except what he indicates is on the record, and the Secretary of State will follow. That will be background also, except what he indicates is on the record. He will be transcripts provided. They will be available at 5 o'clock in room 45 in the EOB. I think that's about it, sir. Well, thank you, all of you, for coming here today. I know you're all very busy, and I'm busy too. I wanted to meet with you because this is an important time in our history, and as the year unfurls, I want you to have a sense of what's going on, what's on our minds, and what's guiding our actions. Philip Graham, as you know, once said that journalism is the first rough draft of history, and as you write it over the next few months, I hope you'll be able to keep in mind whatever insights you might gain today. I'm revealing no state secrets when I tell you that right now foreign policy questions are dominating our attention. In the Philippines, we've had a very big change, a great and peaceful revolution. That triumph of the people's will is a triumph of democracy. They have more men in the field and more support than ever from the people, so this is a critical time. I've asked Congress for a mixture of military and humanitarian aid, and I'm going to push very hard for this. If we don't help the freedom fighters now, a communist Nicaragua will over the next few years attempt to destabilize its neighbors in Central America, cause untold violence and pain for the people there, and create what communism always creates, a huge refugee machine. A recent Gallup poll showed that a majority of the people in the countries surrounding the Nicaragua support continued aid to the anti-communist rebels. There's more evidence than ever of Soviet, Cuban, Libyan, and PLO involvement in Nicaragua. There's a compelling case to be made that this is the decisive moment to help the freedom fighters, and I very frankly mean to help them and will fight for the support of the American people. I would add that the brave men and women who share your profession are being put under heavy strain in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have in the past few months stepped up censorship. Radio Catelica has been shot down and La Prensa, the last great independent newspaper, is being harassed almost out of existence. Connected to Nicaragua, of course, is our need for a continued strong defense. You're familiar with the facts outlined the other night. I would only add that the way I see it, this is no time to back-town, back-track, or back-slide. So that's the quick sketch of my thinking, and I thank you again for coming. I know you have some questions, so shoot. Well, don't take that too literally. Mr. President, last year you did not give a speech on television supporting the military aid to the Contras. Do you regret that now, and will you this year? I'm going to do everything I can, whatever the opportunities might be. We haven't laid out a schedule for them, but I'm going to do everything I can to inform the American people of the situation there, and to persuade the Congress of our responsibility to do something about it. As a matter of fact, I might just throw in here that a few days ago down in Grenada when I met with the nine prime ministers of those tiny Caribbean island nations, they brought up this subject themselves and unanimously and most earnestly said, you must not stop what you're doing. You must continue to help, because they said that they thought that Nicaragua represented the greatest threat to their very existence of anything that has happened south of the border. Mr. President, reports have it that Ferdinand Marcos, although he has a salary, had a sensible salary lower than your own, amassed a fortune outside the Philippines of something like $2 billion to $8 billion, some of it stashed in the United States. Now, do you have any reliable figures on how much he really has, and are you going to help the government of Corazon Aquino get it back? Wouldn't it be better to help her get back those assets that have apparently been looted from the country as opposed to providing American taxpayers money and foreign aid? Well, we have no figures at all. We've heard all the rumors and so forth about this, but we don't have any. We believe it is a problem for the Filipino government, and then we'll comply with law, our own Filipino or international, whenever the law calls for some action. Mr. President, at your press conference, the last press conference you had when you spoke about fraud on both sides in the Philippine election, I'm sure you remember that. Could you just go back and tell us what was in your mind as you faced all those reporters that night? They were still counting the votes in the Philippines, and what did you think you needed to say? Well, in the first preliminary report that was given to me by the two men in charge of our task force there, they had said that it was evident that there was fraud on both sides. But there was no question, but that as the process went on, that the government obviously, the then government, had much more power than the challenger, so there was no balance between the amount of fraud, but I said that only with indication that it seemed to be more of a practice there than anyone would like to see. But there was no need for a change. My mind from the very beginning was this was a solution that had to be found by the Filipino people. They were the ones who had to make the decision. If the great majority and all had come down