 So session number two is more focused on the European dimension, how Europe responds to this crisis, and what could be done to respond better to this crisis, and what kind of new security order might emerge in the European context from this. So we've got a fantastic panel, and I hope you'll join me in welcoming them on stage now. On they come. Yes. Please. So we're sitting order. Yes, Anna, well, why don't you go to the file seat, Anna, and then Beatrice and Elizabeth? Yes. Fabian, I guess, if you come in, and then we'll leave. So General Adrian Bradshaw is not here yet. He's being decorated, apparently, with an icing sugar or something like that, but a Belgian medal. So we'll get to Adrian in a bit if he appears, General Bradshaw, I should say, probably. So first on stage, Anna Fotiga, who was a foreign minister of Poland and senior European politician who, unsurprisingly, given her background, has been keeping a close eye on the Russian threat for many a year. Then we've got Professor Beatrice Hauser, historian, political scientist, and somebody who's worked in NATO looking at these and at Kings. Well, so you've got the benefit of the home audience. Elizabeth Braugh, journalist and scholar specialising in deterrence, you were at Rusey, weren't you, and now at the American Enterprise Institute, and has just flown in. So thank you very much, Elizabeth, for coming in. And I should say, by origin, Swedish, in case the question turns to the Nordic flank of NATO or whatever, we can get some expert... Exactly, expert opinion on that. And then finally, Dr Fabian Zulek, chief executive and chief economist of the European Policy Centre in Brussels, specialist on EU and EU accession, but also, of course, from Germany, and able to look at that country, and it's obviously key importance in defining what goes ahead. Well, let's kick off with Anna Fotogar, because, Anna, you know, I guess that if you're Polish, a lot of people will have been saying, particularly since 2008 in Georgia or 2014 in Crimea and Donbass, look, this is a thing that needs to be urgently addressed and with varying results among European countries. Some, I think, probably preferred to ignore it. So do you think now there can be no further argument about this, or do you think there are still some European countries who don't understand the magnitude of this and the type of change that needs to happen? Well, allow me to start with thanking UK for distance, for actually for many years already and in particular in recent times. I think it is over political divisions or over political opinions in this country. I think that in terms of preceding the threat, the imminent threat from Russian Federation since beginning of previous year and mounting of arms around Ukraine, Five Eyes, so the old alliance were right and actually it was the most accurate assessment of the situation in saying this. I would, well, I wonder, because listening to previous panel, I put the question how to deal with the country that develops like current Russian Federation, nurturing ages-old ideas and it is not only Putin because now this war in Ukraine is online, actually, and we see all effects of this war. So the near imperialism, that is legacy of older ideas because for ages, being a tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, modern Russian Federation, there is enormous expansion accompanied by unbelievable atrocities. When we see what happens in Ukraine and try to remember Chechenya, I was reminded about this. You know, how they used to get Grozny and now sent Kadyrov to do same atrocities, exactly same atrocities. So extermination of those who are not willing to assimilate is part of policy and the question is when we deliberate how to deal, how to build strong security environment in such circumstances, the question is how to deal with the country nurturing old ideas, not reforming structures because KGB guy runs this country and he is not alone. Russia is like mafia type country. The economy of Russia is fully, fully regulated by colleagues of Putin and these are links with the West, collective West. And this mafia has nuclear arms. Are we able to stop this once and for eternity? It's a very good moment to bring in Bertress then in terms of does Europe share that perception, those things we've been hearing from Anna? I mean, because in the past, obviously there were differing responses based on geography, economy, energy, all the different interests, variable geometry, can that survive and is it inevitable that some countries will not feel that strongly or do you think this is a true paradigm shift? Remember Saint Malo or the Brussels Treaty or Modified Brussels Treaty? Let's bring in Bertress then. We were able to say or the West, collective West was able to say at that time that military cooperation close between France and UK, possible, not only transatlantic links should be accompanied by economic links and I believe it, I'm an economist in my background. It should be innovation cooperation and so links are not sanctions again, to be cut are not sanctions. Anna, you've put your views over very clearly. Let's get a perspective from Bertress on that. One of the things that really surprises me is that we are no longer in an East-West ideological contest and nevertheless we find that there are people in the West and throughout the West that seem to be influenced by the Russian