 Okay. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Jerome, for the presentation. I have one, and this is about the last presentation, but it is something that is actually, something we are emphasizing quite a lot. I mean, you presented numbers for growth, for inequality, and for poverty. You demonstrated growth has gone up significantly. Inequality basically did not move, and then you say poverty went down very considerably. Up, sorry, up, of course. Now, that begs the question, that's impossible. You cannot have growth up, inequality unchanged, and then poverty substantially worsened. So, I mean, I'm just making this point, because this is one of the things that for all of the gap country studies is exactly something that we will, before these things are put out there, we will be vetting that very, very clearly, and we will be pushing the country study authors very much until we at least have reasonable explanations for this triangle. So, this was my observation. Thanks. The last study, and essentially two points. The first one is that the poverty estimates come from the National Bureau of Statistics, but you don't say anything about the methodology that was used. Was it the same poverty line deflated by cost of living indices that ordered the National Bureau of Statistics come up with different poverty lines in which case these comparisons are not very meaningful. So, I think it's very important to look at the underlying methodology before you make any kind of statement about poverty going up or down. This goes back to Finns' point, this fear of poverty consistency. Now, on the methodology that you use, I really, you know, even though I think multi-dimensional poverty indicators are important, I have some real questions about just using the number of deprivations as an indicator of the extent of poverty. You say nothing about the possibility of compensation. It's quite possible that the household is deprived of one or two dimension, but may be significantly above the threshold in another dimension so that there is a possibility, in theory, for this household to compensate if income lies there above the threshold but maybe food consumption lies below it it would do some of that income to get more food. So, as long as we don't know anything about the natural level of deprivation as well as any possible surplus in some of the dimensions, I think it's a very arbitrary way of measuring multi-dimensional poverty. And I know that many people do it, and so I'm not attacking you personally, but I think it's professional to be much more careful before it uses these indicators. Take one more, Andy, in the back there, and then we'll respond to more questions. To your right and right behind you, Andy. Mine is really a follow-up on Eric's first point. We know that some of these Nigerian surveys are not comparable. The surveys before 1996 are just not comparable with the later surveys. They're a very different methodology. If surveys are comparable, the only ones that I think legitimately are, are the ones after 1996. My second point is about the figures of 2004. The World Bank has come out with a very revised figure from poverty in 2004 in World Development Indicators, which is actually 64 or something like that. They've revised the figures substantially. I have no idea where this comes from or what the basis of it is, but it sounds like these numbers are contested, or at least under discussion, and we're good to have some discussion of this, even if the main party of focus is on the multidimensional. Thank you very much. It does appear that the very difficult questions are for me. Well, the most serious not, these are very germane and good questions. Poverty estimates, what the National Bureau does, they normally present, they do a consistent survey, then they have a methodology whereby they present four different types of different poverty estimates. So I will check again and make sure we report, actually, what they did, luckily they have some body wisdom. But I'm sorry for other data in Nigeria, very problematic. So we carefully report what they've done. Just last week, the World Bank came back with some revision of some of the 2010 results which are taken and looked at. Looking at the deprivation, what we just reported here are two extremes. I mean, you have, I mean, since we have five, then two, which means you have a five to a power two, 32 different outcomes which you can have. You can have a 0000 or 1111, 32 extremes. But in the paper, we've carefully reported the different outcomes. You can have a situation whereby household, I mean, they're very good in one or something. We are mindful of the comments which you made, but I do agree. But it's good, but it's not for the first time. I mean, it seems like the discussion in Nigeria has been taken away from oil, which is why it's very important for you to actually see what is happening. Andy, I do agree with you. I know you are very familiar with Nigeria, but looking at both of the indicators, I mean, in terms of what is directly comparable with the cattle of them, the best we will get was this 004, stroke 2010, both in terms of methodology and the definition of these various indicators. That was the closest we will get. Well, I think I do agree now with this question. One of these things, I'll take the project forward. Okay. Do we have other questions for any of the panelists? Thanks. I enjoyed all the presentations very much. I've got a naive question for Michael, which is about structural, your ideas around structural transformation in Burkina Faso, and we talked a little bit about agricultural intensification, but do you think that urbanization and industrialization