 So, nice to be, nice to be back and particularly this is really a panel I would have come down to here so I was particularly pleased to have the opportunity to moderate it. Now two days ago people were telling me I sounded like Lauren Bacall, now people are just saying you're really sick aren't you? So I'm sorry for the frog like quality to my voice. This panel is about defining a strategic partnership. Right after the Secretary Clinton became Secretary of State somebody had the idea of figuring out how many strategic partnerships were in existence and how to define them. After a week or two we gave up on this completely there are many different types of strategic partnership and there is no one definition but for our purposes that's actually a good thing because what that means is really thinking about what ought to characterize the US-Singapore strategic partnership is much more a function of the context and the specific long term relations between the United States and Singapore than any formal notion of a strategic partnership. We've got a wonderful opportunity to hear from both Peter Ho and from Kurt Campbell but before I introduce them which I'm going to do very briefly I want to talk for a minute about the pivot to Asia which we're going to hear more about but also maybe try to broaden that out a bit and just put a couple of topics on the table. The first thing to note is of course it is a pivot to Asia not to China not to Northeast Asia indeed when I first heard it I thought to myself exactly of the US-Singapore strategic dialogue because my first encounter with ASEAN with really many people coming from ASEAN was in Singapore at courtesy of Kurt and with Ambassador Ang Chi Chan and the role that ASEAN plays and that Singapore plays in particular have been very important I know in Kurt's thinking and very much a part of the pivot to Asia. We're probably going to be focusing more on the grand strategy on the geopolitics on China on regional organizations generally on the East Asia Summit and I'll leave that for the discussion but I also wanted to just note at the same time with much less fanfare Secretary Clinton has implemented what I would call a pivot to the people a pivot to a whole set of policies that are focused on individuals and not on states actually we just saw a tremendous example of that with her in the UN Security Council last week she was speaking directly to the Syrian people it was very clear she was taking the opportunity to engage the Syrian people that was obviously in a sort of more traditional form but there have been many many policies and many of them actually done in East Asia and Pacific affairs engaging entrepreneurs engaging women engaging youth groups reaching out to Muslim communities thinking about environmental initiatives things like the Mekong Initiative which has happened under Kurt's watch bringing together nations but really bringing together people and groups and foundations and universities as well as governments so I'm going to put that on the table because I hope in discussing the US-Singapore strategic partnership we focus on some of those issues as well Singapore's incredible technological edge makes it a natural partner for any number of the new technology initiatives the State Department is initiating and simply Singapore as a model for development it has tremendous implications for how the US and Singapore can partner on development initiatives throughout Asia again as well as on the sort of grander geopolitical terrain so with that you have the long introductions I'm going to ask Peter Ho to speak first he is now he says he's a retired pensioner with his characteristic modesty he's the senior advisor for the Center for Strategic Futures and the senior fellow at the Civil Service College of course you know that he was the head of Singapore Civil Service for many years he's not exactly taking it easy in retirement I actually think the work that he is doing on strategic futures is really cutting edge and it's something that the United States is already looking to Singapore on and then my old friend Kurt Campbell Kurt said it's much better that you introduce me casually and so I'm thinking well which of the stories from Oxford would should I tell I think probably none of them that's what I thought so he is our assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs I I'm not flattering him when I say that under his tenure our policy toward the region has been really central to American foreign policy there are so many different things that have been launched obviously the very high profile initiatives the entire focus on the pivot to Asia the opening of Burma I could go on but also things like a hundred thousand strong which under Kurt sending a hundred thousand students to China working again at that level as well as at the geopolitical level so this is again all on the record I'm going to ask Peter Ho to speak first and then we'll hear from Kurt thank you and Marie this is not just about defining a strategic partnership it's about defining a 21st century strategic partnership so let's look at the title and implicit in this title is the notion that the 21st century is different from the 20th century and indeed in many ways the 21st century does look markedly different from the 20th century which for most part was defined by clear alliances and in the latter half by a bipolar world divided between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies but the clarity of the bipolar world has given way to something messier