 ..y'r cyfansiwr cynllunio. Mae gennym ni'n gweinio ar gyfer y mae gennym ni'n gweinio ar gyfer y maes. Mae gennym ni'n gweinio ar gyfer y maes yn ddatblygu. Mae'n gweinio ar gyfer ar gyfer y maes. Felly, mae'n cael eu pethau sydd wedi'u gwneud... ..yna allan, y Ffondament Gweinid Unedig. Mae'n gweinid unig yw'r cyfansiwn ffordd... ..y'r cynllunio mewn cynllunio. Yna, Arleil yn y cynllunio a'n gweinid unig... ..yna'r unig yn y maes... a ei wneud yw'r cymdeithasol fyddiol. Mae'r cwyrdd cwyrdd rai fyddiol yn ffordd yn ei gyfnod o'r gwell. A'r cymdeithasol fyddiol yn ffodol 7 yma i'r ymgyrch. A'r ymgyrch gael diwethaf ymwneud yw'r cyfeirio europein. Mae'r cyflodau bod mae'r cyhoeddau cymdeithasol, a'n ffodol o'i gwybod ar gyfer y cyfnodau sy'n dod o'r cymdeithasol. Mae'r cyfnod europein yn ysgrifennu yn ei bod yn eu gweithio. i'w ddechrau'r byddwch chi'n gwneud allan o'r ddechrau'n gweithio. Rwy'n dweud i gweithio'n gweithio'r byddwch yno, i'w gweithio'n gwasanaeth nhw, i'w ddatblygu'n du mwyth yma, i'w ddechrau'r byddwch i'w ddechrau'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio ar gyfer y ddylch chi, i'w ddechrau'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Mae'r byddwch, o'r cyflaen, i'w ddechrau'n ddylch chi i ddweud a'r byw'r cyfnod o'r cyfnodau sy'n gweithio'r cyfnodau sy'n gweithio'r cyfnodau sy'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Yn gyfawr y ddiweddol, mawr o'n gyfrifio'r cyfnod o'r eu strategiogol a'r ffasgfaith cyfnodol ym Mhwylltebol i'r economi a'r 2050. Rwy'n ddweud i'r cyfnod o'r hyn o'r ffasgfaith yn ysgrifennu a'r bydd yn ymgyrchol, the dialogue that will follow in the question and answer sessions that will follow it is under chat- them house rules. which means you can use the information provided but not attributed to the individual or the organisation. Thank you very much for your kind introduction. Good afternoon everyone and let me thank the institute for the invitation. Yn y bwysig, ond wedi wneud, mae'n ffordd yma ydych chi'n gwneud i wneud y byddai. Yn y bwysig, rwy'n ffordd o'n meddwl am y cyfweld a'r ysgwyl wedi'i gweithio cyfweld, sy'n meddwl yma, a'r ymddangos i'r ffioedd ymddangos. Rydyn ni'n rhoi bod yn gweithio'r ddweud, ond mae'n defnyddiad o'r ysgol. Rydyn ni'n rhagledd y dyfod yma o'r ysgol ddim yn ynyddol o'r gweithio. I don't think that they need to go into a lot of detail to explain to you the seriousness of the situation. You're one of the few two countries so far who actually declare the climate emergency, which is a new concept and a very interesting one in terms of responding in a more obvious and loud manner to what we are hearing around the world and in the streets of our cities. But let me just recall a few facts. In spite of this seriousness, in spite of the gravity of these concerns, we still all face everywhere in all countries, in all cities, in all institutions, the concerns about do we really have to do these things. How far do we have to go? How fast do we have to go there? Can we afford it? Is it going to cost us job? Is it going to cost us too much for the economy, etc.? There's no denying that and those concerns cannot be ignored. Some of them are less justified than others, but you cannot ignore them altogether. That's the first situation we are in. We're beginning to enter into an era of contradiction between a real justified fear of what the future has in store for us and deep-seated resistance to the changes that are required to avoid that future. I think it's the political contradiction of our days. Our job as civil servants is to try and offer avenues to the political decision makers to resolve that contradiction. The cost of climate change of the impact is becoming obvious to everybody. It's an economic cost, damage cost money, fires cost lives, floods cost lives. I think it's quite obvious to everybody that the situation is unsustainable and it's going to get worse. If you think that worldwide we are at 1.1 degree of global warming on average, in Europe we are at 1.6. Europe is one of the most vulnerable continents because don't forget we are a meteorological exception. When it comes to the Gulf Stream if you were living in the same latitude as Dublin anywhere else in the world you would have iceberg in your garden, same where I live in Belgium. We are more fragile than others. I'm beginning to see the impact, but what a lot of people don't focus on is our economy. That same economy that we wish to protect, that same economy that gives us prosperity and jobs is not resilient. Start with the basics, the impact of global warming on energy use. You can see that in many countries the consumption of electricity for cooling in the hot periods are increasing dramatically and we don't know where to find it. But you find some things which were totally unpredictable. I was in Finland a couple of months ago and I discovered that in Finland you can no longer absolutely rely on hydropower because the pattern of the rains no longer fills the dams as predictably as before. It's not that they have to renounce hydropower, but before you could calculate it mathematically every year you would know how much power you get from your dams, but you can no longer do that in a place like Finland. Same in other countries, transport, it's very easy to ignore the fact that the permafrost is softening and therefore you can no longer have roads for heavy duty trucks in Canada or in Russia. It's not a situation for any of us, but the fact that on the Rhine you can no longer load barges in full and you can load them up to a third maximum and therefore that triples the number of barges you need and probably also the cost of your goods and the cost of your insurance, etc. This example is multiplying everywhere. The economy as we know it is also fragile towards climate change and that is an important consideration and puts in context the idea why are we doing this, can we afford it? The real question is can we afford not to deal with climate change and even from a purely basic economic point of view we cannot afford not to deal with this problem. Nor do I need to explain