within the context of Burkina Faso makes sense? I won't say matters again. I look at your paper. You don't have to mention it, so I'll forget about it. But the important point is policy. The question I want to ask to all the panelists is whether there's any way in which you can start incorporating any indices or indicators of policy into these analysis. This is still descriptive. The North grows less than the South. There's still very little on the why. And if you look at the indicators that do exist, is there anything on Michael's set? I was thinking about because I was looking at Ibrahim's indicators of governance. Actually, there are indicators there, and I just would be so happy to see that that relates to your question again. How can you answer those questions with this kind of thing? Thanks for your question. I definitely think it makes sense, and I think there are also some possibilities. Probably the most obvious one is the actual industry. I think there's definitely a scope for that, and that would be possible. That would be possible in the medium term. And there's also a huge potential for inter-regional trade. The trade between the West African countries in fact, there's quite little of that, and that could definitely be expanded. So that would be your first step, and I think with a little bit of political action that would be easy to implement. But then, of course, what could be other industries? I mean, if you think of continuous upgrades, maybe of the type we have seen in many of the South's East Asian countries, what that could then be, that's a more difficult question. And of course, many people think about that. There would be the sectors where Africa could be competitive in the medium and long term. So there, it's a bit harder to give a good answer. But actually, industry is definitely the first thing. And now, because I have the mic, I want to take just 20 seconds to answer to Arjan. So what we mean by the Malthusian trap is that we have here, say, equilibrium, where we have high demographic growth, and where we have more or less an absence of technological progress. And that makes it Malthusian. At the same time, of course, you can leave that trap by increasing productivity through technological progress. And that if you look at unified growth theory, that's exactly how you structure the problem. You go from a Malthusian equilibrium to a post-Malthusian and to a modern growth machine. So Malthus somehow ignored that this possibility there of course we do not. But it's a good description of what we have seen over the past, say, 20, 30 years and where we are now. So maybe... Is there a way you can incorporate the analysis because it's made just by now? Well, you said... I mean, I think I provide a lot of explanations for the numbers I presented. More specifically, maybe on the governance issue, whether... I don't understand what you mean here, example. Do you have an indicator of how good or bad governance is in facilitating the shift? Or... I mentioned that I was totally still mainly descriptive in its level. But yet, I think that's a story we provide that describes a long-term, Ivorian model that was in the past very much praised for its success, that relied on the expansion of cash crops, whether it is in the southern forest from the border with Ghana towards the border of Kenya. So there was a kind of cocoa plant in the expansion of this cocoa output that relies mainly on migration and baluté, the cocoa growers from their region of origin towards the border of Guinea. So it was mainly relying on extensive agriculture because you look at... It's also the case in the northern region where here you have the natural crop that differs in many respects in terms of agronomy constraints, but still you have also this... And here it compares the extension of cotton production compares better with the kind of conversion that is highlighted in half on the working episode for cotton production. And so it was an Ivorian model because through this expansion of the output of cash crops, the state could extract growing fiscal income growing fiscal revenue and invest it on the one hand in education and in health services and on the other hand also on the further development of this cash crop production through investments in roads and so on. And Côte d'Ivoire was very much praised for all the success in terms of investment in infrastructure and the great progress in education that allowed it to catch up with neighboring gas in terms of education. So I think that one could now question the sustainability that perhaps is a similar question to Michel's one, but in a completely different context. The sustainability of such a model when you no longer have forests available to extend further extent the output when you know that the soils may require a long time to recover and so on and so forth. But I would be very much interested in getting this data on local governments you are leading to. So let's take some questions. Thank you, Jeff. Finn, I think ask a very Japanese question for you to have a high quality. This whole principle notion of what we are talking about is how inclusive the growth process is. Looking at the Nigerians and you ask yourself which sectors are you driving the growth? I mean, oil is an inclusive economy. Accounting for just about 15,000 jobs or less. Or like agriculture, I mean, which account for the block and the informal sector. So it's not really contributing to the growth process. But this has some of the political economic issues which we will examine as part of this question. Okay, well thank you very much. We've reached the end of the session. Please try to be in the beginning.