 Before I start, I want to acknowledge and celebrate the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet, the none of all people here on the campus, and pay our respects to the elders past and present. It's my great pleasure to introduce Siddharthu Suryodipuro, Pakato, Director-General for ASEAN Corporation in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Principal Coordinator of Indonesia's role as Chair of ASEAN in 2023. Pakato was previously Ambassador of Indonesia to India and Bhutan, and before that Deputy Chief of Mission in the Embassy of Indonesia in Washington DC. And before then, APEC Senior Official, where I first met Pakato, APEC Senior Official for Indonesia when Indonesia hosted APEC in 2013. It's a real tremendous pleasure to introduce Pakato and to have him here, and for him to make time for us on his busy trip to Australia to share his thinking, and right on the heels of President Jokowi's visit to Australia. This is a big year for Indonesia and Fazian after a successful G20 summit and G20 year. At a time really where no other country could have managed given the geopolitics, I don't think that's an exaggeration to say. Now Indonesia is Chair of ASEAN. Of course, as by far the largest economy and population in ASEAN, the 10 member Southeast Asian Grouping, Indonesia's leadership matters, matters to ASEAN matters in the broader region. The last time Indonesia chaired ASEAN 2011, they gave us ASEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership idea, and they shepherded that through to conclusion and now it's enforced. So we're looking forward to seeing the outcomes of this year's ASEAN summit and to note that Indonesia, of course, is already a global player of significance and we should have high expectations for Indonesia this year. I'm personally honoured to be hosting this at the ANU, having first met Paccato back then in 2013 and again in Delhi when you were ambassador. Because there are a few strategic thinkers of Paccato's capacity in the region and to have him steering this grouping ASEAN through a difficult time, we're really lucky to have his thoughts, to have him share his thinking with us tonight. So with that, Paccato will speak for about 15 minutes and then we have, in fact, a lot of time for Q&A and discussion. So please join me in welcoming Paccato. That's an intimidating introduction. Thank you very much, Sheru. Sheru, thank you for that very generous introduction. I have to correct that I wasn't the apex zone but I was the alternate senior official. And let me give a disclaimer. I do come from the bureaucracy of the government of Indonesia so I will be speaking at that level if you hear some bureaucratic jargons. Please understand that's where I'm coming from. But I welcome this opportunity to be, not only to be talking but also to be exchanging views with all of you. I welcome this opportunity. It's an academic setting. I've always believed in the importance of looking at the horizon and beyond to be thinking more freely. So it's in that context that I will be talking. The theme that I'd like to touch on is on ASEAN centrality, why it matters and for that I'll jump straight into it. But before I do that, let me thank Peter Dresdier in particular and Sheru for arranging all of this. We've had previous discussions on this and I really appreciate this. It's not only an opportunity but I see it as a privilege to be here. So on ASEAN centrality, why it matters, I'd like to perhaps touch on three things. I'll speak briefly and then we can afterwards have a discussion. But first I'd like to touch on a bit of history and then about what is centrality as I look at it and the why question, why does it matter. So turning first on history, all of you would know it was founded more than 50 years ago, part of Southeast Asia. It was founded partly as a response to a geopolitical context. It was, continues to be geographically fractured region but it was also fractured politically, economically back then and it developed over time. The evolution of it from our perspective, Indonesia's perspective at this point in time, is that there were a few benchmarks for our, for Indonesia's, every time we host a summit. The first was in 1976 when we had the first ASEAN summit in Bali. It produced the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. It was a response to the geopolitical situation. The United States withdraw from Vietnam and some geopolitical upheavals in the region. So this was a response. It created the ASEAN Secretariat, it agreed on the establishment of Economic Cooperation and it also talked about the need to establish the nuclear weapons free zone. The next Indonesian hosting of the summit was in 2003. This was the Bali summit. What it produced was an agreement on establishing an ASEAN community. So the background to it was that with the joining of CLMB into ASEAN in the late 90s, there was this big debate in the early 2000s within ASEAN whether ASEAN was going to strengthen its external engagements or whether it should strengthen its internal mechanisms. So the answer was to establish a mechanism and with it came also an agreement to establish an ASEAN charter. Note that this was a period of... All of this happened during a Cold War, post-Cold War period. So it was a period of norms building, institution building, a period of hope, a period of peace dividends. There's institutions where established ARF in 1994, EIS in 2004, ADNM and others. And then the third time was in 2011 where ARCEP was established, Women to Establish it. As Rairoba mentioned also earlier to develop ARCEP. And now Indonesia's chairmanship is again taking place at regional upheavals. A lot of dynamics in the geopolitical side, the geo-economic side. And this question about the ASEAN centrality always