and I think earlier speakers touched on this in greater detail and in this 21st century China is rapidly acquiring the comprehensive attributes of a world power political economic and military within a short period of time and the rise of China has created a new strategic dynamic because it challenges the dominance of the United States the rebalancing of power between an established power and the rising power is a complex process fraught with dangers clearly we need a fresh approach to deal with the resulting stresses and strains and to help ensure that the relations between the US and China are on a stable footing what role can a small island state like Singapore play in this regard it is a question that goes to the heart of any strategic partnership between our two countries in the 21st century now Singapore has a vital interest in maintaining good relations and indeed in strengthening them with both the US and China this is not a new interest the US and China are both critical stakeholders in Asia and both must be engaged in a constructive way in this regard it is not in the interest of any that we pursue an exclusive relationship with one at the expense of the other we also see a stable relationship between the US and China as a sine qua non for a peaceful and prosperous region since the Vietnam War Singapore has argued often against the tide of popular opinion that the US military presence in Asia is vital for regional peace and stability this position is unchanged my colleague Gary Ang touched on the strategic framework agreement in his remarks now the SFA actually started off as a conversation that I had with Richard Lawless over lunch in Singapore in 2003 much of the conversation centered on the concept of Singapore as a hub and how the application of that concept could help support the US military presence in the region by tapping into Singapore strengths as a major regional and global transport communications and logistics hub by then the US concept of places not basis had begun to gain traction the US was looking for lily pads around the world to reflect the increasingly uncertain and unpredictable operating environment in which threats could emerge from anywhere almost without warning this lunch conversation led to the SFA but the SFA is not about setting up a lily pad in Singapore looking back it was really an attempt to modernize the strategic defense relationship between the US and Singapore that had been defined by the 1990 MOU and I think Gary Ang explained what that was in conceptualizing Singapore as a hub an important idea had emerged that in an increasingly globalized world it is the hub that can provide leverage extend reach and amplify impact within a larger network or system through the SFA the US a global superpower with global interest would benefit from a partnership with Singapore a regional and global hub in turn Singapore's strategic interest would be served by strengthening the US military presence in the region the SFA would clearly be a major element in a 21st century strategic partnership between the US and Singapore but the underlying wisdom of a strategic partnership in the 21st century must be that it does not call for the partners to choose sides instead it must enable the partners to work together to advance their mutual interests in a coherent and coordinated fashion on the one hand and on the other hand to provide enough flexibility and maneuvering room to allow them to pursue their separate interests with other partners in other words a strategic partnership should be special but not exclusive the SFA's conceptual underpinning of a global superpower partnering with a global hub in a globalizing world to advance mutual interest can be extended to a broader strategic partnership between the US and Singapore globalization is the overlay on the massive geopolitical changes that I touched on in my preceding remarks in profound ways globalization is creating a borderless world the world we now live in is much more of a networked world rather than a world divided it is the flat world that tom freedman has written extensively on there's another metaphor used by richard florida who argues that the world is spiky his argument is that the higher value-added activities are densely concentrated and clustered in hubs the world's economic geography is dominated by hubs that are the focal points of opportunity growth and innovation the distribution of economic activity around the world reflects this pattern singapore today both a regional as well as a global hub we are a connector hub a hub within the east asian and southeast asian region and with a high number of links to cities in other regions we are hub not because of our size but because of our centrality that is many cities and hubs around the world are linked to one another through singapore singapore the country has been cooperating with the us for a long time and has deep and enduring partnerships exemplified by things like the us singapore fta but there are also new possibilities for partnering singapore the hub in the 21st century there is enormous potential to deal with the challenges and tap into the opportunities that have been created as a result of globalization singapore the hub can be tapped by the us to take advantage of its connectivity to other hubs both large and small in the region and around the world beyond the military arena singapore the hub suggests possibilities for collaboration in new and emerging areas of strategic interest it seems to me that there are many new areas