 Welcome to the National Security College here at the Australian National University. I'm Rory Metcalf, the head of the National Security College and I want to begin by acknowledging and celebrating the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet and paying respects to the elders of the Ngunnawal people past and present. So today I think the scale of the presence in this room including the media presence really attests to the significance and the timeliness of the speech you're about to hear and the speaker that I'm very, very proud to introduce. So Admiral Scott Swift is here obviously as commander of US Pacific Fleet but more than that I think is here as someone who has played a really significant role in deepening the strategic relationship, the alliance between Australia and the United States in our shared maritime region in the Indo-Pacific over many years and this goes back of course not only to an appointment not so long ago as commander of the seventh fleet but a very long and distinguished career with far too much depth and detail to need to narrate here in the service of the United States over some decades. I think the timeliness of today's presentation about strategy, stability and the alliance in the Indo-Pacific is reinforced by some of the news that we've been following lately. Of course there are questions in many minds in this country really about the nature, the character, the future, the strength of the alliance in an uncertain world including in times that have been politically uncertain. The news that some of us have followed this week about the extra sets of eyes and ears on the Talisman Sabre exercise that Admiral Scott has just joined us from I think also has reinforced the view that the issues we discuss here today are very real, they're not only something of interest to my academic colleagues and so I guess in the spirit of what we do here at the National Security College where we provide executive training and development to Australian officials and also to officials from a range of partner countries but also our academic program but thirdly our role as a I guess a platform for quality debate about policy, about strategic and security issues of matter. It's my real pleasure to welcome Admiral Scott Smith. Well good morning ladies and gentlemen and thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this morning, it's a pleasure to be back, I think it was just over a year and a half ago that I was here in this same space having a similar dialogue and it's great to see so many familiar faces in the crowd, I think it says something about the relationship that the United States enjoys with Australia and one of those as Rory mentioned going back to my 7th Fleet days was Rory himself as a young new 7th Fleet commander I came to Australia at the invitation of Rory and had just a fantastic engagement with broad minded well informed individuals that expanded my thinking on the challenges that we collectively face here in the region and I very much look forward to getting to that same kind of dialogue in the Q&A period. I do want to thank the National Security College at the Australian National University for inviting me back potentially some short term memory loss there and for providing us all the opportunity to share our thinking and insights with each other, I think that dialogue is critically important and it's for like this that our critical a critical part of our ongoing security dialogue enabling a more informed analysis of the challenges that impact Australia, the Indo-Asia Pacific region and those interests here including the United States, those interests throughout the region. I look forward as I mentioned to your questions and comments and learning from your thoughts, experiences and insights. This is my 5th trip to Australia as the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and each visit I'm struck by the enduring bonds between our navies, our nations and our people. The crucible of World War II forged that bond as our naval forces fought together in places with names like Soon-To-Straight, Coral Sea and Salvo Island just to name a few. Our sailors share common character, common values and in fact common graves. Through the lens of shared adversity we've developed an abiding confidence in each other's commitment, a mutual respect for each other's capabilities and most importantly an unshakable trust that comes from a natural byproduct of steadfast relationships. Make no mistake, our alliance today is ironclad. I find it encouraging to draw upon our history and to see how our relationship continues to thrive today. For the last month Australian American forces as Roy alluded to conducted the Talisman Sabre exercise, an exercise that included 33,000 personnel and 21 ships including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, her strike group, the USS Bonhomme-Rachard and her expeditionary strike group and the Australian, New Zealand amphibious ready group. I actually just came from participating myself again as Roy mentioned as the command and control portion of the exercise in Brisbane. I was working alongside a US Army Lieutenant General, a Royal Australian Navy Rear Admiral, a US Air Force Major General, a Royal Australian Air Force Air Commodore and a US Marine Brigadier General. If Americans and Australia are two people separated by a common language I can tell you that that language barrier does not exist between our militaries. While the exercise was both realistic and challenging our combined joint forces displayed how smoothly we integrate and operate