story or seem to buy into the Russian story and I find that absolutely extraordinary. Also, there seems to be no proper line-up with particular ideologies. So you find in France, for example, both on the far right and on the far left people who are very much in sympathy with Putin. How is that possible? That's something that really really astonishes me and the other thing, you know, we have centres of excellent strategic communication all this sort of thing. We seem to have absolutely no way of affecting public opinion within Russia in the Russian hinterland. Now, we have some access to academics and a very small elite in Moscow and St. Petersburg cities. But the vast majority of the Russian population seems to have absolutely no exposure to an alternative story on this, whereas throughout the West there seem to be people who've got the exposure to the Russian story and buy into it and I find that absolutely flabbergasting. Elizabeth, I know you were looking a lot... The open society and its enemies. That's what we experienced. Absolutely. And in terms of Grey's... I know previously when we appeared on a platform you were talking a lot about that. I mean, this is... Whatever you want to call it, red... I mean, this is not about shades of grey in terms of the scale of the aggression and the scale of the shock, but does it shift relationships on meaningfully? Does it provide the necessary impetus to come out with a more coherent European response to threats from the East? It does. And I'm going to be rude, Mark, because I've been told to talk into the microphone, not look at you. No, no, please, please. It's very important for you to get the back to hear you. No, no. So, Mark, I think that the challenge is that we are so well set up militarily, but the weak part is our civil society. There was a fantastic quote in, I think, last week's New Yorker, the reporter had gone to Ukraine or was based in Ukraine, was based in Ukraine. And nice to see you, Ambassador. And he happened to be at the gas station or petrol station that was manned by volunteers who made sure that people didn't get more petrol than they were supposed to, and a car pulled up with Lithuanian license plates, and apparently that's something that happens quite a bit in Ukraine. I'm not an expert on Ukrainian license plates, but apparently people do this. People register their cars elsewhere to save money. And so this volunteer at the gas, at the petrol station said, no petrol for people who don't support our state. And I thought that was brilliant. And then he told the people in this car, support our army, support our people, then you get your petrol. And that's what it's about, right? I mean, our responsibility as citizens to support our country. And if we don't have that, then what's the point of having strong armed forces? If behind them in our civil society we have this mush of people who may not have feel any allegiance to our government, to our society more generally. And so are extremely receptive to what you, for example, just mentioned Beatrice, and for other forms of aggression. And everybody admires Finland. Well, Finland has spent decades educating the population about national security threats, and as a result they have, but it's 77% of the population willing to defend the country with weapons, then personally defending the country with weapons should they be asked to. Well, how do we get to that? I think it starts with feeling commitment to society. And I would, maybe this is an investigation for you, Mark, I would love to see an investigation into the connection between tax evasion and willingness to defend one's country. I promise you, anything in Finland, they have low rates of tax evasion, but that's for you investigative journalists. Thank you. Fabien, Germany, always so central to European debates, and hearing Elizabeth talk about attitudes there to defending the country, things like that, we know, and education indeed about national security threats, that is not the case in Germany and the numbers are much lower of people who say they'd take a gun in their hand, as it were, to defend the country. How big a transformation do you think is necessary in terms of German attitudes? Because the Chancellor, in announcing changes, more defence spending, changing energy priorities, suggested that he was going to lead the country to a different place. Is that doable in the foreseeable future, do you think? I think, firstly, I would say that Germany has already changed a lot in the last weeks. There have been many taboos which have been broken. We shouldn't forget that for a long time, Germany was told not to do these things. It was told that it could never engage again in any kind of military adventure. Yes, there was a change already over the last years, but it is still a major change, not only to policy, but also to the psyche of people. There was a belief that Russia could be controlled through trade, through interdependence. Clearly, we now know that didn't work, but this is a big change which has to come. Now, there are some people in Germany who traditionally have believed in non-military means, so there is that peace movement which is saying that whatever has happened, the best way of addressing this is through peaceful means, but I think they are in the minority now. So, we are seeing much more willingness to address this. We are seeing that