 I warn you, this is an expert audience. We have industry here. We have nonproliferation experts here. We may even have some regional experts here. I'm going to start off with a couple questions. But my big one is, and we'll start out, we have to compete with next door, costs. Chris, you brought up this topic. And I think our slides will be, are your slides releasable to our website? Yes. OK, so all of the slides that you saw today will be up on our website. If you have trouble accessing them, just email us, and then we'll send you PDF copies. But I thought your slide was fascinating. When you take out the US, if you want to think of the US as outliers, the costs are still rising. When we were in India, one of the comments that the WNA person made was, gee, wouldn't it be terrific to have the Chinese and Indians in there as suppliers? Because it'll bring the costs down. So do you think, now, sort of the Chinese and the Indians are, definitely the Indians are hypothetical at this point. But South Korea, do you think South Korea as a new supplier is going to contribute to bringing the costs down for a new nuclear build? Or is this kind of the loss leader that they have? And if you could talk about the different kinds of costs, because obviously, suppliers who are so strongly supported by their governments have a lot of different ways, a lot of different sweeteners that they can bring down some of the costs for new recipients. I thought you were going to ask an easy question to start. I'm sorry, answer whatever question you want to answer. My boss has been bugging me to get a really good close answer on nuclear costs. And the problem is that there's a tremendous lack of transparency, especially in the Chinese manufacturers. So what are they concluding in the costs? In Korea, the bid that they won was significantly less. The bid was significantly less to the French on an order of $16 to $20 billion less. So many people believe that there's no margin in this first investment for them. But from a strategic long-term positioning strategy, and the Koreans are very, very good at that, they desperately needed to expand their nuclear capabilities beyond Korea. And this was an excellent opportunity for them to go ahead and do that. And I was there just a few weeks ago when it was a whole showcase for Korean technology and what's going on. So the costs, it's a very, very difficult thing to do. There's confusion, what's included, the vendor, the overnight, the all-in, owner's cost. And so there's confusion in that. The presence of global competition is going to make a difference. But I see prices rising steadily. And it's a very, very expensive technology, so expensive that a lot of countries are sort of giving pause to pursuing their investment. And a perfect example of that would be Poland, which has a desperate problem in that 90% of their generation comes from coal. They desperately need an alternative, but they're scared to make an investment in nuclear power because they don't have a history. Even though they have a very long and well-established research group, they don't have experience constructing. And they're very scared of the prospect of having another European nuclear economic disaster like it exists at Flammenville and at Okiluto. So one of the bigger components of cost is the financing. So one of the strategies for lowering costs is to build them more quickly. And the Koreans have been quite good at that. The Chinese, I think, are also good. Do you lose something when you're trying to build things so quickly? I think Alan made a very, very good point that you never know really the cost until all the job is completely done, like you can't evaluate a real estate transaction until you sell it. So when the project's all finished and done, then you will get a good assembly. We spend a lot of time modeling the time value of money. And if you have a 10-year construction cycle as opposed to a five-year construction cycle, what does that do, and all else being equal? What is the impact of that going to be? In a current interest rate environment where interest rates are low, it's less of a significant difference, but if you're at a high interest rate, which could happen a few years, it could be disastrous for some of these projects. Another very important characteristic of building nuclear power plants globally, I think, is, and this, I think, played a very big factor in the Korean victory in the Emirates. That's not so much the technology that matters, although matters to a great extent, but the ability of the engineering procurement contractor to go ahead and get the job done. So the Europeans were struggling with two projects in Europe. The Koreans through Samsung and Hyundai have demonstrated their ability to build projects on budget, on schedule, in the region. And when you go to the debacle installation, you have a sense that it's exactly what's happening, that it's almost military-like in works. They're getting it done. But again, it's still very early in the game. The South Koreans, I'm sorry, and then I'll, just want to follow this just a little bit more. The South Koreans have a lot of big construction experience, particularly in energy projects in the Middle East. I'm not quite so, I don't know as much about the Chinese, but I would think that building reactors in China and India is a whole lot different than it might be building other places. Do you think the Chinese and Indians might have trouble sort of translating that capability overseas? It's a separate question from capacity, because I think I would like to talk about capacity just later. One of the questions I wanted to find out, and I