comes up. So when we talk about centrality, this gets into my second point. We are actually talking about three or four interlocking concepts. The first is geographic centrality. Southeast Asia lies at the very strategic geography. It's a maritime crossroad. The security and prosperity of many countries depend on... Must be the cold weather. The security and prosperity of many countries depend on access to and access through the region. It is a region from which countries project. But the ASEAN region is not necessarily a contested region because of the existence of ASEAN itself. So that's the geographical side of centrality. It is also a fractured region as I touched earlier. But if ASEAN remains as an entity, then it is not necessarily one that is fractured. But it can become a community, but a community that has to be managed. And it is also a maritime region. So when we start to think about the geopolitical context, it is in that context. It is about a maritime region. So when we talk about this geopolitical concept like Quad, Pocus, it is very heavily maritime in nature. And the response of ASEAN has to be corresponding. ASEAN is a maritime region. It has developed thinking over 20 years along these lines. There's the ASEAN Maritime Forum established more than 10 years ago. And recently, ASEAN agreed on an ASEAN maritime outlook basically to bring together various branches of cooperation within ASEAN into one document. It is a challenge for ASEAN just to develop its own rules and norms for a maritime region. I don't think for now we have really developed those rules and norms. There are rules and norms developed in instruments such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. We've had the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality doctrine for more than 50 years. The Treaty of Southeast Asia of the Rebellion Free Zone has that heavy maritime component to it. But when it comes to rules and norms for this maritime region, this is something that ASEAN needs to develop. And secondly, in terms of centrality, it's the institutional and diplomatic centrality. And what I mean by this is that it is within ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms that countries come together to discuss various issues relating to the region. Australia, of course, has been a partner for basically 50 years now, one of the most long-standing partners, supporter of ASEAN. Japan also, 50 years. But other countries have come together also to be part of this regional architecture. So last week for the series of foreign ministers' meetings, there were more than 200 kinds of meetings, including important bilateral meetings, the foreign ministers of US and China, China-Australia, China-India, and others. There were meetings, trilateral meetings. I know that Indonesia had meetings with Russia, China, and then trilateral meetings with Australia and India. So various kinds of diplomatic engagements took place at the sidelines of the ASEAN meetings. And then in September at the summit level, I would imagine many important bilateral meetings would also take place. People are wondering whether President Biden and President Xi Jinping or the Chinese Premier would meet or not. We'll see. And then also within the ASEAN mechanisms, there are 51 countries that sign on to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. ASEAN has $11 partners, $6 sexual dollar partners, and four development partners. You can ask me later what they mean. And I have colleagues that will explain. And then there is a strengthening diplomatic process, the Jakarta process. There are ASEAN ambassadors in Jakarta, and then dialogue partners also have ambassadors in Jakarta. So Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, Korea, US, Canada, India, UK, EU, Russia, I think Norway also has an ambassador to ASEAN. So this creates a diplomatic community and a Jakarta process that I think is strengthening. And we are looking to further strengthen it. And we put it upon us in ASEAN how to strengthen ASEAN's own internal mechanisms. So we are developing the diplomatic centrality. But it's also, the ASEAN foreign ministers last year asked this question among them. Does ASEAN have the wherewithal to deal with rapidly changing geopolitical geopolitical context? I guess their answer was no, because they mean that this should be further discussed. So now there's discussions about the decision-making process about strengthening the diplomatic process existing at the ambassador's level, about strengthening the ASEAN secretariat, perhaps the role of the secretary-general, and also strengthening other ASEAN mechanisms. At the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting last Friday, ministers talked about how ARF can shift discussion from confidence-building measures into preventive diplomacy, what would be needed. This is a question that ASEAN as partners have been struggling for the past almost 30 years. But the region does require a response. We'll see whether the ARF can come up with such a response. So I guess my discussions in Canberra today and tomorrow I think also touch on these issues. And finally, economic centrality. So ASEAN has become, it is an economic community or an economic community in the making. It has consistently had about a fifth or fourth of trading internally within ASEAN. And it has been the largest trading partner for China for at least a number of years. And it is the second largest trading partner for, let me see, for Australia, India, Japan, South Korea. It is the fifth largest trading partner for the US and the sixth largest trading partner for the EU. So from a macro perspective, it is becoming more central for the economic interests of many countries. And finally, let's talk about why it matters. So first for ASEAN