 Today I'm joining you from Perth, Western Australia on the traditional lands of the Noongar people. We all pay our respects to the first Australians on whose land we each meet and acknowledge and celebrate their elders past and present. I welcome you to the last of the ANU Crawford Leadership Big Picture Series panel discussion. Throughout the month of June we have held five panel discussions on a range of topics, some of the most important challenges facing us in these unprecedented times. All our discussions are available on YouTube and ANU TV. Today we have an outstanding line-up of panellists who will look back over the past discussions, give us their thoughts on some of the big issues of the day and challenge us with their perspectives on matters such as globalisation, nationalism, the increasing rivalry between great powers, the fracture between the East and the West, growing inequality and injustice, the disruption of technology and how our climate and our global economy will cope in a post-COVID world. The panel discussion is not live but we have taken questions from registration and given them to the panellists. So please join with me in hearing from the Honourable Kevin Rudd, Ambassador Samantha Power and Dr Lynn Cook, hosted by Janice Peterson from SBS World News. Like Julie, I too would like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the land where I am today. It happens to be a beautiful patch of Sydney, the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation, and I extend my respect to elders past, present and emerging. Hello everyone, I'm Janice Peterson from SBS World News and it's my great pleasure to be hosting this ANU Crawford leadership panel. Big picture panel, what kind of world? Again, a big hello to everyone tuning in. It is so wonderful to have you with us and a big thank you to everyone who sent through questions for this panel. We will try to get through as many of those as we can, but there is a bit of a crossover in some areas that we're likely to cover. So hopefully even if your particular question isn't put to our esteemed panel, we will still cover the territory that you're interested in. The COVID-19 pandemic has upended the world. It's changed our lives in the most profound and unexpected ways and it's thrown up a lot of questions as well. So what effect will the pandemic have on the deeper forces shaping the world we live in? What will happen to globalization? What happens to the distribution of power in the international system and who will lead a post-pandemic world? What's the future of multilateralism and how will the deep currents of nationalism and populism be affected? What won't change? Well, we'll explore these questions and much more in today's panel. And let me tell you, this is a Zoom chat like I've never had in lockdown. This is an absolute highlight and I'm sure that you're looking forward to it too. Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia and President of the Asia Society Policy Institute, New York. Kevin Rudd became Australia's 26th Prime Minister in 2007. He was also, of course, a foreign minister for Australia. He's very active, as we know, on the international stage using his vast experience in foreign affairs to help shape policy and foster diplomacy. He's not in New York, but he's in sunny Queensland. Welcome, Kevin Rudd. Good to be with you. Wonderful. Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Professor of Practice, Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Law School. She served as the 28th U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN as well as a member of President Barack Obama's Cabinet. And he says she is one of our most foremost thinkers on foreign policy. We're absolutely thrilled to have her with us. Welcome Ambassador Samantha Power. Good to be here. Wonderful. And Lynn, Dr Lynn Kwok is Shangri-La dialogue senior fellow for Asia Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and senior research fellow at the University of Cambridge. Now her research focuses on international relations, security and law particularly in the Asia Pacific. Welcome aboard, Dr Lynn Kwok. Thank you so much for having me, Janice. Good to be here. Absolutely pleasure. Kevin, I'd like to begin with you. For the past 100 years, the world order of course has largely been shaped by the U.S. more than any other nation, but it faces a peer competitor in China and relations between the two are increasingly hostile. Now, you've had a lot to say about this. You recently argued that we're heading into a Cold War 1.5 and a steady drift towards international anarchy. Why do you see this as a life-threatening that other countries can do to prevent it? Well, we need to think clearly about what constitutes a global order. I think what history teaches us is it's made up of a couple of things. The first is whether we like it or not a balance of power or a predisposition for power to lie with a great power. And since effectively 1945, that's been the United States. But the second element of the global order is that's called the international system. And that's made up of the institutions of global governance, either through the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and those which have been developed since then, such as the G20. And an order, whether it's functioning or not, is usually the product of those two things working with a reasonable degree of harmony. Of course, what's changed, and you correctly pointed this out, is the rise of China. This has been a 40-year-long project, but it's really become much sharper since the advent of Xi Jinping in 2012, 2013. And China now, both through its operational behavior, both in diplomacy and in security policy, is seeking to push America's hold on the balance of power and on the international system back. China will be, as it were, cautious about saying that in clarion-clear declaratory terms. But if we look at their operational behavior, and Samantha would know this for well from her work on the UN Security Council, that's what we see. And so why do I say that this is pushing us in the direction of international anarchy coming out of the COVID world, the post-COVID reality? I think America emerges from the COVID-19 crisis, deeply damaged, both objectively in terms of the hit on the economy, objectively on the hit of the United States budget as a result of that. But also reputationally through the extraordinary behavior of Trump and the international community. But the other thing is that people often assume there's a consequence of that. China emerges as the winner. I don't subscribe to that view. China has been hit fundamentally by this crisis as well, and that's before we go into the events of the last several days with the possible second wave effect in Beijing. The economy has been hit. It's the worst growth in half a century, and politics has been roiled domestically, and China reputationally in Asia and around the world has taken a big hit because of its failure to contain this virus in the first period of time. And so what I see and I sense is that across the international system is beginning to emerge with neither the United States nor China leading the international system. That leads to one side, whether the rest of the nation states in the world would actually support Chinese leadership, the international system, a debate in itself. But therefore for the rest of us who make up middle powers and small powers around the world, we're faced with two strategic alternatives. Either you sit back by the popcorn and watch the international order sort of grind into nothingness, or what I've described earlier in a review of the UN system several years ago as death by a thousand cuts. That is just incrementally relevant as people step around the system. Or you have other powers and what I describe as middle powers with a combined diplomatic and political interest in triaging the international system until we have a new level of equilibrium between China and the United States. Final point is, that's why in my view, it's not a partisan view, it's just an objective international relations view. It's kind of crucial that Biden wins to, as I've described in stuff I've written, I think the next four years will be the last chance saloon for American global leadership. Either America gets its dot, dot, dot, dot together in the next four years, or they don't, and we continue to drift towards anarchy. And Biden's likely to have a first class team around him. But if he loses, then I think all bets are off as to what happens to international order. Samantha, I'd like to bring you in at this point. We've heard Kevin Rudd's thoughts on the US there, and also China not necessarily emerging triumphant out of this crisis. How do you see the pandemic is accelerating existing trends in the international order? Or do you think we'll see some sort of fundamental turning point? Kevin Rudd certainly not suggesting