 All right. Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. My name is Jim Scho. I'm a senior fellow here, and I run the Japan program. And it's... This is one of my favorite times of year. We get to run our Japan This Year program, Japan in 2020. This is the seventh time we've been co-hosting, organizing together with the Japan America Society of Washington, DC. And we have a new decade. It's our first time hosting Japan This Year in the Reiwa era, and we have relatively new leadership at the Japan America Society of Washington, DC, as well as our first time collaborating with the new president, Ryan Schaefer. Of course, Jim Zimbalt has taken the reins as chairman of the board there. So it's a lot of new pages being turned today, and it's truly our pleasure. We started a little bit late this morning, sorry, but our assistant secretary still well is on his way. He should be arriving relatively shortly. But before we begin our opening keynote speech, I just wanted to say a few words about this program and this partnership. And then I'll turn it over to Ryan to talk about the society and its activities this year. I mean, I say this every year, but this is something I look forward to because the partnership with the Japan America Society really allows us to re-engage with them and to collaborate with them and their whole network of people here in town. And we get to bring together journalists and scholars and policymakers right at the time that we're almost curious and about what's coming ahead. Of course, January is a relatively arbitrary time to pick to reflect and prognosticate. And it's almost impossible to predict. I mean, we would not have predicted the coronavirus dynamic that's going on right now or even in the beginning of this year, the whole crisis with Iran. But it's still, I think, important to take this time. It's a chance to kind of, it helps me at least re-engage with a wider set of issues. Usually I get bogged down into narrow project issues and a chance to kind of reconsider and maybe reevaluate some of our assumptions about the topics that we follow. So as always, we're hosting this today with the Japan America Society of Washington, D.C. This is their event. They did a lot of the work in pulling together the speakers and panelists. It's just one of the many contributions that they make in this town to our bilateral relationship. And for this, I'd like to thank Ryan Schaefer, the president, and Jim Zumwalt, board chairman and their team and to our team, too, for all their hard work in putting this event together. I also want to say a special word of thanks to the National Association of Japan America Societies, NAJAS, and it's President Peter Kelly who's here. Without their support, this event would not be possible. So thank you, Peter, where there you are. And you just celebrated your 10-year anniversary as president of NAJAS, I noticed in my preparations. So I'll have a chance to talk a little bit more as the moderator of the domestic panel later on. But for now, I just wanted to welcome everybody to Carnegie and express our enthusiasm about being part of this event today. As a quick outline, we are honored to be joined by Assistant Secretary David Stillwell who will be our morning keynote speaker, followed by the domestic panel that will take a short break for lunch. We'll get set up for another keynote presentation and discussion from Hiroyuki Akita of Nikke, who is visiting us from Japan. And then we'll have our foreign policy U.S.-Japan Alliance panel in the afternoon, as well, moderated by Jim Zumwalt. So for now, it's my pleasure to turn it over to Ryan Schaefer, who I guess next month you'll get to celebrate your one-year anniversary as president of. Hard to believe it's already been a year. But thank you so much for what you're doing there, and I'll give you the floor. Good morning, everybody. Thanks for coming out early on a Friday morning. My name is Ryan Schaefer. I'm president of Japan America Society of Washington, D.C. And funny enough, when I was offered the job or accepted the job last year, it was the first act was to come to this event and take notes on how it was meant to be run for the coming year. So it's, in a way, this is my one-year anniversary today. At any rate, we're really proud to be running our seventh Japan in the Year program. This year, we're calling it the Japan in the Year, a look at the year ahead, which I suppose could be the title for everyone that we've done. But that's quite intentional to use this program as a bit of a benchmark early in the year. And then we'll actually take opportunities during the program today to look back at some of the predictions that we made last year and in previous years, which in recent times has gotten more and more challenging. Funny enough, when I ran into Akitasan last week, who's going to be our lunchtime speaker, I mentioned, well, you'd better update your talk because now the only thing that people are going to want to hear about is Iran. And that seems like an eternity ago, and it was only last week. So apologies in advance to Akitasan. But very briefly about who we are, since I know that many people aren't necessarily familiar with Japan America Society of Washington DC. First, we're pleased to be an associate of the National Association of Japan America Societies, which is funding today's event, but which also does great work linking a number of Japan America societies that serve different regions of the country. And we happen to be one of the larger of those serving the Washington DC capital region. But we were formed 62 years ago by diplomats in the State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is part of what makes it so special for Assistant Secretary Stillwell to be joining us today. And our mission at the time was to cover all aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship, which is a fairly broad and challenging task. So in recent years, we've been joined in our community by SPRI young organizations like my former employer, the Mansfield Foundation and Saskawa Peace Foundation, USA, and Stimpson, who do a really excellent job of covering policy and political affairs. And for the most part, therefore, we leave that good work to them and we focus our energies on covering the civil society ties that serve as the bedrock of the U.S.-Japan relationship. And how do we do that? We have hundreds of programs through the year, most of which are public, and I hope that you are all taking advantage of them or will. But we have four big ones that make us fairly unique and that I think we in the Washington U.S. capital region should be proud of. First off, we host the largest Japanese cultural festival in the United States. That's the Sakuramatsuri Japanese Street Festival, which happens this year. It will be April 4th. This is a premiere event of Washington's National Cherry Blossom Festival. It's also the biggest event of the National Cherry Blossom Festival, usually attracting 30,000 to 40,000 people to Pennsylvania Avenue right in the shadow of the U.S. capital. This year will be our 60th anniversary, so it's going to be an exciting one for us. I really hope that everybody can attend. The two days immediately prior to that, Japan America Society of Washington, D.C. hosts the United States National Japanese Language Championship, which is a program that we call the National Japan Bowl, which is again open to the public. Again, I think that we should be proud that we host that in Washington, D.C., not New York, not Los Angeles. We get it here in Washington, D.C. That's actually a program of national importance that helps to motivate the Japanese language students throughout the country and even around North America. Japan America Society of Washington, D.C. also hosts the annual dinner in November that serves as the kind of a friend recently called it the U.S.-Japan prom. It serves as the gala dinner that celebrates the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. We have the largest Japanese language school in the region, so some of our 200 students at any given time over four semesters, so please come and study Japanese or if you're a Japanese business corporate expat, come brush up on your Japanese. We'd be pleased to have you. On to the program for today. Again, this is a program that we are kind of principal foray into the policy and politics arena. We try to sneak ours in at the beginning of the year, kind of like Iowa and New Hampshire. Well, we've got everybody's attention, but it also provides a nice opportunity really to benchmark the state of affairs of the U.S.-Japan relationship and take a look at what we think lies ahead and to put our panelists on the spot to make predictions about what will happen in the year ahead, which almost invariably proved to be wrong, but serves us some fun to look back on in the next year and all the subsequent years in which we plan to hold this program. Peter. At any rate, so we're at 10.15 of lost track of what time it is now, but we expect the assistant secretary in a few minutes to give our morning keynote. That session will be moderated by my boss, our chairman, ambassador Jim Zumwalt, and then we'll have our first morning panel, which we'll have an opportunity to reflect a little bit on assistant secretary Stillwell's remarks, but for that panel we're really pleased and honored to have our board counselor, Dr. Sheila Smith, but also Dai Mochinaga and Tobias Harris as well, and Jim will moderate that session. We'll have our keynote over lunch from Hirayuki Akita from Nikkei, who's excellent and we're really lucky and pleased to have him, and then our afternoon panel from 2 to 2.30 is not an opportunity for people to go out and take their evening or afternoon meetings because it's a really good one. Ambassador Zumwalt will moderate a discussion on Japan's foreign policy featuring Patricia Kim of U.S. Institute of Peace, Masashi Murano from the Hudson Institute, Scott Snyder from the Wilson Center, and Professor Kristin Vecchese from University of Maine, who I'm proud to say is my fellow Mainer to represent the stage this morning. So once again, really pleased to have everybody with us for today. I hope that you stick around for the full event. It'll be a good one. And I'll leave it there and note that we do have a few minutes. Again, the Assistant Secretary is on his way, so take the opportunity now to introduce yourself to your seat companion and we'll get up and running again once the Assistant Secretary arrives. I should note that we made a slight mistake on our program. Scott Snyder is at the Council on Foreign Relations, not the Wilson Center, so I'll note that for the record. But please, if you like, take this moment. You can get a refresher cup of coffee and we will get started in about seven minutes or so. Thank you. Okay, everyone, we will get started here in just a minute. Our special guest has arrived. So as most of you know, I'm Jim Zoomwalt, the Chairman of the Japan America Society, and it gives me great pleasure to introduce Assistant Secretary David Stillwell today. David is really a soldier diplomat, and the first time I met David was up at Misawa in northern Japan when he was the base commander up there, and I was charge d'affaires in embassy token and visited many American bases, and the typical modus operandi was to go with the local American commander to visit the Governor or Mayor, and the Governor or Mayor was willing to see us but wanted to control the narratives. There were no photographs, maybe a very short press release, and it was almost as if our visit to the Governor didn't exist. Very different in Misawa. The Mayor had a photo spray, the entire local press corps was there. We were on the front page of the local paper the next day, and it impressed me to see how much David had worked to generate a positive relationship between the combined base in Misawa and the local community. So I really thought of David in those days as first a soldier but also a diplomat, and now I think he's maybe flipped things around and is working in the State Department as the senior person in charge of U.S.-Asia relations. So without further ado, I'd like to introduce David Stowell. He'll be speaking for a few moments, and then we'll do a little bit of a Q&A session. So if you have or you think of some questions, please jot them down or keep them in mind, and I'll try and get to as many people as we can for questions and answers. So David. Well, Jim, thank you for that generous description. I take full credit for all those great things that really are a product of lots of people who went before me, and a very positive attitude on behalf of the Misawa City. You know, a lot of times they would bring mayors from Okinawa up to Misawa to sort of discuss how you work effectively with U.S. forces. I was proud to be part of a activity that was so cooperative and basically easy. So, but I'll take credit. Thank you. To return fire on Jim's story, I'd like to recall a story from that trip that was equally interesting from the warrior diplomat side. So in the fighter pilot, to kind of blow off tensions of the week on Fridays, we would go to the officers club. We play a game called Crud. Crud originated in Canada. I can't really reveal the origins, but basically it's a bunch of knucklehead, you know, immature fighter pilots trying to kill each other. And so what they do is you take the cue ball from the game and you just pick one other random ball. And the goal is to put that other ball into a pocket using your hands. You can only shoot from certain ends. There's a lot of rules and techniques involved. Anyway, we got Jim involved in this game of Crud. And, you know, he got body slammed into the wall a couple of times. He probably was pretty bruised the next morning. And it was his welcome to the world of military diplomacy. So, Jim, congratulations on surviving that. And good for you. Thank you for that introduction. And again, thanks for the opportunity to lay out the vision for the U.S.-Japan relationship for the next year of 2020. A very symmetric number, a number that includes the Olympics and a whole bunch of other great stuff. I feel very privileged to be part of it. And I know we've got lots of good things in store. It's not without challenges, but, you know, given all that we've been through in the past, this should be a fantastic year. So there is so much to discuss that I'm going to put on my glasses and run through it as quickly as possible. But I don't want to miss some key things, just to make sure you all are aware of what I know. So thank you also for a Japan-America Society of Washington, D.C., for organizing this event, and also for the Carnegie Endowment for National Peace for supporting and hosting. Theme today is a look at the year ahead. So let me explain how the U.S.