specifically asked the head of the construction product, how many Koreans were on site in Bahurak? And there are 1,200, or there will be 1,200. So 1,200, they said the total workforce was 10,000. So the ability of Koreans to mobilize 1,200 people to come from Korea with experience working on the reference plants in Korea, and then now to duplicate that experience or leverage that experience to build more effectively in the Emirates was a very, very significant strategy that is being implemented by the Koreans. Whether or not the Chinese can accomplish the same, it remains to be seen. And that's one of the issues that we're looking at in Europe where the interest in the UK government to revitalize their nuclear power industry means that they're gonna develop their own supply chain, they're gonna put their own engineers to work. So in essence, one can argue that you're having your third first of a kind plant in Europe. And so how much learning experience is going to follow the third construction of an EPR in Europe remains to be seen. In China and in the US, there's been a tremendous amount of movement of US construction people to China to observe what's going on. So the projects that are being built in the US are taking advantage of lessons learned in China. Apparently they say the same thing will happen for the EPR project, but when you look at the estimates for that project, one has to question whether or not that's really happening. Questions from the audience? Do we have, we do have microphones. So Corey up front and just identify yourself. So following up on, oh sorry, Corey Hinderson from the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Following up on this discussion of costs, and it comes back to something that was in Allen's presentation about the kind of dominance of the Russians in winning the most recent rounds of contracts. In thinking about the responsible nuclear suppliers, what we've heard from others is that there are concerns about Russian supply when it comes to, again, not the credibility of the fundamental technology, but QA, QC, culture issues, the rest, and yet they still are winning the contracts, which to me seems like it's based, that in the end it's based primarily on cost. So my first question is, is that true? I mean, is cost really what's winning out over these other concerns? And the other related question then would be, are there ways to describe costs that aren't direct financial costs to doing business with partners who may not be responsible nuclear suppliers? And then I don't want to single out Russia there, but so that happens to be with the reactor units in that case, but to Gretchen's point, it also would seem to be a consideration when you're establishing your relationships up and down the supply chain. Allen, do you want to? I think the best answer I can give to the question is that there is price and there is cost, and sometimes there's a relation and sometimes there is not. And so what you are seeing is a price, a nominal price that's out there, and from the perspective of the buyer, that's what the buyer sees, and the buyer's making decisions on low cost to them, which means lowest price. How that correlates with the actual cost of executing the project can be all over the place, as we know. And we were talking earlier about transparency. There is no transparency out there with regard to a lot of the contractual terms, and certainly not into the costs that the vendor sees. In Finland, in Flammableville, you got the public companies, you can see the cost impacts of those projects. We don't see the cost impacts of what's happening in Russia and the Russian-built reactors. I don't think we've got a clear picture in China or India as well. And so it's very hard to tell whether or not the vendors are actually making money or whether they are losing money either on purpose or by accident. But if you're a country that's got limited resources, your focus is on price that you see, and then you try to get the kind of terms that will make sure that the vendor honors that price. And if the Russians can continue to offer prices that are very competitive, bring along the financing and an additional thing, which I didn't mention, potentially offered to take back the youth fuel, they have a competitive advantage that nobody else can touch. V.J. and then Melissa. Thank you, V.J. Sazwal, USAC. My first question is very similar to what the earlier questioner asked, which was that you mentioned the elephant in the room, and I thought it was not Rosatom, it was really the financing. I think that is becoming a very crucial issue and all the reasons that you have given a bunch more. It's the local politics of these countries is driving people, essentially, the busbar price is absolutely not acceptable in most countries. And I will today give it a less than 50-50 chance that even the Czech Republic will go nuclear at the end of the day, besides, of course, Poland. And this is being solved by the Russians through essentially putting up a sovereign fund, which is essentially funding most of these activities. And on the other side, we have UK, which is coming up with real loan guarantees and other subsidies for the consumers. So we really have to think in terms of the developed world where we will, at the end, have to rely on governmental assistance of one kind or the other. And on the other side, in the foreign emerging markets, financing will be the key factor for us to make any sale. Any other comments, I would appreciate it, but let me also go one question to Gretchen. Gretchen, I noticed you didn't mention anything about IAEA's program, which is also fairly wide and comprehensive