 It used to be, we'd say we had a bad day if we lost a few houses, but what's happened to us this year is we've not only lost a few houses, we've lost a few towns. We've had fires burn completely through communities. The city of Cross Plains is certainly a population of about 1,000, lost 116 homes. Ringgold lost about 32 of 40 homes in that community. The community of Kokomo was basically decimated, I mean it's got two homes left. So we had never seen anything like that in Texas. We've been fighting grass fires and wildland fires for 30 years. And our old method used to be simply go get out in front of it, squirt some water, go to house. We've had a couple of fires in Palo Pena County this year that the estimated speed of the fire was 40 miles an hour. You absolutely cannot outrun something that's coming at you at 40 miles an hour. You have to attack it differently than what we've been doing in the past. You have to attack it from the black. You have to stay behind it and you have to leave yourself a way to get out of there. Interagency cooperation in the wildland urban interface is nothing new to firefighters in the state of Texas. 97% of the land mass in Texas is privately owned and they have over 1,800 different fire departments to service initial attack responders. 1,400 of these departments are strictly volunteer. 200 are mixed, paid and volunteer and 200 of them are fully paid. This last year the state's resources were stretched to their limits as they dealt with one of the worst fire seasons they've ever seen. Here in Texas we've had a very unusual fire season and actually started about Memorial Day weekend of 2005. But just this year, just since January 1st, we've had over 2,000 fires. It just Texas Forest Service has responded to that doesn't count what all the fire departments have also responded to. And we've lost 1.3 million acres in 19 lives, over 400 homes. So it's been just a devastating year and it hasn't. We didn't really have much of a spring this year, no spring rain. So we're going into the summer fire season with a huge deficit. In 2004, we had one of the wettest years on record. So we had extensive fuel growth everywhere. With that fuel buildup, then we went into 2005, starting about April 2005. It was very dry. We had a dry summer, a dry fall, very dry winter. And the other thing that precipitated this was very unusual fronts coming through with winds that were just unbelievable. Several days we had winds of more than 50 mile an hour gusts, which just isn't typical for most of Texas. When you're looking at state as large as Texas is, we have, I mean the state is 800, better than 800 miles crossed and 800 some miles deep. So it's a huge area to cover with very minimal people. What's happened this year is because the fire response has been so extended and so large, we've had to bring in a lot of out of state resources. We're looking at now about 3,200 firefighters have been brought in from out of state, I think 47 states have sent people. So it's been a huge response and it's been going on since the end of November. In this module, we'll look at what it's like to take an assignment in Texas and see if there's any lessons learned from their unusual fire season that can apply to your home units. When firefighters come from out of state in Texas, they don't necessarily know what type of fuel model they'll be going in because we have such a huge variety across the state. In East Texas, you have your piney woods and then you get more in central Texas. You've got the hill country with the heavy load of juniper, which is a very volatile fuel model. Then you get the oak savannas and a lot of grass. You get up in the panhandle, it's going to be primarily grasses and a lot of that is CRP grass that's been growing for a long time, maybe very tall, very thick, it'll really carry fire. And then you get out in far west Texas and you have the more mountainous areas. So we have a variety of everything and we've got our coastlines as well, which is a different fuel model. So depending on where you are in Texas, you're going to look at totally different vegetative models. Predictive services will put out risk levels across the state. So once we get to risk level three, we're looking at a drought index that is usually higher than 500 KBDI or our ERCs are at the 90th percentile or higher and then we're going to have resources available and ready to respond. If we're looking at a fire weather day where winds are going to be sustained at over 15 miles an hour and our age is going to be below 25%, it's a heads up for us that we're probably going to have some fires that day. The primary resources for a fire department are going to be basically a type six engine or a brush truck. They may have a little larger type five or type four and primarily they're equipped so that they can ride on the back of the truck and shoot the fire. They're not going to drag a lot of hose or do a lot of hose lays or anything like that. They aren't typically trained to as hand crews. They don't do a lot of work as hand crews. When we bring resources in, we provide a lot of times dozer units that's going to be our first initial response to help them put a fire line around the fire. In different areas of the state, other