-Japan alliance will stand for global freedom, democracy, prosperity, and security in the year 2020. Okay, first, our alliance is strong, adaptable, and enduring. In 2020, it will continue to evolve to address new challenges. And I know we will put a cherry on top with the execution of the Olympics. And we look forward to supporting in any way we can. Second, we are investing in the bilateral economic relationship. Third, we're working ever closer together to protect our innovation-driven economies, a key driver for future national prosperity and strength. Fourth, we will continue to promote our shared fundamental values, such as freedom, democracy, and rule of law in 2020. And finally, leveraging our people-to-people ties, we will build the human capital that powers our lasting prosperity in 2020 and beyond. And the word human capital is operative here, so we'll come back to that. But let's consider each of these in turn. First, a strong alliance. We just celebrated the 60th anniversary last week, and it really is the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the region. Security relationship began after World War II in conjunction with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, our shared values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty require a broader and stronger treaty that would cover security and economic cooperation. And so, January 19 marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. From the Cold War to today, our security alliance has evolved to address evolving threats. We used to track Russian Migs North Hokkaido on our way up to Wakanai. Anybody meant Wakanai? It's awesome. Anyway, that was a very strong memory. And today we track the aggressive expansionism of others in East China and South China Sea. We're not just allies, but we're neighbors and friends. So when disasters like the great eastern Japan earthquake strike, we work side by side to swiftly affect recovery. The close ties start at the very top. President Trump and Prime Minister Abe have a genuine friendship that makes the bilateral relationship even stronger. The two have met five times in the span of six months last year. It's unheard of. We've never seen such frequent exchanges at the national level. President Trump even took back-to-back trips to Japan within a month last summer, first for the new Rewa Era celebration in May and then right after that G20 Osaka summit in June. So in short, the alliance has never been stronger. So to grow it in 2020, we know that Japan serves as host over 50,000 U.S. military personnel and advanced U.S. defense assets, including the U.S. 7th Fleet, enabling both countries to ensure peace and stability in the region and beyond. As Jim said, I spent a total of six years up at Misawa in two separate tours. I got to experience that close cooperation firsthand. We rely on our interoperability and our common understanding of our roles and missions and the capabilities needed to accomplish them. In 2019, we further strengthened our security alliance to uphold a rules-based international order and promote the shared values of the American and Japanese people. The hub and spokes model of alliances that has been in force for so long is no longer sufficient to meet the challenges we face. And it's just not enough to cooperate trilaterally or quadrilaterally in small groups with the U.S. as the convening partner. And so our advantage and greatest strength is the ability to network allies and partners. And again, Japan demonstrates this in spades as it conducts outreach to Vietnam and Japan and Philippines and Australia and a number of other countries in the region that, again, we find very helpful and beneficial and benefits Japanese security as well. Japan's efforts to expand port calls in participation exercises, efforts to complete reciprocal access agreements, and cross-servicing agreements with U.S. allies, including Australia, as well as Japan's commitment to improve information security across the whole of government will anchor this continued networking prospect. We look forward to continuing to grow Japan's capabilities and we stand shoulder to shoulder and help Japan stand shoulder to shoulder with us in defense of the rules-based order in the region, including by partnering on Japan's F2 replacement program to produce the best future fighter for both of us and certainly for Japan's defense. We welcome Japan's commitment to continue to grow their capabilities and shoulder more responsibility within the alliance for defending a free and open Indo-Pacific, which we once took for granted, but we can no longer do. As a military officer who served in the Pacific, I keep saying that, sorry, I believe we should recognize the remarkable evolution that Japan and the alliance as a whole have made over the recent years. However, the threats we face have also evolved and we know Japan will need to do even more to defend common interests and values. And so in the economic lane, the linkage between our economies, which together account for approximately 30 percent of a global GDP, that's a big number, is another source of strength in the U.S.-Japan relationship. We are top trading partners exchanging $300 billion of goods and services each year. The United States is Japan's top source of direct investment and Japan is the third largest investor in the United States with $484 billion invested to date across all 50 states. In 2019, we concluded a phase one trade agreement whose terms entered into force on January 1st and they do provide a level playing field which will benefit American and Japanese consumers. We also reached a separate U.S.-Japan digital trade agreement, a high standard and comprehensive set of provisions addressing priority areas of digital trade. These are areas where our two economies thrive in the global marketplace and where we can together help set common expectations for the world, as this is an area that's just evolving, it's being built as we go. And so our cooperation on this in Japan's expertise in this realm are going to be hugely important. But we're not stopping there. In 2020, we'll build on the phase one trade agreement and pursue a comprehensive trade deal with Japan. Comprehensive negotiations will include customs duties and other restrictions on trade, barriers to trade in services and investment, and other issues in order to promote mutually beneficial, fair, and reciprocal trade. It will also address ongoing issues in key American goods and services export sectors. When we strengthen our bilateral economic relationship, we strengthen the foundations upon which our alliance and partnership rest. More broadly, economic cooperation, connectivity underpins economic growth and prosperity. And for several years now, under President Trump and Prime Minister Abe's leadership, we've been expanding our economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. In 2020, we will leverage our bilateral partnerships, the Japan-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership, or JUSEP, and the Japan-U.S. Strategic Digital Economy Partnership, or JUSEP. Say those fast, to extend cooperation with the private sector and third countries to support high-quality infrastructure, energy, and digital projects. On the energy front, we want the people of the Mekong region to have power at home, at work, and at school, just like Americans and Japanese do. So in 2020, we plan to begin implementing the Japan-U.S. Mekong Power Partnership jump. Another acronym for you. Secretary Pompeo and Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi announced in August of last year. On the digital connectivity side, we intend to participate in policy and technical collaboration between U.S. and Japanese cities and Indo-Pacific cities, in particular the 26 cities in the ASEAN-Smart Cities Network. Our cities will learn and grow together as the world enters the digital age. In all of our economic efforts, we will continue to place the private sector at the forefront and leverage the new $60 billion U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, or DFC, and its partnerships with U.S. and Japanese counterpart agencies to ensure that when the U.S. and Japanese companies work together in the Indo-Pacific and around the world, they bring both the best solutions and the best possible financial terms. Innovation improvement, where we're going, how we're going to advance this. The United States and Japan are both blessed with hard-won, advanced, innovation-driven economies. Our scientific communities are just as connected as these economies. At the government level, we're investing in research collaboration. Scientists at our national laboratories are engaged in collaboration on basic research that we hope will do amazing things like cure brain cancer. At the same time, our university professors and engineers are collaborating on other research and development that's driving advances in material sciences, advanced computing, and much more. These are mutually beneficial. These are cooperative, and both sides truly win. It's the definition of win-win, and these are the kinds of scientific advances they're going to help put U.S. and Japanese astronauts on Mars someday. That's a reach goal. More immediately, this innovation powers our economic prosperity and our national security. U.S. and Japanese firms are among those developing some of the most exciting technologies out there. Often, these technologies are sensitive and with critical infrastructure and security implications. So there are those out there conducting rampant theft of cutting-edge research and intellectual property, and it's not just a problem for the particular company that's affected. This undermines the entire innovation economy that we have in the United States and in Japan. We just were with Secretary last week in Silicon Valley learning more about this, how industry is growing, but how it also needs to defend itself further. So we must ensure that our decisions today will allow our continued prosperity and security. Take to heart, all of us should take to heart the warning that a boxing referee issues to both fighters at the beginning of the fight, and it's gentlemen, protect yourself at all times. You just cannot assume that everybody out there has good intent. Those threats become more and more obvious by the day. Increasingly, we in the U.S. and Japan and Japanese governments are looking for opportunities to come together with the business and academic communities to respond to these threats, and I will do more of this in 2020. We will work ever closer with Japan to ensure that Japanese technology too stays in the right hands and is not used to undermine our collective national security. We will continue to strengthen our cyber defenses and help partners do the same. We will strengthen and enhance information security practices across the whole of government to preserve our shared economic and defense advantages in the face of evolving threats to our alliance. This will include enhanced efforts to ensure supply chain security, to overcome threats to defense industrial base, threats to national networks, and other critical infrastructure required for military mission assurance and economic prosperity. Governance. This wasn't an issue not so long ago, but recent events have caused us to reflect on what it is that makes Japan and the U.S. so strong and what it is that makes us cooperate and speak together in a single language that we all understand, and it has to do with the democratic process. So in 2020, we will promote fundamental shared values such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and support Indo-Pacific partners, counter terrorism, and maritime security efforts. We will coordinate on capacity building efforts with partner maritime agencies in the Indo-Pacific. We will support Indo-Pacific nations efforts to improve their maritime domain awareness, for example, through coastal surveillance systems. Fisheries are a huge area of it's a natural resource for small countries in the Pacific, and yet they have no way of knowing what's going on in their EEZ and who's taking their fish, and this is an area where we definitely need to cooperate to ensure stability. In 2020, we'll continue to work with allies and partners to protect the freedom of the seas. Whether it's in the east or south China sea, the Straits of Malacca, or the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa, the United States and Japan will continue to stand for freedom of navigation, overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea in 2020. United States welcomes Japan's decision to dispatch Japanese maritime self-defense force assets to the Middle East. We look forward to staying in close coordination with Japan to ensure a safe and free flow of commerce and freedom of navigation in that critical region. Finally, human capital, my favorite subject since we haven't really thought about it much, but it's something where we dominate. It's the reason people come to our countries because they want to share and do what we do. So the US-Japan relationship stands on a solid foundation of grassroots people-to-people relations. Japanese and Americans visiting, studying, and investing in each other's countries are a tremendous cultural, economic, and strategic investment in the future health of the alliance. From our shared national pastime baseball to the popularity of anime and manga, our cultures have grown richer from the exchange. Each spring, the Cherry Blossom Festival casts the city in a wash of pink as the stately cherry trees a gift from then Tokyo Mayor Yukio Ozaki in 1910 bloom around the tidal basin. On the cultural front, the Studio Ghibli films are blockbusters in the United States, and American musicians shows sell out in many venues across Japan. We would be hard-pressed to find a country with as many Star Wars aficionados as there are in Japan. So for human capital, what this means is that an educated and empowered citizenry like we have in our countries is a requisite for freedom and prosperity. In 2020, the United States and Japan will continue to help people learn the skills they need to participate in this growing, innovative global economy, creating conditions for self-reliance. For many years, we have worked hand-in-hand with Japan to invest in human capital, and we will continue doing so in 2020. Finally, the Olympics. 2020 will be known as the year Japan hosted the summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo for the second time. Hosting the 1964 Olympics symbolized the country's reemergence on the global stage as a champion of peace. Japan in 2020 embodies the Olympic values of excellence, freedom, and respect. Excellence in design, for example, which visitors and athletes will admire in all the Olympic venues. Friendship among peoples of all nations, starting in sport and growing into an appreciation of humanity's common aspirations despite our varied backgrounds and unique cultural traditions and respect for athletes and officials, fellow fans, and fellow citizens in this world we share. Respect also for rule of law, freedom of expression, and human rights. These are all critical, and I know we will be able to emphasize these during the summer. In celebration of this defining moment in Japan's history, our embassies go for gold campaign brings Paralympians and other athletes to local communities that will host Team USA, sends American diplomats into Japanese classrooms around the country, and empowers teachers through special programs. Go for Gold celebrates our shared love of sports, it encourages Japanese students to cheer for Team USA, and inspires them to study in the United States. It is more than a celebration of sports, it's about the next generation of Japanese and Americans learning from each other. My daughter, Jenae, just spent the spring semester of this year at 19 at Kao University experiencing the full-on effect of life in Japan. She was born there, by the way, in Misawa, and she really enjoyed experiencing so much that she just went back to see her friends. So in conclusion, while the U.S.-Japan relationship is built on a legacy of success, ours is so much more than a legacy relationship. It is a deep, broad, mature, and a global partnership. The United States and Japan are working closely together to build a future of prosperity, openness, and freedom. In 2020, we will deepen the grassroots ties that make up the foundation of our partnership, celebrating Japan's hosting of the Olympics and Paralympics. We will strengthen our bilateral economic relationship by working on a comprehensive trade deal. On that foundation, we will work together in the region and around the world to be a force for transparency, accountability, openness, prosperity, and peace. We face ever-evolving threats, but by continuing to evolve our alliance, we will meet these future challenges, and our free and open systems will prevail. By continuing to work together in 2020 to support freedom, democracy, and security in the region and around the world, we will position the United States and Japan for greatness now and in the future. Thank you for your patient attention, and I look forward to your questions. So thank you very much for that very broad and comprehensive view of U.S.