 and to have the additional support of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea for today's event. This is a rare gathering of the stars, a constellation of current and former ambassadors that's really unreproducible. We'd have to have some kind of occasion where we're presenting large checks to get so many great people to come at one time. But here they're all brought together by their dedication to the United States Republic of Korea relationship and we're really fortunate to have them here with us. I'll make separate introductions and as we go forward in the program, we're gonna start with the prepared remarks and an introduction to those prepared remarks and then we'll have a conversation about the implications for Korean-American relations among the panel and then open it to the floor for questions at a later point. But my job immediately is to ask my good friend and the current ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States, Anho Yong to come up and make an introduction of our principal speaker today. Please. Good afternoon. You're not so back? Good afternoon. Thank you. I'm just checking if there is anybody sleeping. Nobody? Are you sure? Nobody's sleeping? Well, Dr. Park, thank you so much. It's such a privilege to come here and then speak in front of the audience at the Carnegie Endowment. And well, as a matter of fact, I was wondering if I could take advantage of this opportunity. Well, I'm really honored, Mr. Lembert. I didn't know you in the audience. Mr. Lembert, of course, is the director for Korea Desk at the Department of State. I was just wondering if I could say a few words about 1990s, that's 25 years ago. And then there are several reasons why I want to speak about 1990s. And then one of them is, this is something which Dr. Park has already mentioned, which is the stars dating from early 1990s. And then I have to say, I, in fact, was not a star back in 1990. I was just preparing if I could rise up to the stardom. And I'm not sure if I made it, but at the same time, in 1990 I was a very young diplomat who was working for the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. And at the time, I had a big boss to report to. That's Ambassador Choi Young-jin, who in fact served as an ambassador in Washington, D.C., just ahead of me. So he was my big boss at the time as a counselor for the Korean Embassy. And then, during the same time, precisely the same time, I have a bigger boss. That's Ambassador Hyun Hong-joo, who is here with us today. And then at the time, Ambassador Hyun used to be Korean ambassador to Washington, D.C. And I had even bigger boss. That's Minister Han Seung-joo, who in fact used to be the foreign minister back in 1990s. And then later in his career, then he came to Washington as an ambassador in 2003. So that's Ambassador Han Seung-joo. And that's not all. We, in fact, had a very important collaborator for each and every one of us, which was Dr. Park. And then Dr. Park, at the time, used to be the senior director for Asia at the White House. So I was just wondering, somehow all those big stars, big actors from the time, except me, somehow they are all together at the Karnik environment. So that is my number one reason why I wanted to say a few was about the 1990s, but there is a second reason. And then the second reason is, of course, I don't have to remind you. 1990s, it in fact was a time of great transition in international politics, 1990. And then the world was emerging from the cold wall and provided a very new environment for Korean foreign policy, both opportunities and challenges. And one of the things we tried to do at the time in our 1990s, it was to extend our diplomatic relationship with former communist countries, which at the time we used to call North politic. That's how we usually called our broad policy to extend our relationship, diplomatic relationship with former socialist communist countries. We used to call it North politic. And then we, in fact, were making very good progress in pursuing North politic. So in 1990, beginning from 1989 over to 1990, we in fact could establish diplomatic relations with almost all of them, which in fact was done even with the Soviet Union in September, 1998. And in 1991, Korea joined the United Nations, which I think was the culmination of Korea's North politic. That in fact was the highest point of Korea's North politic in 1990. And at the time, of course, we had many important architects for Korea's accession to the United Nations. And one of the chief architects used to be Ambassador Hyun Hong-joo, because he came to Washington as an ambassador in 1991. Before 1991 in 1990, Ambassador Hyun used to be our ambassador to the United Nations. And then I still remember one of the old ad pieces Ambassador Hyun wrote at the time. I wonder if Ambassador Hyun still remembers the old ad piece, the title. I remember the title. The title was May Korea Take a Seat. Am I right? May Korea Take a Seat. That in fact was the title of the old ad piece, which Ambassador Hyun wrote for the New York Times at the time. And then of course, seat in that old ad piece. It was not seat at the dining table. It was seat at the United Nations. So that in fact was, well, achievements made by Ambassador Hyun at the time in 1991. Then I have to say Dr. Park was another very important architect of Korea's plan, Korea's project to join the United Nations. Why? Because as I already told you, Dr. Park used to be senior advisor for Asia at the NSC. Think about it. It was in 1991 that Korea joined the United Nations. Within less than 20 years time, then Korean national proud son of Korea, Ban Ki-moon, he was elected as secretary general of the United Nations. So that's what happened in 1991. 1992, almost the last former communist country with which Korea established diplomatic relations. It was, of course, China. And after 25 years, then of course China is the largest trading partner for Korea. So that's what happened in early 1990s. And then there is the reason why with all these important actors dating from early 1990s, I didn't plan it. I just thought about all these gentlemen being assembled at one single place. Then I didn't plan it. All these memories came back in my mind. So that's the reason why I said myself, today I should be saying a few words about 1990s. But that's not all. There is third reason why I wanted to speak about 1990s. It is because I told you about 1990s, the time of great transition. But at the same time, I just thought about it in the sense that, well, of course, there have been enormous changes taking place in Korea's foreign policy. But there is something, one thing, which, in fact, has not changed at all. There is the strength of alliance between Korea and United States. I came to this town as an ambassador in 2013. And I said to myself, it was my good fortune that I came to Washington as an ambassador in 2013. Why? Because it turned out to be the 60th anniversary of armistice of the Korean War, which was concluded in July, 1953. The reason why we, 1953 means so much for Korea is not only because of the armistice, but more importantly because of mutual security treaty between Korea and United States, which was concluded in October, 1953. That year, in July 2013, we had 60th anniversary commemoration on the moor in Washington, DC. And then that commemoration lasted almost three hours. President Obama stayed in the commemoration during all that time for three hours. So he provided an ample time for me to think about the subject, which is what is the meaning of mutual security treaty between Korea and United States? And then, well, I thought about what drove, in the first place, what drove the conclusion mutual security treaty? And what explains the strength of the treaty after 60 years? And I thought about one common vision we share between Korea and United States. But it's that there is our devotion to a value, very fundamental value we, in fact, share so dearly that is human dignity, protection and promotion of human dignity. And that is something we share with the United States. And that's what I thought on that day, in the morning of July 27th, that, in fact, the common vision we share between Korea and the United States, that, in fact, would be one of the explanations of these mutual security treaties being so strong after 60 years. But at the same time, it is not the only explanation. There would be many other explanations in the sense that we, in fact, after 60 years, and then 60 years before, during all those years of 60 years, then, of course, we appreciated each other as a partner, as an indispensable