itself, centrality also matters for its own unity, because it's a fractured region. So as long as it can remain central, it will help in ASEAN's own community building, its own unity. Without centrality, ASEAN also runs the risk because it is built on a fractured region. So it needs that centrality, efforts to maintain centrality to strengthen its unity. So it's two sides of the same coin. So this is something that when ASEAN, one of the things in ASEAN is it wants to, there is a drive for common identity. This is the Asia that is non-Chinese on India. It wants its own identity. It is also a region that wants to avoid the experiences of the Cold War, the trauma, if you will. So there's that drive. Secondly, there is a need for ASEAN to ensure its diplomatic centrality, to set their rules and norms. And it also provides useful options for the major powers. If we see a region that is in the midst of an arms race for each country to pursue its security, then it is a question of whether countries see their security increase with the increasing defense budget, or there needs to be an alternative to it. So ASEAN will provide that inclusive platform to develop rules and norms that can help countries to gain security, but also not at the higher level of armaments or deterrence, because deterrence and incidents is only one step away. So it's a matter of providing an alternative to the regional geopolitical context. And then ASEAN also centrality would mean that it is able to expand its circle of friends. And what I mean by this is that, for example, at the coming East Asia Summit, the leaders will also invite the leaders of the chair of the Pacific Islands Forum and the chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association. So expanding the circle of friends and expanding rules and norms for cooperation and for interstate relations. So let me stop with those points. I think anyway I've spoken long enough, and I look forward to our discussion on this issue. Thank you very much. A nice reminder of the track record of Indonesia in chairing ASEAN and all the big initiatives from TAC to the ASEAN community to ASAP. And I want to come back to what we have planned for this year in a second. But I think going back to thinking about 2003 and the debate about strengthening internal mechanisms versus external mechanisms, but clearly that's now seemed very complementary and you've pursued both at the same time. And it reminds me, you mentioned intra-ASEAN trade, trade within ASEAN is often cited to be lower at 25%. But I think that's a sign of success because ASEAN trades with the rest of the world a lot. Very open and outward oriented. So I think that's a strength. But that also means that ASEAN is more susceptible to a breakdown in the international system to fracture in the confidence we have in open multilateral trade, a lot more to lose. So you mentioned strengthening norms and rules in how ASEAN deals with external partners to get away from the zero sum world. But I guess in that context, can you give us a bit of a preview of the thinking of what Indonesia is doing this year as chair of ASEAN? What economic initiatives or what initiatives to help engage external partners to keep this region, this part of the world, open to make sure that ASEAN remains open, prosperous, stable. And then we'll come to other questions in a moment. So Dukert, I think it's most obvious it would be to solidify ASEAN and that it's establishing an ASEAN secretariat to be relocated within the ASEAN secretariat. So different entities, same home. It will have its own rules and regulations. So that would be first, we are making progress in terms of funding for it. So we'll see when this will be established. And then, learning from the experience, recent experience of the pandemic of the situation, the war in Europe and Ukraine and other challenges, it's to prepare the region for future shocks. And this would be thinking about ensuring the resilience of its supply, production and supply of food, energy, also the health architecture and financial stability. And then as to the next economic agenda, it would turn into the digital agenda, the ASEAN digital community, if you will. And then developing the digital economy framework in which hopefully this year can start negotiations of it. There's a relatively young population that is highly tuned with the digital world. It will be something, it will be a growing order from a significant base at the moment, that it will also be a driver for growth. And then of course, we trade that investment agenda. And finally, on ASEAN Interpreting Outlook. So, this is a geopolitical geo-economic concept that has basically two components for it. One of which is the ASEAN World Concrete Site, is on concrete cooperation, how to build, invest in the connectivity and infrastructure side. In ASEAN, there will be a big event in September at the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, but it's a question of how to making the sustain into other years. So, how would partners then invest in the connectivity and infrastructure side of the region. And then the more strategic side is how to, you know, the ASEAN Outlook and Interpacific calls for ASEAN to lead the shaping of the strategic and economic architecture. So, how to further build on this? Operationalizing that will be watching very closely. John, first here in the middle. Please just wait for the microphone. Anyone else who would like to start signaling to me? Thank you. John Watson from here in the middle school. We know that, and we touched on this in your remarks, that ASEAN has been a facilitator of remarkable transformation of a war zone, a policy-stricken war zone to a prosperous, stable, central instrument in central region, which I call the Marathon Fulcrum, if