 My name is George Perkovich. I'm a vice president for studies here at the Carnegie Endowment. And it's my great pleasure to welcome all of you and to be able to introduce our esteemed speakers today. The topic is the future of arms control. We are, like I say, honored to have speaking to us and with us in conversation today. President Mary Robinson, who's the chair of the Elders, about which I'll say a little bit more. She, as everyone knows, was the first, was the president of Ireland from 1990 to 1997, former High Commissioner of the UN for Human Rights and was an envoy of the UN for climate change from 2014 and 2015. There's a longer list of her great accomplishments in public service. She is an initial member of the Elders since it was founded in 2007. Similarly, Dr. Grove Brunlin, former Prime Minister of Norway, also has been with the Elders from the beginning in 2007. In addition to being Prime Minister of Norway, she served, of course, as the director general of the World Health Organization from 1998 to 2003. And she, too, was a UN special envoy for climate change, a position that probably will remain for decades, I suppose. They have been part of an Elders group that's produced a report they're going to talk about here today on the future of arms control and a proposal, especially for nuclear minimization, which they will detail. The Elders was an inspiration of Nelson Mandela and was founded in 2007. And it, as the name suggests, was animated by the idea that, as I get older, I think is ever wiser, although probably less popular, which is that people who have great experience and have wrestled for a long time with the world's most difficult problems might have some insights as to what is required to solve some of these most difficult problems. And that others might benefit by listening to their insights, not in the era of social media the way it usually goes. I think everybody wants to project from youth upward. But I think the idea behind it remains quite powerful. And I think we'll hear reasons why when President Robinson and Prime Minister Brunnen give their remarks. And so I'm going to get out of the way and welcome them to do that. We'll have a little bit of a conversation, and then we'll open it to a broader conversation. President Robinson. Good afternoon and thank you very much, George. And thank you to all at the Carnegie Endowment. For International Peace for arranging this lunch event and also giving both Drew Brunnen and myself the opportunity to speak to you. And then on the future of arms control, and then I hope we can have a thoughtful discussion. I was reminded when you were outlining the description of the elders that I now find that my husband, who has a good sense of humor, says, well, Mary's the elder. I'm just elderly. Anyway, it's fitting that we're meeting to discuss the future of nuclear arms control on this very day, the International Day, for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. An occasion in which we should all focus our minds on the threat posed by nuclear weapons. I know there are a lot of distractions at the moment here in Washington, but I'm glad that in this group we can have that focus. And let's take a moment to do just that. When the first atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, it made no distinction between civilians and combatants. Virtually all those within half a kilometer of the blast were instantly incinerated, boiled or crushed to death. Those who weren't immediately slaughtered died terrible deaths soon after from burns, wounds, and later radioactive sickness. Altogether, the bombs detonated over Hiroshima and three days after over Nagasaki, claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. So as we talk of deterrence and doctrine and nonproliferation, it's only right that we remind ourselves that there is a humanitarian and a moral bottom line behind those words, one of terrible, indiscriminate human suffering. The threat posed by nuclear weapons is one of the two great existential threats facing humanity today, the other being, of course, the climate emergency. The world is now closer to a nuclear catastrophe than at any time since the height of the Cold War. However, the seriousness of the threat, the scale and horror of a potential catastrophe, and discussion on what can be done to de-escalate the risk have been given, in our opinion, a shockingly low amount of consideration by political decision makers, by opinion formers, and by the public. This lack of attention allows failures to preserve agreements and build consensus on nonproliferation to go broadly unnoticed. There's an unraveling going on, and it's largely unnoticed and unchallenged. We've seen the termination of the INF, the collapse of the JCPOA, and real concerns over the future of New START, CTBC, BT, and even the Nonproliferation Treaty. Set against this lack of concern for the risk and apparent absence of political will to support the existing safeguards, the elders have developed a set of proposals that we believe could significantly contribute to increasing a global security and reducing the threat of nuclear catastrophe. My fellow elder, Gru Bruntland, will speak further about the details of what we propose, but I'll take a short while to elaborate on our concerns about the state of nuclear arms control. We believe that the recent breakdown of much of the arms control