partner. That would be another explanation. And at the same time, we were more than ready to take best advantage of this mutual security treaty. For us, it is not something we just sign and then put it into the archive. That, in fact, is a living document for us. And then at every opportunity we have, we try to take best advantage of it. And then that, in fact, has been a living document which continued to renew itself through all those 60 years. That, in fact, would be another explanation for this Korea-U.S. Security Alliance being so strong after 60 years. But most importantly, I think it is because of citizens of Korea and citizens of the United States who appreciate each other, for which would be the best explanation for this mutual security treaty being so strong after 60 years. And then what is the evidence of that? Korean citizens and American citizens appreciating this bilateral relationship. What is the evidence of that? Look at you. On such a warm muggy day, you are here. You turned out in such large numbers, including Mr. Lambert. So thank you so much for being here. And that, in fact, the fact that we are here this afternoon and then the fact that I see all of you here this afternoon, I think it is, well, just the beginning of the reason why I feel so confident. I feel so proud about the 60 years of mutual security treaty between Korea and the United States. But at the same time, more importantly, I feel so confident that we, in fact, after one of the 60 years, would be able to look back upon one of the 20 years of Korea-U.S. mutual security treaty. And then with that, let me try to introduce Minister Han Seung-joo, who, as I already told you, used to be my big, big boss back in the 90s. And then without further ado, please, please welcome Minister Han Seung-joo. Thank you very much. I would like to thank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for giving me the opportunity to speak today. I hope to keep my remarks brief, but to cover some important developments that have occurred recently. Three things happened on the way to the forum, so to speak. Not funny, but serious things, and not a Roman forum, but this Carnegie forum. But three things are, one, a deal made two weeks ago between Seoul and Pyongyang that ended a 10-3-week military standoff between the two Koreas. Two, President Park Geun-hye's visit to Beijing earlier this month to attend the Second World War Victory Day celebration and a military parade. And three, President Park Geun-hye's recently relatively positive assessment of Prime Minister Abe's statement on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. I will address the significance of these events in my remarks today because they have a direct bearing on the ROK-U.S. alliance. First, the six-point agreement reached between Seoul and Pyongyang after 20 days of military confrontation prevented the two sides from heading into a direct conflict. But in the end, the crisis that lasted for 20 days and the deal that helped to resolve the tensions had a silver lining. The North Korean blustering helped to remind South Koreans, young and old, in an emphatic way that the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States is crucial to the continuing peace and security of Korea. The United States moved promptly and decisively in support of South Korea with both assuring words and credible actions. It was a classic case of speaking softly and carrying a big stick. It led North Korea to back down and propose a high-level dialogue with South Korea. It turned out that the North Korean blustering was a preparation, a prelude for retreat. Whether the North Koreans intended it or not, the crisis precipitated by the planting of the landmines near a Korean-South Korean base eventually led to a breaking of the ice between the two Koreas. Relations between North and South have been frozen and deadlocked for years. However, after this incident, the two sides agreed to hold talks to discuss inter-Korean relations on multiple fronts, including the pursuit of business, cooperation, and civilian exchanges. They even agreed to restart talks that deal with the reunion of families separated by the Korean War. Even though we cannot be sure that North Korea will abide by the agreement and refrain from future provocations, the crisis has served to reiterate the resoluteness and formidable power of the alliance and allies. It helped South Koreans to have more faith in the ROK-US alliance, and the response of these two partners sent a strong signal to North Korea. The allies also obtained some valuable information when North Korea exposed its war plans and capabilities in the course of carrying out its quasi-war preparations. This crucial knowledge will facilitate the refining and upgrading of what is known as our plan, the operational plan, our war plan of the allies, to counter a possible North Korean invasion. The second event, President Park's attendance of the Chinese Victory Celebration for the end of World War II, which took place last week, is not worthy in that the decision was made after much thought and deliberation. South Korea faces a growing challenge to balance and manage its relations with the United States. It's only formal ally in the world, and China, a country it calls a strategic partner. South Korea faced a serious dilemma or whether President Park Gun-hee should attend the Chinese Victory Celebration, especially the military parade. Since Beijing let it be known that it utterly hoped that President Park would accept the invitation, the United States government, even as it was publicly declaring that it would respect the sovereign decision of the Korean government on this matter, seemed to be less than enthusiastic about Park's acceptance of the invitation. During the event, the landmine crisis helped to confirm the unbreakable solidarity between the two allies. And after close consultations between the two governments, Park was able to accept the Chinese invitation without being concerned that it might give Beijing a wrong signal about the health of the Korea-U.S. alliance. If and when South Korea decides to have the THAAD missile deployed in Korea, for example, Park's September visit to Beijing will prove to be quite useful for persuading Chinese leaders that Korea intends no harm to China. The reason that President Park's Beijing visit has taken on such significance is because there is growing rivalry and competition for dominance between China and the United States. Beijing is increasingly seeking to change certain elements of the international order, basically to undermine the territorial status quo and challenge the predominance of the United States in the region that has existed since World War II. This often leaves South Korea caught in the middle. By taking a less confrontational approach toward China, Korea is often seen as hedging between China and the United States. Korea's stance is especially compared with Japan's position because Tokyo tends to be much more explicit on issues such as the South China Sea. On that issue, what a country does, such as Korea helping the Philippines to shore up its maritime defense by providing ships and planes, for example, is as important as, if not more than what one says. But one must understand that there are several reasons for South Korea's policy. First, as a divided country facing the North Korean threat and as a nation continuing to aspire for eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea regards cooperation with China as critically important. Second, South Korea wishes to find the most effective and pragmatic way to deal with the Chinese challenge without weakening the ROK-US alliance. At the same time, South Korea does not want to unnecessarily and excessively antagonize Beijing. Third, because of the enormous economic interdependence between China and the United States and South Korea, Seoul is much more sensitive to maintaining good relations, economic relations in particular with China than, for example, Tokyo is. Finally, South Korea believes that the best way to maintain peace, harmony, and cooperation in the region is to pursue common ground and interests rather than confrontation and harsh rhetoric. As China's power increases, South Korea's dilemma between Washington and Beijing is likely to deepen, but it is hoped that through consistent dialogue and greater efforts to understand each other's position, the ROK-US alliance will overcome any major challenges. The third event, Prime Minister Abe's less than fully satisfactory statement and President Park's acknowledgement of positive elements in it, bears hope that the strange relationship between Korea and Japan has now reached the bottom ebb and may start improving. Close neighbors across the straight, Korea straight, the two countries throughout history have had a checkered relationship of cooperation and conflict. 