this is going to be the case, but is there a possibility, even a remote one, that there might be a Chinese-led global order out of this pandemic? Well, I agree with an awful lot of what Kevin Rudd has just said, and particularly on the need in the vacuum for middle powers to step up. I think over the course of the last three and a half years, our European friends, our Australian friends, Japan, Republic of Korea, our friends across Latin America and Africa just shell shocked really by the 180 in American foreign policy, at least as it was perceived outside. And really only recently have you started to see different actors in different settings beginning to exercise muscles that they actually had all along. But that given the catalytic role that the US had played in mobilizing international coalitions, those muscles hadn't been used for a long time. So I did think it was noteworthy that Australia led the push, yes, with the US prodigate I'm sure from behind the scenes, but to look into accountability over the pandemic in terms of how it started, what the lessons learned were. Australia prepared to do that despite the threats and then ultimately the penalties that China has exacted in response to that. You see on vaccine development, Canada, Germany, stepping up, convening countries, yes, China has very much injected itself into that conversation with a major announcement of a $2 billion contribution, the biggest kind of eye popping announcement that China has made in an international forum, arguably in history. And, and, but again, who is the convener who is the catalytic actor. I think the first movers club is really intriguing from outside, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Taiwan, countries that did better. It doesn't take much to do better than the United States, which is leading the world in COVID deaths, tragically, but for those countries to come together to share best practices on how to combat misinformation to share lessons learned from reopening schools. Again, the tendency has been, of course, of much of the last seven plus decades, it's the US that brings those countries together and creates these fora. So it's kind of intriguing, frankly, to see a country's now just getting on with it. The one thing I would add to what Kevin has noted is how important I think, given the rise of China, and its tremendous influence on the international scene, but given also that the model that it is presenting is an undemocratic model. It is an authoritarian model. It is a capitalist model. Yes. But it is a model that democratic countries have a strong interest in outshining. And again, it doesn't help that argument globally that the United States has fared so poorly in its handling of the pandemic. It doesn't help that the US has cut off funding to the World Health Organization at the height of the greatest, largest pandemic since 1918. None of that helps in terms of showing what democracies can do, but there are democracies right now performing incredibly in the face of the pandemic. Democracy is showing the importance of expertise, science, state capacity, also state legitimacy. The US's polarization, the divides, the virulence of the divide, I know Australia has some of those divides as well. But those divides really impede the kind of collective solidarity you need to see in the face of the pandemic. So, as we think about what the middle powers are doing or how we avoid the kind of anarchy that Kevin has warned about, what those countries that are sitting on the fence or may have been backsliding recently and going in a more populist or xenophobic direction. And when they see democracies around the world ably handling containing at the very least this pandemic, when they watch how countries adjust in the wake of the pandemic in terms of their supply chains, how quickly their economies recover, whether they get the right balance between stimulus and other economic approaches. I mean, all of that is going to have bearing on what is the contest of the 21st century, which is whether the authoritarian capitalist model is going to get more adherence or whether democracies are going to stand their ground and show that they can deliver for their people. Samantha, you worked so hard to help shape US foreign policy strategy in recent years. I mean, how do you feel personally with Trump throughout his presidency really being so wedded to this idea of, in his words, ending the era of endless wars in far away lands that many people have never heard of? That's how he puts it. He doesn't want America to be the world's policeman. I know you've touched on this already, but how do you feel personally that you've worked towards building America up as a global leader and you're now seeing this retreat from the current administration? Well, first let me say that very few people would raise their hands and say that they're in favor of endless wars. I feel strongly in opposition to endless wars and acknowledge that there is a fair amount of overlap actually between Vice President Biden, my own, as well as a Democratic foreign policy advocate on the outside, my thinking about the over militarization of US foreign policy and the rhetoric of President Trump. But the challenge is President Trump has increased the number of troops in the Middle East and it's not at all transparent about his plans, even for Afghanistan, where the massive infusion of not only American blood and treasure, but that of our closest allies has not brought about the kind of stability that so many people had hoped for. So let me distinguish that where again I think there's overlap and the one reason there's overlap is of course that the Afghan war has lasted so long in the Iraq war carried such costs for the American people and above all for the people in Iraq and the broader region. And so there's, you know, that explains to some extent this desire to kind of come home. But other dimensions of Trump's foreign policy are rooted, you know, in a fallacy, in a notion that we can all set the clock back, not to the pre-Obama period, which he'd also like to do, he'd like to undo anything and everything Obama has done even if it has delivered for the American people. But to set the clock back to the 18th century to a time when we didn't have the kind of trade ties, the kind of supply chain networks all around the world where America was a country, you know, obviously majority white majority Christian, with none of the diversity that we have and none of the family ties that we have to countries like Nigeria, Bangladesh, India, Somalia, Australia for that matter. And there's no setting the clock back. That's an impracticality and his presidency and this pandemic show that. I mean, this is a man who would be very quick to want to close down borders, but your ability to do that while keeping your economy afloat is very, very non-existent. So, so I think when you ask, how do I feel? I mean, I feel like, like many and I think the pandemic has really tested the central tenets of Trump's approach. Trump has turned his back on our core alliances. He has rejected international cooperation as something that is in the US interest to the degree that he pursues it. He's very transactional and very short term. He's rejected science and expertise, technical expertise as being the foundation for public policy, whether in something like a pandemic or on a whole range of other issues. And all of those predispositions on Trump's part have come back to haunt not just him and you see his polls dropping by his standards precipitously. In the outside world, it looks like they're staying remarkably stable, but he's lost massive support by again by the standards of our very divided electorate because of his handling of the pandemic. But, but you know, he's he's also, I think, inviting a conversation among people who had been inclined to just close ranks behind him about whether expertise matters about whether global cooperation matters about whether nationalism as viewed as isolationism and this degree of inward nationalistic focus as to whether that can work and deliver for the American people. So my hope, I mean, echoing what Prime Minister Rudd said, but, but my hope is not only that you see yes, of course a new president, but also rejection of those tenets of the Trump way, because Trump is just a symptom of a set of tenets that aren't just attractive here. There's also gotten more traction in countries like Hungary, Turkey, Russia, and you know where populace are ruling and when they're rejecting expertise and science and pitting one part of society against the other. That is not actually going to benefit even those people who support the leader pursuing that line of approach and I think the pandemic has really exposed that and creates an opportunity for rethinking of these allegiances. What about from you? How do Asian countries view the deterioration of US-China relations as affecting Asia and