-Japan relations. I was struck how several times, both at the beginning and the end of your speech, you used the word evolved to describe our relationship. And certainly in 1960, when President Eisenhower had to cancel his visit to Japan because of the huge opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, it's sort of hard to imagine that today, where there's tremendous support in Japan, not only for our security alliance, but for a positive relationship with the United States. But I think it's safe to predict, because we're supposed to make predictions today, that things will continue to evolve. But I'm going to put you on the spot now and ask if you could look sort of five years down the road, where would you like to see our relationship evolve? What sorts of milestones would you like to achieve? I mentioned earlier this move from hub and spoke to network type security and other relationships. And so in five years, I look forward to seeing, and as Japan already has in Southeast Asia, in Central Asia and other places, continue to take the lead and work as a no-kitting partner. The evolution, as you mentioned, started off in a somewhat imbalanced relationship, as it had to. But what we've seen is Japan emerge as a very strong economic partner, certainly, as I mentioned, jump and juice up and juice up. And a whole bunch of other things in terms of infrastructure in Southeast Asia and beyond. And so the evolution, I believe, from hub and spoke to network puts Japan clearly on the map as one of those key nodes in a network of security, economic security, and human capital. Again, we'll talk about that more and more through the year, but I think what Japan has to offer is fantastic. Thank you. Speaking more about networks, who are the other likely partners of the United States and Japan in this network that you envision? Well, let's just look at the Quad right now. I mean, I know that has maybe checkered past, but the movement and the continued meetings that we're seeing and the interest on the part of all India, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. is undeniable. And so, I mean, this reflects that idea of the Indo-Pacific, free and open. The free and open concept is something that we actually, you know, was a Japan idea that we incorporated into our own strategy. And so that's a huge area. Those key nodes in the Quad, each with its own special capabilities, its regional approaches and all the rest as we all pursue common interests, ideas that have come more sharply into focus recently due to, you know, a changing strategic environment. When Japanese Defense Minister Kono was in Washington recently, and he was asked about networking and asked to list the potential partners of Japan, I was struck at the first country he mentioned was South Korea. Yeah. Obviously, there are challenges there, but obviously opportunities. But could you talk a little bit about both the opportunities and the risks in the Japan-Korea relationship and what can the United States do to try and maximize the benefits of a better partnership? Well, so for the threats to the region, any seams, any discord encourages North Korea and others to take advantage of that, maybe to actually try to drive wedges in those relationships. So for the, you know, from the very start, we need to get that relationship, you know, back on friendly terms and moving forward, not so much looking backwards. Certainly both sides have a role to play in that. I'm happy that the Foreign Minister now, Defense Minister mentioned that, as that's a positive development. And, you know, I do believe that, you know, both sides understand the importance of moving, advancing that relationship, getting it back into the healthy ring. And it has, right? Since last August, we've seen progress in getting back there. These issues are going to come up. You know, I'm glad we were able to do our part to help bring them together, not mediate. That's not our role. But certainly, especially in Northeast Asia, we're stronger together. If anybody's ever read the book The Eurasian Century by Nadej Rolan, it details an amazing amount of work by both Japan and Korea in Central Asia, developing infrastructure partnerships and all the rest. That's an area I'd love to capitalize on. And then, of course, one of the challenges that all three of us, Japan, United States and South Korea face is North Korean. Could you talk a little bit about the year ahead and what you hope to see and what are some of the risks and opportunities in our relationships with North Korea? I enlisted in the Air Force. I couldn't do anything else in Los Angeles. I kind of hit a wall. So, I joined the Air Force wanting to be a jet mechanic in the worst way. And my recruiter, who looked a lot like Pinocchio, said there are no jet mechanic jobs to be had, but you could be a linguist. Well, it turns out I became a Korean linguist. And so, starting in 1981, I spent a lot of time on the Korean Peninsula, in this case, looking directly at the threat from the North. I think what we've seen in the last two years is an administration that understands that you negotiate from a position of strength. And that some countries just don't appreciate. I mean, you certainly want to negotiate with some cultures and countries in a way that shows cooperation and compromise and all that stuff. But there's others who only understand strength. And so, the more that the three specific Korean Japan and the U.S. can maintain a solid position, establish what we want, follow through on the Singapore Agreement, and then wait until the regime in Pyongyang decides to follow through. That's our best approach. So, I think we're in a good place. I've been challenged on that, saying, why are you so optimistic? Compared to where they were, certainly in 1981 or in 2015, when I left the Pentagon in uniform, personally, I think we're in a really good position. We've definitely showed North Korea that we can say no. Hanoi, we can walk away. And that our expectations are that they will live up to their commitments in Singapore. Thank you. Okay, I'd like to open it up to questions from the audience. If you could identify yourself and your affiliation. And also, I'll start with people who have short questions in order to try and maximize the number of people we ask. I'll start with you here and then go to you over here. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, sir. As your prominent military background. Sorry, could you, your name and affiliation? Sorry, sorry. My name is Dongyeon Kim from Voice of American Korean Service. We, you talked about the North Korean calculus. And since North Korea has designated a new foreign minister, Sungkwan Lee, which has, which is a hardliner in North Korea, how do you evaluate that situation? And there was, there was also, there's discussion in Washington, DC, about Japan having a permanent combined forces command that can represent their voice on the peninsula. And I was just wondering how this discussion is going up in the government level in the United States. Thank you. I was asked the same question on North Korea earlier this week during press availability. And, you know, I guess we can do criminology and read shadows on the walls and all those things. You know, the Intel world is doing good work on identifying key players in the regime. I don't care to speculate. I have no idea who this person is. And I really don't, I mean, it doesn't affect my life. You know, we have a Korean focused special representative office that deals with those things, folks on North Korea. So I don't want to get out ahead of the lights. There was a change. I think that in itself indicates something. I hope it's positive to say maybe we should change our attack and come to the table and have the discussions that we committed to. This isn't just about U.S. and North Korea. It's not just about U.S., South Korea and North Korea. It's about the United Nations. It's the world telling them to get pay on this. The second one on, yeah, I'll leave that to General Abrams in Seoul. This is an ongoing conversation. And again, I'm a diplomat. So I'm going to let that one go. You say that with a smile. Yes. Okay, let's go over here then. I'm Peter Humphrey, an Intel analyst and a former diplomat, wondering if Jishimiya will survive the year and wondering if Japan is very uncomfortable with the OpCon transfer. So the Jishimiya, we were very happy to see that, that the ROK continues this very important aspect of certain U.S. ROK cooperation. And, sorry, could you maybe explain, because some people may not know what the Jishimiya is and what the value is? The General Something of Military Information Agreement. The General Security. Security, yeah. Basically, it's a trilateral sharing agreement that allows, say, missile information that South Korea has to be shared, both with the U.S. and with Japan, as we all focus on something that we all agree on is the unhelpfulness of North Korean long-range missiles and other developments, which again, the United Nations has said they should not pursue. And so the Jishimiya is important in making sure that we can defend ourselves but also as a strong message to North Korea that they, you know, unhelpful launches and all those things are unacceptable. So Korea has continued that. We're happy that they have. And, you know, we continue to urge Korea and South Korea and Japan to work through these issues. So we're going to do that. Okay. Ongoing. Again, I'm going to have to defer to General Abrams. We talk about it when I go to Seoul. I dealt with it in 2015, along 14. Yeah. I'm not going to speak for Japan on that. So, okay. Another question. Okay. We'll go here and then in the back over there. Good morning. I'm Evan Carlich. I'm a Navy officer with Georgetown Center for Australia and New Zealand Pacific Studies. A morning of the U.S. State Department has any nascent programs to work with Japan to improve human security, economic prosperity and so forth in Pacific Island states. Thank you. Thinking. There may be. I'm not sure. Obviously, Pacific Islands is one of those areas where, you know, France has interests, New Zealand, Australia all have interests. Japan has interests, too, in the peace and security in that region. But I'll just say the bulk of my work with Japan in this job has been in Southeast Asia. There's lots of potential there, as I mentioned, in areas. I'm not aware. It doesn't mean there's not. I'm just not aware. I can't speak to that right now. Okay. A question was over here, I think. And the aisle towards the back, yeah. Thank you very much. My name is Koji Sonoda with Japan's Asahi newspaper. My question is on burden-sharing with Japan. And so the negotiation on host nation support with Japan will start officially this year. So I have two quick questions. I was just wondering if the U.S. has already requested that Japan should pay from four to five times of the current defense cost-sharing. And also, secondly, what are the principal stance of the U.S. on host nation support negotiation this year? If only Washington was hermetically sealed, and, you know, if only rumors didn't have legs. The president's been very clear on his insistence, not just on, you know, Korea, Japan, but on NATO and others, to live up to commitments to adjust contributions based on the region threats and capabilities in order to balance the fact that America spends 4% of its GDP on defense. And others, such as NATO, have committed to 2%, but in many cases have yet to live up to that number. So, you know, I think there's things to be learned from the negotiation going on right now with the ROK. As you mentioned, the Japan host nation support agreement is being, will be up for renegotiation. And I'm not going to prejudice the outcomes or the negotiator's position, as we have not even begun that process, in the case of Japan, ongoing with Korea. But again, I think we should all reflect on the fact that the security situation in the region is definitely different than it was five years ago or 10 years ago. And that the abilities of capabilities, as I mentioned in the speech, of our alliance friends, you know, to contribute have also increased. Thank you. Okay, a question over here behind the camera. Hee-jung Yang from Radio Free Asia. Another question about North Korea. North Korean official is going to attend for the first time to the Munich Security Conference next month. I'm wondering if U.S. government is, I understand that Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Esper are going to be there. So any engagement opportunity? Answer that briefly is none that I'm aware of. I know the Secretary is going and we're helping him prep for that because he will meet with other counterparts while he's there. But the North Korean question hasn't come to my attention yet. You have a question in the very back row. Thank you for this. Bill Clifford with the World Affairs Councils of America. I have a question and a related question regarding human capital and how the U.S. can help position Japan and the alliance for further greatness. And that's to what extent does Japan's daunting demographic challenges play in the minds of our military and diplomats with respect to military service and also say issues like pensions and what it means for the Japanese economy. And related to that, people say one solution is Japan should open its doors to more immigration but is the U.S. ability to ask for that and is the U.S. perception not only in Japan and in the region changed because of what happens on our border? Wow, okay. The demographic question is probably the easiest so we'll start with that. As you look at advanced economies, Taiwan, South Korea, I mean Singapore, U.S., Japan and others, you see birth rates decline. That's just, I'm not a sociologist but that just seems like as you get more wealthy the need to have lots and lots of kids goes down. And so I think we should all look at creative ways of addressing these things. One way is automation. One way is immigration. I went through Tokyo, went through Narita Customs recently and there were folks that were hired to do screening and the process went slick. It was real easy getting through customs there. I would say that's a positive step in addressing these human capital and the need for the human touch. But I do think there's also opportunities to learn from others who are facing the same issues and you mentioned the border issues. The great thing about human capital and the one I point to most often is that some countries build walls to keep their people in, prevent them from leaving. In some ways happy that we do build walls to keep people out. It shows this attractiveness of what we have in this country that people like the opportunity to come here and be part of this. And we're a nation of immigrants. We appreciate immigration but that immigration must be controlled. You can't just throw your borders open. I mean Europe thought that was a good idea right? And now you look at there probably they're having second thoughts on that. And so now for an island nation it's a little bit easier to manage immigration. So kind of stitching those all together. We find great benefit in incorporating diverse views cultures and people and what I think is population shrink. That's one solution you'll have to look at. One question against the wall and the very very back. Good morning sir. My name is Nissen Rubin. I'm from the American Jewish Committee. So we have seen over the years Japan has built very good relations with Israel. They're also one of the largest donors to the Palestinian Authority. Next week we expect primates in Netanyahu and General Benny Gantz to come to Washington. And besides the quartet would there be a more substantive role for Japan in the Middle East peace process engagement? I think they are great supporters of U.S. initiatives in this regard. So thank you. One of the things I raise today and talk about a lot is the concept of like-mindedness. And we do have a lot of partners who although not governance structure