 This evening I came here to speak to you about Vietnam. I do not have to tell you that our people are profoundly concerned about that struggle. There are passionate convictions about the wisest course for our nation to follow. There are many sincere and patriotic Americans who harbor doubts about sustaining the commitment that three presidents and a half a million of our young men have made. Doubt and debate are in large because the problems of Vietnam are quite complex. They are a mixture of political turmoil, of poverty, of religious and factional strife, of ancient servitude and modern longing for freedom. Vietnam is all of these things. My name is Harry Middleton. I wrote speeches for President Johnson during his time in the White House. Inevitably some of those speeches involved Vietnam for that war which he inherited occupied a great deal of the president's time and attention. Virtually every recommendation that was made to him, every question, every decision, was critical. And one of the most critical came to him in the spring of 1965. The war was going badly. General Westmoreland, commander of the troops in Vietnam, sent an urgent request to turn the tide. He asked for a massive infusion of troops, double the number already there, and at the same time a change in the mission of the troops from advisors to fighting forces. As I have said before, in evaluating the enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he believes our Achilles heel is our resolve. Your continued strong support is vital to the success of our mission. The president got counsel on both sides of that request. On one hand were those recommending approval of Westmoreland's request, and the most sobering of those was the disquieting prediction of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who warned, the integrity of the United States commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the Communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. On the other hand were voices of caution. There was Clark Clifford, who would eventually become Secretary of Defense, who said he saw only catastrophe ahead, and Assistant Secretary of State George Ball, who had grave apprehensions that we can't win, and from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who expressed concern that we are taking the country deeper into a war that we cannot expect our people to support. Which among these dire and contradictory recommendations did President Johnson accept? You are invited to experience this interactive exhibit that will allow you to weigh in as the president's advisors did. We hope to see you soon here in the LBJ Presidential Library.