particularly Southeast Asia? It's fair to say that Asian countries including Southeast Asia are viewing the worsening relations between the United States and China with considerable alarm. It really hurts prospects for growth for the region, but also what it does is it narrows the strategic choices that are available to countries in the region. I think the United States has said repeatedly that it's not asking countries to choose sides. You know, whatever is that they say in a world that's increasingly decoupled, whether it's in terms of technology or trade. Southeast Asian countries in particular are going to be finding it increasingly difficult not to make a choice and this puts them in an impossible bind because what are they looking at? The United States provides a security umbrella for the region and under that umbrella countries have been able to take shelter and become relatively prosperous, so they appreciate that. China will not be able to step into that role very easily even though its military is growing because of mistrust of China and various other factors. The US multinational corporations as well, they form the largest bulk of foreign direct investment in much of Asia and although China is fast catching up with the United States, the United States still has a lead role in that respect. Now China on the other hand is the largest trading partner of many countries in Asia, including all of the United States allies, and it's been the largest trading partner of ASEAN as a whole for over a decade. And China also benefits from the fact that or the perception that it has the wind behind its economic sales. So what are countries being asked to make a choice about put very bluntly? It's a choice between security and prosperity and prosperity. And most countries know that you can't have economic growth without security and without security, economic growth will be very difficult. So I think if we look at how countries in Southeast Asia have been handling it, they've really tried to tiptoe around the issue. And looking at the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which was issued last summer, we see them try to do this balancing act between the United States and China. So while it adopts Indo-Pacific terminology to reference the region, it also talks about the importance of infrastructure development for the region. And it does not talk about the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which incenses China and instead focuses on the importance of economic integration as well as connectivity. It tries to reassert the centrality of ASEAN and importantly underscores the importance of adhering to a rules-based order. So this last bit is significant because I think in this tug-of-war between the United States and China, if Southeast Asian countries in particular are to have any hope of trying to maintain any degree of independence or flexibility of foreign policy options, I think how they would best approach this rivalry is that they should be framing their choices in terms of a choice not between the United States and China, but a choice to uphold principles and the rule of law. And this means some circumstances mean offending China and the circumstances mean offending the United States. So there's very precarious balance. Well, and it's fascinating to see how China's manipulating its image. Kevin Rudd, what do you make of that? How is China going at balancing its more aggressive so-called wolf warrior diplomacy with its more gentler, hard-on-its-sleeve approach? Because we see it, don't we, at the moment, barking at critics, but it's also positioning itself as a bit of a global saviour. It's dishing out medical equipment, supplies to the world, not to mention that multi-billion-dollar aid package that Samantha mentioned a little bit earlier. Do you think this strategy is working out? Let me say just a few short things about that so we can bounce the conversation around a little bit. Look, we should never forget that China is driven by domestic politics. And the reality is that China's communist regime has taken a huge hit in terms of domestic legitimacy as a consequence of the events of January and February of this year. That is that when the Communist Party failed to manage the pandemic and when we had a large number of infections and deaths within China itself. But more importantly, a huge hit on the economy and the fundamental social contract between the Communist Party and the Chinese people for the last 40 years, which is along these lines. You, the people, give us your political rights and we will ensure that you are economically prosperous. That contract has been partly torpedoed by the scale of the economic damage which has been delivered to Chinese people. One little anecdote, there are no jobs for university graduates in China this year. So what are they doing? Everyone due to graduating university in China this year and from my recollection, that's probably about 10 to 12 million people, they've been told to do graduate school. In fact, there are no options. That's just one minor insight in terms of what the employment market is doing in China and with its call at a less than even trajectory towards economic recovery. So the reason I speak about this a little is that it's important for us not to assume that China is simply driven by international factors when it engages in its various forms of international behavior. It's driven also by deliberate, shall we say, exercise in domestic nationalism by the Chinese system in order to revalidate the legitimacy of the system. So that brings us into the second question, which is, and what are they doing in the system internationally? And many of us will stretch our heads as professional diplomats. I used to be one. Samantha was one. And we've observed why would China want to unleash wolf diplomats, to go out there and frankly do exactly the opposite of what Dale Carnegie's book told us to do 60 years ago, which is to win friends and influence people. I had this old fashioned view as a professional Australian diplomat back in the Mesolithic period when I first joined the Australian Foreign Service. But our job was to go and win friends and influence people. This is basically saying to any country which disagrees with Beijing, you're wrong and you need to, quote, correct your mistake, some quote. So for those of us engaged in, let's call it rational diplomacy, this is passing strange, but it's not passing strange. If it's all about a domestic political game aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the system, which has taken a huge pounding. And final point is, if you look at China's objective behavior in the world and its objective standing, it now has a bucket load of problems on its hands, not just a hit on the economy. How does that play into their ability to fund the Belt and Road? The enduring and intensifying security policy tensions with its neighbors, particularly given its predisposition playing that domestic nationalist card to push down on the India-China border, to push down on Hong Kong, to push down on the South China Sea with a further extension of Chinese declared administrative zones in order to enhance its sovereignty claim, to push down on Taiwan and to push back against Japan and the East China Sea. So there's an objective bucket of problems here, but what we learn from this, I think, or I observe, is that the principal problem as perceived from Beijing is to re-entrench internal legitimacy of the system, given the huge hit which they've taken as a consequence of COVID-19. I want to talk more of that bucket of problems that you've talked about there, Kevin Rudd. We've got a question from the audience. Do you think military power will and should be scaled down as a result of COVID-19? Is that to me or to Samantha? That's to you, Kevin, if you're happy to pick it up. All right, I hope you're quick and smart, and Samantha's already talked about the, so we say the overplay of let's call it the military dimensions of international policy, looking at it from an American perspective. And certainly my own critique to the Bush administration, largely echo that talk about a squandering of the American unilateral moment at the end of last century. Bush gets elected by half a hanging chat. And then we have America's extraordinary accumulation of political capital basically flushed down the S-bin through this extraordinary adventurism in Iraq in pursuit of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, which never existed. And the consequence of that has been an America being embroiled in that part of the world for a long period of time. So Samantha didn't say this, but I'm kind of from the Teddy Roosevelt School of American Foreign Policy. Walk quietly and carry a big stick, which is everyone knows that America can act, but it should exercise its military power selectively, deeply selectively, in order to ensure that the system is