70 years after the end of World War II and after Korean liberation from 35 years of harsh Japanese colonial rule, the two countries have yet to completely throw off the shackles of the past and move beyond the legacy of history. The Japanese complain that Korea is never satisfied with Japanese apologies and keep moving the goalpost for final resolution of the dispute. Koreans complain that Japanese apologies are never sincere or sufficient and that current Japanese leaders are trying to undermine past apologies. From the U.S.'s standpoint, quarrels between these two Asian allies are a vexing problem, adversely affecting cooperation, not only between Korea and Japan but also among the three countries, including the United States. It also tends to make Korea and China strange betvillows, both of whom have unsettled grievances toward Japan. It has been 50 years since Korea and Japan normalized their diplomatic relations. There now seems to be fatigue with lack of improvement in their bilateral relations in both Korea and Japan, a factor which seems to allow some political breathing room to deal with each other. The situation both requires and permits Korean leaders to be more courageous and broad-minded and to have a more magnanimous frame of mind in dealing with the past as well as pursuing future relations. Japanese leaders need to undertake a more sincere and deeper reflection of the past and act on the basis of what is really in the best interest of Japan's present and future. It is hoped that President Park's remarks on Prime Minister Abe's speech signal the beginning of a thaw in Korea-Japan relations, improved Korea-Japan relations will bring about greater peace and security and will further cooperation between the allies and the region. What do these recent events and the current situation say about the future of Korea-U.S. alliance? Regarding the rationale of the alliance, from the U.S.'s point of view, it has evolved from countering Soviet expansionism and maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula to securing and maintaining a forward-based in Asia, protecting Japan, and now being an important element of its rebalancing to Asia policy. For Korea, the main rationale of the alliance was to deter another North Korean attack and secure the U.S. assistance and support in South Korea's national development. Today, South Korea needs the alliance not only to deal with the North Korean threat of the conventional kind and WMDs, but also to achieve the aspired eventual unification of Korea. The alliance with the United States has also become essential to Korea on navigating the turbulent waters of international relations in Northeast Asia and dealing with its powerful and ambitious neighbors, including China, Russia, and Japan. Fortunately, there is a growing recognition and acceptance of the crucial importance of the alliance with the United States within South Korea, especially among the younger generations. As the alliance evolves from a basically military defense arrangement to a global, strategic, and comprehensive alliance, it does and will serve as an essential element in dealing with the shifting power balance in Northeast Asia, maintaining peace, stability, and economic viability in the region, and addressing global problems, not only in military security, but also in economy, environment, nuclear safety, development, cooperation, energy, and cyber and terrorism threats are in the vital interest of both countries. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Minister Han, for those sober and deep remarks about the structure of our relationship. We'll now invite the panelists to come up to the stage to elaborate, repudiate, and otherwise comment on what you just had to say. Please, Ambassador Heun. Yes. Over here, please. Ambassador Chae, and I just want to sit here. Okay. You get one more. Ambassador Anho-Yong has given an introduction to all the former ambassadors and ministers here, but none of us has said anything about the man on my left, Evans Revere, who deserves proper attention as an American who has served his country as a diplomat and policymaker on the Korean Peninsula and other subjects as well. I remember memorably meeting you as Deputy Chief of Mission in New Zealand, among other places, but his real contribution that sort of stands out has been on Korean-American relations, and we always turn to Evans for real insight and practical experience. He, at one point in his career, held the position of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, which meant that he was the person doing all the work. There was a famous former American diplomat, Marshall Green, who said that an ambassador is a man. In those days, it was gender-specific. It's changed. Ambassador is a man who goes about with a worried look on his deputy's face. Evans was that. Amen. Evans was that. By prearrangement, we've agreed that Ambassador Hewn will be the first to offer some remarks, and then we'll move on to Ambassador Chae. Thank you, Dr. Powell. It is really good to be back to Carnegie after many years. When I was in Washington, it was days of more Abramavis and few others who were really stars in that period. I come to the old building of Carnegie many, many times to meet with them. Most of the looking back in the past has been done by Ambassador Hewn. So I do not want to repeat what he said. And it was a great period, 1990. And the only thing I want to say is, because we fully got the conviction that the United States is behind us in our own politics and whatever we do, even in domestic politics, we were able to achieve that without much hesitation. So whatever we did in those periods, I think largely due to what United States does through some senior members who are represented here who gave all their support and wisdom. I do not want to repeat their name, but my personal thanks goes to you all. Thank you very much. Well, Ambassador Dr. Han Seung-ju's remark earlier covers almost everything. And the remark is as usual insightful and timely and no one can really beat. And in my case, I have nothing to add or subtract from what he said earlier in his remarks. But maybe he intentionally did that, but he left one subject on mention during his statement and that is in my view TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership. As you know, the TPP was launched with great hope and particularly when President Obama impressively used these political assets to persuade reluctant Congress to pass TPA, we had a great hope that it would get passed. Korea, of course, is another negotiating member at the time, but we expressly told to the audience into the states in the government that we want to be in, but we are told not now, wait few more months, that's all, anyway. So we are waiting patiently to see that happen. As everyone knows in this room, policy making is basically choice. There are many choices before the decision makers and what make any particular subject, priority one is whether it has urgency or does involve magnitude of interest. So in my view, TPP is exactly the kind of subject which we think should be the top priority in the agenda for both the United States and to some extent to Korea because Korea has some part of that to make it a success. During these years throughout the world, we see some dangerous trend and that is back to nationalism, back to protectionism. As you may watch in many of the jurisdiction, the decision makers of the government try to protect the industry at the expense of global rules and they become very aggressive in implementing what they think their law in a very aggressively but unfair way. What they do is having new interpretation of laws and regulations and just ignoring the existing precedent and the practices and to whatever we say, we don't care about, we should go ahead. That is the kind of attitude we are seeing these days. Tax authorities, customer authorities are doing that and competition authorities are simply trying to do whatever we can to protect their national champions. We see one country present very prominently but I do see some tendency in other countries in Asia and others and even in the case of United States, someone says. And it is very dangerous unless we stop this trend and what is going to happen that many of the countries who believed in global rules