 getting public bags. And finally, most importantly, we are going to refocus on the regimes themselves, the 20th century regimes, how do they need to be updated? Do they need to be tweaked and reset to respond to what's happening with us? But to get us underway, let me request Frederick to give us a presentation on a subject that he has been pursuing for a while. Frederick, over to you. You have 15 minutes or so. Yes, thank you. So welcome, everyone, and welcome to the geopolitics of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In his groundbreaking book in 2016, Klaus Schwab said that we're just the beginning of this revolution, changing the way we live, work, and relate to one another. The changes are historic in their size, speed, and scope. What's been inadequately studied, and what I'll talk about briefly here, is the geopolitical changes of the Fourth Industrial Revolution will also be historic in their size and scope. Who will take the commanding heights in this breathtaking and unprecedented confluence of emerging technologies? And what impact may that have on how this tech revolution shapes our future? The most fascinating and compelling question within all of that, as posed to me by a foreign national security advisor, Steve Hadley, is, can the incumbent US and the insurgent China become strategic collaborators and strategic competitors in this tech space at the same time? He then adds the caveat, it's never been done before. So an unprecedented challenge for an unprecedented period of time, but I'll come back to that. Let me start with three framing arguments. First, this fusion of tech breakthroughs, blurring lines of the physical, digital, and biological space, is reaching an inflection point that makes it already clear that they will usher in a revolution that will determine not only the shape of the global economy, but also, and this is the important part, which nations and political constructs may assume the commanding heights of global politics in the coming decades, not just global technology, but of global politics. Second, over the course of history, societies that dominated economic innovation and progress have dominated international relations from military superiority to societal progress and prosperity. On balance, technological progress has contributed to higher standards of living in most parts of the world. However, disproportionate benefit goes to first movers. Third, the technological arms race for primacy in the fourth industrial revolution has essentially become a two horse contest. And some of you may argue with me a little bit later on this, and I think in a multipolar world, obviously there are many parts of the world where people are showing gains in many different aspects of this race. But at the moment, if you were looking at the AI race, if you were looking at the quantum computing race, if you were looking at bioengineering, it's really become a two horse contest between the United States and China. We're in the early stages of this race, but how it unfolds and is conducted will do much to shape global human relations. Moreover, the shift in 2018 in US-Chinese relations from a period of strategic engagement to greater strategic competition has also significantly accelerated the tech arms race. Finally, the nature of this emerging technological contest and this I want to make very clear because not everyone agrees with this, but the nature of this emerging technological contest may favor the insurgent China, rather the incumbent United States. So it's time to think harder about what that means. What does that mean for how we all need to manage tech change so that we can focus on the potential positive sum of its collaborative contributions rather than suffer from the dangers of zero-sum thinking and competition, which appears to be where we're headed now? So let's do a brief flashback to history to understand how technological breakthroughs have shaped their time. So I've taken you back to 125 AD and the Roman Empire's road system, which you might want to call the early internet. Roman innovations, including roads and aqueducts, allowed Rome to expand and govern its empire and become the most important political entity of the ancient world. In 1440 AD, Johannes Gutenberg optimized previous systems of printing to create the printing press. I think we lost the printing press. Yeah, the printing press seems to have been lost. Hang on. Yeah, there we go. So the Johannes Gutenberg optimized previous systems of printing to create the printing press in Europe. This innovation set the stage for European political and economic dominance for the following centuries. Then the creation of the steam engine and the following industrial revolution enabled Britain to create a global empire and this was the first industrial revolution. Most of our lifetimes have been colored by a largely US-driven era of technological innovation. So the second and third industrial revolutions. The second was electric power, bringing about mass production ahead of World War I, telephone, light bulb, phonograph, internal combustion engine, and then the third, the digital revolution, personal computers, internet, information, and communications technology. So if technological advance played a key role in determining who gained the upper hand in seizing the geopolitical commanding heights in the past, that's likely to be even more the case, even more the case during this most remarkable, most far-reaching, and most rapid of history's technological revolutions. Countries and companies who take the lead will dramatically increase their economic growth, competitive advantage, and political and economic influence globally. And as with the Cold War Contest, this race could also determine which system of governance reigns supreme. And it's not at all clear to me it will be liberal democracy or free market socially responsible capitalism at current trajectories. And though the race, as I said, was primarily between China and the United States, it was probably Vladimir Putin, a tech pioneer himself in cyber warfare, disinformation, and military systems, who set it best in earliest on with a certain sense of hyperbola, the one who becomes the leader in this