not being identical is very much alike. It believes in the inherent value of the individual and all those things that are being challenged today by others who have a different view on that. And so wherever Japan can cooperate and help in varying regions of the world absolutely can't object to that. We do share the same ideas. As far as this particular subject I'm going to have to claim I'm doing this a lot claiming ignorance. But look it's hard enough to keep a handle on what goes on in East Asia Pacific much less Palestine and Israel. So again I will defer on that except to note that on many of these things we share common interests. You know Japan's commitment to participate in security outside of the region those things are all very helpful. I think we have time for two more questions. Okay one here on the yes right here and maybe that will be the last question then. Thank you. Thank you. My name is Hongyu Yeo from South Korea Media MBC TV on North Korea. Recently senior State Department official said that on North Korea U.S. pursue slow patient study diplomas could explain what that means. Is that different from the Obama administration's strategic patients? Right the idea is there's nothing complicated about it. You know patient that patient diplomacy means that we know having seen how negotiations have gone in the past that there was going to be times when you know the lights are on and the volume is up and we're moving forward and due to internal politics or whatever inside Pyongyang it's going to then go on kind of a hiatus and wait. We've seen in the past that maybe impatience or a need to resolve these things or a sense that we want to resolve them sooner has had us then come to them and abandon our whatever position we had. Again as I said before I like the fact that we aren't in a rush and that we've stated our position we've made our agreements and we're going to insist that the other side follow through with those. It seems to be working. Okay well thank you very much. I think everyone in this room would agree that US relationship with countries and Asia is incredibly important to the United States and we appreciate what you and your team at the East Asia Bureau are doing to nurture those relationships. So let's give and we appreciate your willingness to come and share your thoughts with us today. So thank you very much. Thank you. Thanks so much for making this. Thank you. Okay thank you very much. We are going to just take a couple of minutes to reset the stage and we will reconvene at 11 a.m. Okay everyone sorry to interrupt but we are going to resume our program with a domestic panel. So if you can take your seats we'll get started. Thank you. Okay thank you again for joining us today. I think my microphone is working well. Appreciate that. Getting a thumbs up from back there. So welcome again and you know I was thinking in preparation for the domestic panel. I go back and forth from year to year doing the domestic panel and the international panel but I kind of like the domestic panel and last year was really sexy as Minister Quasme likes to say. And we had the new emperor coming in the Rewa era. We had an election to look forward to. We had a consumption tax. We had a variety of things we knew were going to happen in the coming year and this year we don't have a whole lot. We know there are going to be a lot of important developments domestically and there are a lot of macinations and dynamics that are at play but other than the Olympics it's not quite as much of a banner year. Because last year we talked a little bit about you know it was the year of the boar and it was the overlap of local elections and the upper house elections which traditionally has been a big shift in or kind of a dynamic election and we did not see that too much but I have a great group of people with me today to kind of look at all these maybe not sexy but still really important dynamics going on in Japan on the domestic front. So I'm very pleased and I'll introduce them in order I guess of their opening discussions. Tobias Harris to my left he's a senior vice president now at Taneo Intelligence covering Japan and he's also a fellow for economy trade and business at the Sasukawa Peace Foundation USA and among previous jobs other previous jobs he worked a while back for a diet member Kei Chido Asao in the upper house in Japan and one of the main reasons I really wanted to get Tobias back this is I think his second time as part of our program but he has a new book coming out this year on Abe Prime Minister Abe Shinzo the Akana class Shinzo Abe in the new Japan so I think that comes out in April at least there. Outside of the U.S. so waiting on U.S. detail. Okay all right well I'm going to ask you about that in a second but we have also of course Sheila Smith thank you so much for joining us you're almost every year because we really like and respect you no no it's great to have you here Sheila is of course a senior fellow for Japan at the Council on Foreign Relations the same place where Scott Snyder is from despite what it says in the program and she's also has a new book that came out late last year called Japan Rearmed the Politics of Military Power and of course before that she had another really good book intimate rivals Japanese domestic politics and a rising China so looks at Japan with a variety of angles but really knows the politics and the people and the country well she's also vice chair of the U.S. advisors to the U.S. Japan conference on the cultural and educational exchange interchange Kulkan which is an important organization so glad to have you here Sheila and we have a new face to join us today and so glad that Dai Mochinaga was able to join us today. Dai is a senior researcher at the KO Research Institute from last year and before that spent about a decade at the Mitsubishi Research Institute in Tokyo he specializes in technology and cyber policy issues he's a computer science engineer with a recent emphasis on cyber security he also has a book I guess a few years ago or two years ago rulers of cyberspace power across borders so we're definitely going to get into some of the technology issues today which is something that here at Carnegie we've been spending a lot more time looking at so I'm going to turn to Tobias first to kind of set the relatively broad table get us get us started and and then we'll hear from each of our our panelists and then have a little conversation here and then bring in bring in the audience so Tobias over to you. Thanks Jim thank you Japan America Society of Washington for doing this again I mean it's really a great event to do every year and to you know to really get people thinking about what's going to matter this year and of course to Carnegie and Delman for giving us a place to have this conversation and facilitating it I'd like to say that that I could correct him and say that there are you know there's there's some sexy issue domestically in Japan but I mean the reality is that you know in some ways this is this is you know Abe's sort of perfect moment on the world stage he's going to get the Olympics he's wanted if you read his writings going back really a long time you know the Olympics this is not this is not something that's incidental I mean he really views this as an important moment he's got strong memories of what the 1964 Olympics were like when he was 10 years old and you know this is going to be I think for him in his mind this is the Japan is back Olympics you know he came back in 2013 came here to DC said Japan you know I'm back in Japan shall be I mean this is you know going to be his moment to show off a Japan that he thinks you know has founded confidence but in that sense you know this is sort of going to be peak Abe you know this is going to be his you know sort of the peak moment of his career the peak moment of this premiership but the flip side of that is that there's not really much to expect beyond that you know he's going to have this great symbolic moment in the world stage but domestically you look at his agenda for the coming year there's not there's not a whole lot of ambition left you know he's sort of past the moments where there was a lot of energy and abinomics where he really had sort of a strong impetus to push reforms through you know that already now you have the political discussion shifting to his term ends in September of 2021 he himself has named some of the key contenders that's really where I think attention starting to shift I mean I think you're not really seeing that heat up because I think everyone is is sort of in the tent and so no one is really working to push him out ahead of his time but there's not really any reason to think that the sort of the main sources of his strength are going to change and so I'm going to go through that you know again so for one the LDP is united behind him you know there's not you know you have kind of these names here no one the divisions have essentially been tamed I mean I think this is you know we're really seeing that after seven years of Abe's centralizing control of the party of policy making of candidate selection of of you know party financing I mean no one no one really had there's no real source of strength within the party to challenge him and we saw this sort of late last year you know one of Abe's closest allies Amadeya Akira now he's the head of the LDP tax commission which is one of these last great strongholds of resistance even that's sort of been brought under the fold and so here he is he's he's popular the party knows they need you know that he's won elections for them they're not going to defy him there's not really any reason to defy him you know you see that even even in the midst of scandal right you've had a diet session late last year that a lot of discussion of scandal one he was still able to get things through the diet he got the U.S. Japan trade agreement through the diet there were some other bits of legislation that got through the scandals didn't get in the way of that and during the recess between the end of the session last year and the start of this session now his approval ratings actually have bounced back a bit so you're not really seeing any any room really for for the LDP to push back against him or to try to kind of start nudging him to the side the other source of strength really is that you're not seeing the opposition make any headway despite you know just again despite some of the scandals that have come along you've had talks between the two main DPJ successor parties the constitutional Democrats and the Democratic party for the people that have been going on now for a couple months and despite talk that by the start of the diet session that they would find a way through that hasn't happened and there's no real reason to think that these parties which have languished in the single digits are going to suddenly enjoy a bloom of popularity once they get you know if they find a way to join forces again I mean there's not really any reason to think that the obstacles that the DPJ faced when it went back into opposition in 2012 that a new opposition party would be able to find a way to regain the trust to the public I mean in that there are a lot of reasons for that I mean part of it is that Abe I think has been quite skillful in occupying sort of the center in terms of policy I mean he's taken I think a number of policy positions that first surfaced on the opposition side domestic you know this idea of for example a social security system for all generations that was that was an opposition idea that had been kicked around on the opposition side for a while and you know he kind of has grabbed that and made that his agenda item there's not so there's not really a policy there's not really policy room for the opposition to grab hold of I think there's there's long memories of what the DPJ's years and power were like and I think people are a little wary of what the opposition would be like when it comes to foreign policy and Abe has been I think a pretty steady hand as you know we'll hear more about this afternoon opposition can't really oppose them on that front and really despite some of these scandals and questions about influence peddling and whether you know you've had corruption at the highest levels I mean the public I think hasn't been convinced by the government's explanations for the scandals but that hasn't necessarily meant that the public is ready then to say well we trust the opposition more I mean I think the government the public government has generally been seen as competent and really better than any alternative out there and that there's no sign that that's going to change this year I mean that the opposition I think in some ways you'd need a turnover of people and we we haven't really had that yet so I mean really one one possibility that's been discussed this year I mean as of now there's no plans for an election there's no opera house election no local elections there's you know discussion of a snap election even if you saw a snap election it's very unlikely that the outcome would look any different than in 2017 and or in 2014 when you had record low turnout you know people just deciding to stay home and no one really you know the opposition not really being able to get you know opposition needs to get independent voters out those voters there's no reason to think they would come out in the event of a snap election and so if you got a snap election in the second half of this year after the after the Olympics chances are you'd have another stable LDP combatown majority you know quite possibly another super majority that obey them would be able to hand to a to a successor presumably you know so despite the fact you know with this political stability you know and maybe because of this political stability you're not really going to see a lot of risk taking I think in terms of domestic policy making abinomics you know we can still talk about it existing as sort of the government's program but I mean at this point you know what we've seen and we're going to see in the coming weeks as the the government moves it's budgets through the diet I mean what you have now is a situation where I think the Japanese economy is heavily dependent on government spending for growth and it's heavily dependent on on loose monetary policy and none of those conditions is going to change this year the government has unveiled depending on how you calculate it I mean it's at least somewhere in the order of 12 trillion if you ask you know Abe calls it 26 trillion but you know it's not all that's new government spending but either way you're getting a big stimulus program again that's supposed to run through the end of this fiscal years or the next fiscal year which starts on April 1st so you'll get more you know government spending really right up until the end of Abe's Abe's term as LDP leader that's I mean that's just you know the reality I mean I think I think Abe can boast of you know a pretty good economic record I mean it's hard to say that this has been a you know a third lost decade and that people are feeling a little more competent employment is you know it you know record highs you know lots lots of people employed employers really struggling to find workers in a lot of different sectors that's you know that's a real achievement tax revenues are up corporate profits are up they're all sorts of signs and you know Abe likes to tout these numbers and they're and they're real achievements but then looking forward and looking at who's going to succeed him you know last year you saw you know a dramatic drop in the number of births and so the demographic challenges are still there you know there's still this question of how Japan's going to provide health care and and pensions for its retirement you know Abe's talking about social security reform this year but is it fundamental reform no and and it looks more like tinkering the margins you know making it possible for these to keep working and then to delay taking their