German weapons are going to Ukraine, which is a major change. That's not to say more doesn't need to happen. Clearly, there is more which has to happen, but I think overall, actually, Germany is going in the right direction. And a big recapitalisation of the Bundeswehr. Absolutely. I mean, things we've known for quite a long time which have to happen, but not only that. I think we have to look at the whole package. The sanctions, the energy sector, which is much more difficult for Germany and some Eastern European countries than for others. We have to look at also the response to the migration question, so it's the whole package. And in all of those areas, a lot has changed, not only in Germany, but across the European Union. Thank you. We have now been joined by General Adrian Bradshaw, who, like General James Everard in the first panel, is a former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and therefore very much steeped in the Alliance management issues and questions of collective security. And so, it's great to bring you in, General. Perhaps on this question, one or two of the panellists more or less said, well, we're kind of there on the military terms of the European, I guess, spending or full structure, but do you feel that there is an effective European military capability? Do you feel that NATO essentially can serve all the requirements of people in the European space? How do you see things developing in terms of conserting and improve collective response to what's happened in Ukraine? Thanks for that. There's quite a lot in that question. Yes, I'm sorry. But, firstly, I think we all need our site and vendor. And one is delighted to see the realization in Germany, which is not at all surprising, but I think collectively in Europe and in the transatlantic domain, we need that realization. But I was reflecting this morning that Mr. Putin has committed two heinous crimes with respect to Ukraine on the macro scale. One, of course, is embarking on this terrible war and unleashing this unacceptable aggression in the heart of Europe. But the other is in managing to lie to his own nation at quite such an extent and to get a nation to believe so many things which are fundamentally completely untrue. And listening to the Radio 4 this morning, the interviews in Russia on the eve of their parade, one reflected with horror the degree to which Russian people have drunk the Kool-Aid, have got the message. And so coming back to the point that has been made, actually, already on this panel, we need to remind ourselves that warfare is hybrid by nature. You know, we all started talking about hybrid after 2014. It's hybrid by nature. It's an all-of-nation, collectively all-of-capability affair. It's not just about armed forces. It's about winning the information battle. It's about winning the economic battle. It's about winning the war of ideas. And it was easy enough in the Cold War to have a great idea which was opposed to a grim ideology. We need to generate the great idea about the importance of democracy and freedom and the rule of law and of truth and how important it is that that wins in the struggle with these autocracies, these criminal autocracies. And so what I would wish to see in our defense structures, firstly, is an acknowledgement across NATO, particularly from the nations who aspire to be in the lead of European defense, that the transatlantic nature of NATO is absolutely vital, that our link with the Americans is incredibly important, and that NATO is the organization for transatlantic military strategy making and for executing the military collective requirements of Europe and the North Atlantic area. The talk of European strategic autonomy in defense should be quietly reduced and more talk should be made of the nature of the relationship with the United States. And the EU and NATO need to start working together properly. We have the Berlin Plus arrangements, which have so far managed to command three operations since 2003, which is a lamentable state of affairs. They were very successful, the counter-piracy operation, the operation down in the south of the Balkans, and most importantly, the UFO operation in Bosnia, in Bosnia Herzegovina, which is incredibly important for the stability of that part of the world. But it demonstrates that using NATO command structures, NATO facilities, Europe can execute military operations without duplicating military structures within the EU. What actually needs to happen is that NATO and the EU need to be able to formulate strategy together, which I might say is impossible. You would be amazed that during my time as Deputy Saker, it was impossible to have strategists from the EU and NATO in the same room developing joint strategy, despite the hybrid nature of warfare today. We could not coordinate military strategy and NATO economic strategy, NATO political strategy, NATO financial strategy, because it was not allowed. Why? Because a couple of nations, one of which is a member of NATO but not of the EU and another a member of the EU but not of NATO, and it. So 29, 30 nations can't do the business, the vital business of today, which is coordinate grand strategy. So that's my observation for this morning. Fabulous. Sorry, Ben, did you understand? Yes, absolutely. There was a moment when I thought we were going to disagree and I actually then found that we have lost lots of common