sphere, meaning artificial intelligence will be the ruler of the world. The US was shocked into overdrive to win the tech race during the Cold War by what became known as the Sputnik Moment. When the Soviet Union launched the first human-made satellite into orbit on October 5th, 1957, it set off a national response that would change the course of geotech history. China quite recently has had its own version of the Sputnik Moment, which has sent the country into technological overdrive. Its Sputnik Moment, little noticed in the West, came in two parts and both involved artificial intelligence capability deployed by the US company Google being applied to the game Go, a confoundingly complex Asian game played on a 19 by 19 line board as you see with little black and white stones. And I have absolutely no idea how to play the game. The first shock came in the spring of 2016 when the Google system called AlphaGo defeated a world champion in Seoul, South Korea. In China, no one really noticed this much in the United States. I don't think in Europe either. In China, some 280 million people watched this machine owned by a California company, mastered their own game. The second shock came a year later in May, 2017, when the same American machine, in the words of the former boss of Google in China, Kaifu Li, quote unquote systematically dismantled the then 19 year old Go master seen here who was ranked at the top of the world. Doesn't seem quite as upset as you ought to be. Chinese authorities went so far as to ban any live stream of this defeat despite huge public interest. Within two months of that event, the Chinese government rolled out its ambitious roadmap called the next generation artificial intelligence plan. The goal was audacious by 2030 to become the global leader in AI, in theory, in technology, and in application. President Xi Jinping has shared with high level visitors that China was left behind by the first three industrial revolutions and paid the price. And he has told them that he's determined to win this round. And you see the growth of China's interest here. Before 2017 was out, Chinese venture capitalists and venture capital investors had poured enough into AI startups that they made up 48% of all AI venture funding globally, surpassing the US for the first time. Many on current trajectories, China will be the winner of this new technology race. Even though the birth of AI, better described as deep machine learning took place almost entirely in the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Beijing is at the precipice of taking the commanding heights of a period of tech development in which machines will both radically empower and perhaps dangerously displace human beings. Many in Silicon Valley have made the mistake of believing that it was inevitable that the internet and the associated digital revolution would inherently empower democracy, individual rights, and free speech. Yet there is just as much evidence that we could face a new, more sophisticated wave of what some call techno utilitarianism and less kind voices called techno authoritarianism. Kai Fu Li, and I recommend all of you who are interested in this, who if you haven't read his brilliant new book, AI Superpowers You Should. But Kai Fu Li argues that the harnessing of power of AI today, the electricity of the 21st century, requires abundant data, hungry entrepreneurs, AI scientists, and an AI friendly policy. He believes that China has the edge in all of these, and also in particular has the edge because the world has moved, in his view, from the age of out of the box research and development where the US has the edge in the strongest, to implementation where China is better. And from the age of world-leading expertise, again still favoring the US, where the scientists still are stronger, to the age of data where China wins hands down. The economist is called China the Saudi Arabia of data, and with that as the fuel for AI, it has an enormous advantage. And the government, without privacy restrictions, can gain data and use data in a manner that is out of the reach of any democracy. China has three times as many mobile phone users as the US, and those phone users spend 50 times more through mobile commerce. Any of you who have used or have seen the use of WeChat when understand how that works. Kai Fu Li's bottom line, China already has the edge in entrepreneurship data and government support, and it's rapidly catching up to the US in expertise. I haven't touched at all on the military implications of taking the commanding heights of artificial intelligence, which are chilling in a futuristic world of autonomous warfare. The United States is beginning to recognize the perils of losing this race in all its dimensions, but I'll leave it to others to dissect the military side of this. I think what's important to know is that current trajectories in the four primary areas of artificial intelligence over the next five years, China will gain, and in some areas of these technologies, particularly autonomous, sorry, particularly in perception AI dramatically, and autonomous AI coming back to parody five years from now. This is again from Kai Fu Li. But to a certain extent, maybe this was the wrong presentation altogether, because if we look at this as a zero-sum bilateral superpower contest, it's ignoring that AI and all its implications and the other emerging technologies as well are going to influence the entire world, and to have the Chinese and US at loggerheads over this in the end probably doesn't serve humanity. The societal implications of AI are far-reaching. This is a chart that just shows the jobs that will be lost, the jobs that will be in the danger zone, jobs that are in the safe zone. But more shocking are these statistics, which is across the West but also in China, the challenges of the fourth industrial revolution could be enormous, caused by AI-driven automation, up to 54 million US workers or 30% of the American labor force could be displaced by 2030. Similarly, in China, up to 100 million workers could lose their jobs in the wake of the fourth industrial revolution. That's 12% of the Chinese labor force, and you can see here 46% of the Japanese labor force could be