performing. As for the ability to deal with the sorts of challenges which the pandemic has created, it goes back to our original discussion of a functioning global order. You can't take geopolitics out of the equation. Much lin is our Southeast Asian friends would like to from time to time and kind of wish it away. It's just there. We just got to deal with it. But secondly, on these clear areas of global governance dysfunction, which is pandemic management, it goes to the other arm of a functioning international system, which are the institutions of international governance. And therefore our job as responsible global citizens should be to do whatever we can to reinvest in and to re-empower the critical institutions of global governance. In this case, the World Health Organization to act independently, not to be subject to political pressure and to have much more vigorous and intrusive inspectorate powers than they've had in the past. That I think lies in what we need to do rather than kind of wishing the military away, because in an idealistic world and even certainly in a realistic world, it ain't going to happen. Samantha, I'd like to get your thoughts on how this pandemic has been handled. Obviously, as Kevin mentioned there, the WHO has copped a lot of flak for the way it's handled things. But how do we rally against misinformation and disinformation? Because we've seen the WHO also criticized for pandering to China, some of the world leaders have paid a severe price. And so we saw a lot of people turning to conspiracy theories, fake news about the virus. Who do we turn to to trust a trusted voice in a time of crisis? Well, let me take the misinformation question, which I think is the heart of what you're asking in just a second, and just step back and pick up on where Kevin left off on functioning, effective, potentially strengthened international institutions. One of my favorite sayings about the UN, one of those international institutions that in the case of the UN Security Council has been blocked on the pandemic, can't even declare the pandemic a threat to international peace and security, even though we were able to do so for Ebola. And this is so much more dire and has affected every country on the earth and tens of millions of people. So the UN Security Council, not functioning WHO you mentioned, but my favorite saying about the UN system comes from Richard Holbrook, a late American diplomat, who'd like to say blaming the UN for a crisis is like blaming Madison Square Garden, you know, our place where people play basketball in New York City, Madison Square Garden, when the New York Knicks play badly. That is, you're largely blaming a building. You can blame Madison Square Garden all you want. You can blame Wembley, you can blame whatever you, but ultimately, it's the players and, as everyone knows, particularly the major players who are going to dictate the ultimate performance. So when it comes to looking back at the World Health Organization, you cannot divorce the World Health Organization's response from the fact that from day one of the Trump administration, the United States had been withdrawing from a whole variety of international bodies, actually not the WHO, but even though it wasn't doing a high profile tantrum as it would subsequently do on the WHO prior to the pandemic, it didn't fill its executive board seat. It wasn't even a relevant presence. So yes, the US, as Trump says, is the number one donor to the World Health Organization, and that's incredibly important and should give it a ton of influence. We have, I think, 17 US citizens who work embedded in the World Health Organization staff that was part of this alarm system and this coordinating body. But do you think that people back in Washington were paying much attention to what those 17 civil servants or public health professionals had to say about what they were learning from within the WHO? No, not at a political level, because again, the disposition was to be mistrustful to feel that, you know, anything global is bad and they're trying to rip us off and take our money. And I mentioned that because that's in terms of the US role in the WHO before and during the pandemic. China is very, very similar. Again, it's a major player on what should be a team. So you can blame the WHO and there's, and there's a lot to look back at, particularly on the issue that Kevin raised, which is, you know, the question of whether they could have pushed harder for access sooner. And when denied access, whether they should have been more outspoken rather than taking the diplomatic approach, the traditional diplomats approach of being obsequious, which does not stand up well with time and in light of events. But, but China, who was going to stand up to China? Who was going to have the back of the WHO civil servants saying you stick it to them? They're blocking access. They're not letting you go to Wuhan. They're not allowing you to dispatch your team to figure out what the heck is going on. They're telling you there's no human to human transmission. You know, instead of being credulous in that way, push and indeed push publicly if that's what you need to do for access. For that to happen, either the US was going to be that voice pushing as it has been traditionally over the years, or again back to Kevin's original point, the democracies or the countries in the WHO who believe in accountable governance who were alarmed at what their health professionals were telling them should have delivered that message in mass instead of waiting for the civil servants. The Secretary General likes to say that he's more secretary than general, and you can view the international civil servants to some extent in a similar vein. So my point here is that as we think about what strengthening international institutions is going to look like, there's really no door number two that doesn't pass through major capitals, or that doesn't require building a coalition, at least a numerically influential coalition of middle powers or smaller countries to either have to have strengthened numbers or you have to have the strong powers, not at longer heads, or one of them really driving reform agenda and isolating the other. And so I just think that's really important to bear in mind because it's very tempting to just see the bright shiny object and the logo of the UN agency. But it comes back, you know, again, unfortunately, to what Beijing and Washington are going in the wake of this pandemic to push the WHO to become. And I don't see current modern day today's Washington or today's Beijing with any appetite to do the things that Kevin rightly said are needed for a strengthened WHO. And so it's going to require much as the launching an investigation into the pandemic required other countries really isolating China, the US and China may well be isolated on these questions of strengthened authorities and so be it. But it's going to require lots of very energetic diplomacy to build that coalition such that that will get done, given the disproportionate weight that the major donors have in these organizations. Let me just say a quick thing and sorry to not go right at your question but on misinformation, and actually take a little bit away from international organizations to something that Australia, I think is much further ahead on than the United States, and that's social media platforms where so many of these conspiracy theories are taking root. It's no accident that the wolf warriors, you know, are taking on more and more Twitter accounts and taking their cue from the Russian playbook from the 2016 election and what Russia has done in the US democracy since and China is using social media now not not all that effectively still a bit more clumsily I suspect than they will a year from now or five years from now. But they recognize that that's a place to so division within democracies that's a place to tell your own story. As Kevin said that's a place to impress your Communist Party officials, your fellow officials with your nationalism and your bona fides back in Beijing that may be a major part of it. But what what has happened in Australia is you all have moved forward as I understand that in a much more aggressive and energetic way when it comes to actually tracking what the social media platforms are allowing. In the United States, there has been a very laissez faire regulatory environment where particularly as I'm taking this now beyond coven particularly as it relates to politicians and what they can get away with on the platform. Basically the view of these companies is we don't want to alienate people who might regulate us and so the way we don't alienate people who might regulate us is we let them say whatever they want, even if it is misinformation, even if it borders on incitement to violence as some of President Trump's tweets have bordered on it across that line in recent weeks with our protests around Black