resources come in really handy. We do use hand crews out in West Texas where we've got the Guadalupe's and the Davis Mountains. We've got more mountainous terrain and that we definitely need hand crews back there. What the fire department's like the most that we can bring in and we can provide are helicopters is a lot of times they can really help in areas that it's difficult to access from the back of a brush truck. There are a lot of challenges you face when you go in on a fire and you're working unified command with a lot of different fire departments because usually they've already called in mutual aid from all across the county and possibly other counties as well. So you have a lot of variety of fire departments there with a variety of experience levels. Communications can sometimes be difficult. We all work off at Texas Fire One which is basically our mutual aid channel but when you get huge fires like we saw in the panhandle this year that frequency is going to be overloaded in a hurry. Some of the other challenges you face when you have varied levels of experience and when federal folks or firefighters from out of region are coming in and they see people out there that don't have full PPE on, they might be fighting fire and denim jeans and a T-shirt, they ride on the back of the truck to fight fire or sometimes on the front of the truck and it goes against a lot of our safety practices. So sometimes that's difficult for out of state resources to some especially safety officers that come in and see a lot of safety violations but we really can't send the volunteers home we've got to work with them, we've got to find a way to show them how to more safely fight the fire but they may not have that background in training. The fire departments don't really give over control of the fire, we come in to help them. It's a unified command effort and we're working with a lot of volunteers with various levels of experience but our whole mission is to work with them not to take the fire over or not to dismiss them and their capabilities because we desperately need the fire departments in this state. Along with the record number of fatalities suffered by Texas there was also a large number of near misses that resulted in critical injuries. In response the Texas Forest Service assigned Hunter Winston to look closely at these incidents and try to extract any lessons learned from them. The Texas Forest Service started having lots of large fires and it started in March of 2005 and they continue up until today having large fires. They've asked me to come in and look at the safety aspect of those large fires. We've had lots of injuries and a few fatalities associated with those wildland fires and so beginning around April the first I started doing that and doing an intensive review of those fatalities and serious injuries across the state. What we've found is we've had 19 fatalities associated with wildland fires since March the first of 2005. 17 of those were civilians. Of the 19 fatalities only two were associated with volunteer or fire departments within the state. Those two fatalities were associated with rollovers or what they call tankers in Texas which wildland community we call them water tenders. Also there were 13 firefighters that had injuries, serious injuries which required hospitalization across the state during that same time period. Of those 13, seven had third degree burns and so that's what I mainly concentrated my efforts on were those individuals that had third degree burns in those instances which they occurred on. What I did was I contacted the fire departments that were associated with those particular individuals that got burns and we actually interviewed five of the seven that had burns, had third degree burns on them and through those interviews we asked them to go through the scenarios and how they got in those positions and what they would do differently if they had to do it again. And it was very eye-opening for me to do those interviews with those five individuals. Now we're gonna take you through part of one of the scenarios that resulted in a serious injury. We jumped in the first unit, responded, come in and come in and started attacking the fire on the West flank, working our way towards the head of it. Before we even got completely out of the station was already initiating mutual aid call for different units out of Wichita County. They were available to respond during that time all the tone going out for those units. That time we were attacking, like I said on the West flank working towards the head of this fire which was rapidly spreading on us because of the different gullies and the tall vegetation that it was into. Sometime after that was my second arriving unit come in, joined in, had them go in front of us because they carry more water to go towards the head of it and try to start cutting the head of the fire off. We at this time had run out of water so we had to come out and resupply with water. They were the unit that was in there and they come back and reported that they were stuck. They were on the head of the fire in the black but they were stuck. At this time another, one of the mutual aid units come in and started attacking just a few minutes after that