in which the us and singapore can develop and enlarge the agenda for cooperation by thinking of singapore as a hub rather than just looking at cooperation with singapore as a country the nature of conflict is changing steven pinker in his important new book the better angels of our nature has argued that violence is on the decline around the world whether you are convinced by pinker's arguments or not conflict other than war is much more likely today non-traditional threats like cyber threats piracy terrorism nuclear proliferation are today as much the preoccupation of defense and security planners around the world as are the traditional threats of military conflict the global nature of the cyber threat clearly requires countries to work together recent hacking attacks against south korean and the us government websites suggest that the next generation of cyber threats will be much more targeted and perhaps even more lethal the stux next attacks on the iran nuclear program highlights the reality that the physical world is not insulated against threats emanating out of cyberspace singapore is a major global telecommunications and it hub with well-developed infrastructure supported by strong policies and organizations to provide and promote cyber security there are opportunities to shift our limited cooperation in cyber security into a higher gear as a compact and well-regulated system but one that is connected to the rest of the world singapore could be considered as a test bed for new cyber security technologies already the singapore government funds such work in terms of research test bedding and policy implementation much more can be achieved if such work is done in partnership and this approach could also be applied to non-security areas such as data analytics but the role of governments in a strategic partnership need not be to carry out such cooperation instead it could be to just establish the framework for collaboration and to signal politically to the private sector that such cooperation would be strongly supported cooperation can be extended into other areas like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or hadr and in this regard the virtues of singapore the hub with excellent logistics facilities and good communications and transport links to the region are relevant to hadr which the military is increasingly expected to play a major role singapore is located at epicenter almost literally of a region that is prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes volcanic eruptions and tsunamis and yet is not directly affected by them it makes a lot of sense in my view to run hadr operations out of singapore where equipment and supplies can be stored and shipped out quickly in an emergency as was done after the 2004 boxing day tsunami and for other disasters in the region in fact singapore is already the centre for regional oil spill response which is a disaster of the man made kind under international agreement dispersants and equipment to fight oil spills are stored in singapore and deployed whenever there is a spill in the region the same approach could be adopted for hadr with the additional benefit of being able to command and control such operations out of the purpose built changy command and control centre at the changy naval base singapore is already an attractive global r&d hub us academia and industry find value in using singapore as a hub for research in the asia pacific region significant collaboration already exists in the medical and life sciences arena the duke n us graduate school of medicine which has a strong research emphasis could become a global model of r&d excellence mit is also collaborating with singapore in the research of infectious diseases together with the duke n us graduate school of medicine this has significantly boosted the number of high quality people working on infectious diseases in singapore but other than our human talent and a well organized environment for medical and life sciences research singapore is attractive because researchers can study the big asian phenotypes ethnic chinese ethnic indians malaise in one place singapore and i think the minister for trade and industry alluded to this in history marks in fact doing medical research in asia is essential because asians respond differently to drugs and to treatments from the west we are in microcosm in singapore representative a hub of the giant asian markets singapore is also the proverbial canary in the asian mineshaft of infectious diseases that emanate from the tropics such as h5n1 bird flu i think it's h5n1 or h5n1 unfortunately the last big g2g collaboration between the us and singapore in the medical arena was the regional emerging disease institute already which aimed to study pathogens that could cause a pandemic in places like indonesia but interest in this initiative has waned which is a pity i think a strategic partnership must look beyond short-term considerations and difficulties and finds some ways to put such collaborative efforts on a more sustainable and long-term footing the world is in a period of increasing volatility uncertainty and complexity during this time some major global wicked problems like climate change free trade energy and food security will need to be addressed if they are neglected or at best managed in a suboptimal way the likelihood is that we will experience more frequent crisis compelling costly crisis responses rather than trying to avoid or mitigate such crisis and the danger for us is if we only rely on a few perhaps