in terms of getting new countries shaped up. Are we still trying to kind of look at it as a bilateral type of arrangement, or do you think multilateralism has some space here for them to work on? Thank you. The reason I didn't mention the IAEA is that I was really focused on industry-led programs. So all the examples I used were industry-led programs, and there are obviously lots of great things that are going on that are coming out of governments or the IAEA, and by no means did I mean that, it's just that I was focused on industry's role. So there was no ill intent of not looking at them. In fact, I have staff that spent a lot of time looking at nuclear newcomers and working through the IAEA and fabulous programs that are going on. Before we go to Melissa's question, we haven't talked about small modular reactors. And I'm almost getting the sense, because this is, in some circles, this is the thing that's gonna save the US nuclear industry. And some of these recipients actually would be better off with small reactors because of the size of their electricity grids. But the sense I'm getting from our conversation today is if the big guys, the Russians, are gonna do all this financing and take back spent fuel, that why would any other country be, why would a new country that wants nuclear power be interested in anything else? You guys have any responses? I must admit that Alan took me out late last night several grandma and yeas and we discussed this topic at great length. And I missed it, how did I miss it? I'm very well prepped for this. So you know my head is there. You know, small modular reactors seem to be a great solution for certain applications. And there's two of them that I can think of, perhaps three of them that I can think of right away. But there's a lot of controversy surrounding them and for all intents and purposes, you know, we can still describe them as being paper or PowerPoint reactors until we have one in the ground operating and generating electricity. Jordan has signed a contract with Rosatom to build a thousand megawatt reactor thereabouts and to supply electricity to a grid that's only 2.6 gigawatts. So that I think defies all sorts of engineering logic to put a thousand megawatt reactor onto a 2.6 gigawatt grid. Secondly, Jordan is one of the driest countries in the world. Nuclear is one of the thirstiest technologies in the world. So to put a nuclear reactor, which is very thirsty and when the driest countries in the world does not make any sense. Jordan has a tremendous solar resource. They are cash constrained to me that makes sense that they do one of two things. They try to deploy solar technology on an incremental basis, wait until an air-cooled Babcock and Wilcox small module reactor that's being supported by DOE is introduced in 2025 timeframe. That seems to be a plausible good solution for them instead of going and spending a lot of money on a big reactor. A lot of skepticism in the industry, I think about the wisdom of going ahead and investing in a large reactor for Jordan. The undersecretary of energy from the Sudan looking to shop and buy a nuclear reactor for Sudan and he very quickly focused on the interest in small module reactors as being something that makes more sense for them. In Poland, there's a huge controversy right now whether or not to invest in large reactors because they don't have experience doing that or to go ahead and develop smaller reactors which enable them to go ahead and displace existing very dirty coal facilities to site the nuclear reactors in proximity to the load and to also reduce the investment risk that they face by spending, I think their estimate is 18.9 billion for three gigawatts of reactor. So that's pretty close to the, it's not as high as the Hinkley investment but it's pretty high on the range. So they're scared of the financial commitment they have to make. They need smaller reactors and deploy closer to the load so they don't have to go ahead and invest in transmission facilities. So there are certain applications for them and I think the industry and the need is there and they would have sales if the technology was deployable imminently. Sure, and let me add a first of all, I'm not sure who took who. But the, I happen to be an SMR skeptic and I'm skeptical because there's a reason that reactors grew to be as big as they are and that was to gain the economies of scale associated with a high upfront capital cost technology. It's true that there's another way to get economies of scale and it's volume production which presumably would be one of the driving forces to making SMRs economical but in order to do that, you have to make a lot of them and if we end up with five or six companies that are effectively offering SMRs and each company only has an order for three or four of them, you'll never get the economies of scale. They were the approach, there's a reason that they were started in the United States conceptually. One is because we've lost the capability to make the big reactors in the United States so there was a desire to go down a path that would allow us to build them. We can still make small things because we still make submarine reactors, for example. The second thing is financing and the problem that we have in the United States is that we have a very balkanized utility system with a large number of relatively small utilities. Even the biggest one does not have a balance sheet that can take a huge lump like 10 to 20 billion dollars and put it on the balance sheet. It's almost impossible. It's completely impossible in the merchant market. And so there is a driving force in finance and there's one in