on the side of abiding by the election the way it was counted and announced, then we would be of help there. But our, from the very first, our prayerful attitude was that it was up to them, the Philippine people, to make the decision. We didn't want a civil war or bloodshed. We were doing everything we could to implore both sides. That's why we sent people like Phil Habib out there to implore them to, to not turn to violence for the solution, but to allow the people to make it evident. And when the people did make it evident then, even the army began abandoning the government and so forth, we accepted that decision. Mr. President, Gene Kirkpatrick, who used to be described as your ideological guru of this administration, made popular a policy that basically the United States had to choose between authoritarian governments like the one in the Philippines and communism, that it was an either or choice, as the victory of democracy now in the Philippines rendered that doctrine no longer relevant should what happened in the Philippines be a message to the governments in South Korea and in Chile to democratize their nations. Well, we think the trend toward democracy has been so widespread that today, here in our own hemisphere, south of our border, 90% of the people in Latin America are now living in democracies or in countries that are tending that way. It isn't a case of choosing authoritarianism as a form of government. It is that we've also seen some pretty grave mistakes made when in changing what most people thought was an authoritarian government, we round up with someone like the Homanie. And what we have, what we've said is that in the search for democracy, we don't want to make that kind of a mistake of settling for someone that is worse than the government that we're getting rid of. We have that situation in Nicaragua right now. This country stood back. I wasn't here at the time, but we stood aside and let the revolution go forward with regard to Samosa. And then Samosa stepped down. But again, the replacement in this instance was not the replacement as evidenced in the revolution where all of the revolutionaries sent to the Organization of American States a written statement of what the goals of the revolution were. And the goals were a pluralistic government, democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of press, free labor unions and so forth. Then when the revolution was over, one faction of the revolution turned on its allies and ousted them and took the government by force. That is the Sandinista government. And right now our goal there in Nicaragua is to try and recover that by negotiations. This is what the Contras themselves have agreed to at our request. They would lay down their arms and join a negotiation to bring about the government they originally fought for. So we're, we just think we must not make the mistake again of an effort to get rid of someone we think is too authoritarian. We wind up with someone that is totalitarian. Mr. President, help me understand what seems like a contradiction if in fact the Contras are stronger than ever and have a wider base of support and population. And the other side, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, are matching and increasing their aid to that society and it is becoming increasingly repressive. Why isn't our policy failing? Well, this could be stronger in the sense of people rallying to their side and their forces increasing in number. But they can't throw rocks at those Soviet gunships or stop tanks with bare hands. They need the weapons, the tools. But what I meant by the strength was that I think the revolutionary forces now, I have heard this figure brooded about that they only numbered about 5,000 or so in rebelling against Samosa. We know that there are about 20,000 freedom fighters now willing to strike at the Sandinista government, but they have to have the tools with which to do the job. We went through a year. They were exerting such pressure on the Sandinista government that it still is a basket case economically. They cannot withstand very much more pressure. But then for a year there was no aid and this gave the Sandinista government a chance to get a second wind. They still are in bad trouble. And we feel, as a matter of fact, they adjust the non-lethal aid, strengthened the Contras hand again and increased the pressure. Now we believe that we've got to give them real aid. And at the same time, and they've agreed that the goal is, and it is our goal in that of Contadora, that any time that the Sandinista government, the only holdout in this, will agree to a negotiated settlement, there will be no more fighting. Direct follow-up. I mean, when you said that they can withstand no more pressure, or not much more pressure, I, I... Well, because their economy is under such a strain. A follow-up on that, if I could, Mr. President, you've made clear once again in your last statement here that the ideal outcome would be a political outcome in which the pressures of the Contras are putting on the Sandinistas would lead them into negotiations that would produce the kind of government we want to see there. Failing that, though, can you conceive of a military victory by the Contras in which they do under the Sandinistas what the Sandinistas did to the Somoza forces before? If the, if the Sandinista government is, is going to fight to the death and to, and to the last man, I suppose that would be the outcome, but it is what I was trying to