displaced, and you can do that count all around the globe, and then think about what happens to populism and nationalism at that point if we don't figure out ways to deal with it. So what is the way forward with these huge societal implications but a bilateral race underway? I see three possibilities. Whoops. I see three possibilities. One is a sloppy status quo, a continuation of the status quo the last several years where China and the US continue to cooperate but increasingly view each other with suspicion. They manage their rising differences and distrust imperfectly, never bridging them entirely but also not burning bridges either between researchers, corporations, and others. The second possibility is a techno-cold war. China and the US turn the global tech contest into more of a zero-sum battle for global dominance, organizing themselves in a manner that separates their tech sectors from each other and ultimately divides up the world. Some of the political momentum is heading in that direction. But what impact does that have? What does this do for the Chinese giants on the global stage and their hold of their markets? What does it do for the US and billions of dollars of loss in China? And what does it do for overall technological developments in the world and how countries decide which one to side with? After being slow to recognize China GeoTech challenge and leaps in capability, the Trump administration has leaned more in the direction of countering and understanding what are the risks. A year ago this month, Axios published a leaked White House presentation that argued that the US and its allies should build a 5G network that excludes China. And a global pushback against Huawei is currently unfolding. The arrest of the CEO, a federal investigation into technology theft, and congressional legislation that would limit the use of US components in the telecommunications companies of China that are involved in breaking sanctions or embargoes. The third possibility is a collaborative future. Nicholas Thompson and Ian Bremmer argued in Wired Magazine November that despite the two countries' political and societal differences, the US should wrap China in a tech embrace. And that the two countries should work together to establish international standards to ensure that algorithms governing people's lives and livelihoods are accountable and transparent. They would recognize that while the geopolitics of technological change is significant, even more important will be the challenges AI poses to all societies across the world in terms of job automation and the social disruptions that may come with it. It may sound utopian to expect the US and China to cooperate in this manner, but this is the world economic forum. This is Davos and this is what we should hope. To do otherwise would be self-defeating and at the cost of others in the global community, which needs our best thinking to navigate the challenges of the fourth industrial revolution. And then I close with this, where Henry Kissinger has said recently we're in a position in which peace of prosperity in the world depend on whether China and the United States can find a method to work together, not always in agreement, but to handle our disagreements. This is the key problem of our time. Thank you for your attention. For those following us, do use the hashtag WEF19 and do follow the session on social media as well. This was a statutory announcement I forgot to make when we started the session. Fred, let me ask you something that bothered me here with your presentation. Of course, we were not on the map. That's one part of it. But you end with Kissinger, but have during your presentation kind of reached the conclusion or rather stressed on the fact that there is a serious decoupling underway. The tech embrace is unlikely to happen. And it is not just Trump. I think as someone very aptly put it, the deep state in the US and the loud state in the US have reached a conclusion that the US and China need to have a different sort of a relationship and technology and trade are no different anymore. It's when we talk trade and when we talk technology, we are actually using interchangeable words. Do you think there is a possibility of an entente where we can create the regulatory architecture pretty much like the USSR and the US were able to do in the 16, 70s, 80s? But it took us some time to get there. Correct. And our economies weren't as intertwined. I think that's one of the biggest differences between the Cold War and now is first of all, the Soviet Union just really wasn't that competitive of a global economic player. And China is. Second of all, our economies are deeply intertwined as we're seeing with the market hit from fears of China's slowdown today. And in general, the market getting hit whenever it looks as though that China and the US are going to be more at loggerheads than working at common purpose. Answering the overall question whether we can reach this, I'm almost embarrassed to try to answer because I do see someone in the room who's worked at that pretty hard and may know more about it. So at some point, if he doesn't mind, maybe we'll have Tom Bossert, a late of the White House, working on these issues if he's willing to give a point of view or two. You know, what I know is he, all of what I know he can fit on his little fingertip, so it may be worth trying to. I think we're just not, we're not talking in a way we need to talk strategically into the future. We haven't had the sort of Kissinger-Nixon moment with China and that opened up great possibilities. I think in the US, one hoped that China by having such economic success and such incredible lifting of the country from poverty into, it really is a miracle what's happened in China. And one had hoped that what would come with that is also a changing of society where it would be much easier for us to collaborate on the world stage as partners. And I think that's where you've seen a shifting of opinion in America from a hope that by engaging with China, you could have this combination of the two rising powers of the next age working together for a better global future. And there's a fear that that's not happening, that China's not playing enough by