fabrication capability that says small reactors in the United States. The problem is that unless you can produce kilowatt hours coming out of those SMRs at a competitive price compared to the big nuclear plants and everything else, then it doesn't have a place in the market and that remains to be seen. So that's why I'm skeptical. One last thing that I would add is that once again, the Russians are the elephant in the room. They've just finished the construction of their first small modular reactor, which happens to be on a barge, which is modeled after their icebreakers and their submarine fleet. And so they're the first to be out on the market with a demonstrable small modular reactor. I'm Melissa Mann with Eurinko. I wanted to ping off something Corey said and this cost always went out. And I can tell you that in my marketing experience, I've never been given credit for being a good non-proliferation player. It really does come down to cost a lot, which raised a question for Gretchen really. And a lot of the incentives you talked about were for the suppliers. Have you looked at all about the benefits of having incentives for the buyer to buy from those that really do have the good housekeeping seal of approval? Because my sense is what you want is for all suppliers to come up to that level. That's a great question. The one thing I should make a point is we've been talking about suppliers and I just want to broaden out that when I've been using this term often, I'm also talking about that whole supply chain with respect to the dual use folks as well. And often, as I think you've heard me say, Melissa, reactors don't fall off the back of trucks. And so they typically don't get diverted and what does get diverted are more of these other smaller things that are all going into, whether it's design as centrifuge or whatever. So that's just a comment that I just, making sure definitionally that I get that out there. But as far as looking at it from the buyer's perspective, it isn't interesting. I haven't thought of it turning the cart that direction or looking at that way and be happy to brainstorm and try to think of what went on this list or completely different list would make sense to try and help them see the importance of trying to source from these folks that really are doing above and beyond what they should be doing. You'd think at the end of the day, even their reputation matters, right? So if you're the buyer and you're being seen as sourcing from really good places, that's gonna make you look better as the buyer. So you think you in a sense would increase your reputation, not just the reputation of the suppliers, but you as the buyer as well. That would be my hope and just my gut feel that that would make sense. But anyway, happy to brainstorm with you. Paul Murphy, Mill Bank. Just on the point of reputational risk, I would add, in terms of considering angles to the discussion to look at lending policies because whether it's export credit agencies or commercial banks, reputational risk issues are a huge factor. You can sort of separate out the financing discussion into sort of the classic, will I get paid back? How will I get paid back? And then equally important that we're seeing in the deals that we're financing right now on nuclear projects is the reputational risk analysis. Is this a good project in terms of looking at the country, in terms of looking at the capability of the host country regulator? And putting all these together to meet the lending requirements that the banks have as well as sort of sustainability issues in terms of the overall project that are not unique to nuclear, but are part of these lending policies that the banks have. And so even if you don't wanna rely on the benevolence of the market in terms of the suppliers and the customers, if they have to finance it on the market, they're gonna have to deal with these issues. If I can respond to that one, Sharon? You and I need to talk. I could not agree with you more. We've just started this really interesting piece in looking at kind of the finance trade and who all the players are and talk about making your head hurt. Given you do this for a living, you probably know this picture that's been shown to me of letters of credit and all the different folks involved. I mean, it's incredibly complex. But at the end of the day, I'll call it a risk assessment. Someone has to decide how risky is that deal? Is that worth me getting involved in or not? And we've been looking at the folks who do those valuations. I mean, even like the Dun and Brad streets and folks that are actually out there and trying to talk to them and seeing their interest in incorporating some of this thought process that I put out there. And one of the big issues that's part of it is that is the capability of, is it independent? Thanks. Is it independent? But that's sort of the first principle from IEA that we want an independent regulator and there've been comments about what happened in Japan and maybe they weren't as independent as they should have been, et cetera. But you start with that as a first principle and then you get into great that they're independent but that they have a clue what they're doing. Do they have the knowledge of what they're regulating in order to be an effective regulator and then on top of that, if they have knowledge and independence, will they actually do something when they see something wrong? So you look at it at all three levels and have to diligence the regulator to be confident that they will be the adult in the room because the lenders are not gonna be able to monitor the project on a daily basis and so they're gonna wanna look