together. What struck me most is our ability to maneuver an impressive amount of combat power very quickly from sea to shore and around the operating area. That capability is critical and shows that we are ready to be where it matters, when it matters, with what matters within the region and indeed across the globe. With that in mind, multi-lateral exercises like Talisman Sabre help improve our ability to operate together demonstrating the responsible use of combat power to provide security for the sake of stability to enable prosperity. In doing so, we set by example that the combined application of accepted norms, standards, rules and laws is the best approach to counter forces of instability. Those forces of instability offer a false alternative focused on bilateral solutions for multi-lateral challenges, too often leveraging coercion and the use of force over discourse and dialogue. We never know where crisis may occur but it is our job to be prepared to respond. It is not lost on me that our shared history highlights that Australia's defense force has been deployed globally for over a century. Demonstrating a keen appreciation for how frictions originating well beyond our own shores can impinge on security conditions at home. That is a valuable perspective to have, especially with maritime nations and it helps widen the scope of things for us to consider when dealing with national, regional and global security issues. One of the most pressing maritime security challenges facing us in the Indo-Asia Pacific, in my mind, is the potential erosion of a rules-based international system. It is a system that emerged from the ashes of World War II, generated unprecedented levels of prosperity, lifted millions out of poverty and benefited so many nations over the past 70 years. Yet its continued acceptance is being challenged on several fronts by the very nations it most benefited. As U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue last month, quote, the international order is not imposed on individual nations, rather the order is based on principles that were embraced by nations, trying to create a better world and restore hope to all, end quote. Membership is not based on size, strength or wealth. All nations, large and small, have an opportunity to participate and reap the collective rewards of cooperation. Unfortunately, some choose to reject the accepted framework of norm standards, rules and laws that underpin the international system and the inclusive security network supporting it and instead pursue a more self-serving path. We have no clear example of the consequences of self-isolation and a desire to return to an earlier period where might makes right than that of North Korea. Satellite imagery underscores the contrast between a darkened North Korea and the bright lights of its prosperous neighbors. It's a stark comparison, but it emphasizes the positive impact of being a part of that rules-based international system. It is difficult for me to understand those that support such an approach from a national, regional and certainly global construct. Behavior of other nations seems to suggest that opportunistic approach that seeks to impose national laws in international space is not a model to embrace. In the South China Sea, for example, rather than use the mechanisms in place for resolving disputes or advancing national claims, there is an emerging alternative to the global order being offered that leverages national power to coerced neighbors to the reluctant acceptance of unilateral actions. Smaller nations facing a growing preponderance of military and paramilitary force just beyond their shores have little recourse but to acquiesce within such a system. The principle of unfettered access to the global commons at the heart of freedom of navigation discussions cuts across domains and disciplines as our maritime economies become increasingly intertwined. The concern of many in the region is that the imposition of restrictive national laws in international waters reflects parallel efforts to restrict access to diplomatic information, military and economic domains as well. This is why the role of navies is important beyond just the maritime. For decades, the U.S. Navy and our allies and the Royal Australian Navy have through global practice and observance of the international norm standards rules and laws reinforce the value of this critical principle. U.S. forces will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international laws allow and remain committed to protecting the rights, freedoms and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all countries. In a region dominated by the maritime environment, upholding the rules-based system and inclusive security network requires a constant reaffirmation by Indo-Asia Pacific nations and their naval forces. As a rule, when nations apply seapower professionally and responsibly, it broadens national and regional prosperity alike. When seapower is applied provocatively and opportunistically, friction results with great potential for spiraling instability. The region of the Indo-Asia Pacific has enjoyed great prosperity since the end of World War II and potential for continued and increasing prosperity yet remains. There is no doubt that nations who have embraced the international rules-based system have shared in that prosperity and will continue to do so. And there is also no doubt that navies that uphold the international rules-based system like the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy continue to do, they will remain essential to ensuring