global rules. So I think you can only get to where you're going if there's a level of conversation, a level of looking into the future and a level of accountability and transparency in the questions of the future of particularly artificial intelligence, but you can go to human enhancement. You can go to any set of other issues where the ethical questions will be huge for the entire globe and no one's really starting the conversation about it. So while these two represent the two ends of a spectrum, China and the US in terms of what they offer to the new forms of globalization going ahead, there are other players as well. I mean, the US is struggling to reach some sort of a balance with its Atlantic cousins, say on data itself. You know, you mentioned data in one of your slides and as the new basis of the AI century, are you struggling to also have significant and serious conversations with other interlocutors besides China? The conversations have taken place and as I don't have access to top secret sort of clearances, I don't know at what level and how deep that you can imagine among the five eyes, among the closest intelligence friends of the United States, that this is becoming an increasing piece of conversation. But all of this has happened pretty fast. The breakthroughs have happened rapidly and a lot of it has happened really over the last two or three years where it's gone from a theory that one has been talking about for a long time to a series of breakthroughs that have made a lot of this technology much more doable and much more executable. And so I think that this is all new and there's not a conversation. There was a meeting of American ambassadors recently and I heard from a couple of them in that meeting that they were surprised the extent to which this is the center of conversation which is the technological future. And I think it's going to come to dominate conversations here in Davos and it's going to come to dominate conversations among allies at NATO and elsewhere and certainly China. And China has been a first mover in a lot of markets in some of these breaking technologies and the real question particularly in 5G and Huawei's ability to really win the global market in 5G sort of telecom equipment. And so the race is on. The conversations aren't taking place well enough but they certainly have accelerated and deepened considerably in the last months. Alice, let me come to you at this stage. In fact, in Fred's presentation he mentioned that sputnik moment. And we have seen a few recent developments in outer space which have clearly signaled new actors' intentions to put new energy, new resources, new efforts into a new form of space exploration, space rate, space dominance. In fact, if you have been following the space debate one, it's a badly governed space. Second, it's getting highly congested. It's probably the most expensive real estate outside of Terraforma. And three, militarization. Creeping militarization of spaces undeniable. Countries now have capabilities which they didn't have developed over this period of time. So for those sitting in the room, what frontier does space present today? Is it as serious in terms of possible contests and competition or are we seeing development that is more likely to benefit most of us? Yeah, I think it's a really good question. You're absolutely right that it wasn't so long ago that space was really dominated by those two superpowers, the US and Russia at the height of the Cold War. But now there's over 100 countries that have space programs. And interestingly, there's a whole new bow wave of commercial entrepreneurs as well. So you see a lot of private operators. Now, space is quite an evocative subject. Quite often when people think of space they think about missions to Mars. It was actually the space programs that are most pertinent to our everyday lives are those satellite missions orbiting around the Earth. And there is a fantastic development. There's a fantastic development in so far as what's achieved. 95% of the data that we need for weather forecasting comes from space. Over 50% of the measurements that we need to even understand climate change can only be measured from space. Space is in fact underpinning all of our financial transactions by providing the very precise time-stamping capability that we need to assure our financial transactions. So space really, really, really is absolutely part of our everyday lives. But then no one owns space. So you can see that you've got that capability, which is so fundamental to the way we live. And you've got hundreds of actors out there in the operating environment. And there are no norms of operation. I mean, the space operations are loosely marshaled, largely by UN procedures, which are largely voluntary in nature, which take many, many years to negotiate. And as a result, can often be quite out of pace with some of the technological developments we're seeing today. So on the one hand, you're right. There is a congested, there is a contested environment up there with both civil and military operators. But on the other hand, like Fred, I share a more optimistic outlook for cooperation in space, if only because everyone has a stake in that operating environment. Everyone has an interest in making sure that we do get safe operations. Because if there are collisions in space, then everyone stands to lose. And unlike collisions in other domains, you know, land, sea, air, those collisions stay where they are. In fact, those collisions become the cause of further collisions and further collisions, leading you to an exponential effect which could render the whole operating environment unusable. So I think the prospects for international cooperation in space remain quite strong. The visions for that cooperation, because I think you, Fred, in your presentation spoke about what is the system that we are exporting or what is the system that we are trying to put in place as countries sit around the table in carbon new regulatory ecosystem. Who do you think, amongst the current actors, is most likely to shape a space regime, a space-based regime where we can all come to a certain agreement on rules of conduct, code of conduct, norms of behavior? Who is carrying