to that host country regulator to make sure that they are capable which raises the question in terms of the build-on-operate model, sort of Russian model of hey, hire us, point to where you want it, we'll do everything. It does raise the question of who's minding the store and does the host country regulator have the capability if they're going to Moscow and being trained that's not necessarily a bad thing but then will they act independently or be beholden to the country of origin for everything that they do? Yeah, great point. May I add something there? Sure. I just wanted to add something because the case of Bonner and the Emirates is, to my mind, again, unique. The Emirates are in the nice situation of having enough money to buy whatever it is that they need and they bought a very good regulatory scheme not only modeled after the Nucca Regulatory Commission but they actually hired somebody out of the NRC, somebody who I know quite well because he regulated me for about 20 years and did a very, very effective job and he went around the world and got other good regulators from the UK and other places so there is a very good cadre of people at Bonner as we speak right now. The trick over the long term is to transition to a situation in which the Emirates are actually doing most of the regulation themselves because these people are not gonna be expatriates there forever. But I don't know of any place else in the world except maybe Saudi Arabia where there's enough money to replicate this model nor do I think there's a willingness to do this in most countries and so that regulatory risk is a very important factor in the risk profile for projects like this. If I could add one thing, going back tying this into small module reactors and so I got the impression in Abu Dhabi a few weeks ago that it's so complex, it's such a huge struggle, such a steep hill to climb to establish the regulatory infrastructure and to build a Nucca reactor that it may be just easier thing to do to establish some sort of plug and play small module reactor thing which sort of on a build on operate basis which makes it much easier for them to get to the point where they have carbon free nuclear power. That's a very dangerous road to go down but I can see that the obstacles to establishing an industry are huge where it may be easier just to buy small plants and have them somehow outsourced in some of the other issues. Dangerous way to go but I can see where there's a lot of institutional obstacles, regulatory obstacles that can effectively stall many nuclear ambitions of many countries. I think a good point but I don't think SMRs, there's still gonna be a wide swath of regulatory activities that you would need. As a matter of fact, what the SMR guys in this country complain about is the fact that the regulation is just gonna be too onerous. You know, you're gonna have to look at zones for contamination, all of those things. So I think the idea that you can plug and play, that sounds to me again like the notion that you have a reactor that you can walk away from after an accident. It's kind of the holy grail. Well some of the smaller reactors you can just come and take a truck and pull it away. The thing that we have to realize is that we're not making a unique product. It's electricity so there's many other ways to make electricity so a lot of these countries who are financially challenged are going down the path of least resistance. So we see nuclear cost and regulatory cost climbing and then we see solar energy cost declining. So who cares if we don't have electricity in the middle of the night? We do have some electricity. So there's margins and opportunities in the area for some of these countries to say that we can couple the solar with natural gas or so. So we don't have a monopoly on power generation. I think that the industry should be aware that there's threats to that. In this country we're closing five reactors or we'll have closed five reactors by the end of 2014 because of low natural gas prices. So that can happen elsewhere and it could also forestall the development of new reactors. We need to be aware that we're just not, that there are other technologies there. I'm sorry I have to intervene on this because it's true that there are four reactors have been shut down and one more is scheduled next year. Of those reactors only two of them were for economic reasons and the economic reasons in fact were significantly more than just the cost of natural gas. The subsidies which are being used extensively for wind technology have so unleveled the playing field with the cost of electricity is actually negative in many places in the United States and you can't run a base load plant when the price of electricity is negative without losing money. And so there's the combination of wind subsidies, the low price for natural gas and then the three of the reactors, Crystal River and the two at San Onofre, those are being shut down for technical failures. One with regard to the utility doing a bad job of opening up the containment with a costly repair that was un-economical and San Onofre bought two defective steam generators which could not be made to work right in the regulatory scheme we have right now and the cost of replacing them was too large. So the three of those five had nothing to do with natural gas. I disagree respectfully in the fact that if the price of natural gas was double or triple what it is the economics of repairing the reactor at Crystal River and the San Onofre's would have changed. So natural gas was at 10 bucks as opposed to at four bucks. The economics penciled out that the reason that Edison decided to