 Good afternoon. Ladies and gentlemen, I will highlight a few points from my statement to the IAEA Board of Governors this morning. I informed on the board that 579 new IAEA technical cooperation projects have been proposed for the next two-year cycle. The top three priorities are, for member states, health and nutrition, nuclear safety and security, and food and agriculture. The project to modernize our nuclear applications and laboratories at Cybert's Dove, known as Renewer Project, is progressing well. This is one of the most important projects ever undertaken by the agency. All new building construction is fully funded. We still need funding to equip the laboratories. We will hold a ministerial conference on nuclear science and technology in Vienna from November 28th to the 30th next year. The ambassadors of Costa Rica and Japan will be available to lead on the preparatory work. Ladies and gentlemen, I informed on the board about my visit to Tehran on October 29th for talks with President Rouhani and other government officials. During that visit, I stressed the importance of full implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I also encouraged Iran to ratify the additional protocol to its safeguard agreement, which is provisionally applying at present. The nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran are being implemented. The agency continues to verify the non-division of nuclear material declared by Iran under its safeguard agreement. Evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran continue. As of today, the agency has had access to all the locations that we needed to visit. Finally, I draw your attention to the third IAEA International Conference on Radiation Protection in Medicine, which will start on December 11th in Vienna. It will consider safety in the medical use of ionizing radiation and the radiation protection of medical staff and the public. The conference is open to the media. I will now be happy to take your questions. Sharia Nasrallah from Reuters News Agency, thank you for your statements. I just like to have a clarification. You say you encourage Iran to fully implement, and yet you omit that adverb fully when you say Iran's commitments are implemented. What's the difference? Is if Iran currently not fully implementing? Thank you. What I said to Iran is that I emphasized the importance of full implementation of the nuclear-related commitments taken by Iran under the JCPOA. What I said and what I say quite often is that nuclear commitments by Iran are being implemented. This is the assessment of the situation. IAEA is not a party to the JCPOA, so strictly speaking, IAEA is not in a position to pass judgment whether or not Iran is in compliance. In any agreement arrangement, the entity that is not a party to the arrangement or agreement is not in a position to pass judgment on compliance and non-compliance. If you recall, I never said that Iran is in compliance and non-compliance. I said the nuclear-related commitments by Iran are being implemented. So what would Iran need to do to fully implement, given that you have called on them to fully implement? Do everything Iran has committed under the JCPOA. Thank you, Mr. Amano. This is Jaferi from Iranian State News Agency. As you mentioned just now, for the ninth time you have verified that Iran has the nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran are being implemented. At the same time, some parties to the JCPOA are raising the issue of Section T of annex one, and they are alleging that Iran is not complying with the nuclear deal in this section. What is your assessment of that? I do not comment on the views of countries. Different countries have different views, but the IAEA's assessment of the situation is that the nuclear commitments by Iran are being implemented. Your Excellency, in one interview to one of the media, you mentioned this Section T, and you said that you have not have access to, for verifying this section. I did not say that. I did not say that. What I said is that Section T does not have any reference to access. Whether we have access or not, it is a different thing. What I said is that Section T is, in principle, related to dual technology, prohibition or limitation of the activities related to dual technology unless it is approved by the Joint Commission. Section T does not contain any reference to access. That is what I said. Simon Study AFP. If you can't have access to check what Iran is doing under Section T, how can you be sure that they are complying with Section T? Again, I did not say I do not have access related to Section T. To address issues, what I said, Section T is not about access. Section T is about, in principle, dual technology, and without the consent from the Joint Commission, Iran is prohibited or Iran has to reduce the activities related to these technologies. Access is a different thing. I did not say whether I have access or I do not have access related to the issues covered under Section T. What I said is that the additional protocol, tools available under the additional protocol, is broadly applicable to addressing the issues under Section T. Whether we have access to some location or when, how, whether, I cannot discuss because I have the obligation to protect the confidential information. I'm not clear. I'm afraid. Why is it that you said before that you wanted more clarity on this issue? If there is more clarity, it makes our job easier. Easier does not mean without that I cannot do that. For an OT, DPA, Chairman Press Agency, without going into how exactly you're verifying Section T, can you say that the IA has been able to verify whether Iran is keeping its obligations under Section T? Let me say this. The IAEA is monitoring and verifying all the elements, nuclear related commitments by Iran under the JCPOA, which includes Section T. At this stage, I do not have any issue, any concern that I need to raise. This is Homo Lesky from Press TV. Again, another follow-up question on Section T. Mr. Salehi in Iran said that this was an issue that you discussed with him whilst you were in Tehran. My question is, do you believe that you can do all the monitoring work potentially required under Section T, using your authorities under the additional protocol? I said many times that the nuclear related commitments by Iran under the JCPOA are being implemented. This is the assessment of the situation as of today. It doesn't mean I foresee what will happen tomorrow or in the future. And I do not speculate. What I said is related to the situation as of today. Matias Wider, German Press Agency. There is strong political pressure by the United States, and does this pressure by any kind influence the work of the IAEA? The IAEA undertakes its verification and monitoring activities based on the inocardance with the modality defined in the JCPOA, based on the safeguard practice, and we discharge your responsibility in an impartial, rigorous, and factual manner. And we continue to do so. That's going on. Just the last follow-up, maybe. You have said that so far as of today that the IAEA was able to visit all the places needed. Now, in this needed, broad term, does this include also the Matias, which includes the Section T? I did not discuss