and the fair game rules initiated by the United States will be fairly disappointed and then we're going back to the old days of you know, you know, practitioners prevailing and ending up as a slow growth continuously and the national boundaries getting higher and higher and all the countries are doing whatever you can say about the beggar died neighbor policy. So it is a dangerous trend. Can you afford it really? TPP began with the economic toll but at the same time everyone knows they did a strategic element. And for the United States, if the TPP fails then you end up pushing all these as if you want countries toward China. That is a reality, I should say. So we have to do everything to stop this. President Obama, I think after spending some of the energy in passing, trying to persuade the Congress, he may have lost some of that and then try to rest for a while on this issue. And of course, because of domestic politics here and also this discord among the participating nations, his frustration is very understandable. But at the same time, this can be a legacy for him because he want to leave something very tangible before he step down as the president. And although it is a little bit too late, now is the time to push strongly because if we make some progress until by the time we have an APIC meeting in November, then we have a chance, maybe there's a last chance. If we pass that, then hope for this early, the conclusion of TPP will be gone with a very undesirable impact which the United States simply cannot afford. In Korea's case, we were in some case, sometimes criticized for not fully implementing existing pact, which is basically US-Korea pre-trade agreement because we were delaying this and that, excusing this and that, but many people here knows that throughout the continuing negotiation process, many of those issues raised by the US side has been quietly and effectively handled and resolved. So we don't have that much issue these days. So we'll try to continue to do that. And TPP is a really good chance to do that. Dr. Han Seung-joo said, in our case, the President Park got a credit for what she did during the 20-day standoff after the DMZ incident where two soldiers were seriously named by a man of mine planted by North Korea. And her approval rating has jumped 15% from mid-30s to high-50s. It's a remarkable jump. Now she has really some political capital behind her. And also in most, not only the DMZ incident, but also her meeting with President Xi Jinping and Chinese leaders in attending the victory parade in Beijing. So whatever is the case, she has some political asset to spend in case of President Obama. I don't know much about it, but with the success coming from the Iran nuclear deal, he also may enjoy that good result. Coming out of that has the approaches election next year. So I guess this is in the good time for political leaders here and in Korea to use this popularity, which is a political asset before it is too late. As everyone knows, political capital has only a very limited shelf life. And that political asset's depreciation process is fairly fast. So I really hope that both leaders use this in a timely manner and does not squander it. So I think that at the same time, they will do it. They are after all, astute politicians. They should know that this isn't the time for them. So I really believe that we might see some progress on this TPP. About North Korea, of course, same. We tried to approach them as much as possible, but until now, they are very reluctant. But then with this DMZ incident, we saw some different sign from them. They offered negotiation first, and although it is rather vague, it is still apology, which is rarely coming from North Korea until now. So maybe we have some chance there to resolve this issue, to reach a desirable result. Again, I think this is a good opportunity for political leaders both here and Korea to use their political capital as quickly as possible. So I think they will do that. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Heung, for that timely and pointed reminder of the important economic underpinnings of the alliance and how necessary it is to freshen and grow our trade relationships collectively and get Korea to take part in the ultimate TPP organization. Now we turn to Ambassador Choi, Heung-jin. Thank you, Doc. On my way to Washington yesterday, on the plane, I heard a song. The lyric, not the melody caught my attention, which goes, the fundamental things apply as time goes by. So what are the fundamentals governing international relationship in East Asia? I would like to mention three fundamentals beyond touching upon the US and Korea because Minister Han explained eloquently the gist of fundamentals regarding the US and Korea. So I'll mention on China, on Japan and North Korea. On China, the fundamental is China has become one of us. Some of you may not agree, focusing attention on the cyber security or what China is doing on the South China Sea, but I remain convinced China does have become one of us. Also, I'm in the US, Japan and Korea. Last year, China recorded a trade volume with US, Japan and Korea combined, $1 trillion. Compute this figure of what the Soviet Union did during the Cold War period. And China has today $2 trillion of US trade bonds. So China joined the trade paradigm, which the US brought to East Asia in a most successful way to the point that she has become one of us. That is very important because only with that realization we can understand that the gameplay between Washington and Beijing is not a zero sum game. Only that in mind, one can understand why President Bach went to Beijing, one of the rare head of state from the Western countries, because we remain convinced that China has become one of us and China will become very helpful in resolving our biggest problem on the North Korean question. Regarding North Korea, the fundamental is North Korea is likely to remain in its mortal dilemma for the foreseeable future. The dilemma between Soviet option and Chinese option. Soviet option means it diverts all the resources starving its people to militarization, just like Soviet Union did until it collapsed. And the other option is Chinese option. In other words, join the trade paradigm just like Japan did, Korea did, China did. But I remain convinced Pyongyang will remain unable to make a choice between the two. She will hesitate all the time, perhaps until it's collapsed. So it's a mortal dilemma which will explain number of things happening between two Koreas recently. The 25th of August, in a way, was a blessing in disguise because it proved the effectiveness of the US-Korea deterrence. And North Korea backed down and there was a various sign through the United States of South Korea which proves that North Korea has a deep fear vis-à-vis US-Korea alliance. And secondly, North Korea is not so reckless to defy such a formidable odds to make a provocation in an unacceptable way. The other side of this North Korean problem is North Korea is very much afraid of cooperation in exchange with South Korea and with other countries as well. Simply take note of the difference between China, North Korea, China, South Korea exchange now. Last year, South Korea had more than $300 billion of trade with China. And North Korea, only $7 billion. And last year, we had more than 850 direct flights between South Korea and China. North Korea and China, only three flights per week. Last year, we had more than 10 million people exchange between China and South Korea. And China and North Korea, perhaps 10,000. So it's only natural that China invites the South Korea to come to the celebration. And our president came to that country to welcome China coming to join us and also to enlist Chinese support in our effort to resolve the North Korean question. On Japan, the fact that on the initiative of President Park, Xi Jinping agreed to have a trial that was submitted in Seoul about in seven weeks is the telltale sign of the fundamentals. We cannot neglect our relationship with Japan. Japan is the second largest trading partner for Korea. And cultural exchange tourism remain very, very important. So despite the raw history issues and other things, we have to keep the positive relationship with Japan alive. So that proves we have to somehow get Japan on board in the North Asian international relationship map. But the other fundamental is there. In other words, Abe and his team, President Abe and his team has a deep and float concept on history. He believes that Japan, not invaded, Japan came to East Asia during major restoration to help South