ground there, because one of the things that I've been preaching for all my lifetime in academia is that what we need is a European pillar of NATO along the Berlin plus that you've discussed, and then basically we had that, we had that in the W.E.U. and the W.E.U. as you recall was not only closed down but its vital defence clause was absorbed into the Lisbon Treaty which means that with Brexit the United Kingdom is no longer part of it. My question is always, my challenge is always, can we not somehow revive something or reinvent something like this European pillar of NATO, the W.E.U., the Western European Union that existed and basically it cannot possibly do anybody's disadvantage if the Europeans can act more autonomously, if need be, because one of the things that I think is absolutely clear that's been said over generations of American presidencies is that the Americans would like us to shoulder more of our own defence burden, that they'd like us to be able to do more together and the other thing that is clear is taking a much, much larger perspective now in Europe than the Ukraine war or even the U.S. departure from Afghanistan is that simply over the decade since the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty and before that the Western European Union, the United States has gradually declined in its commitment to Europe in the sum total of its commitment to Europe. I'm not saying it'll withdraw, I'm not saying it's going to, the end is in sight, the Americans will not come to our rescue if they can and if the situation is urgent. But what I'm saying is that it is absolutely clear that for a long time the tilt towards Indo-Britic has been a very important factor which means that it is everybody's interest, including the United States, that the Europeans can do much more for themselves and everything you've just described, the political will of actually saying why can't we then in that case get together those member states of both organisations that are in those organisations that are on the side, why can't we do things together is absolutely would be in the sense of that thing and the Western European Union was actually embedded in NATO, it left to NATO everything that it was doing, its organisation, that would be a very important answer. There goes, I've said it before. I mean it's interesting in the context of what you said, General, that the sort of emphatic lesson to be drawn I suppose from Sweden and Finland because of the EU is that they don't feel safe within solely that structure that they want NATO membership and that that is the effective response in this crisis from their national perspective but we're going to take two more views on this and then I'm going to try and open things up to the audience. Anna, you wanted to come in quickly? Yeah, I wanted to agree to a large extent with General Bradshaw it was a very important statement. The European pillar of NATO it should be well understood. Of course the burden sharing so taking much more responsibility for defending Europe is important but in terms of decision making it is slightly different and when we speak about transatlantic alliance well, we have a proof war on Ukraine actually it is US in lead and many countries simply following US or aligning with US and then step by step Europe I think that the EU, I think there is much more consolidation and observing things in the EU I see that this actually perception of threat from Russia is much more common within the EU and we are able to better communicate but it's still much to do and US, Canada UK also Turkey in many ways remember Montreux convention that was quite important on this so NATO transatlantic link of vital importance here and strategic autonomy a quick follow up from Fabian and then Elizabeth and that's one of the questions, no problem I just wanted to follow up on your comments and disagree with you slightly on one of the points I think it's very clear at the moment that the transatlantic relationship is the most important relationship not only for defence and security but including that but I would disagree a bit on the strategic autonomy question because I think that's misrepresented and maybe the term isn't very helpful in that but really what we're talking about here is addressing the vulnerabilities of Europe and addressing the vulnerabilities of course also means taking into account where the resources come from what kind of relationships are behind that there's a big difference between a relationship with an ally and with a potential rival or with a potential enemy as we have seen now then addressing those vulnerabilities but this is exactly what we should have done years ago when we looked for example at the energy field we should have looked at where our energy is coming from and how that makes us vulnerable and clearly that should have led to action in the area of dependence on Russian gas and oil so I think this is a useful concept to look at it is also a useful concept because we do have to think in the long term what is the situation going to be what are the contingencies we have to take for example in relation to a different president in the White House for example in relation to a possible security guarantee which has to be given by the EU rather than NATO dependent on what happens between Ukraine and Russia so I think there are many issues there which should be