the details, but I can assure you that we could have access to all the locations and that we needed to visit. On a different subject regarding this week, the Russian meteorological agency said that it had also detected higher levels of ruthenium 106. Have you received any further information from Russia about what the source of this incident leak discharge may have been? No. The latest information from Russian authority was that they referred to us to the statement made by Rosatom, and you are aware of the statement made by Rosatom. That is the latest information. But does that make sense? I mean, all the indications would suggest that there was indeed some sort of incident there. We started to receive information on the concentration of ruthenium 106 in October from some European countries. We have asked 43 European countries about the measurement of ruthenium 106 and whether they were any event that could be in the course of source of such release. We have received a response, and we have received a response, I mean, we have received the measurement by these countries, and we have also received a response that there were no events that could be in the course of such release. You mentioned the report by Russian meteorological authority, and we have asked questions, and we were referred to the Rosatom statement. Kazakhstan was not included in these European countries, so we have asked the questions, but they were not aware of any event that could be the course of such release. I would like to make sure that the level of concentration of ruthenium 106, even the highest measurement, does not cause some harm for human health, and that does not cause some harm for human health. These inquiries and response are undertaken on voluntary basis. I'm sorry, just one follow-up on the interview on section T, where you said you'd welcome clarification. Have you received? No. Okay. As of today, no. But still, we can continue to verify, and many times, the issues under section T. Another question on another topic, sir. You have mentioned that you want to sort of change the design logo to Atoms for Peace and Development. Now starting December, you are starting your four years tenure. I mean, leading up to that, is that your sort of legacy that you are putting more emphasis on development? What are you planning to do in the next four years? And together with this logo, can you just tell me a little bit more about your thought? Thank you. I said today some statement that I will continue to use the logo of Atoms for Peace and Development, but it is not for legacy. If you look closely at the activities of the IAEA for now, the motto of Atoms for Peace and Development, better reflect the activities that we are doing now rather than Atoms for Peace. We are addressing development issues and some non-proliferation issues at the same time. I think our activities in this field are to use a nuclear technology for peaceful purpose, a need to be strengthened, especially nuclear technology for peaceful purpose is very effective to attain the sustainable development goals. But it is also evident that North Korean issue is very, very serious now and around nuclear issue continues to be followed, need to be followed very, very carefully. So these are the priorities in the coming years and I will follow these. I will discharge my responsibility with some sense of tense and follow these things like I did in the past years. Thank you. Any more questions? I'm Yoshitake from Japan's Asahi Shimbun. About DPRK team which was launched in August. If you have any update, please tell us. We have established this North Korean team in summer this year and the objective is to gather the core expertise and strengthen our efforts to monitor the North Korean nuclear programs and stay ready for the verification of the North Korean nuclear programs. This is not a big team, this is a small team but it is very important to give a clear mandate and visibility and we continue to work but at this stage we do not have anything particular to report. I hope that what I said about Section T is clear. It is not. Section T does not refer to access. It refers to technology. Access is referred to in other sections in the JCPOA and in additional protocol too. It is wrong to perceive that Section T is a super access code. It is not at all. It is about neural technology. Access is addressed in other parts of the JCPOA or additional protocol and verification tools are provided by additional protocol. Additional protocol is a very powerful verification tool and I am saying that it is possible to verify and monitor the issues related under Section T using the tools available under the additional protocol. When you were in Washington DC you met some people in the Congress as well. You asked Congress to decide what to do on the Iran issues. Was there anything that, what was your objective to meet them and do you think that your objective was met? My objective was met because my objective was to attend the Wilson Center's 60th year anniversary event and I made a keynote speech and that was my objective to visit Washington at that timing. But we are using the agency's money so I use this time to meet with as many policy makers as possible and I had a meeting with some staff in the White House and government. And there were some misunderstandings so I explained our view on access, our view on our safeguarded efforts and I stressed that the JCPOA is some clear, significant gain from verification for verification and our verification system in Iran is some of the strongest available and Section T is monitored and verified and these are some points and I also explained the details of our verification activities. Not the system but activities too and there were questions and I responded these questions. Mr. Director General, since you made a clarification there about the Section T question when you say in your interview with Reuters that you have limited tools and that clarification would be more helpful when it comes to Section T, it creates the confusion that you don't have enough access or you have problems in verification. You say now that the additional protocol is enough it gives you the tools that you need but when you say in the interview that your tools are limited it's a bit confusing for me. I didn't say enough, I never said enough. I said the tools available and the additional protocol are broadly applicable to address the issues under Section T and any clarification is helpful and these two are not contradictory at all. A follow-up on your Washington visit, did you walk away from these meetings with the impression that the miss sorry did you walk away from these meetings with the policy makers, lawmakers with the impression that you, that the misunderstandings have been cleared up or do some misunderstandings remain? I think my explanation was very helpful for them to better understanding the activities of the IAEA. President Donald Trump in mid-October when he refused to certify the JCPOA he said that the IAEA was being intimidated into doing its job, to stop it doing its job properly. Is that correct or is that fake news? I do not make comments on the remarks of the president but we are doing our activities as we need to. Thank you very much.