explain is that is not the primary goal of the Contras. The Contras have made it evident that they're asking for a return to the revolutionary combine and to the goals that were agreed to by all of them. I understand it's not the primary goal, but is it a realistic goal to think that the Contras can win militarily? I have to believe that that, yes, that that is possible because the Nicaraguan government forces, regardless of their great strength in armaments, they are losing support of the people. A great many of those additional Contras now are deserters from the Sandinista armed forces. Jack? Would you be extending an invitation to Mrs. Aquino to come to Washington and confer with you? I don't know. We haven't made any plans of that kind. She's busy there straightening out her government, but we have assured that government however that as they proceed and go forward now with establishing democracy there in the Philippines that we will support them. We've had an historic relationship with the people of the Philippines and we want to continue that. One more question. Mr. President, I wonder if you would comment on the strength of the communist insurgency in the Philippines, whether you think that is a threat to democracy there, whether you think it's supported by an outside government, or whether you agree with those members of the Aquino government who say that 80% of the military activity in the Philippines is utilizing people who are opposed to Marcos but not supporting any communist ideology. Well, I have to say the insurgent, I'm not talking about, I have no knowledge of infiltration, let's say into the armed forces of the Philippines by communists. Possible, anything is possible with them, not Filipinos, communists, but there is a communist insurgency and we only have to look around the world to find out that their goals and their purposes are expansionist and you can't just say, oh, hum, there aren't very many of them, they're a little like rabbits. So, no, we've got to take them seriously and you can't have a coalition with them, we found that out in Laos when we forced the government of Laos, pressured them to accept the path at Laos as a kind of, in collaboration with them as a partnership government. And it ended up that the path at Laos and all that was in the government. That I have to... A question from Bernie Shaw, sir? Yes, I was going to ask, yes. Mr. President, the other night you appealed to the American people to help you to keep Congress from touching your defense budget. Is it unfair to interpret your appeal as in effect saying that it's un-American to cut your defense budget? I never said anything of the kind, I didn't mean to imply anything of the kind, but I do imply that at this point to not continue with the policies that we've had with regard to refurbishing our military is irresponsible and is pretending that there is no risk. Now, we haven't caught up. I suppose what's on my mind is the fact that a recent poll, a very authoritative poll, showed that the overwhelming majority of the American people believe that we have now caught up past them and our superior in military force to the Soviet Union. And that just is not true, and that's why I gave the figures the other night. There are even additional figures that show with regard to the buildup of the forces where we and our NATO allies are still behind the Soviet power wave. And to think now of acting as if the job is done and to cut back, I think that my position with Mr. Gorbachev is very simple. We know that they too have great problems. He himself has as much as admitted them, economic problems due to the amount of their gross national product that is being put into the military. And our position is one, and I made it plain to him. We cannot and will not stand by and see them maintain or achieve even a greater military superiority over us. And therefore, the choice that we have, and this is why we wanted to talk disarmament with them, the choice is that both of us start reducing the numbers of weapons that we have so that we can still be square and even with each other and reduce them. Or he has to face an arms race because we are not going to allow them to have a dangerous superiority over us. But my question, Mr. President, is it unfair to interpret your appeal as you're thinking that cutting your budget is un-American? Oh, pardon me. I didn't get to that point of it. Yeah, you'd all be unfair if you interpreted it that way. Mr. President, thank you very much. Mr. President, with pass indulgence in yours, sir, the second most interesting and important speech of the week was Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow during the Party Congress in which he did cast some doubt on whether there would be a summit this year and suggested that unless there was concrete progress, there might not be a summit. What's your reaction about, are you any less optimistic about having a summit? No. I stood there out in the parking lot in Geneva, and he accepted my invitation, and I accepted his for 87. We haven't agreed on a date. We all feel that we shouldn't just sit back and wait for a summit, that yes, we should continue to try and proceed with the things we talked about in the first summit. But I have to also point out that negotiations don't all take place just at the negotiating table when you meet. So I treat some of the things that I hear, as I'm sure he treats things he hears about me, that we're both in a negotiating position. Thank you, sir.