architecture and increasing uncertainty over remaining agreements risks fueling a new nuclear arms race and increases the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. The breakdown of the INF Treaty presents one such risk. Its termination in August removed all limitations on the ability of the US and Russia to develop intermediate range land-based missiles. This is an immediate concern not only for Europe, which may once more be within range of Russian intermediate range missiles, but also in Asia. We believe it would be very dangerous for the US to use the end of the INF Treaty to deploy intermediate range missiles in Asia, which could risk fueling an arms race involving China, India, and Pakistan in the worst case scenarios. There's an urgent need for good faith diplomatic efforts between the US and Russia to limit the fallout from the termination of the INF Treaty, including through exploring whether alternative agreements could be reached that might preserve some or all of the benefits derived under that treaty. Looking to the future, we see significant risk in the uncertainty around the prospects for the extension of New START. It would send a deeply negative message to the world if this crucial bilateral agreement between the US and Russia were allowed to expire in February 2021. After all, it's the sole surviving agreement between the two major nuclear states, and its collapse would not only eliminate the only remaining constraint on their nuclear arsenals, but would also remove the monitoring and inspection capabilities, which have provided both countries with unprecedented transparency over each other's stockpiles. As we understand it, the position of the Trump administration is to seek to bring China into an expanded version of New START. We agree with the general principle that bringing China into discussions on arms control is a good thing, and meaningful dialogue should be sought on issues such as transparency of nuclear stockpiles. But China's nuclear warhead count is only one 20th or so of the size of the US and Russian stockpile, and virtually none of these are actively deployed. It would therefore be nonsensical to try to integrate China into New START or any agreement remotely resembling it, and it would be foolish to make New START extension contingent on China's participation. Therefore, given the very limited time before the scheduled expiry of the New START in February 2021, we would urge the United States government to begin serious negotiations with Russia and seek to extend the treaty for a further five years. Whilst the stalling New START process represents a failure of crucial bilateral negotiations, we're also concerned to see the absence of progress on key multilateral agreements too. We note with alarm, for instance, reports that the Trump administration is considering revoking the US signature to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Although the CTBT has yet to enter into force, it has already contributed significantly to the establishment of global norms against the testing of nuclear weapons with the support of over 300 international facilities to detect and monitor nuclear detonations. Revoking the US signature to this treaty would send a worrying signal to the rest of the world that nuclear testing may no longer be an unconditionally illegal act and would undermine an essential tool for the monitoring of nuclear activity in DPRK and elsewhere in the world. The termination of the INF Treaty, the potential expiry of New START, and the uncertain future of the CTBT, put the world on, we believe, a perilous introductory of mistrust and miscalculation. This path reaches a significant fork in the road in April 2020 when the world, as you know, will meet to review the non-proliferation treaty, ratified by all of the permanent members of the Security Council, in addition to almost all UN member states. This is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Failure to negotiate negotiations, re-energize them at this juncture, would put at risk the near universal global commitment to non-proliferation and push some countries to seek their own nuclear weapons programs. Alternatively, seizing this moment to demonstrate continued commitment to disarmament could be the turning point in the other direction. So the elders call on the United States and all other nuclear states to take this opportunity to demonstrate renewed and unwavering support for both non-proliferation and disarmament, which they're, of course, legally obliged to do under the NPT. Next year, as you know, marks the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and of the birth of the nuclear age, founded in misery and unprecedented destructive power at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It will be a year full of significance for those who care about our world's ability to work together and who wish to overcome the divisions that have sadly become increasingly dominant in international political discourse. So we hope, as elders, that we can seize that moment to rejoin the paths together and ensure our world never witnesses such nuclear atrocities again. We are at a dangerous moment. We need to alert people. We need more discussion of this, and I'm delighted we're going to have it today. So thank you very much for this opportunity, and I hope we can have a very simulating discussion and I now hand over