you like, of the interpacific. Really a transformation. But we witnessed today a tearing away the fabric of ASEAN in what's happening in Myanmar, and it appears to be gravely toxic for the ability of ASEAN to achieve its objectives. In the past, Aliyotas, Garrett Evans were instrumental in a breakthrough in the rehabilitation of Cambodia. Australia and Indonesia, when we work together, can really do amazing things. And I know Redna Marsudi has played a very prominent role in pushing for ASEAN and others to play a constructive role in Myanmar. But I'm wondering why you're here in Canberra. Is this part of your agenda? Is there hope for Indonesia and Australia to make a difference, to rehabilitate Myanmar in the next foreseeable future? We have an armistice ambassador, Gary Uran, who was instrumental in the UNESCO championship here. We'll ask him this question later, but we'll not put him on the spot now. The challenge for ASEAN is really how to move forward with its community, building efforts, without being taken hostage by the Myanmar situation. And this, my minister made very clear at the outset of our championship here. It is a reminder that ASEAN is not only about Myanmar. So that's why we put aside our own resources to handle this. The office of the Special Envoy is being managed by, managed and led by Ambassador Murasu Adyaya. So he's the one under the minister really working behind the scenes, various meetings, various engagements. Also my minister, minister Masudhi, behind the scenes. It is part of the ASEAN family, but also there is a lot broader, much broader ASEAN agenda than Myanmar. And I talked earlier about the institution building, about strengthening capacity and about the economic agenda. But I say that it's not to say that it is not a sensitive issue. ASEAN issue, it is a sensitive geopolitical, in the geopolitical context. And the difference with Cambodia was that Cambodia was, you know, the resolution of it took place at the end of the Cold War. It was a helpful geopolitical context. This is taking place at the period of something that you don't have a name yet for it. Maybe this evening will come up with a name for this period. We cannot call it the post-Cold War period. So there are obviously various interests in this. And for Indonesia, we'll go beyond the chairmanship here, the interests and the effort on the environment. I think also for Australia. So how do we support the Myanmaris in finding a resolution for it? It has to be something that is inclusive in nature. This is a question that I need. My name is now... In the discussions and your expressions, I must compliment you that ASEAN has come along here. As I have seen it, I've worked in Jakarta myself. But I would like to ask your opinion, personal opinion of yours, in the hybrid combination of geopolitics and economic community. What would be the priority of Indonesia? Especially when the economic community has not seen as much progress as it was expected, not only, say, three years but almost ten years ago. So I would like to think of the thread from your views. Thank you, sir. Well, I think I'll give you two responses to that. The first is ASEAN's interest in ensuring it's grown as an ecosystem of growth. A market of more than 650 million people quite a healthy growth. And with stakeholders among the major countries, it's a question of this is mixing geopolitics and economics. So ensuring how the stability is maintained by ensuring that the major countries continues to see their interest is engaging and becoming stakeholders to this. So that is one challenge. And the purpose of meeting is like the one, lastly, and then the summits in September would fulfill that part. But it's also a challenge for ASEAN to make sure that it continues to remain a useful option for other countries to remain engaged. So it's also incumbent upon ASEAN. Secondly, the pandemic and the situation in Europe and what appears to be a fracturing of the global training system. The reliance on neighboring countries, especially for items such as food, then should be greater. It should be relying more on immediate neighborhood. So out of this, there is some work being done in ASEAN for ensuring food security, especially in times of crisis. So making sure that in times of crisis that the food is made available for the region. And also in ASEAN we are working with a number of countries such as Australia on this basis. Yes. Thank you. Thank you so much for the opportunity. My name is Salafit and also from this global school. I would like to ask something about the relations between the ASEAN functionality and the ASEAN way. It's about the role of ASEAN and the line resolving the crisis, the regional crisis such as Myanmar and so on. So how will Indonesia manage to implement the ASEAN centrality to not crossing the ASEAN way because the ASEAN way is a principle of non-interference. How Indonesia will manage not to interfere with internal government on issues like ASEAN. Thank you. The ASEAN way is reflected in the interaction and also reflected in the discussion behind closed doors. So there are those values that is not very easy to describe or define that exists and it percolates into the language such as in the joint communication certain sensitive issues are gloss over and don't even though discussed in a frank and open manner. Now when we talk about interference I guess an easy illustration is non-interference within the family. You don't mix in with each other's business but you have that discussion and there are certain norms and rules that are expected of you. So in the Charter ASEAN Charter it talks about good governance it talks about democratic governance apart from non-interference. There is an understanding that we want to get common norms because we want to develop