Korea and other countries to liberate those countries from Western occupation. And Japan failed to realize this good intention because she was defeated by the United States. So Japan is a victim. That is their deep conviction. You may not believe it. Ask them. We cannot accept that Japan is a liberator. We cannot accept Japan is a, Japan is a aggressor. Japan is a colonizer. So I don't think Abe will change his mind. So there's a clear limit we can go in terms of bilateral relationship. So that is reflected in the summit meeting. I don't think, I don't think however we try we want to have. Tokyo's whole bilateral summit could happen either in Seoul, or in Tokyo. The summit meeting will take place in a multilateral setting. Either through a lateral summit or bilateral in a third place. That is the limit. But rest assured we remain convinced that that relationship, the positive aspect is very important and we will keep them alive and maybe even we'll succeed in enriching those aspects in China, Japan and Korea. So in some, fundamentals are very, very good. China is good, Japan is good. But North Korea is really problematic and we don't know how to deal with it because North Korea doesn't know how to deal with its own problem. And we have a very little legal issue in Pyongyang. So these concern in North Korea and others, you may have some different perception but compared to the fundamentals those are technical problems we can always resolve through dialogue and diplomatic means. Thank you very much Ambassador Che. One of my experiences in getting to know Ambassador Che was that we all have categories of which we put people and among my categories are people who talk and listen and never read and the people who read and write as well as talk and listen. And Ambassador Che has always been in the latter category, broad reading and broad writing as well. And you've given us some strategic insights. Now we turn it over to the American upholder of the Alliance. I'll use that title in my resume from now on. Thank you very much, I appreciate that. It's a delight and an honor to be here on this platform with so many good friends and colleagues of long standing. I guess I should add the former golf partners as well. When Doug, and I need to thank Doug for putting this forum together today, it's both timely and important and the turnout suggests that you have hit one out of the park in terms of interest in the community and the subjects we're talking about today. When Doug asked me to join this distinguished group of old friends and colleagues and senior officials, I felt a little bit as a former baseball player that pitched for many years. Like a triple A pitcher who'd been called up to the Yankees to be one of the starters. So it's really an honor for me. And the way the Yankees pitching staff is going lately, they may just call me. But that's another subject for another time. The subject of today's conversation is the future of the US ROK Alliance. And let me cut right to the chase and say that I think the future of that alliance is bright, at least as bright as it has been as the past has been. And I say that for a lot of reasons. I'm very optimistic about this relationship and where it's going. It's an important alliance for a number of reasons. And it's an alliance of two countries that share an incredible array of values and perspectives on both the region and the world. And so for that reason, I think the foundation of the alliance is strong going forward. And I don't see that changing at all. We've actually had in recent weeks as we have been discussing here today a tremendous demonstration of the alliance in action. And that's another reason why I am very optimistic about the future of the alliance relationship. We saw the US and the ROK working together hand in hand at all levels of our government right up to the top dealing with a crisis that threatened at several points to turn into a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula. And we managed to diffuse it. I say we, I have to give tremendous credit to President Park and her leadership and the skills of Korean diplomats and the leaders who were engaged in this process. And that did not make Ambassador Han's checklist. I think he was being a very, very modest and polite. But let's give a credit where credit is due to President Park Gune and the leadership that she demonstrated in the midst of that crisis. At the same time, another thing that was not mentioned is the fact that provocation was responded to in a martial fashion by the ROK as the ROK has said it would over the last five years. The North Koreans may not have been convinced of that in the past. They are convinced of that now, I believe that firmly. And ironically, the result of an ROK military counter-strike on the DPRK was not war on the Korean Peninsula. It was the fact that the North Koreans blinked and realized, I believe, that they had miscalculated and then came to the table. And the result of that is, of course, the agreement that we've been discussing here today. At the same time, the United States played a not insignificant role both symbolically and in terms of the words that were coming out of our various ministries during this crisis. And I think the combination of all of those factors sent a very clear message to North Korea that the US ROK alliance is strong, vital, ready for all contingencies and to put it in the rough parlance of the streets do not mess with us. And the North Koreans decided not to mess with the US ROK alliance and came to the table instead. So a very good outcome, a very positive outcome. But going forward, I don't think we should convince ourselves that Pyongyang has changed its spots. I don't think we should be overly optimistic coming out of that agreement. We have seen agreements with the North Koreans made and broken before. But there is at least a glimmer of hope right now that things like family reunifications may go forward and that the North Koreans may get a bit more serious in terms of being responsive to President Park's various overtures in other areas as well. But we have some interesting anniversaries coming up in North Korea, including the 10th of October where word on the street is that the North Koreans might be planning a missile launch. And that would be another interesting test for the ROK US alliance going forward, how we respond to that. So I think we need to take what has happened in terms of North Korean, the positive response that we've seen out of Pyongyang with a bit of a grain of salt going forward. But once again, I share the very, very cautious optimism I've heard here that we have seen. We've managed to encounter a very, very difficult and potentially dangerous situation and we have turned it in a more positive direction. Ambassador Han in his opening remarks, very eloquent and very thoughtful, has always mentioned three particular areas. And we've heard echoes of that here in the panel. And I regard these areas as future challenges for the US ROK alliance going forward. One of those challenges is the one that I mentioned in North Korea. North Korea has not only not changed its spots, it has made those spots clearer than ever in terms of its commitment to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. That is an important challenge for this alliance going forward and nothing that we've seen in recent weeks unfortunately gives us any sense, including the news out of Beijing, that North Korea is about to change its mind in terms of its dedication to maintaining its nuclear arsenal and building that nuclear arsenal going forward. The other challenge going forward is dealing with a rising and more powerful China. And in this area I have to express but maybe some slight disagreement with my colleague Ambassador Che about China being one of us. What I saw on the streets of Tiananmen Square and the weaponry that was on parade and the rhetoric of the Chinese speaker listening to what was going on in the background and the songs that were being sung and the praises of Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party. It was not just Dear Rigour, it was beyond that. And since many of those weapons systems that I saw on parade are aimed at either the United States or Japan or US bases or US allies and partners in the region, the message was at a minimum mixed coming out of Beijing and since we are among friends and I regard myself a second to none in terms of my friendship for Korea, the Republic of Korea and President Park, I completely agree with her goals in approaching Beijing, the goals that were so eloquently laid out