to my colleague and friend, Gru. Thank you so much. We are glad to be here and to be able to have this kind of discussion at this difficult time. As Mary just has said, of course, we see the nuclear threat as elders as one of the biggest threats to the future, together with climate change. Now, let us, as we have, Mary has already said, the international arms control architecture is at risk of collapsing, and the new nuclear arms race between the US and Russia may well have begun. The stakes could not be much higher. Let us briefly consider the scale of the risk we face. There are 14,000 nuclear warheads in existence today with a combined destructive capability of nearly 100,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. Over 90% of these are in the hands of the US and Russia. Worryingly, almost 4,000 remain, operationally deployed, and most disturbing of all, 2,000 are currently held on high alert status. That's 2,000 nuclear warheads, ready to be launched within a few minutes in the event of a perceived attack. Our view is simple. As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, it is inevitable that they will someday be used, whether by design, accident, or miscalculation. The only guarantee of the non-use of nuclear weapons is their complete abolition. Unfortunately, that is where the simplicity ends. The difficulty in crafting a fully enforceable global zero treaty means it is not politically realistic to expect the elimination of nuclear weapons anytime soon. That is why we believe that nuclear disarmament is most likely to be achieved through a practical step-by-step process which can secure buy-in from all governments, including the nuclear powers and their allies. We therefore advocate that the immediate medium-term objective should be to focus on minimization of nuclear weapons, but with total nuclear disarmament as the ultimate end goal. This is why the elders are proposing a minimization agenda that calls on all nuclear powers to take urgent first steps towards nuclear disarmament. This is made up of four key asks, our four Ds. The first is doctrine. Every nuclear state should make an unequivocal no first use declaration. The elders believe that all nuclear armed states should commit to a no first use policy, a formal declaration that they will never use nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack. Any nuclear state that does not feel ready to adopt no first use should at the very least make a declaration that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others. We understand that military strategists will always be wary of adopting positions that reduce their flexibility to respond to potential threats. However, the flexibility gained from a first use policy is largely illusory. The threat of first use is simply not credible. The moral cost and the global condemnation that would result from a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state would exceed any conceivable military benefit. To carry one out against a nuclear adversary would mean mutual national suicide. And yet by leaving open the possibility of a nuclear first strike, nuclear states force their potential adversaries to prepare for precisely that possibility, reducing trust and increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war. Second, it's our second of the four Ds, D-alerting. Almost all warheads should be taken off high alert status. With some 2000 US and Russian weapons remaining on a dangerously high state of alert, ready to be launched within minutes of receiving information or misinformation about an opponent's attack, the risk remains very high of nuclear war being triggered by accidental or unauthorized launches. The prospect of human or system error is an omnipresent reality. The risk compounded by the prospect of cyber sabotage of communication systems. The highest priority must therefore be given to taking as many weapons as possible off their high alert status. And third, deployment. Substantially reduce the one quarter of all nuclear warheads that are currently operationally deployed. Extension of the New START Treaty, which has reduced the number of each side's deployed strategic weapons, is a crucial next step. But the US and Russia should also increase their ambition and start working towards a new agreement that could implement substantially deeper cuts to deployed warhead numbers. So long as nuclear weapons exist, it is probably unavoidable that states will want to retain the monsterably survivable retaliatory forces with some weapons kept intact and usable at short notice. But in a world serious about moving to nuclear disarmament, it ought to be possible for the great majority of nuclear weapons to be not only most bold, but also partially dismantled. And finally, our point D4, decrease. Dramatically cut the number of nuclear weapons in existence from 14,000 to around 2,000. Such a decrease should be spread evenly between US and Russia, with both reducing to no more than 500 each, and no increase in the arsenals of other states. This is in line with a 2010 study by the US Air Force as to the minimum warhead numbers that could constitute an effective US deterrence. Now successful progress on these measures could also produce positive momentum, creating conditions under which total elimination of nuclear weapons could become a more realistic goal. Of course, the implementation of these