the security and stability that enables that prosperity. And with that, I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you. Please don't go away, Admiral. I think there's going to be a lot of interest generated, a lot of questions. I'm going to, I guess, take advantage of the prerogative of hosting the event, perhaps pose the first question to you, but then invite some more comments and questions from the audience. If you have a question, please do get my attention and indicate who you are when a microphone comes to you because we are on the record. Admiral, I think your remarks really encapsulated both the challenge and I think ways forward on a lot of the regional security issues that worry us. Those of us who've observed the, I guess, the Talisman Sabre exercise from afar this year have been struck, I'll be very direct about it, by the fact that China's taking some interest in the exercise on this occasion and there have been, I think, some pretty credible press reports about the presence of a Chinese surveillance vessel in Australia's EEZ, presumably not there to monitor yacht racing. I'm curious to know what your perspective is on that, whether you can leave some sort of comment, not only on that particular instance, but on the principle, if you like, that's at stake here. Thanks for that, Lori. Let me change the context of the question if I might have that liberty and take you back to RIMPAC, not the most recent RIMPAC, but the RIMPAC before, where we had a similar situation with a Chinese intelligence ship that was participating in the exercise, though, in a somewhat uncoordinated manner. So I think, and far be it for me to comment on something that is clearly an Australian governmental issue, so I'm going to put the perspective in another context and take it back to my comments that as we look at challenges across the region, we should focus on them not so much as challenges, but as opportunities. So I view this as a great opportunity to experience that we had in RIMPAC. So I apologize. I am not an expert on UNCLOS and the United Nations Law, the C document, but I am a student of it. And UNCLOS would suggest that in the RIMPAC perspective that these activities not only were entirely legal, but well within the prerogative of any nation. Those operations were being conducted in the United States EEZ. There are some expectations of those operations. My approach would be to ask the question of any foreign vessel operating in the United States EEZ is to ensure that those operations are military operations and not commercial operations. Because if there's commercial operations, there's a law enforcement factor that comes into play, and I would expect that the United States Coast Guard would visit that vessel to ensure that whatever commercial activities were taken were in compliance with international law. But safe to say on the RIMPAC example that we made the assumption that it was military-based operations and collections. The opportunity that creates is to increase the insights, increase the understanding of what's behind the action. And as I continue to interact with my Chinese colleagues, I've met several occasions with the South Sea Fleet Commanders, the East Sea Fleet Commanders, the North Sea Fleet Commander. I've met with the previous chief of the People's Liberation Army Navy and had met just recently with the new chief, although we had known each other in his previous roles. So it's an opportunity to engage in a dialogue directly with the Chinese to help understand the dichotomy in my mind is why is there a different rule set applied with respect to taking advantage of UNCLOS and other EEZs, but there's this perspective that there's a different rule set that applies within another nation's EEZ. It goes back to the rules-based order and an understanding of what that rules-based order and that understand that those rules apply broadly and regionally. It's how you gain consensus and where countries have different perspectives. So again, I look at it as an opportunity to engage and better understand the broader challenges and the perspective of those challenges from the various stakeholders within the region. Thank you for that. We'll take some questions from the floor. I know we've got media present as well as the interested public, so I'll try and spread the questions out a little, but I'll start with the gentleman in the middle of the back row. Please wait for the microphone and identify yourself. Good morning, Sir. Major Jarrah Thompson, Army Headquarters. I've seen a lot of commentary talking about referencing the context of a rising global power, the facilities track when you're going. And I'm just wondering what your thoughts are in terms of whether that example of the Polynesian War a couple of thousand years ago still holds any relevance today or whether people are probably reading too much into it? Yes. Next question. You are at a national security college, so it's the perfect question. So I think there's great value in using history as a guide to expanding the dialogue with respect to the challenges that we face. I do think it's important that we bookmark that discussion as originating from a historical perspective. There's a danger in there as well, so you can see where I'm going with the answer and you alluded to it, that history is not a template by which to judge what's happening today because the situation today is very different. I mean, I could spend 10 minutes talking about why it's so different. I mean, in my mind it starts with social media, the speed of information, the global economy that