by Ambassador Han earlier, the long-term strategic and medium and short-term concerns that Korea has vis-a-vis the PRC. But I asked the same question that I know many of my American colleagues have asked and that is was it necessary to be at the parade in order to pursue those goals with China? Could there have been another mechanism that might have been used, for example, at visit before or after the parade to pursue those goals? And perhaps we can talk about that some more. The third area that's been touched on is Japan. I've spent as many years working on Japan as I have on Korea and listening very carefully to what Prime Minister Abe said on the 14th of August, I came away feeling that it was not as good a set of remarks from either the American perspective or the ROK perspective as they might have been, but they were better than I and many others had anticipated. And I thought that President Pakune's response to those remarks was right on the mark. I thought she handled it very carefully. I thought she handled it well. I think Abe left open some room for an improvement in ROK-Japan relations. And there's no question in my mind that President Pakune did exactly the same in terms of perhaps opening a door to an improvement in relations. And one of the challenges for the US ROK relationship going forward is to somehow see if we can reconstitute and revitalize and refurbish the trilateral cooperation between Tokyo, Seoul and Washington that is so vital to dealing with the first two challenges that I mentioned going forward. So I've gone on a little bit too long. Let me apologize for that, but thank you for the opportunity to be here. No apologies, very pertinent remarks. Minister Howell, is there any, as we say in the US Congress, would you like to revise or extend your remarks? I'm delighted the comments that have been made. I'm glad that you've got it. Let me pose a question to all of the panel before we throw the floor open to your questions. And that is one of the consequences of the exchanges between Xi Jinping and President Park during this past weekend in China was Chinese renewal of pressure were pleased to renew the six-party talks. And to my knowledge, the Obama administration has worked on crusty relationships. We're voting this week in the Senate on Tehran. They've opened relations with Cuba. Some people say, why not Pyongyang? My knowledge, the administration has either publicly or quietly reached out to North Korea at least five times. And in every instance, their hands were slapped back, not with a welcoming handshake but with a fist from the North. Do any of you have any comments on the prospects of renewed efforts to get the six-party talks going in light of the important change that was signaled in the August 25 agreement? Well, we don't have any illusion that just by meeting between President Park and Xi Jinping, China's policy toward North Korea has changed. And North Korea, although I said earlier that we see some slight difference in the way they respond to this, they're still the North Korea. When Kim Jong-il told North Korean audience praising about this accord with the North and South, he mentioned two factors which made it possible. One is his board decision, of course. And then second is because North Korea had a nuclear power. We were able to get the result. So we don't have any misunderstanding about North Korea and Kim Jong-il. So when we discuss about this six-party talk, immediately people reaction is, oh, that's subject again. And we see clearly fatigue there. So it may be again one frustrating episode. But maybe we may try one more time. Maybe who knows? Kim Jong-un is a new type of leader. And the way he respond is somewhat different. So let's try that whether Xi has, the country has real sincerity in approaching this as a way of sincerity. Again, maybe you have another objection to that, but we did because we tried it before. But trying once more is not that bad at all. That's rich. I'd like to remind the fundamental on North Korea. What is it? North Korea is in mortal dilemma between opening reform and militarization. And she's not likely to handle this dilemma. That means six-party talks will not produce a meaningful result as long as North Korea remains in dilemma. In other words, for the six-party talks be productive, precondition is North Korea makes a strategic decision in favor of Chinese option. Having said that the difference of chase exists between Washington and Beijing and Seoul on the other, whether it is still helpful to have six-party talks, even though we do not have illusion on the result given that North Korea will be unlikely to make a strategic decision. So reflecting all these three, two different shades of oppositions, if you read carefully the expression of six-party talks is that Seoul and Beijing wanted to hold the six-party talks. The expression was Seoul and Beijing wanted to have meaningful six-party talks. So meaningful is to embrace the difference of shades between trans-Pacific. May I jump in on that one? The use of the word meaningful was very interesting because that's a word that the US administration has often used with respect to talking to North Korea and resuming the six-party talks. Meaningful literally means in this instance that the talks need to be about what the talks were designed to be about, which is the denuclearization of North Korea. The problem that we have here though is that North Korea has made it eminently clear that it has no intention of denuclearizing itself. You've all seen the reports recently that there are now some new developments going on at Yonggyeong, the nuclear facility. There seems to be some work going on at some of their missile facilities, et cetera. So I see nothing based on what has transpired in the last couple of three weeks that would suggest that North Korea has turned over a new leaf on the nuclear issue. Should we continue to try to pursue six-party talks? Of course we should. There's no penalty for reaching out and trying. What I think we are likely to get back though is a reaffirmation of the conclusion that many of us have come to, that North Korea is not prepared to go down the road of denuclearization under any circumstances. And Ambassador Hyun's reference to the comment by Kim Jong-un, I think was a very telling one, to have the leader of North Korea explicitly refer to North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons as one of the reasons why this situation played out the way it did, to me was a very ominous reference because it suggests to me that the next provocation or the next confrontation, and pardon my cynicism here, but I think there will be one at some point, the North Koreans will more explicitly make reference to their nuclear capabilities in an effort to try to get that confrontation or provocation moving in a direction that they favor. And that to me is very, very disturbing. Serious observers do notice that as time passes, the accumulated nuclear material and potential accumulated weapons will only grow and the problem will become bigger if we don't find a mechanism to get out of it. What's your response to that? I agree, and it's one of the reasons that I and then many others in this room have advocated either bilateral talks or trilateral talks, six-party talks, whatever mechanism is necessary, a number of people in this room, as I have written with ideas and concepts that might be used to move forward, but all of them depend on North Korean seriousness in coming to, here's that word again, meaningful discussions about denuclearization and the problem is that regardless of the strategy, regardless of the content of what we're prepared to put on the table, if the other side is not prepared to play, where does that leave us? Well, now we come to the point where you open the conversation to the floor. When you raise your hands and I call on you, please wait for the microphone to come and then identify yourself in your affiliation, ask a safe question if you would please. So the floor is open, hands up. Halfway back in the middle. Hi, I'm Leon White and I was wondering what can the Alliance do in the future to provide greater deterrence for these cycle of provocations, kind of low-level provocations that we've seen for decades. Thank you. I could take a shot at that. I think the Alliance has already done something based on the provocations that took place in 2010, the sinking of the Yun Pyeong and then the sinking of the Cheonan and then the attack on Yun Pyeong. In the aftermath of that, the ROK and the United States developed a provocation counter-response plan. That plan was actually used in the response to the recent attack, artillery attack and rocket attack by North Korea on the South. And my judgment is that it worked. It worked in sending that very, very strong message to Pyongyang that provocation will be met with a military response so you ought to stop it right now and ratchet tensions down. That's exactly what happened. So I think this sort of thing that we have developed bilaterally is the best way to deal with these provocations in the future and let us hope, as I suggested earlier, that the North Koreans have learned a vital lesson that provocation will be met with a military response. Just a technical observation. The use of ANTP Q37 radars allows the American and Korean armed forces in the Republic to zero in on the source of these attacks and fire back counter-battery on them very effectively. And the technical effectiveness, I think, contributed a lot to the political outcome. Farther back in the center again, back at the top. Hi, my name is Hayoung Lee and I'm currently an intern at CSIS Korean Chair. Thank you for the great talks. I'd like to ask a question to Minister Han. He talked about why U.S.