measures would be far from a perfect solution. They would not get us to where most of us want to be, which is a nuclear weapons free world. But they would help to make the world a significantly safer place. The elders believe the challenges of achieving the final elimination of nuclear weapons are daunting, and will require a significant amount of political will. But this is not a reason to despair. The mall steps can be significant, and what seems unsinkable now is likely to be far more achievable in a decade's time if a minimization agenda like the one we proposed develops momentum. As the elders founder Nelson Mandela famously said, it always seems impossible until it is done. Thank you. Great. Thank you both. I have one comment and then just two questions and we'll turn it to the larger discussion. And my comment is a way of reinforcing the central argument about the value of focusing now on a minimization agenda. And how I would put it is that there's obviously the tension. So there's a moral argument that's reflected in the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and it's a moral argument that anything more than zero is wrong. It's immoral. And that can be a very powerful argument. But then as you note in the report, the greatest difficulties, the seemingly overwhelming difficulties of verification and enforcement are they grow exponentially as you go from the last 100 or the last 10 weapons to zero. That increment totally changes the verification and enforcement requirements. And that difficulty is then used by people who don't want to go anywhere lower to say, ah, you see, these people are full of what's impossible, we can't do it. And so there's that way in which the focus on zero actually keeps impede progress towards minimization. And so I think the way you all have articulated and the focus on minimization, I think is both, in my view, both correct but I think can be politically useful. So that was the opening comment. So then my questions relate to the 4Ds, doctrine de-alerting deployment and decreased numbers. And in each of them, it seems the primary focus actually is the U.S. and Russia. In other words, I mean, that's where the problems are, especially amongst the bigger nuclear power. It has a no first use doctrine. India has had one, there's a lot of question about that, but France and the UK don't really say what theirs are. But the U.S. and Russia, their forces are predicated on first use. So it really is kind of a U.S.-Russia problem. De-alerting similarly, clearly the U.S. and Russian forces are more on alert than others, both in terms of the percentage of those forces. Same with deployment and then the numbers, as you guys say. U.S. and Russia have, what is it, 92% of the arsenal. So a couple of questions. One, isn't it, if it's the case that this really is a U.S.-Russia problem for now, then politically how do you all look at getting traction in Russia and amongst the Russian leadership to pursue this agenda that you're talking about? Because we're having this meeting here. You'll have a bunch of other meetings in Washington. There are groups that work on these issues and it's a different environment in Russia. So I'd be curious kind of what your strategy is and what you're encountering and thinking about how to motivate Russian leaders to play along with this. Well, first of all, I'm glad that you support the idea of the minimization strategy for the reasons that you've given and that Gru also highlighted. Yes, it's true that this is primarily addressed as both to Russian and U.S. but it doesn't exclude the others but it is primarily. I was very struck and I think we discussed it at the time at the Munich Security Conference and since the lack of the real back channels the lack of discussion that's going on which is really very worrying. We met Foreign Minister Lavrov there and we tried to encourage more discussion. We have met President Putin. Gru was at a meeting with Putin with five other elders a little while ago. We're looking for a further meeting. We've had a meeting recently in China and we did raise the nuclear issue. So we are concerned about the lack of dialogue and in particular with the unraveling that's happening or the unstitching or whatever you might describe it. Gru, anything on that? No, the only thing I would add is that I mean the present complications illustrated by even the last two days here in Washington between the U.S. and Russia they cannot be everlasting. So I mean we are making policy positions and trying to work on issues that also they are short term important but also long term important. So hopefully a more normal relationship between the U.S. and Russia can re-establish itself. Hopefully as soon as possible. Well then let me turn to my second and last question because it can build on that. You talk in the report about the need for other states and obviously civil society to be involved. Obviously other nuclear weapons states because we want them to contribute to the minimization agenda but their references to other states including those non-nuclear weapons states who have been relatively active in this space. And so I guess one of the questions is how you as experienced figures but also then as an organization thinking about mobilizing other leaders from other states and what you think they can do to actually motivate U.S. and Russian leaders to embrace this agenda. You