brittle overarching global institutions as mentioned by my colleague a regional architecture defined by network of groupings centered on asian has emerged in the asia-pacific over the last four plus decades and the us is an important part of this architecture although these groupings have often been dismissed by critics as talk shops with little impact the regional architecture in the asia-pacific of untidy overlapping groupings may well prove to be more effective in organizing relationships where there is great diversity and several centers of power and it has played a non-insignificant role in dealing with some major global challenges one important regional response to the 2008-2009 global financial and economic crisis was the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai initiative and the subsequent establishment of asian plus three macroeconomic research office or amro in singapore to monitor emerging threats to financial stability in the region and they are examples of how a regional approach can sometimes work faster and better than a global approach in which it takes far longer time to forge agreement and reach consensus of course this cannot solve all problems but the various elements in the regional architecture engage all the major players and have the intrinsic value of promoting dialogue and consultation in a multilateral setting that might not be able to be done bilaterally while the us is clearly not at the center of the regional architecture asian is i submit that it actually has a deep and abiding interest in supporting the regional architecture and participating actively in it but the problem for the us is that it is a member of some of these forums but not all of them and it seems to me that for the us to operate effectively in this regional architecture it is vital that other countries that are members of all forums such as singapore have a good appreciation of what the us views and interests are their breadth and limits and the reasons for them vice versa it is important that the us understands in turn the interests of the individual countries that are and i would add that this applies equally to other non asian countries whether it's china or india or japan that are present in some forums but are absent from others but acquiring an understanding of us views and interests and vice versa can only happen if there is regular dialogue and consultation in this regard the announcement last week of to institutionalize the senior officials dialogue between state and mfa the ministry of foreign affairs of singapore is an important step in building a 21st century strategic partnership but dialogue between diplomats is not enough a 21st century strategic partnership should not be narrowly cast instead it should be as broadly based as possible this is because the biggest challenges and the biggest opportunities may come from left field risks some of these left field risks such as global pandemic cyber threats are already penetrating the mainstream economy with real cost for governments they are linked to shifts that we may not yet fully recognize such as climate change or global population growth that have downstream implications for resources health fiscal policy so on they could emerge to be game changers and looking out for them and then dealing with them ought to be an imperative of all governments and require broader dialogues involving more agencies coming together to share information and wider collaborative mechanisms to strengthen collective action how to structure such broad-based dialogues should be part of the effort to develop a 21st century partnership thank you that was that was wonderful on the focus on thinking about power in in the context of networks you were singing my song it was particularly a wonderful presentation I think Kurt Campbell is going to speak sitting I think we'll let him do that that's right first of all let me thank our host today the center for strategic international studies and I want to thank in particular Murray and Ernie for just a terrific program that has really served as the centerpiece for so much work that is being done not just on Asia but in particular on Southeast Asia for all the institutions and groups that support it thank you and congratulations for this very good work it's also an honor to be with Anne-Marie Slaughter I had a great fortune to really work under her to be able to support the work that she and the secretary did over the course of the last several years and she has been an inspiration to many of us in terms of her academic and intellectual leadership at Princeton at the State Department and then whatever she decides to do next and then also to my good friend Tommy Coe thank you for your many years of Peter ho sorry that that part's off the record sorry lucky I have no ego I know thank thank god that's one of the great things thank you for thank you very much for your service that you've given our relationship for many years I have had a chance to be briefed a little bit on the preceding discussion over the course of the last couple of hours and I think before I get into some specifics associated with the task at hand which is really the path forward for the U.S. Singapore in relationship I think I want to say three things about the overall arch of American foreign policy in the Asian Pacific region I think hopefully this will address some of the issues and discussions that I think came up this morning and in this respect I'm just speaking for myself but I believe in these issues very much