-ROK alliance is important for two reasons. The first reason was the U.S.-ROK alliance can deal with the North Korean threat and the second was peaceful unification can be achieved with the strong U.S.-ROK alliance. And my question is what's the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance if we achieve peaceful unification in North East Asia and then will U.S.-ROK alliance remain or it can be dissolved or it can evolve into another regional security community like NATO or something like that? I think I made it clear that the reasons or rationale for the alliance from the Korean point of view has gone beyond defending or deterring against North Korea. I think there is growing realization in South Korea in all generations that it is a very important asset for us in dealing with regional situation generally but also the powerful countries' powers in the region and also in dealing with the global matters. We looked and we're looking very closely to what happened to NATO in Europe after disintegration of the Soviet Union and the virtual removal of the Soviet threat. NATO not only survived but thrived and expanded both in depth and threats. And the conclusion is that just as NATO has survived with greater strength and robustness, I think there will be acceptance and willingness, desire to maintain the alliance in Korea. I think the U.S. also will find the need to maintain the alliance beyond the North Korean threat and the existence. I have a question for you. Actually, my name is Tony Lee. I'm from Institute of International Relations in Taipei. Actually, my question is quite similar to the previous one. I just want to invite Ambassador Han to further elaborate or clarify that your last remarks in your speech, you mentioned that in the future, South Korea is not only facing the conventional threats from North Korea as we all know is nuclear weapons but also facing the challenge of unification of Korea. And you also mentioned that because of that, the U.S. ROK alliance should be more comprehensive. So I'm just wondering in what sense in your mind that this alliance should go forward to be more comprehensive in the future? Along the same line that I answered before, it's the alliance was signed and approved in 1953 and 1954 from Korea's point of view, North Korea was the main and almost the only thing. But right now, it's not necessarily that we are worried about China, Russia or even Japan attacking Japan. But in order to call it navigate through our relations with them, we will be more reckoned with, with the alliance with the United States by these powers in case serious trouble comes with Japan. In fact, the U.S. is the only country which will be able to prevent any untoward development between the two countries. But beyond all that, there are serious problems in the region and beyond the region as well. So if you're talking about the values that we share, I think if you look at all the Asian countries, even though Japan is a democracy, Korea is a democracy, we are the only country where the people actually fought for democracy, not given by somebody else. And I think that really comes for something that we have something that we value, which are the values that we share. I'd like to take advantage of your comment, not to gain say what you've said, but to point out from my perspective, a lot of Chinese commentators, for example, would say the alliance is our Cold War artifact, that it's time to be swept away and the new kind of regional security or global security architecture is necessary in it. But from my perspective, I stand back and look, we've got new non-governmental actors, whether they're big corporations or terrorist groups and other kinds of players. We've got more big countries who are taking regional roles all over the world. And we've had the history of peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region come by with very little militarization among the states of the region. The US security blanket, in a sense, allowed a lot of countries to focus on things other than how strong they are militarily. And that's been very beneficial for the peoples of the region. At this point, with so many moving parts on the global scene, to start taking out what little structure there is, strikes me as probably unwise. And so even if you don't want to advocate on the particular argument of this particular alliance, I think a structural argument is also there for a very conservative and steady-as-you-go approach to alliances that have served so well up to now. Question in front of me. Hi, Scott Harold from the Rand Corporation. My question is really for the entire panel. I'd really welcome hearing both Korean and American perspectives. And that is if we were to look ahead into the period after our next presidential transitions, what would you like to see the next administrations do? What is a concrete step? And I think this has some echoes of the past two questions. What is something that we could do that would further develop or further advance the relationship? What are things that you've heard that are interesting that you say, you know, this is an idea that's under discussion that would further evolve the relationship in an even tighter direction? Are there any concrete things, or have we really just got to, as you said Doug, steady-as-we-go just keep doing everything because we've reached the point where there's nothing left to do except maintain? I don't think, I said there's nothing left to do, but is there anybody who would like to volunteer? We start down here. I think North Korea remains the problem for the entire North East Asia after the change of the presidency in Washington and Seoul. So that should be the focus. What can be done is North Korea may collapse in several years or may stay for decades. That means we have to prepare the continuous plan. In other words, we have to have a post-unification strategic architecture in mind. So for that, we have to make clear our positions, U.S., China, and Korea. I hope U.S. having seen that North East Asia around Korean Peninsula, there is one to three, number one to three economic power in the entire world. And number one to three for military power in the entire world. So that means North Korea around Korean Peninsula, that region will remain, if not the, one of the most important geostrategic center in the world. That will proceed America to remain engaged under Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, from China, I'd like to see that if China wants to have entire Peninsula on this sphere of influence, they will make Japan bear vis-a-vis Chinese pressure. So in the end, they will be harmful to China's long-term interest. So that means China will allow South Korea, will agree to South Korea's unifying North Korea, provided that there will be no American troops and North authority is parallel. So if we can agree on the architecture and work towards on that vision, that will be a long-term strategic vision we can share, and that will help us to move forward. I'd suggest there are two priorities for the next administration. I'm assuming that TPP is going to happen. And based on Ambassador Yeong's excellent comments earlier, one of the most important priorities for the United States would be working with Korea and the other TPP partners to bring Korea in. I think that would be a tremendous step forward. And also a tremendous example of U.S. leadership, I think that would resonate