pensions so maybe to ease some of the burden on the social security system but even then some of that legislation is going to wait for the fall and there's always the chance of a delay so we're not looking at a really aggressive social security reform agenda you know this is something that one of its successors is going to take on so I think it's safe to say at this point that really this year we're going to get a real you know this is this is going we're going to get a good look at what Abe's agenda legacy is this is a domestic statement you know stable competent government the economy growing not robustly not with a new growth model but enough to say that you know the prospects for a lot of Japanese have improved relative to the past more women in the workforce maybe a little more mobility but the the grand experiment I think we can say hasn't quite worked you know we haven't seen you know the shift to a really a more consumer-led growth model the government Japan's economy still dependent on growth you have you know politically you have post-populist politics which maybe is a good thing compared to a lot of other democracies but you know maybe Japan needs some of the robust political competition that in some ways led to Abe in the first place right and Abe came back because the LDP was an opposition needed something to distinguish itself to make a case against the DPJ and Abe came along with you know sort of this new economic experiment and it enabled Abe to come back and then enabled the LDP to come back you know that that's a pretty strong argument in favor of robust two-party democracy and I don't think we're going to see that come back this year you know maybe in 2021 as you transition to a new leader there's space for the opposition to say you know the LDP maybe is not all it's cracked up to be but but at home I don't think you're going to see a lot of dramatic change you know this afternoon you'll hear about how busy the international agenda is and I think there's maybe still room for Abe to shape a more expansive legacy abroad but at home I don't think we're going to see it terrific terrific thank you very much and you you covered all the issues I was hoping you would touch on but you left some for Prashili to dive to Prashili to dive deeper not really into so he just went home yeah yeah okay the jockeying for position I wonder if you can get a little bit more deeply maybe into some of the the political folks who are looking to succeed Abe and constitutional revision was not touched on there's a handful of things maybe you could dive a little deeper to give us your thoughts happy to do it hi everybody hope you're not remembering what we said last year we're a blank slate so let me just just to pick up on Tobias's comments about Abe and his legacy and I think it's always wise because we have these meetings every year we get very fixated on the short term but but remember he came back into power in 2012 and his his his reputation outside the country was oh here comes the nationalist right Japan evidence that Japan is shifting to the right we had that conversation for several years remember because in 2015 it was the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two so Abe came back into power just as the region was very focused on historical legacy issues and lots of people were a little worried about his ideological proclivities to be a more nationalist nationalistic revisionist voice for Japan now in 2020 he's the savior of the liberal world he is Mr. Magic he is negotiating trade agreements he has stabilized Japan he has given the Japanese people although there are certain people who take issue with this but he's given the Japanese people reason for hope measured hope to be sure but certainly much better than I think a lot of Japanese felt in 2012 I would go and I'm sure Tobias and others have gone to went to Japan in that period and and there was a new sense of optimism in a couple of years after Abe had been in office and Abenomics has its ups and its downs its successes and failures the successes I think are slow and gradual but I think one of the ones that I would say was really important for Japan was to get the Japanese people to look optimistically about their future again and also on the security side more and more Japanese were extraordinarily worried about the region about how and who was going to lead them in this more difficult time in space and then of course more recently who is going to manage the more difficult and less predictable U.S. president so Abe has navigated a lot of expectation a lot of cynicism about his about his leadership and I think he's done it remarkably well nonetheless when I again more recently you go to Tokyo and there's been ups and downs with scandals and cronyism in 2017 that set of scandals and it's back again with the cherry blossom viewing right again the word that pops up a lot in my conversations with executives and companies and scholars and others is a little bit of Abe fatigue he's been around for a long time and that's a good thing for Japan but in the general kind of how do we make politics sexy again kind of theme maybe not so good so I think there is a little bit of that people are ready for transition and nobody is more ready for transition than the people coming up below him in the liberal democratic party so these are the people that are really ready for their own time of leadership for Japan and to have a bigger voice in the future not only of the party but also how to move the reform agenda forward so you've got some fairly technocratic and interesting people coming up it's hard to say after eight years of Prime Minister Abe whether they're going to fill those shoes in the same way globally but you've got the three foreign ministers right? Shida the current foreign minister Motegi and of course the current defense minister former foreign minister Konotaro those are the names that come up those three people would be very articulate spokespersons for Japan's economic policy but also for Japan's role in the world so I tend to go Japan needs a global voice those three people would give Japan a pretty articulate and effective global voice but then you have the other two Mr. Suga who's been the chief cabinet secretary and then Mr. Kato who is a little bit more aligned with the base of support for the Abe Prime Minister ship a little bit more on the conservative nationalist side so you've got people who would work well with the bureaucracy and in the party the more political managers of the Abe reign right? Those two I don't know I can't predict although you know Jim is going to force us to predict later on so I'll wait for Jim to make us do that but there's always the anti-Abe there's a little space under certain circumstances of course for Ishiba Shige to really find some ground here I think it would take some setbacks between now and the next election for Ishiba to have that space quite honestly I'm not sure he's in the strongest position possible inside the party and I'm sure that's a diplomatic way of saying that but I think remember when you elect the leader of the LDP it is not just the Nagata Chogin the diet members right? who get that say depending on how the next leader is selected Ishiba could have considerable room among the party members to advocate against the Abe platform and so don't don't rule Mr. Ishiba out he's still there and I think there's a certain amount of party members who would like to see a little bit more robust pushback on the agenda of the prime minister nonetheless I think Tobias is largely is largely correct that this is going to be a pretty strong effort within the party towards managed succession right? and you're already you're hearing lots of our political reporters talk in that kind of language if not that word itself interesting piece of the question for me though is when the LDP goes back to a general election most likely I think at the end of 2020 after the success of the Olympics and we're all kind of predicting it'll be on a wave of accomplishment for the prime minister he will hand the baton to somebody else and then they will with his blessing take the party to general election or slightly reversed he'll take the party to a general election and then hand the baton over one of the two so that's a late 2020 some people say take issue with that saying no there's another scenario a third scenario that's become a little bit more popular in Japan and that's the Trump Kaisang you know in other words the outcome of our election could factor into the way in which the party thinks about Mr. Abe and maybe maybe there'll be enough nervousness should President Trump get reelected there may be enough nervousness about who's going to manage this partnership with the United States and that may change the dynamics I think that's a little attempt to make it more sexy I don't know I'm going to regret introducing that word I didn't introduce it by the way that was something that was told to me by political journalists so it's already out there in the Japanese vernacular so don't don't attribute that to me but I kind of like the Trump Kaisang as a just something we can talk about in class right so so I think there's another piece of this and a a good friend of mine who works for the Omiyori brought this up at the U.S. Japan security conference a week or so ago and his expression was an expression of anxiety about the post-Abe era and I you know his anxiety was every time you've had a long serving Japanese prime minister Hoisumi for example in the very recent history of Japanese politics you have tended to have this is this is my word in Kaitensori you know annual turnover that kind of inability to secure a really strong political base in the LDP and of course I hadn't thought about that I thought we were kind of out of that moment of annual transitions in prime ministers but you could conceive of this maybe a moment where Japan does go not in the forefront of global events of the strong prime minister in a strong base at home but retreat somewhat into a more not unstable because it's very stable but less defined leadership in that period and that would be very very difficult I think to manage the only second thing I'll say is a lot of what Mr. Abe has managed to accomplish is because of the two-thirds majority in the lower house now all kinds of you know the LDP co-made though partnership is a strong and durable one both parties or it's a symbiotic relationship now at the at in the electoral sense right neither can run opposite each other anymore right you can talk to very very senior LDP of diet members and they rely on the co-made to vote even in rural areas so you're not likely to see a divorce between LDP and co-made though but you could see different partnerships you could see coalition government come back to Japan even in the absence of a strong opposition contender for the LDP so there's a variance here that we should think about both in terms of leadership transitions being more frequent but also the coalition dynamics on certain policy issues in particular making it more more difficult to predict decision making both domestic and foreign policy so I don't know how you want us to end here but I think one piece of the puzzle is the Olympics is going to be a crowning that's the way I said I think it's going to be Mr. Abe's crowning moment not forbid anything should not go well Olympics are hard they're hard to manage in a week or two the governor of Tokyo will be in town she too is going to have to manage a very diverse and complicated scenario of managing Olympics not every country that hosts the Olympics not every city has a good experience we all know that whether we look at Rio or Los Angeles or you know this is a complicated process for Japan and for Tokyo and so we shouldn't take it as given that this is going to be smooth and without its own bumps along the way I'm not wishing bumps but I I think we should just make sure that we pay attention where we can to the ways in which the United States and others can help it along the way be more secure and more successful yeah oh thank you the end no I appreciate that no that's terrific and you've left left us a few things we can dive into even more detail in the Q and A and but now I want to turn to die and I'm so glad that that he's here with us today because and we heard a lot of it in Assistant Secretary Stillwell's remarks as well this this emphasis on innovation this emphasis on kind of the shared mission or the imperative of alliance cooperation in science and technology research and development information security technology security and of course the cyber security piece is is big in that regard and in the context of making the Olympics go smoothly so uh so uh Mochunaga-san let me uh ask you to give some of your thoughts about the coming year thank you Jim thank you for inviting me inviting me I'm a new guy and I'm I'm a computer computer scientist so I'm I talk about really the different aspect of the technology I'd like to talk about the new challenge in Japan we'll have in 2020 especially for first I'd like to talk about why the new technology is difficult to handle in our our society and the next I'd like to introduce about new trends in Japan especially Olympic Tokyo 2020 Olympic and the new policies and new technology such as 5Gs so I'd like to first talk about the difficulties in new technology a new technology is difficult because of the it it has a strong connection between the economy our economy and the the other one is the the difference of their level level of knowledge the first we will our our our life is highly depending on the computer system which support our daily life for example power power generations or power grids or telecommunications at the same time we face the cyber threat motivated by a financial gain or stealing trading secrets therefore cyber security scope of the cyber security is expanded to the protecting our economy and the difference the difficulty in the level of knowledge is for example I'd like to say regarding a cyber cyber security computer system is a burner computer system is only be attacked if there is a vulnerability in the system if the computer is simple or transparent we we guarantee that the system is very safe however every day every year our computer system is getting more complex and networks and the network networks and the source players also become complex more over our society especially people use people and organization using the computer is also complex so the whole system is complex that you will have the vulnerability in your system and for the for the for the attackers they will exploit that kind of vulnerabilities vulnerabilities you don't know why you we don't know because we don't have enough knowledge about the computers so there is a so much difference in the level of knowledge that makes the technology is difficult for handling in the policies or political issues so the upcoming trends in the Tokyo 2020 Olympics there are so many new technologies it will will be introduced we will be introduced in the Tokyo 2020 Olympics for example the monitoring system deployed in the airport or the stadium or stations that monitoring the people's behavior for safety operations at the same time operating or Olympic Games the attractive target for the adversaries for disrupting that game by the cyberattacks and the cyberattacks can cyberattacks can attack the not only website but also critical infrastructures that will make power shut down and recent Olympic games demonstrate that's such a kind of threat especially the Pyongyang 2018 Winter Olympic Games cyberattack shut down their internet access and shut down the trying to shut down their shut down website and the power out power outages so the Tokyo 2020 Olympic organizing committee and the Japanese government trying to trying to prevent such a kind of cyberattacks however we Japan will face the massive amount of cyberattacks they we cannot escape from that so the Japanese not only Japanese but also worldwide cyber security