has second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth orders of effect of a decision made that it's very difficult for the decision maker to fully understand what those impacts are going to be over time. So I think the world that we live in perhaps overstated and stating the obvious is much more complicated today than then. But having said that, it goes to a common theme that I reinforce to my staff is that it's so easy to judge because it's so hard to understand and we need to broaden that dialogue to understand. As most people that ask me a question along this theme, it comes to how do you make space? How do you accommodate the changes in whatever the power centers are in any period? I mean, if you go back to the city's trap that you speak of, it was really a focus in my mind about the accommodations of centers of power as they changed. And that is absolutely applicable today. A common reference that I use is the global stage isn't getting any bigger. It is what it is. So the question is, as powers rise and fall on that stage and new powers step onto that stage, how do we accommodate their positions on that stage? Because room has to be made. And I think everyone would agree using China as the example. They are a global power, certainly from an economic perspective. And I would suggest we all would want to make space for them on that stage. The question is, what's the mechanism by which that space is created? Is it that standard of those international norms and standards that have governed that change in power? I mean, their origin was really at the end of World War II. And look at the approach that Japan took prior to that. And I think certainly the U.S. took a leadership role in establishing what those rules were at various conferences. It was a San Francisco conference in 1954 that worked through the process of establishing those rules here in the Pacific. But equally important is we established the institution for changing those rules, because those that were at that conference had the forethought to understand that the rules based that they were setting then may not be applied in the future. So it's equally important to focus on those institutions. And regardless of what your historical perspective is and what you may apply to better understand the challenges that we face today, that dialogue is critically important. But part of that dialogue needs to be focused on the mechanisms by which those ideas flow into that domain. And I think we've established institutions that are well suited to generate and support that dialogue. My concern is that one is the rules based approach is being challenged for an alternative. My question would be to fix what? And then the challenges to the institutions themselves is something that there should be a broader discussion on, I think. Thank you. We'll take some more questions. The gentleman in the middle. Thank you Admiral for coming to talk to us, especially at this time. In addition to the... Oh, please identify yourself. Pete Badness, I'm a visiting fellow in international relations. In addition to the structural situation of the so-called Thucydides trap, since the election of Donald Trump, it's true that we lived in extraordinary times. And at risk of being blunt, I would like to pose this question to you. If when you returned to your command next week, you were to receive an order from the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States, to make a nuclear attack on China, would you do it? So far these are yes and no answers. The answer would be yes. Every member of the U.S. military has sworn or oath to defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic and to obey the officers and the President of the United States as the Commander-in-Chief appointed over us. So this is core to the American democracy. And any time you have a military that is moving away from a focus and an allegiance to civilian control, then we really have significant problems. Thank you. That's an answer that of course worries us. And may I do one follow-up? That question rather than comment. Is this question one that is being discussed among military leaders in the United States at your level of command? So I really think it's a different question. The question is, what is the appropriate application of military power? And we live in the United States, I'm speaking as an American, we live in a democracy. And that discussion is a robust discussion that started when I first became aware of it and continues today. I referred to it in my prepared comments and that is the application of military power, which is core to I think to what your question is. But there's opportunity, this is an example of what Roy has teed up here. There's an opportunity to have this type of broad discussion with individuals of alternative views of other individuals to generate that dialogue. Thanks for the question. We've got a couple over here in this corner. We'll start with I think it's David Rowe and then the gentleman in front of him. Thanks Roy, David Rowe from the City Morning Herald and Age Newspapers Admiral. I know we're having a media roundtable in a couple of hours from now, so I risk of making you sick of the sight of me before we even start that. But I'm overriding it for you just to unpack a phrase that you used in your speech. In a region dominated by the maritime environment and holding the rules based order and inclusive security network requires constant reaffirmation by Indo-Asia Pacific nations and their naval forces. Can you define constant reaffirmation and what it would look like