community there has to be common norms, common standard of behavior and this is something to be aspiring to. It's not necessarily with us it's something that we work for. Okay I'll just throw it John Guppy says I'll trade I'll look at a couple of questions and it's about essentially the two efforts in a room in our state. What do you see ASEAN as being able to do to lower the level of tension between those two countries? What sort of steps might ASEAN have in mind to do that? The second question is this Indonesia is a very big country in its own right and it doesn't always have to work a block step with ASEAN on every policy issue. What might Indonesia be able to do bringing ASEAN along with it but very much on its own initiative to seek to lower tension between we should talk about the three in the room so the eagle, the panda and the elephant because India-China relations is also critical I think that what was made possible by an India that was insecure and that's also how the Malabar naval exercise began for so I think it's also critical and for the region these are the ones that will remain China-U.S. is critical but the U.S. has always been uncritical and I think occasionally sometimes chooses to be so but you are right it is critical and for ASEAN it is a matter within ASEAN there is that need to start to think about not only the court of conduct for the South China Sea with China important in its own right and their processes are going to be for Indonesia we are quite confident that we can accelerate the process but what's more urgent and critical is a form of goal a form of conduct between China and the U.S. that's the more critical and urgent part of this maritime domain so that's what I think ASEAN should start moving towards I mean through diplomatic channels these are things that are being voiced and reported so something that we need to start really think about and then for ASEAN itself how to develop its own rules and norms for the region so apart from more general norms like the treaty of enmity and cooperation what kind of rules that will be more more relevant or more reflective of its geopolitically maritime nature this what I think can be done Coal of conduct between China and the United States China and ASEAN Coal of conduct but what is urgent is also sometime of coal between China and the U.S. that is the more urgent one Next question Thank you very much My name is Professor of international relations during this building I'd like to go back to the agenda that you were talking about in terms of the challenges for ASEAN and particularly to look at the issues in travel to around climate change but I'm thinking more specifically about decarbonisation pathways Indonesia itself has actually taken a lead on this in 2019 the government published a very, very detailed report setting out a decarbonisation plan transition to a low carbon economy for Indonesia subtitled in fact a paradigm shift because it was a really interesting terminology at the level of the ASEAN members states they're all members of the Global Commission on Climate Change they've all signed up to the Paris Agreement and they've all submitted their first determined contributions but there's a great deal of variety in those documents and in those plans at the level of ASEAN there's ASEAN has a state of climate report there's an ASEAN Centre for Energy I think there's supposed to be the establishment of the Centre for Climate Change so we have a regional level activity which is not really very much about setting the norms and rules that we've talked about we have a great deal of variety at the level of the member states these are really crucial issues for ASEAN energy market demand will continue to grow but at the same time it's a region that is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change so in terms of balancing around the centrality and the ambiguity of centrality how do you move forward on this how do you have this region level activity you have a variety of processes and plans in place at a national level how do you make those coherent how do you do that to move these issues forward in a way that actually gets to some real outcomes a few things some to mind the first is this vision of an ASEAN grid but at the same time also realisation that again this is a fractured region so in the macro region there will be a establishment of a grid and then also in Kalimantan in Bordeaux but then also models for grid there is a discussion on going on that and then on carbon I think we are thinking about the creation of a carbon market but for Indonesia the focus of is national carbon market so how do we establish that and then thirdly a lot of effort currently is actually going into a new economy so this debate why not green, white, blue there is a thinking that this is also it serves as a new economy source of growth it's an area that is less explored so rather than talk about fish or other resources we talk about we start talking about added value into these resources so from seaweed into biochemistry and others so this year we are hoping to adopt an ASEAN framework on the economy building on this year's decision 2021 so yeah question down from the front here I'm just going to wait for the mic hello I'm Yona, an exchange student from Indonesia too I have a question regarding the formation of all this that you mentioned earlier in 2021 this security pact announced that the working region in the Asia Pacific which includes the territory of ASEAN too but mainly believes that the formation of this security pact is a threat for Asian control to be and until now we haven't really heard any official statement from the ASEAN like some of the countries are in favor of this but some of them are in point Indonesia being against the office so what do