to an audience in Ireland what climate change can do to agriculture and to the pattern of crops and to the pattern of rains and what you need to do to maintain an agricultural society. What are we doing? In Europe we have effectively coupled emissions from economic growth between 1990 and 2017. We have reduced emissions by 22% while our GDP grew by 58%. We are now proposing by 2030 to double the rate of reduction to have a reduction of another 23% in 13 years, so in half the time. In 2014, this is on the base of the decision we took in 2014 that we should achieve at least minus 40% greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. We have the Paris Agreement. We now have what's called a nationally determined contribution where we have committed internationally to this at least minus 40%. In 2019 we completed a five years legislative programme with 2030 as the objective. We have reformed the emission trading system. Many of you would know the shortcoming of the initial system when I took this job 14 months ago, the price of a ton of carbon was around 5-6 years. In spite of that European industry had gotten the message and in the past 10-15 years have done massive reduction in energy consumption through energy efficiency even with existing technologies which incidentally have had a very clear positive impact on their productivity, their competitiveness, their ability to keep jobs in Europe because we haven't seen the threat and massive de-localisation towards council like China. We have seen cases but the massive trend that we all fear has not materialised one of the reasons was because the signal given to industry that climate policy would require greater energy efficiency has been absorbed even at very low prices. In the meantime we have reformed the system. The reform has started with the first element this year and will be in full in 2021 and the market is already anticipating that and the price of a ton of carbon is now above 20 euros and when the new reform is operating in full we expect those prices to continue to go up between now and 2030. We have completed work on the energy union, a renewable energy target of 32% at about 17 euro-wide these days and we have an objective of 20% in 2020. Energy efficient target of 32.5%. A massive exercise of planning at Member States level. The plans that Jim was referring to are plans which have been introduced by a new regulation on governance of the energy union. Member States have produced draft national energy and climate plans between the end of last year and the beginning of this year. Those drafts are public, you can find them certainly on the commission website most likely on the website of the different governments. Commission will issue recommendations in this respect and Member States will finalize those plans by the end of the year. That's never been done in Europe before. It's not to say that planning alone fixes your problem but you start from planning and this exercise also fits with the kind of debate that we see happening not only in Ireland but in most Member States how do we plan ahead for this transition towards a more climate friendly economy. CO2 standards for cars, an obligation to reduce a mission by 37% for cars by 31% for vans, 30% for heavy duty trucks. For the sectors not covered by the ETS, a 30% target Europe wide national targets determine partly on the relative wealth and partly on consideration of cost efficiency. The target for Ireland happens to be also 30% and for the land use sector an obligation to maintain, at least maintain our carbon sink imbalance and preferably to enhance it. When it comes to international action we started the implementation of the Paris Agreement. We achieved the so-called Katowice rule book last year in Poland which gives you the transparency rule, the common metrics, all we need, the processes, all we need to measure what all countries are doing and to compare what they are doing on the basis of the old maxim, what can't be measured, can't be managed. So this is where we are. I'm sorry I'm going very fast, but there is a lot on the table here. So what are we going to do next? We started from the IPCC report on the impact of 1.5 degrees global warming and that report clearly shows that even that impact, which is a lot worse than what we are experiencing now, is going to be very expensive and very difficult to cope with. Not respecting the Paris Agreement target well below two degrees and trying to stay as close as possible to 1.5 increases the damage and the cost exponentially. So we started from that report, which also says that in order to achieve that, the world has to be climate neutral, net zero, sometime between 2060 and 2080. In our analysis we take 2070 as an arbitrary median point but that's the range that the IPCC report gives you, which also means that developed nations have to reach neutrality as early as possible in the 2050s. Otherwise there will not be a knock-on effect on emerging economies and developing countries. The current collective ambition of countries in the world who have committed to the Paris Agreement lead us by the end of the century to something between three and four degrees of global warming. So somebody has to start the process of going down towards the Paris Agreement goals. What we have put on the table is that Europe should be the one to start. Why us first? First because we can do it. Europe is the only place in the world where the political conditions, the awareness of the population and the technologies to achieve the transition are all present. If you look at the United States, technologies are there too. Those who believe in climate change in the U.S. believe us passionately as Europeans do, but they are not a majority. The country is profoundly split and it's very hard to say which side has a majority. The same in many other countries. Secondly, we must do it because otherwise nobody else does it and if nobody does it, we will suffer or everybody else. As I said earlier, we'll probably be among the first to suffer because if global warming gets to the point of altering