the bait in today? Yeah, so there's a couple of really interesting trends at the moment. I mean, ultimately, our legal frameworks will come back to the UN. But what we're seeing at the moment is an increased appetite in the industry, in particular, to really drive forward best practices, drive forward norms of behavior. What do I mean by that? I mean things like taking a commitment to limit the amount of space debris that is in that operating environment. There's nearly 2,000 active satellites providing everyday services back on Earth. There's hundreds of thousands of pieces of space junk. And navigating through that operating environment is becoming more and more of a challenge. And of course, the industry themselves, they have the biggest stake of all to make sure we get this right. So we're seeing a new push coming from India itself to align best practice around limiting space debris, more transparency about their operating regime. And I think that's the second area where we are likely to see some change. So to date, most of the world's information about those objects that are in space has been held in rather a closed system. It's been in the US military system. It's been provided as a global good. But when you consider today there's so many different actors, so many different countries, I'm not sure that that closed model can be fit for purpose for the space operations of the future. We may well need a more open system where all operators can act in a more transparent way and share information about those hazards in the operating environment. So technology companies, space companies, businesses now beginning to exert themselves in trying to bring governments and other actors together to create new regimes. Fred, is this likely to be a modus operandi for the US and China to begin to see a common future? Well, if you'll forgive me, sir, I'm a recovering journalist myself. I was at the Wall Street Journal for 25 years and I actually have a question. Because the answer is, I had a conversation with a national security advisor, H.R. McMaster, when he was in his job. And I asked him of all the things he's looking at in the world, and you can imagine the national security advisor is looking at a lot of danger. I said, what keeps you up at night? And he said, space. And so what is it about space that would keep him up at night? And I think it is connected to China, and I think it is connected to the military dimensions. But he didn't go into that level of detail in my conversation with him. But what keeps you up at night about space? And if you don't mind me. No, please. Mind you surfing the role of moderate. Because I do think this is a frontier, our whole economy rests upon this. Any war fighting that's been taking place, whether it's the Russians, the US, or anybody else, is connected to this. And so what worries you? What vulnerabilities do you see? Yeah, absolutely right. I mean, the US seniors talk about it in the language of space, providing the third strategic offset. So the first strategic offset being nuclear, the second being precise positioning, and the third coming from space or cyber in some way. And I think the belief is there because space really does give you so many powerful tools in communications and in navigation. If you can direct and navigate, if you can communicate securely, and if you can see what's going along in the theater securely, then you really have a lot of capability at your hands, which will really give you the advantage over your adversary. So I don't work in a military organization, so that doesn't keep me up at night. It probably would if I did. The thing that keeps me up at night is this idea around there being collisions in space, which would then cascade and render the operating environment unusable. And we have to find a way. There's a very fine balance here between a very understandable commercial competition element where you've got players around the world who want to be that first to market, the first to be able to provide, for instance, some of the amazing communications capability that's been talked about from constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit versus the risk that those new innovations may ultimately pose to the operating environment for every nation. So Fred, let me take back the mic and pose that question to you again. Do you think US industry could play a role in bringing the two countries closer to each other or techno nationalism and nativist economics and nativist business policies will actually see a section of the US industry exploit this new tension to their benefit? I'm going to answer this in a roundabout way. So if you look at the end of World War II, it was clear that the Soviet Union and the United States were going to be the competitors of that time. And I think it's relatively clear that China and the United States are going to be the ideological system competitors of this time. And we had to go through a Berlin airlift in 1948. We had to go through a Berlin crisis and building the wall in 1961. We had to go through a Cuban missile crisis in 1962. And it was really only after all that that we started talking sensibly about how not to blow up the world through our various ambitions and goals. I don't know what year we're at with China. I hope we don't have to go through those kinds of crises and nail-biting moments. But we've got to start talking with our allies, bringing in our allies, bringing in for sure India, the Europeans, the rest of the world. But somehow the US and China have to start talking. I think space wouldn't be a bad place to start. And I do think industry just has a role to play now particularly in the technological field where so many of the breakthroughs are there and so much of the understanding is there. And so I think industry can't sit back and think of itself as a bystander any longer. I think we all have too much at stake. And so maybe some of the best ideas for this period of time would come from industry rather than the quiet back walk in the woods kind of negotiations that would have taken place during the Cold War. We're going to open this up to all of you to come and join this conversation. I'm particularly going to get Tom into this debate. Tom, do