addressed but I think none of that really questions the transatlantic alliance Quick response from maybe the points you make are entirely fair and I didn't mean to be too hard on strategic defence autonomy for Europe but I'm hitting at the use of the term in a political context particularly from one of the member nations when they seek to create more defence autonomy within the EU as opposed to reaching out to NATO and making use of shared structures and I think that is potentially damaging if it suffers to damage the relationship with the United States that is the context I think we should we owe Ukraine a big huge deal of gratitude for having demonstrated in a very unfortunate situation that everybody can play a role in keeping that country safe so let's learn from Ukraine not by waiting for a war Ukraine didn't wait for a war they didn't have the luxury of the sort of preparation that we can do but what we should learn from them is that everybody can play a role in keeping that country safe in organising themselves and if I may hope I'm not too surprised by the fact that there are societies that most of us don't feel any sort of allegiance, loyalty to our societies or to civil society to societal structures and that's what we are seeing very dramatically in the US but also in other countries and I think it started with what Robert Pattenham documented 20 years ago the bowling alone phenomenon but if we look at the challenges facing our society especially national security it stands to reason that we can all get involved in some way and by getting involved we create that sort of buffer that tells our adversaries that if you try well you can try but we will have the entirety of our society or large parts of our society will be organised to the advantage of taking whatever it is you want in our countries that's what Finland did in 1939 and kept the Russians, the Soviets at bay for 105 days and what the Ukrainians are doing today Great, we do have the Ukrainian ambassador here now so the last part of the session is going to be remarks from him so we've got time for a couple of questions certainly let's see how we go so let's start with one or two questions I think you were just fractionally faster in getting your hand up there so let's start there and then second question here Yes, thank you, Merrick Chapman I'm a macro strategist I'd like to ask about the commitment of this is directly at Germany in particular where we've heard that there's been big changes in their orientation but it's lacking the 100 billion fund that they've committed to their military is actually extra budgetary so they're going to continue with the debt break they're going to pretend that they've not got this fiscal commitment so it sounds like they're not being entirely honest with themselves I wonder if you could comment I think Fabian and General probably should talk to German I think many countries play around with budgets and putting things across different years and in different ways personally I don't think it really matters what matters is that the money is spent and that it's also spent well and I think this is one of the great concerns for me the number sounds great but really it isn't really about spending that money it is about spending that money effectively so that increases European capability European capacity that it contributes better to NATO that also means we have to look at the whole defence industrial sector because in the end we are already spending a lot of money on defence and security the question is whether we're doing it effectively and I would think that if this 100 billion is what we want to see then we need to also make changes to how we procure defence and security how we organise that whole sector well only to say that Germany has a special contribution to make for the future in that it lies in a particularly significant area of Europe from the point of view of getting stuff from A to B and it's noteworthy that the means or so have been reduced hugely since the days of the Cold War so for example where there were dozens of trains that could carry main battle tanks there are now rather few and tend to be dedicated to commercial interests so the amount of spending that is required on infrastructural support to the means of responding to a threat are enormous and it's quite possible that defence spending in Germany would not be in the shop window if it were going to be very, very effective I would just make that observation Major Alan Broughton, Royal Marines my question is to Fusion, we've spoken a lot about how the UK can cohere its social, political, economic and military leavers we've seen in the response to the Ukraine crisis an unprecedented response from our civil institutions or civil institutions around the world such as McDonald's, Visa, IOC but those institutions have made those decisions unilaterally whereas in comparison Russia has a national defence management centre which is able to cohere its political, social, economic and autocracy and we're a democracy in the UK we're able to do that with say counter-terrorism what we have the counter-terrorism extremist network is it feasible with us talking about Fusion for us to actually cohere our foreign policy in a way where we could have security lines of effort and direction to say something like the BBC or is that inherently undemocratic Elizabeth First and then