we really think about this, will it ever be a threat or will we ever be favored we reverse to Indonesia and ASEAN first of all this is not the first time that ASEAN operates in the same geographical space as other regional organizations in the past it would have been the American alliance system now there is office so it's it shouldn't be a problem on its own I think a more critical question would be what kind of rules and norms that we have to build for the maritime space that is for the most part Southeast Asian and also a crossroad for many interests we don't have that at the moment so something that we need to build on we have instruments like the UN convention on the sea but there are also other instruments so the region may want to look into it and then build it up so how could the region decide on its own rules and norms and not have other countries decide for the rules and norms for the region nowhere else in India you know many people would ask me you know countries are projecting their navy into Southeast Asia so what is Indonesia going to do we are projecting anywhere since these navies are projected into our waters we have to ensure that our waters remain stable and open for all and hold with respect the rights of others for equal access for their own access but also respect the rights of others into access to and access to the region James Gary after that and if we have any more time we will go to the back please James thanks for your remarks I just want to draw you out a bit more if I may and last year an ambassador to the United States at an interesting speech that Washington, America needed an ether of ogle for Southeast Asia a tendency to still look at the region as a block rather than have an appreciation for the different cultures and sensitivities they are in I wonder what your reaction to that kind of assessment is and secondly would you be prepared to give a response to the Biden administration policy towards Southeast Asia in this term with a particular reference to America's economic footprint in the region thanks from the perspective of ASEAN it has always looked to engaging the U.S. from two other years from the U.S. side there has been greater attention I think there is throughout the years and there is an administration there is a growing trend of interest in Southeast Asia not only as a function of China but also its own right as well and I think the Obama administration there was marked the stronger interest in it and this continues with the Biden administration and many of the policy makers are a continuation of it Indonesia happens to be the country coordinator for ASEAN in ASEAN-US nations so that's last year it was ASEAN-US special summit and this year we are working on establishing ASEAN-US center in the U.S. it's still at the initial stage of planning and conceptualizing but I think we can be quite optimistic we can be realized and I'm quite optimistic that this is something that can be sustained but of course Washington will always have a global view but at the same time the interest in Southeast Asia will also continue to grow Gary and then Fred that's going to have to be the last question thank you very much that's it for your presentation and welcome to Canberra Gary and I used to be in D.C. as well I was one stage senior official to ASEAN and ASEAN and Indonesia and so on you mentioned the Mekong region and it reminds me about the Mekong region and what I'd like is a sense of you of where things now stand because some people have said over the last few years that China is seeking to wedge the five preparing states the three they changed in some way to wedge mainland Southeast Asia ASEAN members and maritime and I'm wondering what your sense of this is because a number of commentators as I said have been quite worried about this over the last few years the Mekong is in China's immediate neighborhood and as China grows the relationship with the Mekong will inevitably also grow it would have its own dynamics between the Mekong sub-region and China also India which are in that region so there is this dynamic there are processes in terms of water management and we are supportive Indonesia is supportive of that process Indonesia itself is starting to undertake its own or enhancing its relationship with the Mekong sub-region building on the existing bilateral relations so some small steps for Indonesia in that direction I think from within the Mekong itself they also have their own discussions there are countries that would like to strengthen relationship between the Mekong and other partners the situation in Myanmar though has created certain complexities for countries certain countries that would not recognize the Myanmar junta so that creates that complexity at the political level so that's another layer of complexity I'm afraid we're out of time but thank you so much Pagato for being so generous with your views thank you for taking so many questions you can see we probably go all night to tell us about the different dimensions of centrality ASEAN centrality would matter so much matter to us here in Australia and the wider region and the convening power of course of ASEAN I think we take the granted sometimes and we don't appreciate it enough but extremely important and extremely important that Indonesia is chair of ASEAN in particular time because more of ASEAN is not enough right now in the external environment the eagles and the elephants and dragons and more so we've got high expectations for this year what you've produced may seem a bit unfair but you've got a pretty good track record and again we really appreciate you taking the time to share your views and to fill so many questions so please join me in thanking Pakao thank you everybody for bearing with me thank you thanks everyone