 So, a key question here is, are we sure that the enormous rise of the global 1% was necessary for growth at the bottom? So, this is what we often hear, you know, in the trickle-down debates. Well, the answer is no. We're not sure at all. In fact, when we do a careful country-level analysis of growth and inequality trajectories, we see that it is fairly possible to combine higher growth and lower inequality. So, in order to discuss this, I will present two sets of regions that are broadly similar, that indeed have a lot of differences, but that are broadly similar in terms of size, of average income level, of exposure to global markets or of technology, so US versus Europe and India versus China over the same period. So, here we compare US on the left, Western Europe on the right, and in blue, you have the share of total income captured by the bottom 50%. In red, the share of income captured by the top 1%. In the case of Europe, in blue, same bottom 50% and top 1%. What is striking here is that at the start of the action, 1980, the two regions have more or less the same level of inequality. So, the top 1% capture about 20% of total income in both regions, and the bottom 50% about 20%. Over the course of time, you see a complete inversion of the relative positions of these two groups in the US, whereas in Europe, there is a rise in inequality, a rise of the top 1%, but it is much more moderate than in the USA. What happens in the US is pretty striking, because the bottom 50% had an average income of $16,000 in 1980, and they have an average income of close to $16,000 today. So, this stagnation is true before and after taxes, so before and after taxes and transfers. So, this explains the complete decrease, the sharp decrease of its share in total income. Now, let's look at China and India. So, again, relatively similar inequality levels in 1980, and trajectories that really differ from the middle of the period onwards, with China that's more able to moderate the rise of inequality than India, where we document a continued rise in inequality. And I will come back in a few slides on how we constructed this curve. So, often the arguments brought forward to increase the rise in inequality is globalization or its new technology. Well, when you compare EU and the USA, which have more or less the same exposure to global markets to new technology, in fact, this really highlights, this really stresses and points out the role of policy choices or lack of choices and of institutional changes in these countries, in particular in the US, and we discussed this in much more detail in the report, the sharp decrease in progressive taxation in taxation at the very top, very unequal access to education, to health, the importance of a falling minimum wage, the importance also of privatization policies in rich countries that didn't happen at the same rate. If we look at China versus India, well, that's another case where you see that higher growth is possible with lower inequality, so that's really the comparison between total growth rates. In China, 800% total growth rates a bit more, and in India a bit more than 200% total growth rate over the period, and the bottom grew much less in India than in China. One of the main reasons for that is not related to the kind of democratic regime you may or you may not have in one side or the other of the Himalayas, but really the important investment in education health infrastructure for the bottom 50% in China that really contributed to lift the bottom and the rest of the economy. Now, we note here that all countries accepted to meet the sustainable development goals in 2015. One of these goals is that the bottom 40% should grow faster than average, so here we show value of the bottom 50%, but it's similar for the bottom 40%. None of these regions that I discussed above actually met this goal, that the bottom 50% should grow faster than the average. One more on the Indian case, where we show that after historical decline from 1940 to the 1980s, income inequality has been increasing in India, and in our benchmark estimates, the top 1% captured 6% of total income in the mid-1980s. This has risen to 22% today, and the historical peak in 1938 was around 22% a bit lower in our benchmark estimate, so if anything, it is back to its historical level. But another striking fact here is that when you look again at all the growth generated in India since 1980, well, we show that the top 01% captured the same share of total growth than the bottom 50%, just a bit more. We hear in the news, and in fact the bottom 50% from 1950 to 2000, well, we see that they fare better in the post 2000 than before. That's not arguable, but what's also not arguable from this graph is that they fare much worse than the average, and much worse actually than the average is just half the rate of the average. So in India, is shining India a reality for the middle 40% of the population? So here we have the same graph, the full population at the top, and it's more or less the same for the middle 40%. They grow a bit better than the bottom 50%, but still much less than the average. So where really is shining India? So here we show the top 1% in red at the top of the graph, the top 10% in orange in between, and so this is where really you have these growth rates of national income above 6% per year on average when the average population is around 4% in the 2000. So let's compare again India, China, US, and here France rather than Europe. Here what we plot is the total income growth by percentile in these different countries, full population. So values are a bit different than before because we stop in 2014 here as the Indian data stops in 2014. So in other graphs when we stretch to 2016 we're making a very conservative assumption. Sorry, that is we assume that all income groups grow at the average rate. In effect we know that it's often rarely the case. In fact it's the top groups that grow faster than the rest. So again if anything our results are more on the lower