Petra Siam I'll leave the BBC to Mark well maybe not but the UK government is actually doing I hope I'm not revealing anything untoward but is doing really pioneering work on working with the private sector because obviously as you say in a democracy, in a liberal democracy the government can't tell privately owned companies what to do but it can engage with them to help them better understand their role in furthering the national interests and by the way this is a lot harder than it was during the Cold War when companies did that because CEOs are often from a different country than the company and the company may be ultimately owned in yet another country but the UK government is doing some fantastic pioneering work there Can I address your question in a slightly different way it's not what you extended here and it should be Professor Helen Thompson who comments on this but one of the things that is happening is that what we're doing the sanctions are affecting the entire society and if we're talking about how we're educating the population to come along with us it's actually small people who are paying the price of our sanctions now Professor Thompson would be able to liken us to the effect that the sanctions have had on the gas and oil prices that were going up even before the war but I keep getting letters from former friends or old friends who are saying I can't pay my gas bills in this country my electricity bills in this country so one of the things that is clearly happening also is that throughout European societies the fact that these prices are going up are something they've seen as challenging the prosperity they've had and very briefly therefore also on Germany for example one of the things the Financial Times quoted Chancellor Schultz saying that they had to weigh the disadvantages of this impeachment or this impounding on the prosperity of our societies against the help for Ukraine this is one thing that particularly western societies are really not used to any longer that people have to make sacrifices in that way and to some extent one could even say you turning down the radiator is your tiny contribution to our sanctions on Ukraine I mean this is not happening so from that point of view this all of society approach isn't taking place although de facto it's an all of society effort that is being made to a large extent it is also about perception of threat because we learned something in Poland recently over 3 million people coming through our borders and a lot of them actually it is the biggest wave of refugees real refugees after I think after the Second World War not that is true and without without governmental lectures with full support of government of course of all levels of government but each individual family each person took this on his, her own and they host people at home it is not very easy I know it from my family experience as well but they do this and that's understanding threats and solidarity who I'm sure will reflect on that but Fabian and then General Bradshaw I think this question of the cost of living crisis is really important because it plays much bigger in politics than the war itself maybe that's because it's not communicated in the right way but it does have an influence on how politicians act and I think there's also a question of solidarity how can we actually manage to distribute the costs which are undoubtedly there so that the most vulnerable aren't suffering the most because then we're not going to maintain the public support for any kind of action in Ukraine and that also means doing this across countries there will have to be some form of solidarity between countries because countries are affected very differently now just on Germany I think what we have seen there is frankly it's the wrong way of making the argument there has been far too much discussion around the economics of it the argument in Germany is about historic responsibility it's about moral responsibility it is about learning from what happened in the second world war that's an argument where Germans can also be convinced that sacrifices are necessary and that there is something here which is more important in the immediate effect but talking about the economics of it is not going to convince people in Germany right, thank you thanks, I mean I think your question was about our ability to be able to fuse strategy and the Ukraine war has served to force us to think about the relationship between economic and defense and security and information strategies but as yet our mechanisms for fusing them are not that great which is my point about the EU and NATO working together in the face of somebody like Putin who has his hands on most of the levers you need a very quick response between the military and the diplomatic and the political and the economic if you're going to be effective in response to his latest move which implies in the context of NATO and the EU that they need to be able to work very closely but within our nations sadly we've lost the ability to do that during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns they were largely subcontracted out to defense and security so for example in the United States the strategy for the invasion of Iraq whether you think it was a good thing very rapidly to SENTCOM who did an immaculate job of developing military strategy but what one needed in Iraq was a holistic