you want to come in? You're here to learn. You're here to learn. Learn more. But before we go to the audience, let me ask you one last question. Export controls or technology restrictions? And you could see that the 5Is in varying degrees have begun that process of controlling tech, controlling the flow of AI, controlling the flow of intellectual property. Is that something you think is useful in globalization 4.0? Do you think it could really create access challenges for many others who need such technologies for the daily businesses and social purposes? Or are you fearful that if we are not careful today, we could be moving into a new round of export control regimes which will be commensurate or which would rather coincide with the proliferation or rather the control of technology that are today integrated, most of us, in the 21st century? I can't think of a tougher job than to decide, on behalf of the US government, what technology should be controlled and what technology should be commercially used on behalf of the US to deepen relationships with allies to strengthen the commercial standing around the world. And it's not an easy line to draw because the technology is moving so fast. And so clearly, you have to control the technologies if they were lost. It would be a danger to your national security. But there are other times where we control technology such as armed drones and then suddenly another country picks up that market and our allies are suddenly flying somebody else's drones. So I think it's really, really hard. And we're going to have to continue to try to protect our most sensitive technologies. But it's such a moving target that it's really, I can't imagine trying to keep up with that and doing it in a way that doesn't cost markets and outrage allies time and again. Space sector, I think it was a sector, especially in the 20th century, which saw limited capabilities being allowed to be transferred across borders because it had other uses as well, right? Yeah, absolutely. But if we're still discussing export control, I think actually the far more significant step forward would be around aligning some of the regulatory regimes. What you don't want is for some piece of technology, some highly innovative, but perhaps too unproven, too risky type of technology finding a flag of convenience somewhere and being launched into space for the detriment of all those other actors. So I think it's far more imperative on governments at the moment to focus on aligning those regulatory regimes to make sure that we establish a level playing field. Things like in orbit servicing is a massive new area, really exciting. And it could be a very, very effective way to prolong the lives of some of these very expensive space missions. But obviously, if you've got that capability, you can also use that capability in an offensive way as well. And we have to pay attention to that issue around space operations. Yeah, so I'm going to come to you now. So we have two interventions from the first floor here. Get my attention, and I will come to you as well. Go ahead, sir. Thank you. Your prediction about the work displacement surprised me because AI and the Industrial Revolution 4.0 are going to dramatically increase productivity. And when you increase productivity, people will have to work less hours a week and actually will not want to work many hours because they want to have a lot of spare time and free time to play with the new tools or to use the new tools and new technologies. So I don't think that they are actually also history shows that technology revolutions did not reduce the labor force. So technology does not lead to job losses. Can we take a series of questions and then come back to you? Look, I'm a student of this as you are. And my optimistic half full side wants to believe you're right. What I know so far about the technology, and it's not just going to hit blue colors. It's going to hit radiologists. It's going to hit legal clerks. It's going to hit the jobs that are going to be lost to this. Now, I was very interested to read Klaus Schwab's interview with Time Magazine coming into this because he acknowledges all of that but also thinks it's going to force us to rethink what the purpose of life is. Is the purpose of life to work 60 hours a week or is the purpose of life to sharpen my tennis game? I don't know. But the fact of the matter is that kind of shift in thinking happened when farmers moved into factories. It happened when, and there was a lot of feeling when digitalization first came about, that there would be enormous job loss. And you're right, a lot of jobs get created from new technologies in the new world that we're in, in the leisure area, in the entertainment area. There are all sorts of jobs that can be created. But it's going to happen quickly. And we already are facing a great deal of nationalism and populism, I think, less from globalization and more from technological change and people feeling unsettled by it all. And so I think we can't say for sure what's coming at us. But we ought to at least think about the possibility that this many jobs are going to be lost. And if that's true, what should we do about it? And I guess your larger observation is probably true. Technology does create more opportunities. That's shown that to be true over 200 years of our experience. But I think it's that transition shock that governments and countries have to respond to. And in this case, it is the rapidity of that shock. And it could not unfolding. The other thing that scientists are showing is it could bring an even greater concentration of wealth. So does that mean more government intervention to distribute that wealth, to avoid social upset? Because AI will be concentrated in certain hands. It will augment what you can earn off of certain activities and products. And it will weaken the lower end of the ladder. There may be even a bigger gap. So you've even got some people. I think Mark Zuckerberg gave a speech at a graduation last year of one of the universities where he talked about a minimum assured salary that American citizens would have to be promised at some point. So it will raise huge, huge society questions. So I think these days we are