Lives Matters. Why do I mention this because I actually think we are getting with coven proof of concept that Facebook and other social media platforms can draw these lines, because they are being much more aggressive on the life and death consequences that that stem from misinformation as it relates to this pandemic and this is true of Facebook, Twitter, you know all of the major companies, companies, then they have been on arguably threats that were life and death beforehand and certainly threats to our democracy, given the damage that falsehoods, peddling falsehoods and disinformation, the damage that that has done in widening and hardening divisions within major democracies. So I actually think on misinformation we may be getting the beginnings of proof of concept that companies can go further and I think that's why you see Mark Zuckerberg and others under much more sustained political pressure than he has faced in the entire history of Facebook, because he's proving in one domain that he is prepared to be aggressive, even as he sort of, again, exempts large, you know, large parts of the terrain, claiming neutrality, which is, which is, I believe, a false claim. If I may, Janice, I just wanted to pick up on points made by Kevin and Samantha. So, Kevin talked about the objective difficulties that China is facing in the face of COVID and Samantha also talked about how, you know, the wolf warriors and their attempts at shaping the narrative might not be all that successful or effective. I think from the region, perhaps not amongst the decision making elites necessarily, but broadly, there is a degree of traction in terms of the story, the narrative that China has done very well in tackling the the COVID crisis, and that, you know, China's facing bullying from the West. And unfortunately, that has had that narrative has had a degree of stickiness. And although I think in the case of COVID-19, you know, we're having loss of lives and livelihoods. So there really are no winners. The question is not whether, you know, China is doing badly. It's who's doing worse. And I think in this respect, the image in around mid-March of, you know, China getting no new cases of COVID-19, and then on the other hand, in Europe and in America, thousands getting infected, you know, thousands dying. I mean, that was a stock image that stayed in the mind of many. Even before COVID, there were question marks of American leadership, its commitment to the region, its wherewithal. Post-COVID, where the handling of the United States handling of the pandemic, how chaotic it was, you know, that kind of really reinforced images in the region of the United States as a declining power. And it's not only about capacity. If we look at the political will to lead, how did the United States respond to COVID-19? Was it to kind of assert a global leadership role as a responsible role? Unfortunately not. What it did was really to kind of issue all sense of regional or international responsibility, leadership or even responsibility, because some of the actions that it was taking to try to bolster its own position in the fight against COVID, directly undermined the interests of allies and partners like Germany when masks were diverted from Thailand, you know, to the United States. So I think that while it may be true that objectively China is not doing well, and in some respects we regard their wolf diplomacy as kind of crude and ineffective, there is a larger buy-in by the region amongst the populace in general. But also, I mean, I think it will increasingly bleed into the decision and policymaking elites as well. Not least because many in the region actually benefit from this narrative that authoritarian states do better in fighting the pandemic at least and crisis in general. I'm just surprised at how often this is repeated, even by intellectuals in the region that, you know, authoritarian states have an edge in dealing with crisis. Now, this is evidently false if we look at the examples of South Korea and Taiwan. But there are also counter examples which have given people reason to believe this narrative. So we have Vietnam doing well, even though it has very little resources to test for COVID-19, it has had zero deaths despite proximity to China. Singapore also doing fairly well until, you know, it was hit by a second wave because of its work with the tight-leap act. But then if we look at democracies, electoral democracies in the region, Indonesia and the Philippines, then exceedingly poorly, Indonesia chose to stick its head in the sand and avoid the situation altogether, saying it wasn't a problem. When it finally decided it was a problem, it took a week or more to act, you know, it canceled large religious gatherings, but only after thousands had traveled to attend these gatherings leading to several infections. And then in the case of the Philippines as well, you know, measures were taken too little, too late. And so you have those two countries which are electoral democracies in Southeast Asia, actually faring the worst in Southeast Asia. So there are facts or factoids that you can throw up to give stickiness or traction to the false narrative that authoritarian states fare better in dealing with crisis. But the focus of the region has largely been, it really does. And that has given, you know, authoritarian states in the region, or even democracies in the region, the opportunity to pass, to take very militant measures against their own population, but also to entrench their powers within the country. So we see that in the case of Cambodia and the Philippines as well, just to give two examples. But I guess that there is this concern, isn't there, that some authoritarian states are using things like the tracking and tracing and curving people's liberties and freedoms, that they're using these things and not putting an end date on them. And that people are concerned that they might use these things to further strengthen their grip on power. Is that a legitimate concern? I think certainly it is a concern if the international community is worried about reversals on democratic gains and freedoms. And so we look at Cambodia, as Prime Minister Hoon said, initially was remarkably understand about COVID-19. And so he threatened to report a real mass in the briefings. He refused to ferry back Cambodians who were in Wuhan when the virus broke out. He decided to go visit President Xi Jinping in Beijing in February, just to show that there was no problem. But he seems to have had a change of heart since then because around the end of April, I believe it was, he decided that the situation was obviously serious enough to pass emergency laws. Now, what did this emergency laws, what did this entail? Yes, handling, it allows Cambodia to respond in the case of national health emergencies, but also to respond in far more vague cases, you know, where there is national chaos, whatever that might mean. And also where the security of the nation is considered to be in serious jeopardy, again, not defined, then martial law can be implemented. So there are certainly cases, worrying cases, of an authoritarian turn in the region. And I think this would be very unfortunate because I think as the man who knows, I mean, it's hard to get democracy entrenched, but far easier to have it reversed. And I think that's my concern for the region. Kevin, globalization was slowing even before this pandemic. Do you think we've reached peak globalization in terms of trade, investment and migration? I think there have been two impediments to the progress of let's call it neoliberal globalization. By neoliberal, I mean one which is capitalist in nature and with minimal social protections. The one impediment which has been at work for quite a long period of time has been the failure of states and elites benefiting from globalization to do much substantive in terms of domestic inequality. And as a consequence, I mean, people are not stupid. I mean, people in democracies around the world ask themselves a question, am I better off or worse off? And as if you have an inability to redistribute wealth more effectively in the Western democracies and or other democracies, then as a consequence, those constituencies are going to become much more amenable to the sort of populist nationalist identity politics based rhetoric, which Samantha referred to earlier, which Trump's appeal to in the United States. So that's if you like, if I was trying to be analytical about what is being the driving factor in politics, pushing back against the pulling down of boundaries, which so many of us have welcomed over many decades, given where boundaries have taken us to in the past, which is usually conflict, autarchy and war. Unless we, the democracies, Western or other and other states deal with the inequality agendas within our own country, then we're not actually dealing with the primary cause of the factors. Then you've got the second