strategy so when we arrived in Iraq the only people on the ground by and large were from defense and the intelligence services one needed people for reconstruction for education for rebuilding political structures for information and all of that was missing Ukraine has forced us to confront the reality all of that needs to be combined and I think it starts at the top in the cabinet office here in UK in the NSC in the United States which needs to have much more power to bring ministries and departments together and coordinate stuff before it's pushed out I did want to sort of come back and come back to the question in the sense of saying well isn't our NSC system just to give us this capability but I think we are quite limited on time and I think all of us would very much like to hear from the Ukrainian ambassador so if I can call on that Impristika to come up on stage and I think his remarks on this topic will obviously be particularly important and interesting to the conference Good morning I hope you can hear me Thank you I'm sorry to get in the way of such an interesting discussion I would love also to be a part of the discussion and mostly what I appreciate when talking to the audience like yours is being able to react because that's the way how we build up our messaging as well I understand how many different things here around and I'm sorry that I came a bit late I was in another meeting with this audience like yours in our museum where the Secretary Ben Wallace was also giving his address and we'll be happy to see him again Just a couple of words to tell you actually I came with the prepared speech but I understand the appetite here is understand what actually Ukraine was one of the question earlier today was actually Ukraine once how Ukraine believes that this work can be ended it was actually end of the work for Ukrainians I don't want to tell you how the situation on the ground I have total respect in your media and the people around the government which are making all decision knowing was actually situation all about in Ukraine I just wanted to tell you how Ukrainians see and how we can bring this to the end first of all we had a six rounds of negotiations with Russians sometimes very difficult to believe but we are sitting around the table and negotiating with them I have to tell you that in usual Russian manner they came with such a high expectation such a high demand that I'm not even going to tell you because you will see how unrealistic they are how unjustified they are and everybody understood that that's the negotiation position so what we came at the end of the days to how we managed to bring together us and Russians around what the items there are just a couple of them please bear with me so the Ukrainians are asking now not how we finish up the work but how we will be leaving afterwards and what is the afterwards security picture this is something very close to what we are discussing right now and I will be more than happy if you engage in this trying to understand what future of our order if you wish will be so the idea came that at the end of the war we will sign the treaty and ratified by the parliaments which is very important I have to remind you that Minsk agreements so called were not a part never been signed by anybody neither by Ukrainian presidents nor Russian and never been ratified by Ukrainian parliament so there are major guarantors as we call them guarantors which we offer it to become Ukrainian guarantors after the war is ended and among those the US UK, France, China Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy Poland, Israel was mentioned and in the initial stage even Russia was mentioned Belarus as a guarantor that was two inputs from Russian side you can imagine that so we hope that all the guarantors will be able to support our way towards EU you can see that NATO is not mentioned here in the next 15 years we agreed with Russians that the fate of Crimea will be decided this is very interesting diplomatic way of telling that we don't know what to do with the Crimea right now the fate of Lugansk and Donetsk so called Lugansk and Donetsk people republics is also set aside given to the presidents Putin and President Zelensky to decide when they meet it's again very as a purely diplomatic trick how to allow the negotiations progress knowing that the re-stumbling block is here the sanctions and legal actions against Russia should be discussed only when we finish the peace treaty with Russians not before as some of our colleagues in Europe now are doing telling the Russians we will start lifting the sanctions and the last one that everything we discussed with Russian will go on referendum with Ukrainians if Ukrainians decide that we still have to go to find the place under the umbrella of NATO security guarantees so the Russian Ukrainian negotiations will be restarted that's more or less I understand it's complex that that's more or less what we agreed last official negotiations were on the 29th of March obviously Russians are not happy with the result of negotiations and they believe that they don't have to go along them they will fight and will achieve something on the ground on our side the same we start to receive more support sometimes militarily support sometimes politically financially and the both negotiation teams and their positions departed each other so just to finish