want to go first on that one? Well I certainly during the day we have been asked by people we have been meeting with where are the leaders that you see that could be most accessible and possible to move forward on our agenda. And I have to admit that you know Mary and I were looking at each other not convinced that we see so many of them. I mean you see people in non-nuclear states that could be but we really need someone from a nuclear state to be active in trying to move in this direction. So what we ended up with answering was well the closest is probably Macron. I mean the French position is at least he's a younger politician and I think you know he's one example that I would at least not exclude him from being a potential carrier of some messages of wisdom on this area. But then of course you have a non-nuclear state like Germany so also Angela Merkel I'm sure I'm sure I mean the two of them we would be hoping that at least you know that they could have some possibility to open up the questions because it's been too dead in many ways for a long time now the whole nuclear issue. Just to build a little on what Gru was saying I think what we see this policy paper as doing is kind of building a bridge between the nuclear powers none of which have got anywhere near the recent nuclear test ban treaty so that had a lot of signatures and we fear an even wider rift with the NPT review you know a sort of frustration and that's a real worry so I think you're right we need more dialogue but we need also to build a sense of how we engage the nuclear powers and we believe that this minimalist approach is the way to talk and get things moving and then build towards what we all want ultimately. I'm gonna open it up but one of the things that I most await in President Obama's memoir will be whether it's a chapter on nuclear issues or however he treats it but it's exactly this issue so in 2009 he made the POG speech and everybody applauded and then basically no other heads of state not from the nuclear weapons states from the non nuclear weapons states then kind of work with him and march with him and made this a big issue people just applauded and said great so the US wants it to happen let's move on to other things and you actually need that kind of mobilization that you're talking about not just from the weapons states but from the non weapons states so if Macron or another were to take that step then they would need others to buttress him right away and I think that's a real it's a real challenge let's open it up you know the drill you're already raising your hands when we call on you then please introduce yourself for the speakers know who you are Erin's bringing a microphone Erin why don't you start and Natalie is there why don't you start with the lady right next to you Erin and then we'll come up here thank you my name is Liz Kim I'm a reporter from Voice of America's Korean Service Ms. President and Ms. Prime Minister I wonder what both of you thought when North Korea's recent short missile range test drew almost none response from the United States I didn't quite hear she's wondering what North Korea's missile test drew almost no response from the United States and what message do you think that's well my understanding is that there's been much much more concern in Korea and in Japan about these and that they the sort of apparent lack of concern is really very worrying I mean it's clearly trying to politically downplay but actually these are real these are missiles which are landing and it's very serious Natalie right next to you on your left there thank you both for excellent presentations my name is Carlton Stoiber I'm the Director of Nuclear Security for the International Nuclear Law Association and the one thing that I did not hear mentioned in this presentation although it is mentioned briefly in your policy paper on page 11 then there are the risks of non-state terrorist groups getting their hands on ill-secured nuclear weapons or dangerous nuclear material the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the scattering of former Soviet nuclear facilities across several fragile newly independent states has led to heightened fears and so I wonder if you might say a few words about this aspect of the threat that terrorists or other non-state actors might use the presence of these nuclear weapons arsenals as a basis for very significant terrorism that would have huge implications well I think we agree with your assessment and that's why it is mentioned however given that there is quite a considerable awareness about the question you just raised and in the context of the two big powers that have nuclear weapons are not moving forward to make agreements at the big level of this issue I think we probably would say that our focus has been to try to move countries who are now inactive or even skeptical to move together to create more public goods in this area that that certainly has to be sold if we are going to see a world that is prepared on some reasonable level and methods to even address as much as we can the issue you just raised because it is really fundamentally a big threat and if we don't have governments working together across the world on the whole nuclear issue how are we going to deal with that threat? We'll work our way to the front Nancy and this gentleman here in the silver suit I'm Nancy Gallagher from the University