from Australia's point of view in particular? Well, I won't and I'll go back to the previous question. The most important thing that I do as a Pacific Fleet Commander is build relationships. The most important byproduct of that relationship is trust. It's also the most perishable element of any relationship. So if you're not constantly building trust, there's always this sense of is the commitment still there from an individual perspective. I think that's some of the challenges that were brought out in the previous question. So it's that it is very important and this is beyond the scope of any one country. It's very important that we continue to act and understand the value that's been brought by this rules based system. Because if we take it for granted, then we're in peril of headed down another path and end up in a place where our ability to take from a military perspective, my specialty is security but security for security's sake has little value. It's transitioning that security into stability and that occurs through actions and that actions is governed by that international rules based order. So people are concerned about how military power may be used. That's why it's so important that we continue to demonstrate that from a national perspective in an international construct, I would suggest here in the Pacific line is more of a regional construct so that we could show that connection between security and stability. And then it's up over to the whole of government. So when I talked about the importance of freedom and navigation, not just from a naval perspective, from the diplomatic information granted that it was a part of military and economic, that's the dime construct that needs to be across all of those domains. And the challenges in one domain need to be thought of in the context of what similar challenges bring in the other domains as well. So that's the security to stability piece. It's that connection between dime that connects the stability to prosperity. Because if nothing is done with stability, if you don't act on those opportunities, prosperity's not going to follow on. So it's a whole of government approach in my mind. This is not just the military piece and that's what I meant with everyone has an opportunity, not just here in the region, but broadly. And too often times I can't go anywhere without having a China-centric discussion. This is not a China-centric discussion. I mean, look at Europe and the challenges being faced in Europe with this recent discussion of a Chinese-Russian bilateral exercise in the Black Sea in my mind, entirely appropriate, well within the bounds of international rules. Look at, you talk about the U.S. election. Look at Brexit, look at other elections around the world. We are in a, if I had this discussion a year ago and someone were to ask me, I'm glad I didn't get asked this question, tell us where you think we'll be a year from now. I would have been so off the mark. So please don't ask that question. We're going to get to what's more important or what are the activities to take us to that destination that we all want to arrive at collectively. What are those actions that are required? Part of those actions are the re-affirmation of that rules-based order that has brought some great prosperity to the Indo-Asia Pacific. Let's take this question here and then I think I saw at the back of the room. Yes, please. Richard Sammons from the Department of International Relations here. Thanks Admiral for coming to this public forum. I was wondering if you would ask almost a semi-personal question. As I was very interested to read your biography, I saw that you served in operation Prane Mantis, which was the London in 1988 planning response to an Iranian provocation. The United States retaliated against Iranian oil platforms and indeed hit the Iranian naval forces quite hard. But perhaps most importantly, as soon as the point was made, U.S. forces were able to pull back and avoid any further escalation. I just wondered, this must have been a very formative experience in your naval career. I wonder if when you think about situations, say provocations in Iran and North Korea, would such an operation be possible today? Or would the risk of escalation just be too high? Yeah, so it's a great question. I go back to the first question as always. You put yourself at risk if you take a data point and try to extrapolate from that one data point what the destination is that you're arriving at that you want to arrive at and even the path that you'll take to get there. It's important that multiple data points be tied together. I thought where you were going to go with the question was how old I am. But the United States, I mentioned that Australia armed forces have been deployed globally for over a century now. From a United States perspective, I have been involved directly in combat operations since I was a young Lieutenant Commander, was that first experience. So I think it's important that we bring a collective perspective to the challenges that we face in the region. And to go back in history and suggest that works so well, and I'm not saying that it did. Over to the diplomats and leaders in government to make that assessment, perhaps historians. But it is difficult, if the assumption was that works so well, to lift that whole clock as a template and try to apply it someplace else because the dynamics invariably are very, very different. I will say that it was a formative event for me. It was the beginning of my thinking with respect to the use of military power. And the fact that military