contributing factor to let's call it peak globalization, which probably reached its peak in around about a year 2016, possibly in November of that year, but I'm not wishing to be too precise about it. But when you then had the quote leader of the free world, basically then legitimizing through the bully pulpit of American, not just domestic politics, but global political leadership, that the essential nostrums of nationalism and protectionism were valid and were morally defensible, and in fact formed the absolute pillars of his make America great again strategy. Then of course the other feeder systems around the world, whether it's in Bolsonaro's Brazil or Erdogan's Turkey or wherever. Countries which have at various times been part of the democratic family of nations saying well, that's what the leader of the free world is saying. And if you were to do a simple academic exercise and track the extent to which words like nationalism and protectionism have now become part of the acceptable domestic international vocabulary over the last three to four years, then when American leadership goes bad as it has done on these questions, it has a multiplying effect. So in summary, there's a driving factor which we're all responsible for which is inequality within our countries, our communities and our economies. And we need to tend to our own social contracts in order to obtain the political constituency support to sustain what I would describe as a social democratic form of globalization. But secondly, absent, let's call it the intellectual leadership and the sheer capacity of the United States under being the institutions of global governance, pushing in that right progressive direction. Then it's going to go backwards at a pace of knots, which is what's happened over the last three to four years. Samantha, a lot of our audience is very interested in the future of multilateralism. The pandemic, of course, putting a squeeze on multilateral institutions. Can the lateralism survive this? Well, if I may, sorry, I keep doing this, but to pick up on because I think Kevin's point was such an important sort of precursor to the question about multilateralism because what you're seeing now in a lot of places, but certainly in the United States, is a temptation to throw a baby out with bathwater. For the very reasons that Kevin has put his finger on, there is a disillusionment with the downsides of economic globalization. The people who have been left behind who feel as if they were seen through, seen past. I mean, I want just for to accentuate this point. Recall that 9% of the voters who voted for Barack Obama in 2012 shifted to Trump in 2016. And this was an election that was settled by 78,000 votes spread across three states. So we're talking about millions of votes hanging in the balance. 7% of the people voted for Obama in 2012 stayed home in 2016. So you're talking about many millions of votes in play for a very, very narrow margin, and that margin then produced the second part of Kevin's prior response in terms of the embrace of nationalism, xenophobia, protectionism and the legitimation and then the contagion really around those concepts. So after this sort of contingent outcome, but you know, Donald Trump is the president and has had the effects that he's had over this three and a half years, there is a lot of buyers remorse in the United States in both political parties around the exuberance around free trade around the ways in which often sort of perceived corporate interests took the place of or were seen as stand-ins for workers' interests or citizens' interests. And, you know, this reckoning or this backlash began really in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008, 2009, but Trump really sort of, and that's something that because of the disillusionment with the financial crisis, it's one of the reasons that Barack Obama as an insurgent as a newcomer was able as a non-representation of the old way of doing things was able to sweep into office. But Trump has written that wave and he's expanded it because, again, using the pulpit not only domestically but all around the world to press this message that globalization is bad for your people and that foreigners are dangerous and that the world is a zero-sum place where if someone else is gaining, you are losing. Trump was elected for a whole bunch of reasons, but he's now had and will have had four years to, again, deepen the spread and spread that message. The good part of what has come out of that is I think there is far more attention in circles that we're really looking past these issues, two issues of economic inequality. I mean, the pandemic is accelerating that as well. I mean, a very different balance between the state and the market, a very different conception in the United States as to what the cushion should look like for people who fall behind. And of course our protests around racial injustice are only extending that conversation appropriately into more and more domains. So there's been a major shift and a healthy shift. There's also been a healthy shift in thinking about how American engagement in the world gets better sold to a skeptical domestic audience that has been listening to Trump for four years or that has suffered this, what they proceeded to the economic consequences of globalization. So you'll see people who believe in an engaged or an internationalist America much more attentive to selling a foreign policy for the middle class. So that's the good news that there's some really, I think, healthy correctives to some of what we in the Obama administration and others got wrong. But the bad news is there's a temptation to throw political globalization out with the economic globalization. And so the backlash is not only again along the dimensions that Kevin has described, but it's going to require a lot of work to convince Americans and I realize I'm talking very much as an American here in this response, but to convince them to invest in those political structures that you meant in your question when you talked about effective multi vitalism. So, so in other words, to distinguish, okay, there were people who are left behind in economic globalization, how do we correct. What is the right balance between the state and the market. What is the right set of environmental and labor protections in our trade treaties that won't leave so many Americans behind how do we alter our supply chain so we're more resilient that conversation is happening and it's rich and it's interesting and Joe Biden's own platform I think has shifted in a very progressive direction. Just in recent months, but the conversation about what our investment in political institutions looks like is more sclerotic. And I think the most encouraging thing that has come out of Joe Biden is again along the lines of what Kevin was saying in his first response which is one of the first things he's going to do if he becomes president is convene a summit of democracies. On the agenda will be things like how do we together combat misinformation how do we protect our election systems how do we combat climate change. But it's also going to be like, be about what does effective multilateralism look like, and it doesn't look like a China rule a Chinese influenced or Chinese dictated rules based order, because the rules that China has an interest in seeing are ones that would mean less intrusion on what goes on inside states, less human rights protections less independent monitoring less transparency. Those are the kinds of efforts that China is making now with the US very much on the sidelines. But it does, it would have to, in order to be effective multilateralism, entail middle powers democracies who perhaps for too long have been sitting back, willing to be part of us led coalitions but not themselves taking initiative on very many issues and I think for there to be effective multilateralism coalitions of democracies are going to have to be much more coordinated, much more strategic and savvy, because China as as has been said is using the leverage of its economic heft in the developing world to bring even those who are actually not impressed with their pandemic response, African leaders condemning the treatment of Africans inside China, people frustrated that the PPE comes with a requirement that you have to praise China or vote with China within the UN. There's not a lot of soft power being one outside the region I can't speak for for for the region itself. So effective multilateralism to occur when you have so many fence sitters trying to decide, am I going to go in the direction of what China wants to see in terms of multilateralism, or am I going to try to retain transparency and accountability, use my, my, my vote and my, my status as a as a community within a coalition to get multilateralism invested in peace and security in human rights in economic development. All those fence sitters are waiting to see