of Maryland and I think that you've laid out an eminently sensible set of suggestions for forward progress for those people who support an incremental approach as opposed to immediately saying the goal is zero and that's that but similar things have been done before and I'm really interested in your thinking about both what would you be looking for particularly in the run up to the 2020 NPT conference and at the 2020 NPT conference in terms of actual commitments particularly from the United States and Russia to start making progress on this agenda and what types of leverage do you think that non-nuclear weapons states particularly who are allies of the United States or otherwise in a somewhat ambivalent position about US nuclear policy have to bring to bear? Yeah I mean that is part of our real concern as I say we want to try and bridge what is becoming an increasing divide of frustration with the nuclear powers for their failure to implement that important part of the nuclear the NPT and so you know I mean I think the review will be very important the 2015 review was sidelined as we know and by a particular issue there's an attempt to try and divert that issue but I mean what we feel is it's connected I mean if we don't have dialogue at the serious nuclear issue on these issues and agreements are beginning to unravel it doesn't bode well for the review of the NPT certainly we will be supportive of the large number of groups and Carnegie and others who are attempting to make sure that we have a better climate for that review but I do believe that non-nuclear states obviously have a strong role to play but they're getting increasingly frustrated because they've gone the step further and no nuclear country has in any way approached or bridged with them so there is a divide growing in this area as in others which is kind of regrettable I will add to this that when the nuclear ban treaty was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize a lot of difficult attention happened certainly in Oslo where the prize was being given by the Nobel Committee and we were all wondering what is our Prime Minister going to say now but also generally in other NATO countries of course so one important issue is part of your question I think is how do we open up some nuanced dialogue on these issues given that of course in many NATO countries and certainly in Norway there is a lot of skepticism about the present situation and that doesn't mean that Norway has signed up to the nuclear ban treaty because all the NATO countries decided not to do so it doesn't mean that there isn't a lot of attention and interest supporting the long term goal of that treaty so to open up for a discussion at a more reasonable level which can speak even to the nuclear powers and including our own allies is an important aspect I think of what we may be able to contribute to by this report that we have made this gentleman right here with the silver suit thank you so much, my name is Akbar I'm a former World Bank official first a note of thanks to distinguished ladies for their distinguished career and excellent proposal along with other elders my question is on your proposal is there a sequence when did you expect to accomplish these four days or even getting closer to those targets my second question is that two countries Pakistan and India recently showing jaws on the issue of Kashmir although both are signatories of non proliferation is there any way that elders could reach both countries to cool down on Kashmir, thank you maybe I'll take the easy first question but on the four days we launched this report at the Munich Security Conference we took it with us to China we talked with other, indeed with the Foreign Minister of Iran during the UNGA a couple of days ago, Ban Ki-moon and myself met with him we are very keen to sort of open up a very lively debate partly because of the review next year because of the need to energize a new start and all of that so we're not doing a special timing we've been asked to participate and indeed launch the doomsday clock in January we will use our powers of advocacy to try to alert the world to how serious the situation is and that we need to make progress and that this minimization agenda is the minimum progress that we need to make and we need to make it quickly because we're actually going backwards and we are facing a nuclear arms race which is really very serious well, Mary, if you think I can decide our priorities and our travel agendas whether we can do something serious between Pakistan and India but when we try to direct our own work our policy development and our decisions about where to focus and where we should spend our time we always think is this an area which is not being dealt with in a serious way or sufficiently already then maybe we should look and also do we think that an independent group like ours could make a difference to what is otherwise being done by others we are always looking at the efficiency because we are after all a small group with a small secretariat this is the kind of thinking that goes behind our decisions we don't have a plan at the moment to go to India and Pakistan but I have to tell you we have gone to India and tried to meet with President Modi also because we are pushing for universal health coverage because a country like India with its large population has a really not sufficient system