power should be used as an enabler to regain a condition of stability by which dialogue and diplomacy can take root. And I think that's what happened in that military operations. Issues had accelerated to the point that there was a sense that it was unable to have a dialogue otherwise, that the forces of instability certainly in the region needed to be reduced. I would argue that it was a measured approach. The oil rigs were attacked for strategic reasons. Those two ships that were attacked for strategic reasons, but no other naval forces were attacked for strategic reasons to not do that. I think that's the approach that needs to be taken, this broader approach, because I have so much value coming to forums like this. If I only talk to my military colleagues, then we're going to come up with military solutions. We need to expand across that whole dime, the diplomacy, the information, the military, and the economic to understand what tools are available to change the conditions that we find nationally and internationally unacceptable. Thank you for taking a question over here. Andrea Sornano, PhD candidate from National Security College. My question is a little bit more localized for Australia, but I would like to know the American perspective on it. In the negotiations for the establishing of the maritime border with Timor-Leste, what would be the ideal scenario for America that would stabilize that region? I'm really not qualified to speak specifically about that issue, but what I will say is it goes back to the comment that I made about the second, third, fourth, fifth order of consequences of a decision being made. And too often times will be making decisions based on a first order analysis and not that broader, deeper analysis. That's why I think institutions like this are so important, that there's this collective collection of individuals with disparate and differing views that come together to focus on collective challenges. And so you mentioned one. I'll go back to another point that I think I mentioned. It's been a very rich engagement over the last two days here in Canberra. I find myself repeating myself sometimes in the same event, which doesn't instill a sense of commitment to others that I'm speaking to. So I hope I'm not repeating myself here. I think it's actually the importance of relationship building, and that's what I do. So I've been to Timor-Leste on several occasions for that very reason to make sure that I have a better understanding broadly of what's going on in the region. And I know that there are tensions that are related there that certainly surround the local area. There's certainly Indonesian, Malaysian, Philippine, Australian, Timor-Leste obviously being there. So visiting all those countries and having the dialogue about those issues that some may feel are too sensitive. That's not what the first visit is for. The first visit is to develop an understanding of the individuals that you're dealing with. The second visit is about let's get to those consequential issues to have that discussion. So the toolbox that we're reaching into is a toolbox that's rich with opportunities. It's not just a military toolbox. It's a toolbox with those diplomatic, those information, those military, and those economic tools that are made available to resolve challenges such as the border issues that you raise. Thanks. We'll take one or two more. I'll have one question for the end if I have time. I think a gentleman right in the back row. Yes. Hi. My name is Yuhua Jun, a PhD student from school at CHL. I would like to ask a much more technical question about this as we have heard so many Chinese scholars and generals later in time that the PLA is capable of using DF-21 missiles to take down US aircraft carriers. So do you think they are capable of doing so? Absolutely. Yeah. So is Australia. So we need, it is a technical question, but it's not a productive approach to having a broader dialogue. Any country, I think a country's military should match its broader national power. And oftentimes that national power I categorize into two primary areas. One is its ability to influence the region or influence the world. That's the diplomatic side of it. And the other side is the economic side. And I think it's reflective of the scope, scale of the military here in Australia. So Australia has fulfilled a significant leadership role, not just in the region of Australia, but broadly, really around the world. And I think they have a military that matches that as well. Now when you have a military, we do focus on the technical and tactical eaches. And I certainly have great respect for the PLA. I know the PLAN better, so maybe I have more respect for the PLAN. That's why I spent so much time talking to the leaders of the People's Liberation Army Navy. I think that mill to mill engagement is richer than it's ever been in my military career. And I think having those dialogues is more important than getting into the tactical eaches of the capability of the Navy. The issue is how are you going to use that power for the benefit of the region? The power to increase stability and from stability to prosperity. We can take another question from the group. You seem to be flagging here, but I think we have a question here. Thank you. Hi, my name is Theresa from the Department of International Relations, and I'd like to ask whether there's any interactions between the actual Navy, swimming, walking the ports, or there's interactions with the Chinese, and whether that perhaps leads to agreements or some sort of bottom-up approach to water