experts moving toward to the system making a system a resilient that means that focus on the recovery as well as prevention so the new new movement toward the resilience is is big challenge for the Japan and world world cyber security researchers Japanese cyber security policy is started in 2000 and its initial stage they are focusing on regarding the protecting government government agencies and the critical infrastructure but they but the the dramatic change happened in 2014 it is that Abe administration changed national security policy toward proactive pacifism and Japanese government declare to maintain offensive cyber capability lost new national defense product program guideline is established in 2018 this is a new new new era for Japanese Japanese defense policy to have offensive capability in the cyber domain Japan has already established cyber cyber defense unit in 2014 and it started with the 19 personnel but in this years in this year it will become it will grow to 290 personnel it's really it's still small but it grows dramatically however they they have they will however they will try to get their offensive capability in this year and in this next four years however we have the constitutional and operational limits for constitutional limits prohibits invade secrecy of information telecommunications and do not allow have the strike capability that is a strong cap for the cyber defense unit and the other operational keep limit is the lack of a budget around about there is Japan is Japan's defense budget is capped by the 1% of GDP but the Japanese self-defense forces hyper budget is very small one so that kind of budget or other resources restriction will be the issues for the cyber security unit in the self-defense forces the other things new Japan's challenges in the protection of the protection the protection of the new technology is export control new export control policies export control policy is very important for protecting new technology such as quantum computing or cryptographies this is a new this is a very very critical critical technology for protecting our nations and it takes long time to research but the cyber attacks steeding such a kind of result of a research this is a very very critical issues for Japan and the United States so the Japan is now trying to catch up that kind of technological advancement and prevent such a kind of leaking from Japan Japan and the Japanese government ministry of economy and trade industry set up new guidance regarding the protecting protection against for the cryptography technologies in Cold War era Western countries trying to keep their technologies in the western regions using the Kokom Kokom is the Kokom is Kokom is now we're now is transformed to the what's now arrangement and what's now arrangement regulates is an international regime for export control but the crucial issues is such a kind of regime is takes there it takes a very long time to review revise that the kind of regimes so Japan is taking forward to taking forward to restrict that kind restrictions export control measures before the international regime catch up new technologies but the Japan is a very critical issue is investment for the new technologies United States is almost invest invest the new technologies about the double of amount double of double double of dollars invested to the new technology for 15 years at the same time China invest 18 times for 15 time 15 years Japan still same so the Japan should invest what we need to do so I terrific no that's that's terrific thank you and I'm glad you brought up the issue of export controls because that opens up some other areas that are becoming increasingly important in the U.S. Japan context of course the U.S. is looking at revising some of its export control rules and regulations we have the whole 5G Huawei blacklist entity list is it on is it off dynamic going on and how that impacts Japanese companies and then sharing of research and development among U.S. and Japanese partnerships in these areas and Japan just recently instituted a new investment control rule that changes the U.S. has changed how we operate SIFIIS or the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and with an eye toward managing Chinese investment primarily in in the United States Japan has taken similar steps but and there are some similarities but some differences and I thought it was interesting just last week or so the Treasury Department issued new rules that essentially created a bit of a white list of countries that that get easier access or less screening on investment in foreign direct investment in the United States the U.K. Australia and Canada Japan would very much like to be on that list as would Korea and a bunch of other countries and the U.S. has indicated that it's open to possibly expanding that list but this issue of technology security this issue of defense based cooperation all these other things become factors in this and I think this year this coming year these are going to be very big themes going forward so I have a whole little list of additional questions I'd like to get to and then and then we'll jump to the audience but let me start on the political front and go back to that because first of all I just wanted to ask Tobias a little bit about the title of his book because a conoclast I had to look it up and it's well I'll let you explain it but I was I was at first intrigued and was surprised at the choice of that that term but then the way you explained it to me made made a lot of sense sure and I always appreciate the opportunity to talk about talk about my book talk about my book so you know I had had kind of a list of ideas was going back and forth from the publisher and and the thing that that grabbed me about it because when you look at Abe's career I mean on the one hand he's you know he's a third generation diet member both sides of his family I mean he's both his Abe grandfather and of course Prime Minister you know the late the late Kishinobusuke were your diet members and prominent politicians but he you know he comes from this tradition despite you're coming from a prominent political family I mean he's it's very uneasily with the Japan that emerged after 1945 and you know from the moment he arrived at the diet you know he looked at his elders and the kind of compromises his elders made in terms of accepting the constitution accepting restrictions on Japan's playing a global role as a great power and of course he inherited many many of these ideas from grandfather Kishi but he he wanted you know and he he said it very plainly in 2006 when he became Prime Minister for the first time you know he wanted to break free of the post-war regimes and I mean so this is you know this is a politician who despite coming from you know well within the establishment has looked at that establishment and decades of that establishment choices and he has wanted to to move past them and to end those compromises and he's never really been shy about it and he's you know talks about it himself I mean as you remember when he gave his speech before the joint session of Congress I mean I remember he he you know said you know he he claimed that it was because of his time in America that you know that his elders looked at him as you know cheeky abe and it was sort of a a laugh line in that speech but I mean that that that streak is is really throughout and it hasn't meant it doesn't mean that he's not a realist or he's not capable of being pragmatic I mean and I think you know seven year you know now in his you know seventh, eighth year he's you know shown that he's perfectly capable of being that but he would argue and and I think argued from really from the beginning of his career that there was no tension between being a you know pragmatic realist statesman but also having kind of a clear vision of where the country had to go and and that you know and so I I think that really is sort of the thread that pulls through his entire career and you know we still see this now as he tries to navigate a you know pretty complicated international landscape and I don't want to step on the toes of the afternoon panel but that you know kind of Japan's and the stepping forward and looking at an increasingly multi-polar order you know they're being a place for Japan you know not just as a as an ally the United States but sort of as a as a kind of shaper of international order in its own right you know that is you know I think the destiny that he's wanted Japan to realize really as you know his entire career as a politician so that's you know that was really the idea great no thank you because I've always thought of Abe as a real traditionalist and yet I think in some ways he's such a traditionalist that the post-war order is doesn't fit in in a way or that's what he's he's looking to reshape and so that gets me to constitutional revision and maybe Sheila you can jump in here a little bit where where are we going with this he brings it up every year in his diet speech it's kind of on the agenda talking heads get up here and say it'll never happen but for me I thought it was gonna happen I forgot about that but but can you help us understand a little bit what is whether it happens or doesn't happen what what is kind of where are the the lines of effort converging eventually and what areas would potentially be revised if and when that that happened what are your thoughts on that so can I plug a CFR product yes absolutely so so we had lots of questions about this and the the level of understanding about the constitution outside of Japan and even inside Japan actually is pretty superficial it's attached to Abe right it's his idea right or it's about article my alone and what you what a lot of people fail to understand is that the diet conversation on constitution revision goes back to 1999 and there was a cross-party committee established in the diet there are multiple there was a 900 page report that was issued parties on the left parties on the right right had all their different ideas about what might be revised etc right so zero on in from 2000 to now you've had episodes in which electoral politics have also engaged this question of constitutional revision maybe surprising to those of us who watch Japanese politics from afar but the DPJ had a had a had a draft for a constitutional revision in the mid 2000s it was seen then as a kind of premise that yes we are able to govern we can have this policy too we on our info guide on cfr.org we have Japan's constitutional debate we have a big sort of overview of both the history of the constitutional debate right the politics and how they've evolved over time and we have more parties today that are open to the idea of constitutional revision maybe not Mr. Abe variant right but a different variant right and then where the Japanese people come down on this and the Japanese people are pretty steady state half people go okay yeah we should talk about it the rest of people are like eh not so much a priority right so the Japanese people have always been sort of resistant to the idea that this is something crucial that we must do now and yet all of us who if we go to Japan talk to our friends some of them will say sure let's have a conversation about it but what they want to revise could be completely different now the thing I think it's interesting about Abe right is he reminded the Japanese public if he did it repeatedly over and over again in the diet that this was the premise of the LDP in 1955 when the liberals and democrats got together it was one of the foundational pieces of their agreement I just went back in the early 50s between 52 and 55 to look at article 9 and the in the self-defense force law that was debated in the diet in 54 and you've got a whole different range of discussions about Nakasone was there right from the Kaishinto all different positions about whether Japan should be independent in terms of its military capability whether it's okay to rely on the United States whether the constitution should be thrown out tomorrow right so you've got an active debate in the 1950s and Kishinobusuke emerged to be one of those people as well but the liberal democratic party was actually formed on the premise of the constitution review device that was the political bargain at the time so Abe reminded his diet members and his party that that was one of their foundational commitments right and he again repeated the origin story of why should we have a foreign power determine our foundational document governing document it's time to put a Japanese in premature on that document what I think is interesting and this is where I think we are now is that it's less a conversation about revising the constitution it's more about amendments adding amendments to the Japanese constitution not touching the regular document that was passed in 47 but adding amendments on financing education right tertiary education on crisis management by the executive branch of the diet which right now can't decide in crisis if the diet's not in session right but there's a whole host of other things out there from different political parties but you've moved far away from what we used to think of the right left politics of constitutional revision now it's a question about 21st century challenges to Japan it's more closer to the political conversation on reform than it's ever been and quickly before I move on Ishiba's view on the constitutional revision is kind of is a big friction point right that's a big difference on article nine specifically and I think you know Ishiba and others there are others not just Ishiba-san but there are others inside the LDP themselves who would write who would like to rewrite article nine they would like to get rid of that ambiguous second paragraph for those of you who've read article nine they want to be much more forthright about Japanese militia to get rid of the ambiguities that Ishiba himself says you know is confusing to our adversaries as well as to our friends right we need to be clear about our military power and we need to be clear about how and when we might use it yeah I mean unless we're going to move unless we're going to come back to it just no we may not come back okay so well so as long as we're talking about the constitutional revision debate I mean I mean Abe in some ways has a problem and that even as I think people are open to the idea in all sorts of ways I mean because he's been so zealous about it for a while I think a lot of voters are just just don't trust him necessarily and I think our little skeptical that you know why is he so going home about this why does this have to get done why does this have to be a priority when there are so many other problems that need to be addressed and you know in particular now you have I think he has also a problem where and you know we've seen this with you know in some of the debate you know the national security law debates and collective self-defense that a lot of times you know I think the public also reacts not even so much to the substance of changes but to the process and in a lot of ways Abe has moved Japan to a more textbook Westminster style democracy where the Prime Minister actually can you know what the Prime Minister says goes as long as the majority has a parliamentary majority but there still are I think some lingering kind of consensual norms the idea that the Prime Minister can't deviate too far from public opinion or can't push too you know run you know too rough shot over the opposition and so I think Abe has kind of found himself in a bind where at least until last year the upper house elections last year I mean he had you know after 2016 in theory he had super majorities in both houses but if you push too hard on that you know you push too hard and the idea that you've run rough shot over the opposition means that you have zero chance of getting a referendum through which of course is the last step in the process you know that you need a majority of the public to agree with you and so I think he's