again where the United States goes but also where democracies like Australia plan to go and whether they plan to take initiatives of the kind that I think we've just been seeing in recent months. So we do have quite a bit of interest from our audience on the issue of climate change. I know this is changing tack quite a bit, but I do want to put this to you because there has been a bit of interest about this Kevin, you've been a long time passionate advocate for stronger global action on that front on climate change. What do you think about that is it possible to get climate change back on the global agenda. I thought to do a decade ago around about the time of the Copenhagen conference was exercise Australian international leadership, very unpopular at the time, not least of which, domestically and to some extent internationally. But frankly, some of us had a look around the room and found that not a lot was happening. And so we began organizing coalitions of the quote policy willing. Subsequently became known as the Karaheiner group of like minded countries. That is those supporting a substantive climate change outcome in Copenhagen and then later at Paris. We formed. We got running together with the British and then we got the Ethiopians and then we got and by the time we got to conference time we actually had a significant gaggle of support. What happened the Copenhagen conference on climate change decade ago was that China decided to roadblock it and got India to help it. That's the bottom line. But let me tell you the international activism we use made it harder and harder at that stage for China to continue to say no. And their post Copenhagen learnings on international climate change diplomacy is really insightful because the Chinese concluded they had taken a big international diplomatic hit against them. By being the obstructionist they were on that occasion and the and the sea change in Chinese policy settings on international agreements on climate change action between 2010 and 2015 in Paris is huge. So therefore climate change is no respect to a person's no respect to national boundaries and no respect to the respect of ethnicity. And you know something in mind dealing with the Chinese leadership on these questions and Chinese think tanks and ministers ministers responsible even in recent months is they actually get this that this is fundamentally in their national interest. And to go back to another excellent point made by Samantha before the challenge for all of us globally given this peak globalization phenomenon you mentioned. Given the popularity that populace have found through smashing the United Nations system almost as a reflex reaction domestic politics. Look at Abbott in this country in the past. Look at Morrison's speech against globalism only a few months ago in Australia is to be able to sell an effective political message domestically that international cooperation is in the national interest and in your personal interest and that there's no alternative. Unless we have international cooperation on trade guess what Australia's living standards will collapse by between 20 and 40% if we go into a mercantilist world in the future and you need international rules for that on climate. If one half of this country Australia becomes uninhabitable and the North China plane ceases to produce agriculture effectively for to feed China's 1.4 billion people. Guess what doesn't matter what Australia and China do domestically unless the world is acting simultaneously given the problem of Indian emissions. Not to mention the United States having stepped up for lunch for the last four years. The bottom line is unless we're all in this together it doesn't happen. So my point is to make a an argument and defence of Samantha's proposition about how we sustain global cooperation which the technical term is multi-lateralism but that is a real turn off for voters in any country. Global cooperation to solve national problems and on climate. I think it under a Biden administration and with the Chinese continued national interest in acting in order to bring down global greenhouse gas emissions. Hopefully it becomes the vehicle notwithstanding all the geopolitical tensions which will continue between the United States and China in the future over any manner of issues that on the question of climate change. There is sufficient recognition of combined national interest to sustain this space and in fact to demonstrate that we can act effectively to preserve the global columns. Final point global commons. Final point is action up until now sufficient. Of course not. I mean I'm not being polyanerish about this. If everybody honored their Paris commitments we will have achieved one third of the greenhouse gas reductions necessary to keep temperature increases under two degrees centigrade by centuries in. That's if everybody honors their Paris commitments. So given that backsliding on that and we've got two-thirds still to go then if you're Roman Catholics you'll be pulling out as we are you'll be pulling out your rosary beads and seeing what can be done. But given that we believe in real policy action and what states can do and what technology can do to help us on the way through with appropriate political leadership we can get there. And the message of progressive politics to the world at large is that frankly it ain't all that hard. This is perfectly doable to keep temperature increases within two degrees. Yes I know it requires political will but political will, political cooperation with a technology fix on the way through put those three things together. You're seriously pumping iron. Thanks so much. Kevin Lynn I want to bring you back in here we heard Kevin there talking about the need for global cooperation and we have a question from the audience. Do you think the world can enter a multi polar order without the direction of the US or China or do you think the wider retreats from globalization with those retreats that this might be the end of international cooperation as we know it quite doom and gloom. Well, I think, given the economic and military strategic diplomatic heft of both the United States as well as China I think it'd be very difficult to see cooperation or good outcomes on any number of important issues without them. Whether we're looking at climate changes we just spoke about or the need to manage nuclear proliferation and arms or handling this pandemic, but definitely going to be needing the two major powers of the two superpowers in fact to to to jump into the fray and actually get the hands dirty. In some instances some of the multilateral institutions that we've been working off in need of reform, but the response must really to your hands dirty and right to reform these institutions like the WHL rather than to kind of sideline them or undermine them all together. So I think, you know, countries are worried about the United States and China and their lack of cooperation and how this undermines the multilateral project or the global the project for global cooperation. And trying to get we get rounded through various means like the increased focus on regional cooperation, etc. But there really is no alternative to many of the major problems that the world faces without the two superpowers. Thank you so much, Lynn. I suppose we've heard from all of you about some of the big challenges out there, but I'd love to finish on a positive note if we can. Is there any good news to come out of this, Lynn? We might kick off with you. Thanks so much. I think with all this doom and gloom around us right now I would be quite hard pressed to think about positive developments emerging from this. On the other hand, I think if we are to emerge from this situation, both in terms of addressing the pandemic or quashing the pandemic as well as the economic and social recovery that needs to take place after that, we need to see several things happening. So these might emerge if we emerge from the pandemic relatively unscathed. And I think one has been alluded to earlier. That's a need for enlightened leadership. We need more leadership from the major powers from the United States and China, but also from the middle powers who might have to step in to support the international community as the United States becomes more distracted and faces divisions at home. The other thing I hope we come away from this pandemic with is a greater sense of connectedness. I have no problems with America first, China first, Russia first. I think all countries actually, for better or worse, seek to put their own nations first, their own citizens first. That's not the problem. The problem is the very narrow conception that leaders around the world have adopted with increasing support from their citizens. And I think that's a bit ironic because nothing undermines the nation or the national project more than an insular limited view of what will work best in national