bound than on the higher bound of the level of inequality and on the rise of inequality. What is very striking from this table is, well you can see by yourself a very sharp rise in the rate of growth as we go to the top of the distribution. Now at the very, very top, India performs better than China, but only at the very, very top. If you look at all of the groups, growth rates are much lower for the bottom 50%, the middle 40%, and even the top 10% in India. And this is what I was mentioning earlier, this very striking fact of near stagnation of income at the bottom of the distribution in the USA, which is indeed not unrelated to the election of the previous election. Now in the USA, now if we look at the share of growth captured by different groups, bottom 50% captured 11% of total growth, top 01%, 12% of total growth. So around the same share of total growth captured for the two groups. There will be three periods for inequality and growth in India to summarize very rapidly a complex set of events and of institutional changes. But rising inequality in the 20s and 40s with decreasing agricultural yield per capita, increasing large industrial output, which can explain this rising inequality aside with institutional changes, which favored the influence of an economic elite. On top of the colonial elite, 40s to 80s, decreasing inequality, but also low growth, nationalizations, sectoral regulations, high tax progressivity up to more than 95% top marginal income tax rates. And 80s to now, relatively high growth that is lower than India and actually low for the bottom 50% with the set of policy that you know. So what we argue here is that China in India is arguably a top 10%, even more top 1%, even more top 01% phenomenon. Third part of the report, we argue that this distinction between private and public capital is essential for the determination of the level of inequality in the country. And we document this sharp reduction in public capital over the past, sorry, of the past 80 years in rich and emerging countries. And indeed public capital is defined by the sum of public assets, whether physical assets like schools, like hospitals, like transportation infrastructures, plus financial assets held by governments minus the depths of governments. And private capital is the sum of financial and non-financial assets of the private sector minus the depths of the private sector. The sum of private and public capital make up national capital or national wealth. Here we use the two terms as synonyms. We show very large transfers of public to private capital, again with varying trajectories across countries, but there's more homogeneity in these transfers in the rich world than for the income trajectories. And what we say here is that the rise of private capital is in itself not necessarily a bad thing, but it raises new questions on the distribution, the role of taxation, the role of inherited wealth, because indeed private capital by nature is more concentrated, tends to more concentration and to self-accumulation. So this is perhaps one of the most, one of the most or second most important graph in this report where we show the value of private capital in rich countries and the value of public capital in rich countries expressed as a percentage of national income. So about 300% of national income for private capital in France or in Japan in 1970, so this means three years of national income as private capital in these countries at the start of the period, and this rises up to 500%. So a very sharp rise in private capital in the context of a very sharp decline of public capital, about 70% of national income in most countries represented here close to zero and even below zero in some countries. So what does below zero mean? Well, it means that if you were to sell all your schools, all your hospitals, all your public infrastructures, all your financial assets, you would not even be able to repay your debts. And then as a government, you would have, or as a citizen, you would have to pay a rent to the new owners of schools, of hospitals, really not a future that many citizens in many countries would want to live in, but this is the kind of trajectory that we're seeing. Indeed, this decrease is due to two important factors, first privatization, second the rise of public debt. Now if you look at China and Russia, well, this is private capital and you see that, well, they have been catching up very rapidly with the level of private wealth. So what is striking here is the speed of this catch-up in a few decades. And now let me express, that's again public capital, but we express it in a different way, so not as a percentage of national income, rather as the share of total capital. So here 70% of public capital in China in 78, so the rest is by definition private. So it decreases from 70% to 30%, which is approximately the level of the share of public capital that was observed in rich countries during the mixed, so-called mixed economy period. So it seems that China is stabilizing at this level, so indeed no one knows what is the future evolution, but clearly this puts the Chinese government in a much easier situation to invest in a lot of important sectors than rich countries, where you here see again minus zero values. You see a similar trajectory for Russia, we do not yet have the estimates for India, we're currently constructing them, but the trend would be most likely similar in India. To conclude, there's a series of policy discussions that we touch on in the report. Again, our aim is not to close the debate, but rather to open it, so to provide this amount of information to different individuals, different stakeholders that can then engage in national debates. And finally, the interest of comparing these countries in this world inequality report really has been to highlight the importance of different types of policies that can be implemented to tackle inequality, whether wealth inequality or income inequality, and to generate more equitable growth pathways.