 To continue our conversation around security, we have our second speaker who is Professor Tsarunas Lekish, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy at the Vytodis Magnus University in Lithuania. So, you're all set up. Thank you very much for your invitation. Thank you very much for the possibility to speak to this respected audience. And the topic, the Baltics as an EU grey zone in the Russian systemic narrative, I think is very important because in this audience when we try to make out of Nordic Baltic aid plus Ireland a subject out of, you know, in international law, at least in cooperation, etc., etc., we have the other actors which are trying to claim this space. And one of the main participants of this international rivalry is Russia. Right now we understand that the main priority, probably priority number one is Ukraine and Middle East, together with Syria. But the second priority and this you can hear in every international conference is Arctic. Okay, so this in a sense Nordic dimension. The Baltics actually though the Baltics are very often I mean drumming them about the Russian threat, but the Baltics probably are the third in priorities in terms of foreign policy and military buildup. However, the Baltics are important because they are kind of good case which demonstrates not only this balance of power which exists in the region and the Baltics are the case where we have this balance of power. We have much stronger potential on the eastern side is the Russians and we have much weaker potential in the West. However, we have the case also of competing narratives. Usually all strategic community when they speak about narratives they get into this historical stuff. I mean justification of, you know, certain claims, Russians are using it also extensively, we know the case of Crimea. However, when we speak about systemic narratives, systemic narratives are closely related to the place of the state and international system. In a sense, we speak about the past, present, and the future. And my talk is related to our big policy paper which was still in progress, you know, writing in the Institute for Policy Analysis, Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis, and here we try basically to connect communication science and political science and the international relations. And we basically say that systemic narratives cannot be understood in isolation from the identity and policy narratives that interact and intersect with them. Basically, when we speak about Russia, Russian projects and their systemic and strategic narrative seeks to reinforce Russia's global prestige and authority whilst promoting multilateral, legal and institutional constraints. On the other more powerful actors as a means to ensure that Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. And here I give some examples of, you know, let's say the basis on what we try to construct our argument. And though at the very beginning I just want to make a small remark, the minister, when he gave, you know, welcoming speech he spoke about, you know, let's say different age, but different age related closely and internet with technologies, et cetera, et cetera. But when we study narratives, we notice that majority of them people basically are able to operate only in the system of narratives, but not to have kind of inductive thinking based on facts and evidence. And deduction is the most what people are, you know, 90% of people in the street are capable of doing. I hope in our audience is very different, but these are the findings of psychologists and opinion researchers. But when we come back to the Russian claims and their systemic narratives, we should stress that they dispute fundamentally the set of rules, norms and institutions that govern the region, the regional order. The issue is that originally send the relationship of the rails and remains at the core of the broader dispute is the competition over, for example, Ukraine. Other states in between, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, at the same time, there is another layer of arguments and the whole very similar argument which is disputing the present status of the Baltic states, Finland, for example, Poland, all the central Europe. And these arguments are put forward with the arguments taken from international law. And basically, though the West and all other probably the countries of Nordic Baltic aid for sure, they largely understand international law and democracy to have universal normative and technical characteristics. However, when you listen to the Russian participants of numerous conferences, the papers presented, for example, with the RAN Corporation or this organization of security and cooperation in Europe, basically the Russian put the stress on plural civilizations and basically they undermine the possibility of a shared normative basis for institutions. However, there is a problem because in the West and very often, especially when we go to the West like France, Germany, the Russian effort is received most often as a universal list. While if you go down deep into the arguments, you see that this is actually a local Russian projection of its systemic narrative. And basically, the Russian narrative is based on power, on power argument. And I would claim that despite of the current fixation with this disinformation and Russian-led information warfare, and very often, I mean, we have all kinds of gatherings of strategic communities, stratcoms, you know, big effort on disinformation. When you look at the projects funded by all international organizations, disinformation is a kind of a core in all this. Russia has been very coherent in drawing on a security imaginary, which sets limits on how much scope for adaptation in Russia's narratives for international order there is. It doesn't want to surrender or to make concessions, arguing about power balance. Also, Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia's global precision authority whilst promoting multilateral, legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure that Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. And here, because we have only two minutes left, and here, basically, the strongest narratives are so-called influence narratives, influence narratives. And influence narratives basically claim that Russian sovereignty transcends into the other states. And the whole international order is predefined by agreements between superpowers. So if anybody is getting in like Trump in Syria, this is the situation which is favorable to Russia. Basically, what are the effects of all this? That while furthering Russia's goals, the narrative diminishes trust in NATO and US, encourages doubt in US motives in Europe and supports needs for kind of need for dialogue mantra. So the dialogue, if you look also at the international initiatives recently, at the UN, for example, which has a lot of initiatives related to the dialogue and trust building initiatives. Basically, this is which is going in the interest of the Russian stance. Another narrative there shortly, because we have only two minutes, basically, US and West destabilizes Eastern Europe. This is another narrative which is very strongly expressed. For example, when you look at the US withdrawing from INF, when it comes to supporting the sanctions on Russia, matter enlargement, et cetera, et cetera. So we can go during the discussion in details. Then there is, in short, to mention restoring security order narrative. Basically, European security orders in this area and West and Russia needs to return to the essential treatise. And the essential treatise may basically mean taking into account the Russian influence and their interest. Then another very interesting narrative is about defendability of the Baltic states. And basically, this kind of argument about defendability of one place or another place is very often used when it comes even, you know, to present Syria in a fierce, for example, if you look at what Russian arguments are regarding the Kurds, Turks, et cetera, et cetera. So defendability of the Baltic states and of the Nordic states is important as well. Basically, the claim is that most of the, I mean, potentially, the places for the Russian influence are non-defendable because of their geopolitical position. So the neutrals are also very often put in this position. I mean, if you try to read what Russians are writing, basically, the neutrals are because they are not defendable. Okay? So it's like to remember to the Nordics, you know, they're often when they are putting forward this neutrality argument. And because they are not defendable, you need extra force, you know, to defend them. And therefore, this is militarization of any of all these places, let's say Baltics, Nordics, et cetera, is detrimental for the internal affairs of the countries, slows down the economic development and encourages immigration or immigration, whatever argument is used. And basically, when we come to the conclusion what to do, the question is basically, I think that one of the main problems is to overcome cultural divide in EU, first at EU level, and then when we come to the Nordic Baltic dimension. But first, I mean, to overcome this cultural divide where very often everybody to the east, I mean, the new members of EU are seen somehow culturally and economically, civilizationally inept, closer to the Russian world. Okay, so it's like then it's the Russian arguments are usually met this kind of modest support. So I think the main thing is, you know, to increase cooperation, I think the Nordic Baltic format plus Ireland is a very good tool for that. I mean, in the future, I think it will create all kinds of additional possibilities to overcome this kind of militant Russian argument about the spheres of influence. Thank you very much.