so I'm going to state them clearly the great strength of of our Asia policy is that it is bipartisan it has always been bipartisan and my hope is that it will always be bipartisan I think the key foundational aspects of our approach our security commitments our strong support to critical political relationships our commitment to strong trade and economic engagement I believe those are the foundations of our approach and obviously we are entering a political period in the United States and in fact almost in many of the key countries in the Asian Pacific we're heading into important political seasons it's very important that we're careful about our rhetoric and I mean we the general we I think it's something we have to be sensitive to and careful about secondly we never left Asia the United States has been engaged in Asia consequently for decades I do believe it is true that over the course of the last many years that we have begun to step up our game in Asia but that will be a long-term commitment that will take years but we are also building on a very strong foundation I must also say that one of the most critical components of that engagement was the partnership that the United States began building with India consequently over the course of the last 10 years beginning in the Bush administration also with the visit of President Clinton to India so this is important work and it is necessarily bipartisan work and when I say bipartisan it also is the case that it does not simply work in the executive branch as we work to fashion new relationships with key countries particularly in Southeast Asia for many years these countries have been more engaged in many respects by the legislative branch than the executive branch and so the nature of our engagement has to be whole of government in the sense not just the State Department and the White House and the Defense Department but essentially all the key aspects of our executive and legislative branches branches and it needs to be bipartisan I fundamentally believe that I believe we will have a much better chance of national level success if we can keep those things in mind and the last third point and Maria I would just simply say I think it is incumbent upon the United States it is extraordinarily important that we go the extra mile to explain and be very transparent to key countries about what our goals and ambitions are in the Asian Pacific region because I believe what we are attempting to do is in the best interests of all countries in Asia and in particular I want very much next week when Vice President Xi visits the United States we take that opportunity and then subsequent opportunities to engage in a deep strategic discussion with China about our role in the Asian Pacific and how we are determined to work together I believe it is our destiny for the United States and China to find ways to cooperate to work closely together and we want a strong partnership with China we want to work on a partnership that's more predictable that's based on the well-being of each of our peoples and that is welcomed and supported by the surrounding region and here I'll get to this in the moment when we look at the role of Singapore it is this kind of advice that we have received consistently and quite consequentially in my view from Singapore from Singapore over the course of the last several years I think before we look forward in any critical relationship it's always important to look back and to both to celebrate and also be honest about the kind of advice that we get from a critical partner like Singapore what we have experienced in my short time in government is a kind of strategic advice and honesty that is rare in global politics so for instance I recall my colleague and friend Stanley Roth and I during the 1990s during some of the most difficult periods of challenges with respect to uprising in Indonesia before Admiral Blair went down for his important visits it was the Singaporeans who helped us who gave us context gave us suggestions about how to think about rebuilding this critical relationship with Indonesia and explain to us how important it was to keep at it to keep with it historically it has been Singapore's critical role to remind us of the role of balance in our relationship with our Chinese friends and how important it is to explain to them what we want to accomplish but also to be firm and clear about our goals and expectations and I think it is that balance that has been an essential component of a successful engagement strategy with China over the course of the first years of the DPJ government in Japan quietly it was Singapore although we were determined to maintain a close relationship and have a patience about the engagement it was also the case that Singapore quietly urged us to remember that the fulcrum the essential element in American engagement in Asia was the partnership with Japan which we fully believe but it's also very good to have that reaffirmed by friends on a regular basis and then just on a number of other issues when it came time for the United States to think about taking a more engaged role in the ASEAN regional forum when it came time to think about joining the East Asia Summit the country more than any other that provided us the quiet guidance about how to think about it how to provide the context about who were you know who we should talk to and in what way really it was Singapore Australia played a very important public role but behind the scenes it was people like Peter like Ambassador Chan who