of health coverage with people so there are several issues which lead us to want to speak with certain leaders that could make a difference but we met others and we didn't get access to President Modi to Prime Minister Modi so it's also a question where do you get access and we have gone we have been to Iran, we have been to China we have been to Russia at the highest level and by the way we haven't been to the highest level here not even not even before Trump India and Pakistan but they have bilateral day and night so it's not as easy but we would do it if we thought we could really make a difference this gentleman here now good afternoon and thank you for being here and welcome to the United States my name is Julian Kyle Lewis from the American University here in Washington following our most recent United States presidential election in 2016 the women's march here in Washington was the largest mass demonstration in the history of this country in the entire history it was the biggest so my question for you is a lot of young girls really grow up thinking you know that this is a man's world and as high as you make it in your career trajectory that there's always some guy or some group of guys telling you what you can do, what you can do, what you can and can't say and even if you're the president of Ireland or the prime minister of Norway there are still young people who don't respect that title as much as they should to feel that you have a voice of significance on a global scale on a very pertinent issue like nuclear policy so can you talk about how you were as young girls that grew you up today to become who you are and what you represent thank you very much that's actually more interesting than nuclear policy so I'm glad he asked I think I could begin and say that I grew up in the west of Ireland not in a political family both my parents were medical doctors as it happens two older than me and two younger than me and that was a good preparation for discerning myself and using my elbows etc but I felt always felt very lucky in my life in many ways to I came to the Harvard Law School after graduating in law from W. University Trinity College and it was a very special year 1967 to 68 so that's why I'm an elder and it was the year where the young American contemporaries were disputing an immoral war Martin Luther King was assassinated in April just after I graduated Robert Kennedy was assassinated and what I remember from that year and it stood with me in the future was that young people were actually taking action they were going into civil rights programs they were going into poverty programs in the south of this country they were talking about giving a leadership whereas in Ireland that I had come from and your turn didn't come until you were in your 40s or something so I stood for election the following year to the Irish Senate and got elected at the age of 25 and then just sort of went on from there but you never do it on your own you do it with a whole lot of other people I learned more about Mary now than on that part of Mary's life well you know I was the oldest of the children in my family and I think my parents they were both social democrats young idealists when they had their children in Norway where the labor movement was strong and the labor party was very strong so I grew up in a political family not like Mary but my father happened to be a doctor too but a politician so then I chose to be a medical doctor and strangely I went to Harvard like Mary I went to the Harvard School of Public Health when I was 25 or 24-25 one year an important year just a few years ahead of Mary and I then got exposed to occupational health pollution traffic congestion and a number of things that were already widespread in the US but were not problems in Norway at that time so for 10 years after my time at Harvard I knew what was coming and I was engaging more and more in the public health arena and on pollution and other issues that I had seen I knew they were coming so when I was asked to become prime environment minister all of a sudden which was unusual I was 35 and one day I was called to the prime minister's office will you please enter the government I had not campaigned I had not like Mary gone into an election circle but they saw there was this young woman belonging to the social democratic party who was active in public health issues and so from then from that day being placed at the cabinet table and leading a ministry I had been on my way to do what I can but like Mary you know we chose to stay on this not only in Norway or Ireland but certainly these are global issues and global concerns so we are now mother of sustainable development I'd love to call you that thank you for that question the lady right there yes thanks Natalie and then there's a gentleman here in the grey coat and a workaholic front and then back hi I'm Emily Newton from the British Embassy wow how do I follow that question bringing it back to nuclear with the advent of climate change and the realisation and the need for higher and higher energy demands how do we allow for people to use nuclear power atoms for peace how do we make it so that new states that want to use that new technology are able to do so without the potential for them to make nuclear weapons thank you very much it's a very interesting question and obviously nuclear energy doesn't add to the problem