building? Yeah, I hadn't thought about that context, but it probably has led to the agreements that the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea began as, I want to say, a bilateral, but it was a focused effort between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN. And then it's much broader than that now. I mean, it really is a model that we use to bridge the communication gap that's created based on differences in language that really all Navy's in the region have embraced, and I suspect come back three years from now that it will have spread globally because the utility of it has such great value. I think that utility, the discussion initially at the higher levels was about the policy implications, but the utility of it was never a question. I think that came from the engagements that we have at the tactical level. I can tell you that my interactions with, from commander to commander, counterparts that meet each other at sea, it's somewhat unique from naval perspective. We're all sailors regardless of what flies from the fantail or what nation we swear allegiance to. The sea is a daunting environment to operate in. It's unforgiving, and there is an embrace code across all sailors that all sailors will respond to sailors in distress. And that generates a natural affinity for dialogue when we encounter one each other with each other at sea. My discussion with the South China Sea fleet, the East China Sea fleet, the North Sea fleet commander, the chief of Chinese Navy is very, very positive. We talk very frankly about consequential issues that our nations face together and what its implications are in the maritime environment. And I do think that the underpinning of those discussions is the relationship that happens on an everyday basis. The Pacific fleet will have conducted over a thousand ship days of operations just in the South China Sea. We conducted operations in the South China Sea with eight other nations just in the month of June. So this is a common area which we can come together to generate that dialogue. It doesn't need to be just in a form like this. It can be on the sea, and I'm happy to characterize as that's exactly what has happened. Admiral, it seems to be exercise season at the moment. Not just with Coliseum and Sabre of course, or as you know the Russians and Chinese in some far-fung places, but also the Malabar exercise was conducted recently, United States, India and Japan. Of course some voices in Australia have been interested in perhaps in future Australia playing a role there. It would be interesting to hear a little bit more from you on what you see as very, very candidly the purposes of exercises like this, perhaps using Malabar as an example if you like, both in a capability sense, but also in a political sense. Actually the characterization that you had is insightful. I think it captures well what the focus is with respect to exercise. There's always a capability piece. There's a readiness piece that is important as well, and there's a national piece to those exercises. I think Malabar, which we have just completed, is a great example. For those of you that may not be fully informed, there's actually two versions of Malabar. There's a Malabar that we exercise in the vicinity of India, and the next year we conduct Malabar in the vicinity of Japan. Malabar is a bilateral exercise still today between India and the United States, specifically from a naval perspective with Seventh Fleet. We have included the Japanese in the years that it is around India. That is a new development, but it's still a bilateral exercise with multilateral, certainly trilateral overtones to it. And then when we've exercised Malabar around Japan, we've always included the Japanese maritime self-defense force in that piece of the exercise series. There is an interest in Australia participating. I know that dialogue is ongoing. I'm a great supporter of Australia's participation. Certainly in the element of the exercise that occurs in the Indian Ocean, Australia clearly has interest there as well. But more important, it is the focus on multilateral engagements. So this idea of taking a bilateral approach to solving problems, I find it hard to find a problem that's truly bilateral in nature. Certainly in the maritime, there's almost always a multilateral element to it. And if you expand the discussion out to a global perspective, the parallels that we see here in the Indo-Asia Pacific are clear and sharp with respect to the challenges that are being faced elsewhere in the world. I mentioned Europe earlier, but it's certainly true in South America and Africa, other regions of the world, that multilateral element of exercising is something that I'm always striving to encourage and expand. Thank you, Admiral. We've got room for one or two more questions. I might go to Matt Sussex, our academic director for an hour. Thanks very much, Admiral. He doesn't need a microphone. No, I'm tempted to ask where you think he'll be next year, but I won't. I'd like to bring you back a little bit to rules-based order. And I think you had some quite thoughtful observations about people changing, they're thinking to be more accommodating. My question, I guess, is there room in the rules-based order for the Belt and Road Initiative? And what types of alterations in thinking do you think the major stakeholders might have to make? Yeah, so there absolutely is. I think there's room in the rules-based order for any concept that any individual or nation may support or may pro-offer. I think that the thing that's most important is that