talking a lot of the rivalry between the United States and China. And now we are doing the same thing. But when I listen to such a talk, it reminds me of the one historical moment of the rivalry between setting right the German Empire against British Empire, one rising power and one dominating power. And I think the United States seems to feel the same frustration as the British Empire once had felt. And Germany the same way. But the history shows that the post-German Empire and the British Empire was nothing but the troublemakers in terms of World War I and II. And United States came in as peacemakers. They were actually the troubleshooters. And so it seems to me that in the future we are facing, we are going forward to digitalize the decentralized world. So we are no more fighting for commanding heights in terms of market or territory. So probably we might end up fighting another peacemaker or troubleshooter, which don't identify at this point of time. From what we can inform when we are talking about globalization 4.0, we are thinking of something like that, which is shaping. For example, I'm from South Korea. I'm a chairman of the Eastern Group and was chairman of World Energy Council. I recently found out that South Korean economy is larger than Russian economy. Small forest countries have become larger than one superpower, Russia. So I think the world is changing very drastically. And for example, in terms of the energy transition, energy storage system is the technology of future. And South Korea is the leader, and no one recognizes it. And so in the future, probably India or someone like some organization like World Health Forum initiative that comes from that we have, can shape the world in the future and becoming the troubleshooter for all the troubles caused by United States or China. I think there was a comment, but I could probably ask you both to respond to that as well. But let's try and get another one from the audience. I saw, yeah, there you are. Do you want to comment? There's a hand there. Hi, I'm Sraab Sinha. I'm a global shaper from the New York City Hub. And recently there's been a refocusing on the moon and the lunar space race, especially between the US and China. So when thinking about the resources down on the moon, how are we thinking about who owns the moon, how are those resources allocated, and how do we make sure that countries with developing space programs, how do they have a seat at the table when we're thinking about this? And then also what are the national security implications of this lunar space race? Thanks. Great. So let me go to Alice now. Yeah, no, I mean, that's absolutely the right question to be asking. There is a new resurgence in exploration. I think it's a fantastic, exciting time in exploration, actually, because most of the world's efforts have been focused on the International Space Station for the last 20 years. We're now really at an inflection point. We've got a blank sheet of paper in front of us. You know, the exploration has been a fantastic success in international cooperation. We need to make sure that that endures going forward. So you're right. There is a new push to the moon. We will be discussing having an international space station, but not orbiting the Earth, but orbiting the moon. From that, we will use that as a launch pad to go further and onto Mission St Mars. And the specific point around resource mining is really where the ultimate goal is to be able to find everything you need for space exploration from space. Because if you can get to that tipping point, then you're really, really opening up a huge new paradigm in what can be achieved in our space exploration missions. So it's interesting. It almost reflects back to the conversation we're having on export control. There, we're not talking about export control, but we are talking about standards. We are talking about putting in place systems which all countries around the world can participate in because there are common standards and they're enabling standards. And through that, we certainly hope that we're able to have a bigger multilateral even than we've had before. And bear in mind before, on the international space station, we have over 103 countries. So it's pretty impressive already. He also asked you about property rights. Ah, yes, yeah, whole new legal world. I couldn't, in all credibility, give you the answer. It's keeping many lawyers in gainful employment, so maybe that's part of the answer to the earlier question too. To date, the moon has been a site of special scientific interest and that has limited what we can do in the end that will have to be, presumably under UN frameworks, a mechanism via which countries can agree that resource mining in a sustainable way. We're not there yet. So I think one almost has to have some panels planned at World Economic Forum. Maybe there already are, which is what can we be optimistic about and what should we celebrate? Because if you look from the birth of the World Economic Forum to now, global poverty's been cut in half. Correct. The global middle class is bigger than it's ever been before. Technology is available to more people in the world than it's ever been before, so we have the tools to unlock the best era of human progress the world has ever seen. But we can also miss that chance, miss that opportunity. That's why we talk about the issues that we're talking about. On South Korea, there are breakthroughs all over the place that are really exciting technology around the world. The nuclear technology that South Korea has been developing to protect against proliferation. The small module nuclear plants, the smart plants is really interesting. But if we're going back to this history moment, the founders of the Atlantic Council, Dean Atchison, Mary Pillsbury Lord, Lucius Clay, they all sort of congregated around this notion of being there at the creation. And that was Dean Atchison's famous book about that period of time where the US got so much right at the end of World War II after getting so much wrong at the end of World War I. I think we're at another one of those points. So are we going to do 1919 or are we going to do 1945, which on balance I'd rather have that, although it wasn't