close that is that there was no certainty as far as restarting those reactors and we had cheap natural gas so who cares? We'll go ahead and just shut the reactors down and go ahead and use cheap natural gas. It's gonna significantly impact CO2 emissions in the state and you're reducing portfolio diversity and I don't agree with the decision. I really wish those reactors were continued to operate but it's the rules are the rules that exist in the country today. Unfortunately we are seeing a lot of very good nuclear generating assets closed for surprising reasons. I think we have a question in the back. Okay. Other questions from the audience? Then let me follow up with question. So we were in Korea just around the time when the scandal was first starting to break and we didn't get a lot of, so these workshops that we had featured government, some government officials, academics, some industry representatives. We didn't get too much response on the corporate governance part of it. What the Koreans were very concerned about was this capacity issue. How were they really going to build a lot of reactors in the UAE when they were building at home? Do you think after, and these scandals have just grown and grown, do you think after, at this point, that the Korean vendors and sub-suppliers would be more amenable to this kind of corporate governance approach? And if so, how do you get to them really? Yeah, no, it's a great question. I don't have a, because you always ask difficult questions. A great answer for you. I mean, you'd hope so. I mean, what would be interesting is to look at, you guys have just been to the, see the new reactor that they're building. I mean, I just would love to know, has there been any shakeout? Has anybody kind of, as far as them building these reactors abroad going, you know, maybe we gotta be really careful in looking at if there is any corners getting cut, making sure that quality control is at most. I'd just be curious if there's any more stringent kind of look at, and back to financing, you know, maybe finance folks are looking at this and going, maybe there's a little riskier deal than we really initially thought we were getting ourselves into. But I mean, they were okay receptive. I mean, I mentioned a couple of the comments I got on the work. It wasn't a complete thud by any means, but I agree that the issue at the end of the day was really human capacity. I mean, having the bodies, and that whole issue we heard about training and trying to train all these new folks, and the king, I think, don't ask me what it stands for, but I think, remember that acronym? Anyway, you can't forget king, it's kind of a great name. But anyways, this place for training of the next generation of all these workers. So, anyway, it sounds like... Two finger from Paul, Murphy. Can I ask that these not be for attribution? For, I know we're on the record, but can I sort of... There's an unknown person in the back of the room, or this is being webcast. Okay. Then I'll have to be intentionally vague on a few points, because we're financing the deal. The scandal in Korea has had an exceedingly high priority both for the lenders and for ENEC. And it's something that when it happened, they took exceedingly seriously. And a lot of time has been spent understanding the issue in terms of what exactly is going on and how might it affect the project. I think that, and I don't know if it came up in the conference in the UAE a few weeks ago, but ENEC was a very aggressive in investigating the issue and putting procedures in place. I can't really say more than that, but from a lender perspective, that was a confidence-building measure to see that the ultimate customer took it very seriously and didn't just say, well, this is the supplier's problem, we don't care, they... And I think that goes back to the point of having a very capable owner organization that can be an intelligent customer of the nuclear technology to basically drive the process. The Koreans took it, that made it a very big issue, but ENEC took it very seriously and drove the process as well, and the lenders did as well. So he had pressure from three points. I mean, I think from the Korean perspective, it's an issue of pride and making sure that for future projects that this doesn't get in the way of them being successful, their reputation was called into question. I think the reality, the unfortunate reality is this happens on all projects. Whether it's a nuclear project or not, and perhaps because it was a nuclear project, it was taken even more seriously, because of the high standards in the nuclear industry, the margin for error is so much less, so that if there's any blip on the radar, you're gonna jump all over it. You would hope that these things don't happen, but they do, and you have to deal with them. So I think that being a responsible customer was important. It was important for the lenders to see, it was important to see that Fanner was taking it very, very seriously well. And so I think when you talk about why should you behave well, why should you care about things as the seller, the fact that we see that the lenders and the regulator and the ultimate owner were all over this was a very big deal. One of the reasons why it is so important for entirely different reasons is the reference plant for the deal of Shinkori three and four. So for an APR 1400, it's never been built before, anywhere in the world, they're being built in Korea. And so one of the issues was, well, the APR 1400 would come online so many years in advance of BRCA one, of four. And so you would have multiple years of operating history, and whether it's the