of the emissions but I'm not very hardline on this but from everything I've heard first of all it's extremely expensive secondly there are risks and also at the end of the time of the plant it's extremely expensive to demolish and there are some risks involved and we saw even risks from climate nature itself recently in Japan a terrible problem so given that solar and wind and other renewable energy is becoming cheaper and cheaper it does seem that it's a better way forward to go for the other renewable energy you know and certainly I don't think that Saudi Arabia needs nuclear energy at the moment I was part of KAUST the King Abdullah University for Science and Technology for a number of years Saudi Arabia at that time realized it had extremely good potential for solar it had great sun and it also had good sand and it was doing high level research buying in knowledge from the United States in particular everywhere and I now see the going solar they have no need for nuclear except perhaps a more dangerous need and that's very worrying what I want to do we're running out of time so if you can bring the microphone and we'll go around this table I'm favoring young people for the reason that I mentioned with the elder so ask the three questions in a row and then at least we'll have them on the table thank you so much and thank you very much for your presentations they're very inspiring my name is Angel and I'm with Phoenix TV my question is I also used to work in the United Nations and one of the questions that I have is we can always encourage we can always advocate but it's always hard to finally lead to the enforcement of all these kind of actions like how do you think we can finally lead to the state of the enforcement of decreasing in nuclear weapons thank you this gentleman and the woman next to you and then thank you hi, Chase Sunderine, a recent graduate of the Corbel School at the University of Denver so my question is primarily about nuclear weapons modernization and whether that fits into your 4D proposals I know that's a current issue of content with the MPT but with that modernization well decreasing the physical number comply with your overall goals to the ideas you've put forward hi, thank you for coming my name is Juliet, I'm from the U.S. Helsinki Commission and my question is more so about how tactical nuclear weapons play a role in your policy proposal these weapons are designed for battle rather than global destruction and even kind of push this idea that limited nuclear war is possible so I was wondering how because your proposal is very focused it seems to me anyways is focused on nuclear weapons that are meant for global catastrophe how it also proposes to handle nuclear weapons that are meant to be used on a limited scale three good questions maybe if you take the first one I'll take the second and third because I think they're very linked well, I mean it was how do you you can encourage and you can advocate and you can recommend working in the multilateral system working in the UN in different parts but the enforcement part is always a frustration because we don't have an in most areas we don't have an enforcement mechanism the only places we have that is where you have an agreement which is in enforced which is already agreed to ratified et cetera as an international instrument then you can have verification procedures you can have control mechanisms you can have a kind of accountability and this is what we need to be pushing for in more areas because unless we have accountability from leaders of countries then yes you can advocate you can inspire but we need also more of a global governance system which is developed by countries agreeing to a number of things and during my lifetime I have after all seen movements in good directions in this although in my own opinion it's not strong enough and we are far from it with regard to the nuclear issue for instance there is a way and we have to be pushing on I may be wrong but I felt that the question about the nuclear weapons modernization and the question of tactical nuclear weapons was really talking about these low yield weapons which we don't believe are at all in advance because any use of nuclear weapons is horrific and these low yield they are nuclear weapons from what I understand so we would hope that this would not be considered to be part of a modernization in quotes process I hope that answers the question but we we understand that this is something that's being discussed at the moment in congress and we are quite concerned about it I just just on both of those questions I mean it seems to me that one of the additional reasons why focusing practical energy now on minimization is useful is that you don't have to resolve those two issues so for example if somebody a French president said well we might just use as a demonstration shot if we were losing a major aggression and so you don't have to resolve that issue we were talking about if it's not totally catastrophic action when you're debating about minimization whereas when you're debating about zero then that comes up and similarly with modernization as long as you're going down and if they're switching systems it's less of a stumbling obstacle anyway thank you those were great questions so thanks everybody for coming and then please join me with the Prime Minister Berlin and President Robin thank you very much