helped guide us through sometimes a challenging thicket of diplomatic concerns and guideposts that we had to be sensitive to we were also finding in the current arena on a number of issues that Singapore's guidance and suggestions are central during a period where myself I became very concerned and a little bit pessimistic and even down downbeat about the prospects of what could be would be possible with Burma with Myanmar it was Singapore that quietly passed messages that urged us to continue to keep at it to continue a dialogue even if it appeared at the outset that that effort was unsuccessful and it has been Singapore that has given us encouragement that we have to be clear that we match the important steps that are taking place in Burma with our own steps and I think most recently with respect to the South China Sea Singapore has been helpful in ensuring that our very careful approach is well understood by the key countries in the region and that we support ASEAN and a dialogue between China and ASEAN going forward so and almost every consequential issue that we deal with whether it's North Korea whether it's India's increasing role in the Asian Pacific region we probably listen more closely to advice and counsel from Singapore than any other country in Asia and that is not an exaggeration and and and that is a fantastic base on which to build so that there are enormous things and and Peter has laid out some very consequential areas of military of strategic of political cooperation but I must tell you that this foundation that has been established and and proceeding long before my or other people's roles is a very strong foundation on which to build and I would just like to offer a few of the things that I know and we would like to open it up for discussion here the areas that I think are going to be important as we go forward I liked very much Peter's idea that any fundamental strategic relationship has to be more diversified than simply kind of a state department ministry foreign affairs line of communication I agree with that but I also believe that having a foundation of a more formalized structured set of interactions is critical going forward so all one has to look in terms of American foreign policy is compare the nature of our interactions with Europe they are multi-tiered they're extraordinarily ritualized we have enormous numbers of multilateral many lateral bilateral mechanisms that really keep our senior officials busy on a regular basis and if you compare until very recently Asia Asia for a variety of reasons has remarkably few institutions people often say look that that the essence of American strategy is our bipartisan our bilateral relationships and then multilateral but even our bilateral relationships when you compare them to our European relationships they have remarkably few mechanisms mechanisms actually serve the purpose to prepare agendas to help us advance common agendas and they discipline our respective bureaucracies and I know on the outside that's people think oh that's just boring bureaucratic stuff it is not it is the essence and fundamental aspect of progress in any relationship and one of the things that Secretary Clinton and replayed a huge role in institutionalized policy planning talks in Asia one of the things that we want to be able to do with the host of countries is put in place more formal mechanisms of dialogue so there is a regular basis there is a tempo there is a schedule there is x there are expectations about what two countries or a number of countries want to accomplish and so even though that seems like the boring work of of accountants it is it is my destiny and so I work on this I think it's important and and the hope is that we put in place a series of these kind of overlapping interlocking institutions in Asia that keep us more actively engaged in building a stronger relationship secondly I also agree with Peter that there's much to learn about from the United States about the the institutionalization of Asia and he is also correct in stating that the United States is a member of some institutions but not all it is important for us to ensure that those institutions that we are not involved in directly that our friends and partners keep us appraised are aware of our interests and seek to promote them and on occasion protect them when those issues come up but I'm also concerned about the institutions that we have joined and that we are playing a larger role in when Stanley Stanley and I went to the ASEAN Regional Forum in the 1990s we spent more time thinking about our performance than what we were going to do in the actual meeting that is the truth but it has become the ASEAN Regional Forum is a deeply consequential gathering now much more so than it has been in recent years and we have the Singaporeans to thank helping this progression towards seriousness and a recognition that at the core of all of our multilateral engagement in Asia is ASEAN and so I believe that part of our challenge will be in deepening the responsibility and role of those institutions that we think are most consequential in Asia and for me that is the Defense Minister's meetings that are now moving we hope from a more irregular once every three years to a more regular set of meetings and perhaps preparatory meetings we are very enthusiastic and supportive of the East Asia Summit we believe the key here are deeper roots not just broadening not just extending membership and agendas but deepening deeper dialogue and the same is true of the ASEAN Regional