the function of the Gulf Stream, the situation in Europe would precipitate. So we have, this is not a question of moral obligation, is in our old-fashioned good self-interest to trigger this transformation if nobody else is prepared to do it. Thirdly, we also have some more base interest in doing it. This requires a deep transformation of the economy. It requires developing and deploying new technologies. It requires new services, new business models, new and better ways to run our economies. Who gets first against the most? It's a very well-known principle of international economics. We have the ability to do that. We also have to compare this with the counterfactual. What if we don't do it? Our current economic model isn't a fantastic success if you project it over the next few decades. We are not doing too badly, but there are problems and I'm sure that you could list a long list of problems in Ireland and I hear a long list of problems everywhere in Europe. We are under competitive pressure from emerging economies. We are losing our technological lead. We still do not have any resources. We are heavily dependent on energy, mostly from countries who are not particularly friendly to us. So there is an element of independence as well as security of energy supply. So it's not as if continuing this model as if nothing happened would make us particularly successful, particularly happy. Our industrial fabric is in many ways obsolete. It requires massive investment in modernisation. So money will have to be spent. Our energy needs are increasing. There is a need for a massive investment in our energy system. In any event, around 2% of our GDP. Same investment in a clean energy system would cost us according to our projections around 2.8% of GDP. It's a big difference. But it's not a difference between day and night. So if you compare the cost of the transformation with the cost of business as usual, you get into a different picture altogether. And this is why the Commission has been proposing that the EU should be climate neutral by 2050. We want to spur other developed countries to do it at the same time or shortly thereafter. We want to be followed in the 2050s and 2060s by the emerging and developing economies. We see that Japan has started to fall in the same logic, although they have clearly a lesser level of ambition that we have at least for the moment. Australia may be exactly in our position if a new government wins the election. That is what we hear from our Australian friends. New Zealand is in our position. Canada hesitates because you have provinces like Quebec or British Columbia entirely on our view and others, notably the Prairie provinces and entirely much more reluctant. Under US, again, very split, we all know what the Trump administration is saying and doing, but we also have at least 17 states who have committed to maintaining and enhancing the policies that Trump is trying to reverse. We have a massive movement in cities and local levels in the US, and I see as many American companies or European companies coming to talk about how can we be global citizens and do our part to fight climate change? So the US, with all the difficulties, is far from being a lost cause in this respect. And even China. China, which has magnified preoccupation of economic development, let's not forget in China, there are still 500 million people living in poverty. Never mind that there are 800 million who are either wealthy or okay, still 500 million people living in poverty. Still, if China is showing the example, it will follow it. China still makes 70% of its energy out of thermal generation, mostly coal, but it invests in renewables more than everybody else in the world put together. China just launched an emission trading system whose operation is at the moment limited to the power generation system, and it dwarfs the size of the European system. And they intend to expand it to seven other sectors. So even a country like China, with all the difficulties it has, is moving in the same direction as we are, waiting for what we have taken to call leadership by success. If we can show that a model of decarbonised climate neutral society works also in an economically successful way, we will be following. If we can't show it, then we probably won't be able to apply it even at home, let alone convince anybody else. So what does this long-term strategy actually contain? It's based on a thorough scientific and economic analysis. We already had the first confirmation, if you like, the UK climate change committee, which is an independent body, I believe, similar to the one that you have in Ireland, has produced a massive report whose analysis partly coincides, partly overlaps and completes our own. We've developed eight scenarios. These are not prediction. We don't expect Europe to look like any of these scenarios in 2050. But five of these scenarios take one main clean technology and try to push it as much as possible. Let's see what happens if we electrify everything we can think of. Let's see what happens if we replace fossil fuels with decarbonised fuels. None of these scenarios gets us to climate neutralities. Then we have some more ambitious scenario where we start combining technologies. And two of these are capable of arriving on net zero. What we wanted to show is not that what Europe is going to look like in 2050. We are confident we can. But we wanted to show the durability of certain things, the feasibility of a scenario which leads to net zero, that we have a range of options, that we have a range of benefits beyond emission reduction, that we can do it very largely with existing technology. Granted, there's an issue of scalability of some of them. There's an issue of refining them, making them cheaper, easier to operate. But the technology is by and large existing already today. So we're not relying on big bright new invention that nobody knows anything about. And in particular, this analysis enables us to compare this with the counterfactual I described earlier. What is the real comparison is not with our economy today, but