those proposals be brought forward to the stakeholders broadly, whether it's a regional issue or if it's a global issue, to have that discussion. So the One Belt, One Road Initiative, many in the region are embracing that. And I think part of that, the reason for that, is the dialogue that China has been expanding to include others in the road to help understand what is the plot, what's the impetus, what's the destination of the One Belt, One Road, one of the equities of those that would participate or choose not to participate in it. That's the level of dialogue to get to. But it's not, you know, I think one of the advantages is if there was a military approach that the One Belt, One Road Initiative was being forced on people from a military perspective, I don't think China would be nearly as successful as they have been with that approach compared to the approach that they've taken. Can I just, quick adjunct to that, Admiral, how do you see the Chinese security presence or military presence in Djibouti that gets reported down the media in light of China's interest and in light of the interests of other countries in the region? So I think that goes back to the broad point, I haven't used the word specifically, but it's transparency. So as I am, and I'll say gratefully, my good friend Admiral Donigan would take exception to that. But, you know, my first flight tour was as the deputy commander of Naval Forces Central Command. And since that tour, I've been in the Pacific since. And I'm grateful for that opportunity. I find the region, I find the challenges absolutely fascinating and so dynamic. I mean, just the example of going back a year and doing the reversion analysis of what is it that was missed that we couldn't do the predictive analysis that would have highlighted where we would end up today. I don't think it could be done because there are so many factors at play. But as I do have friends in the Middle East specific to that region, the question is to what end, but look, China has a global economy. They have significant economic interests in Africa. It doesn't surprise me that they would want a, I don't want to mischaracterize this, I'm not an expert, China may not be characterizing that as a base. By using that term, I don't mean it in that context, but certainly a place to support their military operations from. It's a long way from China. I would imagine it would be a logistics hub. It's the context in which that will be applied to it as we move forward in the future. I think that's where the dialogue drives to. And quite frankly, I don't think it's a military dialogue. It needs to be broadening across that whole of government approach. Those that have concerns from their perspective, bring it into that international forum, bring it into those institutions that have been established to support those kinds of dialogue and then have the discussion. I'm going to end with a yes or no question, because I know that you're good at those, Admiral. So we had one question on nuclear issues today, we're really putting a pretty stark hypothetical, but I'm going for a slightly different question, which is in two parts, do you think North Korea is serious about putting nuclear weapons on submarines, and is it wasting its money? I'll take that one out of the context of North Korea. I think the developing a submarine capability is a double-edged sword. I think I would use Australia as the example. We're not putting nukes on you, Admiral. I'm just talking about the submarine capability at the beginning, but I'm going to get to the new question in a minute. But I've got to give my friend Tim Barrett incredible praise for the strategic approach that he has taken to ensuring that the capability that Australia already had in Collins' class and how to modernize that capability with an understanding of what the national interests are of Australia, because ultimately that military power is used in the national interest of whatever country that military supports. To the specific of, and I'll characterize it as, submarine launch missiles, it is an incredible technical challenge. And any country that goes down that path to try to develop that capability should do it with a clear understanding that it is as much art as it is science. You just can't take a slide rule, take physics experts, engineering experts, and develop that capability out of whole cloth. There's a whole series of issues that come up. I'll go back to the question that was asked about civilian control of nuclear weapons. There needs to be very clear controls with any nation that possesses nuclear weapons as to what those controls are. And I think most of the dialogue that occurs in that nuclear realm, I'm certainly not an expert in it, goes to that sense of the veracity of those controls and the confidence of those that are adjacent to those nations. Are they confident that that commitment to those controls is in some ways the... So I'll leave you with that. You've been very generous with your thoughts and your time today. I think you're certainly familiar, and I think for many of us in the room, you've reaffirmed the view that not only do you bring a message of reassurance about the alliance and about the military relationship with Australia and the United States, but you're also being great insights as an military leader, as a security practitioner. But as a diplomat as well, I think it's a big diplomatic side to really what we see in your work that will stay with me for the rest of the day. I'm going to ask my colleagues in the room to join you now in thanking... APPLAUSE