Forum and I believe that the next 10 years will be the most consequential period of institution building in Asia that we've seen in 100 years and I want the United States to be a critical partner in that role and we will be better able to participate to be able to play that subtle role of listening as well as acting with the close consultation and support of our friends in Singapore. Next I would also simply say that we have seen some developments again in Nepida in Burma in Myanmar that no one would have anticipated six months ago they are dramatic they are shifting the nature of Southeast Asia and the United States is strongly supportive of this effort and we will need to work with countries in Southeast Asia so that we temper our enthusiasm with also a recognition that more will need to be done and we will need to ensure that we have the support of others so that this historic opening can be continued. I'm again very hopeful and I think you've heard what the President and Secretary Clinton and now Senator McConnell, Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman when they've returned from their important trip trips to Burma the United States is supportive of this effort and we will want to take the appropriate diplomatic, political and assistance in economic steps in order to make clear to the leadership that we recognize, appreciate and support their steps towards reform. Let me just if I could make three last comments where I think Singapore can be essential. Obviously right now we're at a critical period with respect to the TPP and Singapore's role in that has been central. I also think as we go forward one of the fledgling institutions that we have now started to meet on a more regular basis is the U.S. ASEAN summit and we've worked closely on people-to-people ties on issues associated with education and training. My own view is that there has to be an economic component that's more far-reaching in this regard and Singapore can assist us in that process as we go forward even with the recognition that our most critical challenge in the current period is TPP. Two last things if I can. Second to last, there is a quality for all of you would-be public servants just to recognize about what it's going to be like to serve in government over the course of the next several years. In the past, if you had a good idea and you had the support for it, you could go up to Capitol Hill and you could say, look, let's come up with a plan of action. Let's find some money. Let's figure out how to-let's find resources. Let's figure out how to implement a good idea. I'm afraid for the next several years we'll be in a very different kind of environment in which we spend a lot of our time trying to protect what we think are absolutely essential programs from the budget knife. My own experience in government right now that you can do a couple of different things. You can bombon it. You can fight it. I think you have to do a little bit of both. It is also the case that I think going forward, we are going to need to have many more innovative public-private partnerships. I have to say some things that I'm proudest of, the things I've worked hardest on, have been these public-private partnerships. They have been working with other countries, with other organizations, with individuals. Annemarie was gracious enough to talk about the 100,000 strong, but that's just the beginning. In my own bureau, we have now 15 public-private partnerships. Just one other example. In the next couple of months, we will announce a major gift to Japan. This is the 100th anniversary of the lovely 3,000 cherry trees that were given by Japan to the United States. This year, we are going to respond and give 3,000 carefully chosen species of dogwoods to Japan to be planted, some around the tragic area that was hit by the earthquake, some planted around Tokyo as a remembrance and a signal of the respect and affection that Americans have for Japanese, completely supported by the private sector and others. I could go through many of these specific agendas, but most particularly at the U.S. Ossian summit, we announced a program very graciously supported through very generous grant from Brunei to put large numbers, very large numbers of English teachers throughout Southeast Asia to Vietnam, to Laos, to Cambodia, to Burma. And that program is more than we can do right now, but it will allow a huge number of lives to be affected by people, Americans on the ground teaching English. And when you listen to Ossian friends, they will tell you that it is this quality, the fact that so many friends, so many young people want to learn English is a great ticket for us into the big game. Lastly, and I'm sorry to go on so long, I've always been struck by the vision of the key players in Singapore. And you experienced that all day today with every from your foreign minister, from all your ministers who have visited and from Peter. I have to tell you my own personal experience of this, the most interesting conversation I've ever had on climate change was with a minister mentor. And it was several years ago in which, Ann Marie knows I was working on this, I was thinking about what the national security foreign policy implications of climate change not might be, will be, right? And it was the minister mentor who more than any other person started talking about some of the extraordinarily difficult challenges of environmental refugees and the nature of the kinds of protections and the balance between trying to curtail emissions but