interests. And unfortunately, we've seen far too many countries adopt this very narrow view of national interests instead of the focus on multilateralism and international cooperation. The third thing I would like to see coming out of this or that might come out of this is more robust multilateral institutions. These are going to be what drives us out of a very bad the very bad situation that we now find ourselves in. So if they are to work, we need to simultaneously seek to reform them. And as I mentioned earlier, the United States and China needs to be integral to these efforts. And finally, I think we need to have a greater appreciation of the threats that non-traditional security challenges also pose to the international community. And these extend from, you know, things this might lead to a greater focus in health care, which I think that would be a good outcome when we focus more on health care and health systems and securing critical health supply chains. President Xi Jinping has already talked about the need to develop a health silk road, while other countries and middle powers United States as well. Also, you know, focus quite rightly on the need for greater health development in many of the countries in Asia. And also, we talked about climate change earlier, you know, you know, one view and the preponderant view, unfortunately, is that climate change priorities will take a step back, given the need to boost the world economy. But I think if we have a greater appreciation of the threats that non-traditional security challenges pose, we would also in the efforts to rebuild economies and rebuild livelihoods also factor into account the need for greater health. Climate sustainability. Thank you so much, Lynn, Samantha Power. I'd love to bring you back in here. Do you have anything positive to end on? Always. Absolutely always. The great Israeli psychologist Amos Tversky said, never be a pessimist because if you're a pessimist you suffer twice. So it's one of the more pessimistic things one can say. But I'd offer three really shining bright spots. And the first is a little bit close to home there, Taiwan. Taiwan, the multi-dimensional ways in which they have tackled the coronavirus, the way they have also managed to export millions of masks to countries in need, including in the developing world. The trailblazing way in which they have integrated at the central level government ministers, social media, people who work for Facebook and the social media companies, and critically civil society and citizen activists, netizens in the corona response. So that you can look on your phone in Taiwan. And if you're in need of masks, if you run out of masks, you can see at your nearest pharmacy what their mask supply is. And if it's going low, you know to go someplace else. When people are trafficking and misinformation, citizens are the ones to raise the flare about that. It goes into a central process. And there's an amazing amount of literacy when it comes to misinformation among Taiwanese internet users. I could go on, but it's a model. And I think Taiwan, despite being shut out of the World Health Organization, even as an observer by China, has really shown the world a lot of what its democracy has to offer well beyond COVID. So that's one bright spot. Second bright spot briefly, female leadership. And I don't think we even have to get into causality versus correlation. I think there's for two reasons. One, if you think about what it takes to become a head of state for anyone, as Kevin Rudd knows, the only one of us who knows, it's really hard. If you think about what it takes to become a female head of state. The qualities that these women have to get where they've gotten, prepare them by and large for a crisis like that. It's not inevitable that they would handle it well, but some combination of toughness, humanity, and of course, respect for science, and a recognition of the importance of trust. I think that unites their responses. So they get where they get, and they have shown the second dimension of female leadership that's so important is irrespective of whether it's correlative or causal, that they're handling it better in Germany, Taiwan, Iceland, Finland, Norway, New Zealand. Those are countries led by women who've all done remarkably well in handling the pandemic, but irrespective the kids in those countries who are seeing these women lead in this way, lead calmly, humanely, rigorously. Those kids' perceptions of the future, of the present, of what's possible are altered by this experience. I mean, for so many countries, these women are playing the role that Winston Churchill may have played in the Second World War. This is such a crisis. It is so essential that leadership be as strong as some of these leaders have shown it to be. But think of what boys and girls, their sense of the possible, and how that has been altered by the fact that these are the women who've fared well in this crisis. And then the last thing briefly, Kevin mentioned how in the context of climate change, the climate change doesn't respect borders or ideology, or he didn't mention tweets, but the pandemic is the same. And what we've seen in the United States, you can bluff your way through a pandemic, through faints and scapegoating of WHO, or bringing it back to China again and again as President Trump has done. But at a certain point, when it is seniors who are paying the price primarily around the country for the pandemic, getting out of control for the mishandling of the pandemic. When you're a churchgoer and you're not able to attend services because the pandemic has gotten so out of hand in your community, you know, you can divert all you want, but people are hungry in the United States, at least right now, and a lot can change between now and November for evidence-based leadership, for truth-telling, for trusted leadership. And there's not a lot of evidence that the diversions and the scapegoating is working politically. And so this is to partisan a thing to say, but I would say my third and final bright spot is Trump's falling poll numbers. Kevin Rudd, over to you. Any bright spots? Well, given that we've now gone two minutes over a lot of time, I'm going to give you three points in 60 seconds. Number one, a Biden administration has every capacity to turn these global challenges around. The sort of foreign policy, international policy team and international economic team, which Biden is likely to pull together, is first class. And therefore, you're going to have such an appetite on the part of American allies and friends around the world to work with that globally progressive agenda that I think it is potentially a very exciting four years ahead. I've seen all the criticisms of Joe Biden. I've met the guy when he's vice president. I know him reasonably well. Sure, he's not JFK. None of us are. But guess what? He stands for decent values. But more importantly, the team will be good first class, and there is a yearning on the part of democracies to make this work. Number two, is to build on Samantha's earlier point, working collaboratively and collectively to wrestle these global challenges, including climate to the ground. And finally, I agree also with Samantha's point in terms of the positives about the achievements of female leadership. Here in our part of the world, Samantha, the impact with Jacinda Ardern and New Zealanders had on the way in which Australians think about these questions has been really impressive. And not just on COVID-19, but prior to that in a handling of the mass atrocities against Muslims within New Zealand as well. And to be frank, when the history of the COVID crisis is written, it was her early decision to take on a national objective of eliminating the virus. Number two, shutting the borders and three, domestic lockdown all very early, which frankly stampeded the male leadership of Australia into the same direction. I mean, that's the untidy, uncomfortable history of what actually happened down here. So when people talk about Australia and New Zealand having done well, I think if we look at the sequencing of the decision making process, there was genuine leadership by her on this. And I think that's had a huge effect on seeing democratically elected leaders who are women exercising such effective national leadership. And at a time, which frankly, on a degree of difficulty, if we're at the next Olympic Games, this is 9.5 on the diving scale of difficulty with twist and pipe. And folks like this have pulled it off. So well done to Jacinda Ardern. Well, thank you so much, Kevin Rudd. It was such a pleasure to hear from all of you. So thank you to Ambassador Power, Kevin Rudd and Lynn Crock for sharing your sage wisdom and deep insights with us today. And on behalf of the ANU, we're really truly grateful for your engaging and thoughtful insights. So on behalf of everyone here, thank you so much. It's been an absolute pleasure.