commissioning, the testing, everything. And there was confidence in that you would have this number of years. Well, because of the cabling issue, it's gonna delay those projects in Korea by a certain amount of time and people can research what it is. Let's just say it's significant. By having that delay, you are cutting into the amount of operating history you will have before the first unit comes online in BRCA. So for very selfish reasons, that's an issue too for the ultimate owner of these projects, because now it's affecting some of the data that they would have had to layer into that project. So it's a big issue from many different areas, but I think the important thing is that it's not just the Koreans taking responsibility for their failures, it's important to see that the Korean government has jumped all over this, that the owner, the lenders, and the host country regulator are all over the issue. So it's not something that they could hide from even if they wanted to, but I think from the way they've responded and taken it very seriously, everybody's taken confidence that, yes, we've had a very unfortunate thing happen, but it's being handled in a very serious manner. Other questions from the audience in the back? Good morning, Jim Olum from Lightbridge. I just wanna amplify what the gentleman from the bank was saying, and basically my training has always been that the operator of the plant is ultimately responsible for safety. It stops right there, and the feedback has to go from them, and E-NEC is a really good example of doing it right. And the thing that concerns me is where you have a situation like the build-on operate, where the regulator, if there even is one, has kind of a paper tiger mentality, and the operator is the one that's really the designer, the builder, and the get out of my way guy. And I think that that's a difficult situation to rectify with the operator being ultimately responsible in a country that may have a weak regulatory regime. So I just throw that out there to think about as a kind of a caution, where here in the US I think with INPO, we have a really strong operator capability mentality about a strong nuclear safety culture. WANO, I hate to say it, but WANO is not as strong as INPO, and WANO needs some work, and what they deal with that makes their job so difficult is the diversity of cultures that their responsibility spans. So how do we help WANO would be one question to be able to be stronger and do the things that INPO can do to demand excellence. Can I respond for that? Great, great question. I was just gonna mention that at the break someone came up to me and said, why didn't you have WANO on your list of the company, of the organizations, the entities? It's exactly for that reason. I said, because I don't think they deserve to be. I mean, they just don't have the teeth that those other organizations are really trying to, and so I completely applaud your comment that what we can do to try to help WANO, but it's anyway, it's not there yet. That's what Jim has mentioned, I think is very important as a general principle. Our focus was on responsible suppliers, but you gotta have responsible customers as well. And it is being a responsible customer is doing what ENEC did at the advice of their international oversight board to chase this one down and make sure that it doesn't impact their project. I'm not sure that every place in the world the same kind of response would occur from every customer. Right, so the slides, how I got into this was my concern about when you look at the distribution of nuclear energy, it's gonna shift dramatically from countries that are mostly in the organization for economic cooperation and development, OECD, North America, to lesser developed countries. And so the question is, in my mind for a long time is, all right, if you have some issues about governance in those countries, what can you do? Well clearly those countries themselves have to build up their capabilities, but what will the suppliers also need to do? I would argue that the UAE may be the anomaly because they've had, A, because it's the first country in the Middle East that's gonna have nuclear power, so it has to be better than the best, B, because they have a lot of money to purchase the kinds of expertise that they need. So the question is Bangladesh. I ran into a Bangladeshi nuclear official, ran into him, we were in Vietnam, and I said, so really, why did you choose the Russians? Financing cost. But there's a whole, it's a package deal, right? And so the safety culture, all of it, all of it will be Russian, the Bangladeshis will be sent to Russia to learn Russian. So there are some issues with that. I'm not getting down on the Russians, but they are not, they have clearly, Bangladesh clearly has not developed the kind of capacity or capabilities that it needs in governance, whether you wanna talk about nuclear safety, security, regulation, all of those things to be able to be a strong regulator in this scenario. And so that's the kind of thing that we need to watch across the board and that the nuclear suppliers themselves have to be quite cognizant of and not always just so ready to jump in with sweeteners to these deals. Do my panelists have any last words of wisdom to offer? With time's lunch. Well, we can certainly break early. Thank you so much, everybody for attending. We will have Mampreet Seti in January who's attended our Indian workshop here to talk about some nuclear issues in January. We'll also be issuing a broader report on the Sustainable Nuclear Futures Project after the holidays. But please join me in thanking our terrific speakers. Thank you. Thank you.