extremely well, not only in the ROK, but elsewhere. The other area is North Korea. Unless there is another provocation or incident between now and the end of this administration, the concerns that I expressed earlier about the rising threat from the DPRK's nuclear and missile capabilities, that threat is going to come to a head, I believe, on the next administration's watch. And so some mechanism, bilaterally, between ourselves and our ROK allies, to deal with that is going to have to be worked out. We're going to have to come up with some new creative mechanism for applying new types of pressure, applying new sanctions, applying new forces, bringing in new players to the Chinese, perhaps, et cetera. Some mechanism that will send a very, very clear message to the DPRK, it's in North Korea, that we will not allow them to use during the next provocation, the next incident that happens. Their nuclear weapons capabilities is a tool of blackmail or intimidation. And that's, I think, going to happen on the next administration's watch. Yes, sir? I fully agree with Evan's observation regarding TPP and his view about the success of that. I really hope that happened, and it will happen in my view. However, if for whatever reason, it is delayed beyond the beginning of the next administration, one may think about forming a kind of studied dialogue about Korea, Japan, U.S. trilateral free trade agreement as a way of not making TPP and another problem, but the way of prodding the countries to find TPP, if you don't have that, we have more problematic kind of situation before us. And by doing so, you can use that as a kind of prodder catalyzer of TPP. That's one thought you can have. And of course, in other areas of North Korea, fully agree with your observation. Scott, I would just add a footnote, which is that we have proliferating challenges in space and cyberspace, which the alliance is only just beginning to handle. And undoubtedly, the controversial subject of theater high altitude air defense that will emerge as something the next administration more likely will have to deal with one way or another. Can you make a microphone, please, and the other by yourself? Hello, I'm Yeong-gi Kimirano from George Washington University. I think probably the core of the issue is North Korea, not only for international relations, but also for domestic politics. And I think if, of course, US-Korea alliance is the most important thing here, if there is any deterrence, that would be it. But Korea-China alliance would also help because North Korea cannot ignore China. And if President Park just went like before the ceremony or after, the goal would have been maybe better achieved in some ways, but I think it wouldn't have had this very striking impression. If I were North Koreans, I would be scared about that. And the US shouldn't really look at it as if it's some kind of betrayal because I have heard someone remarking that as a kind of betrayal of a friend because I agree with Ambassador Choi that I just spent six months in China. Now, I could see they are becoming very capitalist country. They are trying to be friends with all the capitalist countries of the world. Is that a question? So, I mean, it's not a question, but I'm just reacting to some comments and I think the future of US-Korea relations should involve not only Japan, but very much so China. Let me say first, you said Korea-China alliance. Alliance in that context is far different from our alliance with the United States. So just friend relations, strategic partners, whatever, but no alliance. That is one of the reason we came all the way from Seoul to tell our audience that it is different. Please don't have any suspicion. That is basically our thought. And I still believe that took the case. So many differences. So I'd like to make a comment on that. I'd add another corrective footnote and that is that the North Koreans have been ignoring China for a long time. But talk about that some other time. And one of the things, we often say that Chinese do not fulfill the sanctions on North Korea to the extent that they should under the UN sanction regimes, but we seldom give China credit for denying face to North Korea. The young leaders almost four years in position now and has not had a trip to Beijing to get the blessing of the communist popes in Beijing. And so I think that has been a more significant sanction than a lot of us would otherwise appreciate because of the concept of face and importance. But the North Koreans know how to play this game too. Take a look at page two of the Nodong Shinmun today and you'll see that Xi Jinping's congratulatory message did not make page one, although the Cuban and Russian ones did. Right in the back, I'll almost put the camera. Thank you. My name is Jun Beiyu Shoka from Japanese Public TV NHK. My question goes to Mr. Riviere about the Japan ROK history issue. Given the fact that Japanese Prime Minister gave the statement, President Park reacted and she went to Beijing afterwards. Given all those facts, from the US perspective, what do you think is the remaining problem to solve the history issue from what should the Japanese should address and what should the Koreans should address and how should the US administration give the message when President Park is coming to Washington? Thank you. Well, there's a lot of meat there. In terms of the US role, I think other than continuing the sort of encouragement that the United States has been providing both parties, there's not much that the United States can do to resolve history issues between Tokyo and Seoul, quite frankly. There's, I think, significant things that Japan could and should do vis-a-vis the so-called Comfort Women sexual slaves issue. And I think Seoul has made it very clear what needs to be done. There's been lots of dialogue between the two sides about what might be done. Some people of goodwill on both sides have been meeting and talking about possible resolution. And I would only suggest that some of the ideas that they've come up with could provide a solid and mutually acceptable foundation for putting that issue behind them. Ambassador Che made some excellent comments yesterday, a few minutes ago, about how he sees Prime Minister Abe and his perspective on history and issues. And I share many of the things that he said. I think we've got, we may have reached a limit in terms of how far this particular Japanese Prime Minister is prepared to go. Although, to be fair to him, he went further than many of us expected in that statement back in August. My sense is that both Seoul and Tokyo know what needs to be done in order to move the next step forward. There's not much weight that the United States can add to this equation that would get either party to move. The decision-making needs to take place at the highest levels in both capitals. And for a few hours in August, I thought that perhaps a decision had been made along those lines and nothing that's happened since has dissuaded me from that judgment. So I'm very, very cautiously optimistic that the leadership in both capitals sees an opportunity with the events of August behind us now to move forward and I hope that happens. When you look at the relationships among Japan and China and Korea and the United States, we're hostage to incidents but where we are today is definitely in a better place than where we were two and three years ago. And I think that's a good, steady application of advice, counsel, and giving people time to see where the benefits lie and reducing tensions like that has paid off, if not rewarded us with everything we want, we certainly have a better situation than before. Any other questions from the floor? This brings us to the end, therefore, ladies and gentlemen, and I thank our distinguished panelists and I want to invite all of you to a reception on the next floor down, hosted by the Korean American Association and sponsored in part by the Korean Embassy as well. Thank you for joining us, please thank the panel board. Thank you. Well done. Well done. Well done. Well done. As usual, let's... Good. Minister, well done. Great remarks. I'd like to hear your remarks. Thank you very much. Yeah. Thank you very much. You know, when you said about the alliance, I've been preaching this for a long time. If people don't want to hear it, they'll like to hear it. Thank you very much. You have a copy of your remarks. Could you send it to me? It was really good. It was really good. It was strong. I completely agree with all the points that you made about the China-Korea relationship. Sorry. Oh, okay. Except... See...