that if we will have one minute if we will have questions on this structure I will be happy to respond but just couple of things to tell what Ukrainians feel what is our biggest pain right now this is the lack of security structures which would allow us as a nation to survive we are not talking about Budapest memorandum everybody knows the fate of Budapest memorandum we are not talking about the partnership for peace with NATO did work with us the NATO now what it did not help us the European the future is not helping so the Helsinki final act we have to admit that Russians just threw this paper away OACE did not work Ukraine was biggest and most expensive mission OACE over the whole existence of organization did not work either I don't want to start with UN and UN Security Council so what Ukrainians maybe to hasty in our observations and our assessment of the existing structures in the world but that's what nations have when it is at war against the very big powerful nation with the nuclear weapon and the part of the Security Council so what Ukrainians believe can be done right now we offer it maybe it's half baked I understand but we offer it an idea to the world and we call it United 24 meaning that we offering an idea that will become a sort of basis for the new security arrangement I'm not talking about organization which arrangement Ukraine asks that if anything happens to the sovereign state in the world the nations guarantors of this security will come together in the three days will finish up all the consultation just three days then the next move is nations guaranteeing that the sky over the particular nation will be closed against any enemy on this planet third the nation in need will be provided all the assistance they require militarily financial and everything I know that it sounds like a fiction but that's the best we could come at the moment right now let me stop it here if we have a second I would be more than happy to reply if not thank you very much we just have time for one or two questions so let's the first hand I saw there obviously we have got the ambassador so questions to the ambassador all the panel but let's say any terms you were talking about the terms of a settlement there are three issues I think were very very important for many Ukrainians which ought to be or perhaps I like your views whether they are a condition of a settlement or a condition of sanctions being lifted for war crimes in other words the pursuit of war criminals at the height of the Russian leadership down to the troop level of Russian forces that's point number one the issue of reparations for war damage inflicted by the Russian aggression on Ukraine and certainly the very humanitarian issue of the deportees not the refugees who fled to western Europe but the compulsory deportees from the occupied territories deported into Russian territory under being currently reeducated as it were those three issues are they part of your conditions for sanctions being lifted in other words that has to be resolved before some sort of semblance of normality returns to relations with Russia thank you what I gave you this is official party line if I may if you talk to a hardliner like myself I will tell you that for example I can't see why we have to look into pockets of western taxpayers money for the after-war reconstruction and rebuild I believe Russia has to pay for everything so everything you mentioned is not even a question that's the way I would describe I can't see how can we get out with reparations not to be paid by Russians or all those committed the crimes won't be prosecuted and there are so many other things I guess the best way out of it if Ukraine wins militarily so if you love yourself it's very difficult to believe I understand but if you love itself the idea that actually Russia can be defeated on the field of war you would allow yourself to think and find the way how to do it what to do maybe it will be even better for Russians themselves a quick question from Fabian I just wanted to ask because you mentioned EU membership and I wanted to ask what is the expectation of Ukraine in terms of EU membership and also timescales it's very easy we believe that that's actually what initiated the war what was the last drop when Russians lost their patience remember in 2013 that was the case why they went against us and why they went to take over the Crimea so it's not even NATO that much because in this audience I don't have to explain that NATO is already all over Russian western borders just another piece it's not changing the strategic strategic concept of Russia being able to defend itself so this is EU we are just departing Ukraine show that they are not ideal but we are departing somewhere thus creating the conflict within Russian society creating the threat to Russian society that somebody like Ukrainians can live differently they don't need Russia to follow the case we can build up our Slavic the Russian population the Russian territory but the way they run themselves Russian dictatorship whatever the way is look we are pretty much out of time so please join me in thanking very much Ambassador Bistrak UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace on stage shortly there will be a little bit of hiatus so I will ask the panel to join me in leaving the stage but please also let's thank our panel Ambassador Bistrak