another one come in. I had come out, this unit had come out, another firefighter was on scene put him in that apparatus and we had reports of the fire spring towards the east towards two exposure structures down here went down to check it out and knew there was no problem there stayed in my command vehicle and we had initiated, like I said, mutual aid. We had one unit come in and stage at those exposures to stay to protect those. During this time we're still having more mutual aid units arrive, the fire is spreading on us and all. Still growing, spreading and going to the north. By this time it's already passed this lake so that's pretty well where the truck got stuck. Anyway, during this time we're still having the fire reported I had got into a unit and taken it down and it stopped where it was below a hill over here on the other side spreading that the apparatus protecting exposures couldn't see it. I stayed there, two firefighters showed up I left them with it. I come up, got in my command vehicle and at this time had the white Murphy respond with me going up, he was here at the station got him into the small one ton told him to respond up here on 171. This time I'd heard had got reports of the Clay County unit coming in 171 from the east. Got to the head of it and all and at this time she was all the way up to getting close to this 171 told the two units we want to try to stop it here at the road. I had entered into the middle of it to make sure what they were of what the unit on the east was doing knew Dwight was coming in behind me. Got them told them to stop, stop it there and Dwight had stopped behind me. I'd seen him stop. I turned around and come back and when I come back, that's when I discovered Dwight had sustained his burns. And Dwight, you had gotten off the truck and going in across the barbed wire fence you're on the right of way. Yes sir, at that time, the fire was about 20 or 30 yards out and it was in the vegetation but it wasn't going that bad. And I thought, well, I didn't, you know, get on top of it and get it there. And about the time that I got over the fence and took about 10 or 15 steps in and I actually started spraying water, the wind picked up considerably. And boy, it brought that thing to life in a major way. And there wasn't anywhere to go where it was coming and it was coming quick. And I briefly thought about trying to go back over that fence. No, if you get hung up in there that's where you're going to stay. So the only other decision I could do was just wet myself down, try to get through the fire and get into the black. And that's pretty well when I did and just waited for help to come. And thankfully, Richard turned around and come back. I feel bad cause you know, this is kind of a rookie mistake. I had training I knew better but the old saying complacency will get you every time. And it's been a long time since we had a fire this size. And I was one of the later arriving units and I'm thinking, you know, this thing's running away from us. When I went in to make my initial attack it wasn't going that bad. It was coming to me, but it wasn't going that bad. And like I say, the tone goes off. You come up to the station, you grab your pants, your boots are already in them, grab your coat, grab your helmet, throw it in the truck and take off. And Richard told me where to go. I went there, oh, there's fire, there's fire. I got to get to it. Got off the truck, started a pump, went over a fence I knew better and started spraying. About that time the wind really picked up and it was coming to me faster than what I was comfortable with. And I looked behind me and I thought I can't get back over that fence in time. So the only thing I could do was just hose myself down and try to make it through the fire and get into the black. And, you know, first the message that I could send to anybody, guys, take the time. You know, get your head straight, get your gear on. It might be hot, it might be a little heavy, it might be a little cumbersome, but if I'd have had my gear I wouldn't look like I'd do right now. Take the time. Now let's listen to a few Texas firefighters and hunter talk about the lessons learned from this study. An abbreviated copy of Hunter's Report is included in your student workbook. The dead man's on is where most of these injuries to our firefighters, the third degree burns, happened over the last 14 months. People do not realize how fast fires can run through the vegetation that we have here in Texas. We have tall grass as high as knee to hip high grass, often mixed with a lot of brush. It not only runs through that vegetation really fast during these low humidity, high temperature days, but it spots in those same fuel types. And therefore you have fires actually jumping ahead of themselves. And these conditions is what I think caused a lot of the third degree burns that we've had over the state. In the volunteer fire service or in the fire service period, we spend an awful lot of time training in structural firefighting. And a lot of times people will try to take what they have learned in structure and change it over, if you will, to grass firefight, to wildland firefighting. And there's just no parallel because you don't have an inch and three