what we have to do in any event, even if we ignore climate change between now and 2050, just to keep our economy ticking, just to keep ourselves afloat. Then this analysis clearly shows that we can do a net zero scenario under these, in most ways, desirable to aim at that objective. It's articulated around seven building blocks. Anybody who's familiar with the climate policy will recognize them. Renewable energy. We need to fully decarbonize our energy supply. We expect some countries will want to continue to use nuclear power, but by and large we're talking about renewable sources. About half of them wind. Energy efficiency, where we have a huge store of gains in Europe, especially in the building sectors, in terms of renovation. Clean mobility. Clean mobility means going beyond transport. Clean mobility also means public transport. It means rethinking the spatial distribution of the territory in the citizen between citizen and countryside. It means rethinking how much we have encouraged commuting and whether it is in our interest to do so, whether we cannot develop a different model of spatial management of our territory. Industry, energy efficiency, I mentioned that, but it needs to go much beyond the technological change. And it needs circular economy, which is not just reducing the need for materials, but also reducing the emissions of the processes to use these materials. Infrastructure, interconnections. In the short term probably more gas pipelines, but what do we transport in these pipelines when we decarbonise our society? Can we reuse them for hydrogen or other decarbonised gases? Electricity, electrical interconnections, smart grids. Then six, the bi-economy. And seven, as a complement, is a panacea not as a solution to all problem, but we will need an element of carbon capture and storage because there are applications that we don't know how to decarbonise. Cement, you can reduce the amount of cement you use. You can make cement less carbon intensive, you cannot make zero carbon. Just to give an example, biogas, same story, you can make a lot of biogas, but what do you do with the CO2? How are we going to pay for all this? The first thing I'd like to say, this is a question of investment and not of cost. Climate change is a cost and it's an unavoidable cost. Mitigation, adaptation, resilience are investments to avoid that cost. We have to get into this logic if we want to solve this problem. Mitigation has brought forward the proposal for the next, both the annual financial framework, our seven years European budget, where we have proposed 25% minimum of climate relevant expenditure. 25% on average because there are programs like Defence where it's pretty difficult to envisage climate relevant expenditure. But when it comes to research, in different spending programs, we have 35%, 35% for the cohesion funds, 40% for agriculture, et cetera. The vulnerabilities that we need to address, beginning with European funds, with Member State funds, are the same all over. The regions and the sectors which are vulnerable to the kind of transformation we're talking about here are the same which are vulnerable to foreign competition, are the same which are vulnerable to the economic transformation that automation will bring, that 3D printing will bring, that digitisation will bring. In any event, we have an issue that we need to solve. We need to find the resources and the alternatives. Adding the climate dimension may indeed facilitate because the green economy will use 4 million jobs and more can be created. Finally, there is massive private capital available. The question is how to incentivise it. I mean first we need to define what is a green investment. There's a lot of green washing out there. The investment managers are under pressure from their client to advise on green investment. What is green? They will need guidance. The insurance industry is being to realise that the current policies are going to kill them when the impacts of climate change are going to multiply. They need to build this into the policies in an effective but affordable manner. They also need to know what is going to protect themselves and the customers against. Third, we need to facilitate the use of these funds. I'll give you just one example. A big reservoir of energy efficiency is renovation of old buildings. Not to speak about the Soviet era of stock in Eastern Europe which is in a terrible state. Most individual home owners do not have access to loans for renovation, not because they can't afford the interest rate. They are considered as an excessive risk by the banks. How do we use public capital to lower the risk profile of those who we think should be financed to renovate their homes? There's a massive work to be done. The commission has already put out a number of proposals for a sustainable finance action plan which concentrates on definition and concentrates on how the investment managers operate. But that's only the first step in this. We have to find better ways to make it attractive for private capital to flow into these objectives. Very, very last point. The politics of this we are at the moment discussing this basically every council that meets every European council that has had this on the agenda. We are touring the capitals to have this kind of discussion to explain what we are doing what we are proposing and why we are proposing this and something else. We hope to have an endorsement by European council could be as early as June could be as late as December. It doesn't matter. The important thing is that it comes and on that basis we can then start working at what policies we need to put in place. The urgent decision to be taken on how we spend our research money how we spend our infrastructure money do we need to deal with regulations like standards for product build a climate change dimension into how products are built etc etc. It's a massive program but it will not happen if we don't have a strong level political direction that agrees whatever happens in 2050 we must be at net zero. Thank you very much. Sorry to be too much.