been stuck in this bind we're in theory the diet number you know you could start the debate tomorrow but it would mean basically subverting these norms that it actually and in fact norms that the LDP itself agreed to when they started that process and that you know created the constitutional permission from the diet that it would have to be an all-party process everyone would have to sort of agree that you know this proceeds and so he's been reluctant to do that and of course just as a footnote to this one of my favorite kind of little tidbits from the debate over the last couple of years is that the lower house constitution commission sort of did a little study study of how to go about this and particularly in the referendum process and one of the people they talked to about convening a national referendum is David Cameron who's probably an expert on what national referendum should do and he said don't go to a referendum unless you're sure that 60% of the public is behind you and it's I think pretty hard to find 60% of the public to agree on a particular form of constitution revision let alone you know leaving aside the procedural questions and so I think I mean there's just I don't and so I don't see this changing certainly not before the Olympics and even you know heading up into the end of Abbe's term it's really unlikely and so then it becomes a question how does that influence who succeeds Abbe and you know you know does it mean that you get someone who's maybe seen as more dovish and so maybe it would be more trusted on it or do you get sort of another person who's zealous about the issue you know what you're not going to sound as a as a Japanese voter and uh speak for all Japanese voters look at all those cameras and as a cyber policy specialist I'll give you a chance to go that angle if you want to do you are there aspects of the constitutional amendment revision debate that you think about that either maybe in terms of the 21st century or dealing with some of the some of the technologies and issues that have come up there maybe there are some things that that you think might be worthwhile or or if you have any other views on the constitutional question yeah actually my my colleagues and my friends in the working for the cyber security issues seeing the constitutional issues for the article nine on article 21 of a secrecy of communications is a very very intensive issue for us or article for example article nine of the holding the forces is the issue for the cyber defense unit for example if the north korea trying to attack by the missile missile before that cyber defense unit trying to the attack attack the that kind of a base and stop that kind of a firing missile by cyber attack it was not used over force it's just preventing that they're preventing the firing missile is it possible or not that in in in history Japan will not Japan decided to not have the striking striking capability so it is part it is some kind of strike capability so it's just talking at end so we cannot talk about that it's prohibited in the article nine really why we can't talk about that is our cyber security communities and the other things is for the intelligence intelligence operations for collecting the information from the cyber cyberspace for example kind of the collecting information for the internet traffic is prohibited in the article nine because the secrecy it invade secrecy of the telecommunications however we can some people for example police police or the some military forces is doing the intelligence operations by the the why wireless communications they can gather that kind of information because it's not why it happened it's just collecting something in air so what is different between that so this is a crucial issues for the cyber security research as for the for the constitution but for the Japanese people one of the Japanese people constitution constitution division is one of the issue for the Japanese people there are so much issues for the social security or the aging society that is a kind of issue because without such a kind of huge budget is going to that kind that social security and they cannot invest in defense budget doing the other developing new technology invest in new technology that it can't it can't because of the huge social security budget you know thank you so I want to move on to a couple other things and then then we'll open it up we do have some elections in Japan in 2020 in Okinawa assembly general elections will happen in the late spring in 2020 and you know Okinawa and the Potemba relocation as an alliance issue is you know some year if we keep doing this event every year some year it's going to be the year that either there's the momentum breaks toward all right let's just finish this job and get this relocation done and there's there's kind of a a fushime or kind of a a noticeable acceleration in that direction or or the project gets more definitively stopped or cancelled or adjusted or changed instead in the last several years we've been more in this a foot in each camp almost where things are kind of being obstructed and delayed but it's moving forward and it's not changing so I don't know if any of our panel have any thoughts about the coming year I mean last year we had the referendum relatively soon after we had held this event and yet and yet here we are any any thoughts on the on the Okinawan situation I have lots of thoughts on the Okinawan situation but I I would just caution you not to look for acceleration because I don't think that's that's the dialogue that we've seen in the 20 odd years since this conversation began with the people of Okinawa I think it's you know 1996 97 it's been a summer relocation as a part of consolidating US forces out of that heavily populated residential area began year in 2020 so here we are so a slow accretion and the tug and the pull and the two steps forward four steps backward that I think is largely explainable but not very comfortably explainable by the fact that the majority of people in Okinawa still don't want new bases there they they were the bases that are there were imposed the Ftema relocation would involve accepting a new base even though it's on an existing base I think for politically that that is the way even conservatives will privately tell you now Okinawa political preferences of course between the LDP and other parties that's like everywhere else in Japan there's tugs and pulls between people of all kinds of different opinions on social security on you know economic development plans and that kind of stuff but on the basis I think you've got a pretty consistent viewpoint no matter when you are pulling across the across the prefecture so it's always been a story of Tokyo trying to push right the government in Okinawa to resist less or to hold out more carrots to make that resistance weaken and I think that's just the that's the way in which Tokyo has approached it and I don't think there would have been any other way to do it whether you like the relocation project or you don't like it I think that's the that's the game however there's something new and I think it's important that we register it and that is there is now a conversation about intermediate range forces missiles US missiles going into the region already the governor of Okinawa said not here no thank you so as we think forward about a lots of the security force posture shifts new technologies new ways of thinking about not only Japanese military capabilities and how they're deployed because now the southwestern strategy is what the self-defense force priority is right is to put more of their bases down south in the southwestern region be prepared that any attempt to make Okinawa the primary location for new capabilities will ignite new new opposition I think in the prefecture yeah so that's my sense of what we are thanks that's a good segue into another question that I had which is the question came up with this is secretary still well but was definitely avoided but we we get a chance to say whatever we think here you know I think what's going on right now in the US host nation support SMA negotiations special measures agreement negotiations with South Korea is a terrible development of alliance management and you know there were just notifications given as per the union agreement to some of the workers on Korean bases that furloughs could be coming because there's there's no they're currently without an agreement on on their host nation support deal the US is is looking for a fundamentally different model the Trump administration is looking for a fundamentally different model where some US base costs would be covered by South Korea as opposed to the the current SMA agreement is all basically on peninsula related costs personally I think that would open up a terrible can of worms of the other of Korea than having the right to audit and dive into some of our budgets and on domestic issues and I don't know why we would want that but but from a Japan point of view kind of the I'm curious about the domestic politics or the domestic the dynamics of and we don't know how things are going to come out in the South Korea negotiations but we know Japan is next in line for this discussion and I'm wondering if you all think this is going to be one of the the topics of conversation and maybe we can ask Akita-san too later on about this as well but I see this as a big train heading down the the track and I don't know what we're going to do about it so I mean in general I mean I think I mean I mean I think the risks are huge and you know we've seen domestic political backlash in South Korea so you can't rule out the possibility you know I guess working I guess the tricky thing for me is the calendar the mother calendar I mean one is sort of you have earlier rounds of negotiations I mean it's depend on you know what sort of leaks you got I mean that would shape the extent to which it becomes a domestic political issue the U.S. presidential elections got to be a factor on how Japan approaches these negotiations presumably that you have it's in this awkward timing where you know do you agree to something early and assume that you know that Trump is re-elected or do you kind of hope you know that you're dealing with a different administration by the time you know a new deal has to be actually be implemented but then you also have Japanese the Japanese budget cycle because it's got to be in the budget for the next fiscal year which will be done by the end of the year so you're in I mean that figuring out the timing of how to actually do this is tricky and I mean I guess another factor is that you know obviously he's had a lot of leeway when it comes to kind of managing his relationship with with Trump and sort of people have trusted that you know maybe he's not not getting a lot of tangible benefits for Japan you know that the U.S. Japan trade agreement was generally skewed towards you know towards U.S. interests but I think people have been pretty forgiving of Abe's handling of that and so that's got to be a factor as well that you're not going to necessarily see immediate an immediate backlash I mean unless it's so obvious that you know the U.S. demands are extravagant and Japan can't possibly pay you know there's a lot of incentives to try to fudge this and to not let things get out of control you know certainly for the Abe government but really I think I it doesn't seem that either administration would want it to get too out of control so it's a lot of cross cutting I mean I don't I don't think it's I don't necessarily think it's you know guaranteed to blow up but this certainly the risk is that if there are no other comments on the the main panel I want to make sure we have time for the audience to get their questions in so I welcome you to raise your hand I'll follow Jim's request that you identify yourself and keep it as much of a relatively short question as possible let's work our way from the back from the back and then we'll come up to the front here so I have one hand over there and the far left and then another gentleman here so we'll start there and then here and then we'll come up Hello I am I'm Kyung-Goo Lee and I'm a student from South Korea studying here and I thank you all for having this wonderful explanation about Japanese politics and also some of your forecasts and I'd have I have to ask some questions about the future of future prime minister of Japan to Dr. Sheila Smith some people think that maybe people like Suga or like people like Kijida or Kono might be the next prime minister but some people at least some people in Korea think that maybe Abe was too mastermind of maintaining the balance between different factions in LDP and he was maybe a too mastermind of dealing with domestic policy initiative that there might not be a sufficient alternative at least until like 2021 that he might try to extend this term as he did in 2018 and maybe becoming prime minister again do you think there is a possibility that that thing could happen again in the upcoming years? Thank you Sure I think it's a pretty straightforward answer to that question I mean that's what the Trump Kaisan idea is all about I think the scenario that people are speculating about is that our election could produce a re-election of the president in which case Mr. Abe is best prepared to deal with that especially as host nation support I am a less sanguine I think from Tobias about HNS I think the negotiations are going to be bloody I don't think we have any other reason to think they won't be and I think you've you know so I there could be that element to it as well but here's the thing he's already the party has already extended his time in office once he himself has publicly said he doesn't have he's tired he doesn't have an appetite for a fourth term any politician that says they don't want to have an appetite for the next term usually can be persuaded so it won't be Mr. Abe going to the party and saying give me another term it will be the party going to Mr. Abe saying we can't do it without you right so that's the scenario what will condition that scenario again we've got lots of speculative answers to that Mr. Nikai who's the secretary general of the party has already said that could be done that the party could rewrite the rules if it was necessary so I think my third opting from all that basket of potential successors right the second basket being Mr. Ishida and then the third basket is the Trump Kaisang which is the Abe option can't tell you with any probability how high that probability is though I would also add too that it's I mean I don't know if I take Abe's protestations that seriously because it's hard to imagine him out of politics I mean he is such well he was out for a while yeah well but well but he but he was itching to get back into the arena you know within weeks after that you know and then you know and I think he was in some ways do you really kind of his recollections of the time after his resignation you know that he almost was withering you know that that he needed to be in the arena and that you know he needed to to keep fighting and you know in some ways as long as constitutional revision it's almost hard to see him wanting to to say okay you know I you know I give up I didn't you know achieve my one great goal of political life and so I mean there's certainly I mean I think it's easy you know I agree it's you know the the link to to our election I think is hard to hard to avoid which would mean that I think so around March of next year when the LGBT has its invention that would be you know really the thing to watch you know so between November and March of next year you know is there sort of a groundswell of support for that thank you I had another question there gentlemen there and then we'll work our way around Hi Shida-sensei Akemasite Onigatobu daimasu I'm Kenny from Okinawa Prefecture Government Washington DC office yes my question is today it's a little bit about more specifically about the Henoko new based construction