quarter line. You've got at most an inch, maybe three quarters. You don't have an nozzle that will kick out 120 gallons a minute. You've got one that will kick out maybe 15, maybe 30. And a follow pattern, simply to didn't put enough water to protect you. It's, you know, we try to draw that parallel. It works to an extent, but it doesn't work to the full extent. So as you're working on wildland fires, we need to understand the heat and the intensity of wildland fires, especially coming through the volatile fuels of the grass and the brush that we have here in Texas. And that the fog will probably not help you if you're standing on the head of the fire. Along the flanks where it's cooler and down at the hill of the fire, it will help you a lot. I think what the volunteer fire departments need to do in all the fire departments who attack wildland fire and especially in urban interface areas is take a step back, look at the whole situation and see where is the safest spot that they might attack that fire. Oftentimes the fire departments in Texas roll out and all they have is engines. They don't have dozers and the other heavy equipment some of the federal and state agencies have. Thus, I think maybe the safest spot that they might be able to attack the fire might be from the black itself. Go in and start at the hill of the fire and go up the flanks, but staying in the black, always using again their water out of their engines to put the fire out as they go and making sure that it is extinguished good as they progress up the flanks. You know, if you're standing in fuel, then you are part of the fuel. That's what I always tell our guys. Anytime we can fight a fire from inside the black and we're doing a direct attack, then our trucks stay inside the black, our firemen drag the black with them. Keep one foot, one tire, one part of your body in the black. You know, that's the biggest safety zone there. The grass fires are very serious and very dangerous. One thing when fighting grass fires, and actually it was the sage old firefighter that told me this and I've always remembered it, always ask yourself one question. Do I really need to do this? If you ask that question and answer honestly, you can be safe. Do I really need to do this? If you get the fire put out, but you got two guys in the hospital, you know, your risk benefit factor just went out the window. You're risking your life to stop a grass fire. You know, I think a lot of times we don't look at the risk benefit factor enough. As we prepare for this upcoming fire season, keep in mind that witnessing unusual fire behavior is becoming more and more usual. It seems normal now to hear people talk about fire behavior that they've never seen before. Top federal fire officials are warning that climatic studies are predicting a continuation of warmer and drier conditions across the Western U.S. and that this will make wildland fires even more dangerous and unpredictable. Five of the 10 worst fire seasons since 1960 in terms of acres burned have occurred in the last seven years. What happened in Texas last year was unusual when you're looking back through history, but that doesn't mean that it won't happen again this year or at least in the near future. To help us prepare for whatever kind of fire season we're about to experience, let's listen to some final thoughts before we go back into our groups and complete the next exercise in our student workbooks. Now we're hoping to develop a DVD and this paper that we're gonna send out to every fire department which there's over 1,800 fire departments in Texas and we're hoping to help them with that and hopefully encourage them to get more wildland fire training. We've noticed also that most of these departments that I interviewed over 50% of their fires were wildland fires this past year and yet way less than 50% of their time is spent in wildland fire training. So we think that they need to increase the amount of wildland fire training that they're getting for their individuals and in order to keep them safe in the future. If there's a message to be made and a lesson to be learned from the wildfire season of 2005 and 2006, we can't do business as usual. I know there's a hero glory in getting in front of that fire and being the macho John Wayne, shoot it dead, stop it in its tracks. We can't do that with the kind of fire conditions we're seeing, it has to be attacked from the black. A lot of the fires that we had this year, it was kind of like the dog chasing the car theory. The fire behavior was so extreme that if you did flank a fire down and get to the head of it, it was just kind of like that dog that chased the car. What does the dog do with the car when they catch it? Under no circumstances are we gonna put anybody in front of it. That's just a blatant kill zone in front of being in front of a wildland fire. Our environment is always changing. Things change over time. Locations change over time. So re-evaluation, I put up on my watch. I have an hour beep. Every time that thing beeps, I start asking if my plan is still valid. I look at where I'm at, safety zones, escape routes, tactics, weather. Is everything still in line? Everything's still working. Put that hour beep on your watch. It helps.