great for everybody, it was a move in the right direction. And that takes people who are there at the creation. So are we there at the reinvention? Are we there at the reinvigoration? Are we there at the destruction? And so Peggy Noonan's written about genius clusters. And so at these moments of time where history is bent in the right direction, you tend to have this cluster of geniuses, whether it's Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman, whether it's Conrad Adnan, Alvaro Shulman, that come about. And for the life of me, I don't see that genius cluster right now. And you wonder whether it's going to emerge in the right time or whether it's going to take something, something awful to get us there. One hopes not, but the times are so promising in so many ways. But where is the genius cluster that's going to tap this and then put together a new world order that really works for everybody and takes us in the future? And I think to a certain extent, that's what this whole Davos has been organized around by Klaus is the whole title of it has been aiming at that. And we're all kind of swimming in the deep trying to find our way. I think I entirely agree. But I think it's also about us finding common platforms, finding common goals and objectives. We will always need the peacemakers in the mix. But also if we can find areas of shared interest and that changes, right? As technology changes that changes. It's why I really enjoy working in space but you can't help but have that perspective. Astronauts talk about this overview effect, that very iconic image that you get when you look down and you see the earth and you realize that the geopolitical borders don't really matter at all. So I think it's finding those common platforms. I had made just one anecdote from last year. I've talked already about the UN frameworks and this need to use those UN frameworks to find common modes of operation. Last year, one of my teams said, we're nearly there. We're nearly there. It's the first time in decades. But we're nearly there with a new UN treaty. I said, well, that's amazing. What's it covering? He said, it's a weaponization of space. I said, that's absolutely remarkable. That's surely the most controversial topic you can imagine. And he said, no, no, no, weaponization but not at each other. Only at something else. So I was like, right. So what we were about to agree was it was OK to use space as a weapons means for aliens. But we didn't even get that one. So before we wrap up the session, let me ask you both possibly a, let me throw a curveball in the baseball lingo platform. I think you use the word platforms. As we move into the world, which is proliferated by rapid change, technological change, the gig economy, questions around work, informality, new forms of social cohesion, existence, coexistence, do we need the 1945 solution or are we chasing the fool's gold? Or do we need a more informal platform-based systems of solution finding, which are nimble, lithe, flexible, mobile, where informal gatherings, maybe not the genius cluster but some semi-genius clusters themselves, can respond to a specific issue rather than creating the UN of the 21st century. Do we need more divorces? Do we need more gatherings where business leaders, academics, media thinkers, civil society can actually produce nimble solutions? So are we moving towards a new age of informal institutions and informal regulations which rely on standards not necessarily on laws? Short answer, it's got to be public-private. And I know that's kind of a catch word now. But when people get into trouble, when you don't get your paycheck in the United States right now, when you're afraid of war, you're going to turn to your country. And I think the era of the nation state is not over and will continue as far as I can see into the future. The problem is the nation state doesn't have the tools to solve all the problems it's expected to solve. And so it has to work together with non-state actors, with NGOs, with others to solve it. The question is, what coalition of actors can you actually put at a table to solve what problems? And there are some models for this and there are some models that are working all right. So nation state can't do it alone, but it's not going to go away. The informal networks aren't going to solve all the problems of the world. But the nation state can't do it without these networks. Everything Fred said. And pace. And base. Pace. That's the really significant issue we have is that technological innovation is at a pace which far outstrips our ability to govern. So we need using these only big UN structures, for instance. So we have to find a way around that. And back to AI tools can actually help governments deliver services better and more efficiently. And so there's ethical AI that could be really game changing in a positive sense. So as I conclude this session, I carry back with me four thoughts which were expressed by these two very erudite speakers, the role of the private sector, and its partnership with governments. I think that's a central theme that was evident. Second, of course, was regulatory innovation itself and can technology, as you mentioned at this particular last intervention, can technology itself be a problem solver to its own creations? And can we use AI and big data as a regulatory input to manage the world? The third, of course, was the social transformations. And I think the largest regulatory interventions will have to come toward the management of societies that are going to be implicated by this change. If we don't get the average Joe Wright, if we don't get his ecosystem healthy, he's going to work in certain ways. He's going to express himself politically or socially. So I think management of societies, even as we manage technology, is equally important from what I heard this afternoon. And finally, genius clusters, I think that was a way of saying that we need leadership. We need, this world requires new kinds of leadership, new forms of leaders, leaders with new ideas, with creative minds, and possibly we might have some of them outside. Please join me in applauding the panel for the intervention. And thank you for joining us at this time. Thank you.