project because it was already 20 years ago and just recently Japanese government officially admit that it will take another 12 years we all aware that the growing rapid threat of China power and the necessity of the confront all these come capability so my question is that how do you feel about this 12 years time span when it comes to the strategic changes in the U.S. marine and navy reconstruction in the region thank you anybody want to jump on me so I have been watching this since I was in the prefecture in 1998 been watching it but I'm watching it today from a distance and so I have less of a sense of the internal inside the prefecture thinking it doesn't surprise me that we are not on the cusp of immediate resolution or an acceleration of completion of the project that it doesn't but in the years when I have gone back to visit Okinawa I have gone up to see Camp Schwab and to Henoko and there's been a considerable transformation right in terms of how much concrete is there and how much what was a very quiet Odoang is now a pretty pretty foundational construction has been done for the for the new base so you know the question is is it ever going to happen and if so whose base is that going to be and our Marine Corps of course now works extensively with the ground self-defense forces they work in amphibious amphibious battalion development they work in Saga and they work in other parts of Kyushu to support and enhance capabilities of the ground self-defense force first and foremost but all three self-defense forces they also work off-site they work in all different parts of Japan but also they work off off of Japan as well the Guam base is another piece Jim is the expert on that more than I but this dispersal idea that was part of the Obama administration and it continues to be some of the ways in which our military envisions its operations across the region has also had an impact on the importance of that base right to our Marine Corps it's very important I'm not saying it's not but it's not the one crucial piece of the puzzle the way it used to be back in the 1990s on the China I think the important thing to watch here is Japan's own defense strategy and the way in which the self-defense forces now are relocating to Sakijima as in Okinawa which are the islands not the main island where the bases exist already but are the islands Yonoguni Miyako Ishigaki and then up into the our own islands further north outside the prefecture that's where the Japanese military is investing that's where I think you're going to see the most transformation in terms of military forces in the next 10 to 12 years and they're not going to be U.S. forces they're going to be Japanese thank you and for what it's worth I'll throw my my quick view in there which I know is not popular in in Okinawa but if if I were running for governor in Okinawa I would be making the pitch that my goal is to get this completed as quickly as possible and I'm going to become a partner in this process so that we can get Potemma closed and we can get a more safe operating posture up there reduce forces U.S. forces and then I want to put I want to have on the table the next step of of of burden reduction or you know what's the next step of of kind of relieving the burden on on Okinawa because I feel like we just we're we're just stuck in this position and nothing is is is changing so I don't see Henoko as the end of this process but I think we have to make that move in order to get to the next step but it is it is a difficult difficult issue for sure let's let's move up to the front I'm going to take these two questions together here I have two hands here we'll take these two one after another and then thank you very much my name is Dongyeon Kim from Voice of America Korean Service now if you go back to what what Prime Minister Abe had published in his book New Nuggetsi the Japanese resolution he underlines one of the priority and one of the thing was the resolve of the abducted North Korean abducted issue and as the Tokyo Olympics coming out and we we saw the Pyeongchang Olympic as being some kind of a momentum for the North Korean relationship and we know we know that Prime Minister Abe has been really pushing forward to have a some direct conversation with North Korea which has been a failure now North Korea being with his harsh rhetoric this year there is some speculation of having a like ballistic missile fire or something how do you see the calculation regarding with that of the Tokyo Olympic and his agenda of having a normalization with North Korea and how North Korea would react toward the Tokyo Olympics okay thanks and we will get to some of that in the afternoon but but you can touch on on that and then let's get another question Richard Coleman CBP retired this is a huge question but just in general what is the public opinion and are there any political differences with respect to climate change decarbonization and you know what's the status of nuclear power okay yeah but we'll take we'll take a stab at that that might well let me turn to the panel here how about on the first one just North Korea okay you go first okay okay I'd like to take about the North Korean Tokyo Olympics games I think two two issues is not directly connect to connect this is my answer because the Prime Minister Abe thinking of success of the success of Tokyo 2020 Olympic is in this year's highlight so the North Korea issues take more time so it so don't rush that's a kind of issue and taking time and take time to resolve the North Korea issues even if the resolve Japanese people in North Korea and the other type of issues for nuclear issues something like that but the but the Tokyo 2020 Olympic is almost six months six months there is a six months so it is that it's too short to resolve the other kind of issue connected with the other kind of issues and to some extent the Olympics also connects to this broader climate change discussion in the context of certainly Japan is positioning these games as environmentally friendly aspect I know they were pushing today I heard on the radio news featuring hydrogen as a part of the fuel for the torch and for other types of things to reduce emissions now there are there's a PR aspect and a public diplomacy aspect to this theme does anybody have any thoughts on kind of the more underlying substance in this this climate change not necessarily our area of expertise but I mean I think you know if we want to talk about Abe's legacy I mean I think climate change is probably one of probably one of the weakest parts of it you know that he said the right things and you know he's not you know in the world of sort of climate change villains you know they're countries that have we're not exactly in a position to to criticize him on that but it's more a question of what he could have done you know that here's a leader who's you know been strongest leader his country has seen in decades you know stable politics you know at least a kind of historical reputation of you know being good on on green issues and climate issues and while he said the right things you know why why hasn't there been a Japanese green new deal for example you know he's talked about technological innovation and you know the private sector can do its job but you know why you know why hasn't you know why hasn't his government been really at the lead of that and you know he talked a big game about getting nuclear power back going early on in his tenure and he hasn't really been willing to take risk to make you know to make it happen you know the restarts have been really slow you know they've gotten some back back online and then they've had to go back offline and there's been a lot of domestic opposition not a legal opposition it's just not you know it's not where he said and you know where Medi thought it would be as part of Japan's energy mix and so instead you know like we've seen in places like Germany you know you have coal and you know other fossil fuels are making up for that lost generation and so it's just it's not so Japan is not the worst out there obviously you know it's Paris goals were less men ambitious you would say and certainly depending on the benchmark you use they you know they could have been more robust and so it's more about missed opportunities you know could Abe have been a different kind of leader and you know he's hinted at trying to do that in the last couple years but there hasn't really been the commitment you know investment in you know really sustained political capital you know there's been a lot of you know we can kind of innovate our way out of this but I don't you know I don't think that's enough you know and I think saying that you know we have companies that can that can do the job I don't I don't think anyone thinks that's you know that's you adequate to the kind of you know the challenge that that not just Japan obviously is seeing the effects already you know could the heat ways last couple years and and more powerful storms I mean Japan is not immune from this by any means but you know globally you know Japan could have been I think a different kind of leader on this issue and I don't think that's happened you know can I just one one one thing on that on that I think we shouldn't underestimate the domestic political complications that emerged after 311 yeah and so you've got you know just before 311 if kashima happened you've got a an energy policy put forward by the DPJ but echoed by a previous policy by the LDP so there's consensus on both sides on this right that you'd have 40 percent self-sufficiency in energy and that was going to be nuclear and so you don't have what you see in Germany which is the German public turning completely against nuclear energy you don't have fully that kind yeah you don't have that kind of public response but you do have the complex regulatory piece of local government national government oversight the oversight is still not trusted completely despite the institutional revisions and then you've got this question of well what else is there for Japan and that dependence on overseas sources of energy is real and I think you could talk to the Japanese corporations that despite innovative technologies and investments and renewables it's never going to be as much as the aspiration which was the 40 percent right a decade ago so the politics are more complicated at home but the needs of Japan are greater in some ways in terms of sourcing and diversified in sourcing of energy and I think that domestic piece is going to be an Achilles heel for Japan going forward makes it hard for Japan to lead on climate change you just saw Mr. Koizumi the environmental minister at the United Nation almost getting booed off the stage so and that comes from a country that led at the Kyoto at the Kyoto meeting so you know this is where domestic politics can really confound some of the larger ambitions of Japan to lead in in some of these areas globally yeah this is really mixed because there is the cold piece as you mentioned or refer to but Japan has also really been investing a lot in the region in the natural gas LNG infrastructure that will make a difference in the overall emissions from that region over time so a mixed story I'm going to take two more questions from the back boom those two hands there let's do those my name is David Loudon and thank you so much for hosting the this event today my question is for Motinaga-san if not sufficiently addressed at present I would ask has anyone brought forth the idea of a digital network environment threat response policy and that might indeed take an amendment that Dr. Smith outlined to accommodate but that the intent of that is not offensive it's to neutralize the threat and with such with the immediacy if we're considering the Olympics and other events that are going to happen later on this year this might be the perfect form to raise that issue especially if we have any Japanese politicians or members of their state here thank you thank you did you get that did you okay hi many man Ricas Japan automobile manufacturers association great to see you all another technology question for you so I think there is rising awareness and concern in the U.S. tech community that some of the United States efforts some of the current administration's efforts really to pressure Huawei and pressure China on technology competition is creating greater sort of vertical integration of companies like Huawei therefore sort of hastening the creation of to parallel competing systems I'm wondering what's the conversation like in Japan on this do they have the same concerns what what do you think the Japanese approach will be to this challenge okay thank you for your questions first I'd like to talk about how do how can on Japan you come to make a countermeasure for prohibiting while prohibiting the offensive capabilities one is the one of the one one solution is of making more resilient system in Japan for example if we if we take down some kind of power outages how can we first how can we how can fast fix that kind of issues and the how can we cover that the power power stations and that kind of capability will can be used as a countermeasures not not being an offense of the other type other other other issues and the for offensive issues is not cannot cannot be separate from the defense issues in cyber domain because the cyber is not in cyber domain only only defense cannot be defense our system so we have to learn about offensive tools we have to learn about offensive measures and how can they think about offense how can how can we attack us it's it's same as thinking about how can defense our side so we cannot totally forget about offensive things so but but we have to keep in mind in offensive thing but focusing on defense and resiliency and the next things is a far away and parallel parallel situation parallel internet discussion in Japan is Japan hold a free free open in the Pacific vision or free and open in the Pacific vision and they the administration is set that kind of vision as you the set of principle as rule of law or openness or openness and that kind of principle can be applied to the internet issues because if the china or far away or that kind of companies if they are open and they are follow the rule of law we welcome their far way because they are they they share our vision but the Japanese Japanese researchers of the internet thinking far away does not agree that kind of principle that is a very very critical issue for the far way issues and on the Russian Russia is approved new law about the cutting from the internet and the Russian Russian networks that kind of movement is going to toward to cut of the authoritarian network system in the in the in the in the in the in the in the in the in the nation that's for example China and China China now promoting the digital circle digital circle in the east Asian countries and they are introduced far way equipments and and next they will introduce Chinese Chinese legislation system legislation in legislation in the cyber domain for example protecting data protecting privacy and how to control the traffic of the data and they should controlling of data in in their country or they on the on on having countries who has own a view about the authoritarian mechanisms so that kind of issue is going to be making things difficult thank you very much and thank you all for for your questions and I'm sure we'll get to some of the technology and trade issues as well in the in the afternoon panel my my quick final prediction question will will I be able to gamble at a casino in Japan before the end of the year? No no how about certainly not with a cabinet member okay all right yeah so sorry we didn't get to casinos but we will we'll leave a few issues for for next year to discuss thank you panel terrific start please join me in thanking our panel thank you we are going to take a break for lunch we have sandwiches and salad and things we're going to start the keynote speech session at one o'clock so you have a half hour for lunch