also deal with the inevitable adjustments that are going to be necessary. Unbelievably far reaching, incredibly incisive, careful, analytic, but also remarkably strategic. I look forward to working with Singaporeans on challenges like climate change and those things that lurk just over the horizon that are coming into the consciousness of sort of modern day strategic thought. Just in conclusion, I can't say enough about how much we value the relationship. I can't tell you always, my particular counterpart is Bellahari, Bellahari San as I refer to him as. If you have a thin skin, better to stay out of the room. He is wonderfully honest in his critiques and assessments about the failings and occasional trip-ups of American foreign policy, but it is remarkably valuable to hear straight talk about from a country that wants the United States to be engaged and to do better. What more can you ask for? Thank you. Would you emphasize? Thank you. Well, you know the relationship between the Singapore and the United States is based on a long history of cooperation and I think over many decades we have built up many areas of strong cooperation. So that's a foundation for any kind of partnership going forward in offering the idea of looking at Singapore as a hub rather than just looking at Singapore as a country. The idea is to open up new possibilities of how you might conceivably extend and expand an already rich relationship. With China, it is a bit different because we do not have that same long history of cooperation. Yet, going forward, we do have a very important relationship. It's important for political reasons. It's important for economic reasons. It's important for strategic reasons. It's important because China is very much part of the region that we live in. So with China, I would say, we start from a lower base and therefore we need to build it up. But I would say that the same considerations which we apply to the US apply to some extent to China. We want to build up the economic relationship, the trade relationship. We want to be more coordinated on matters pertaining to fiscal policies. We want to have more dialogue because we need to understand how the Chinese think and that's one of the areas where I think all countries face some obstacles in trying to understand Chinese thinking and Chinese views. We would like to have more structured dialogue with them. Now, all the attributes of Singapore as a hub could also apply to China. I'm not sure whether we are ready or the Chinese are ready to do it. We are ready probably, but the question is, are the Chinese ready? Now, when I offered the idea of Singapore as a hub to the US, I think we are ready with the US or the US should be ready. With China, well, if they are ready, I think we are ready also to run with them. So this is what I meant by with important friends and partners, we should have a special relationship if it is going to be a strategic relationship, but it cannot be an exclusive relationship because we are a hub and we have big interests with other countries as well. But we will make sure that our strategic interests with the United States are strengthened as far as we can. But as I say, it takes two to clap and for us to move forward on this, it really also requires some positive signals from the US that it wants to bring that relationship forward. And of course, all Kurtz remarks are very encouraging. Thank you. Thank you. So the floor is open. Please wait for the microphone and then state your name and make sure it's a question. Emol Skoden. We have heard a lot today from lots of speakers and I think appropriately about the good advice Singapore gives the US about the role it would like America to play, what the US should be doing. I wonder if you could flip that. When you have these real straight talk conversations for Secretary Campbell, what are you telling Singapore about the role you would like it to start playing in terms of or continue playing in some cases, in terms of strategic issues like the future of ASEAN, how we react to growing Chinese nationalism, even some global issues, or for Peter Ho, what do you hear from the Americans in that sense? Where does that straight talk lead when it comes from the American side? Kurt, why don't you start? I will. Thank you, Emol. Thank you for the question. Can I just, I wanted to just, I thought Anne Marie's question to Peter was very good. I would simply say just on this particular issue that I spent at least a little bit of time in Asia now, I would say at a general level, one of the most important features of Asia is that every country in Asia right now wants a better relationship with China. Every country does and that's natural and any American strategy in the region has to be based on that fundamental recognition. That is also the case that every country in Asia I believe also wants a better relationship with the United States. And I think that's also natural and we want that to be encouraged and supported by China as well. And I think what Singapore and other countries often will say is let's make sure that we create the circumstances that, you just need to speak. Mine's on. Sorry, it's on. Let's make sure that countries are not put in a circumstance where they have to choose in such a way that hurts their interests. So we support that. We think a deeper stronger dialogue between countries and China is a good thing and something to be encouraged. Let me just say when we meet with Singaporeans, it is a very much a two-way conversation. We talk about a variety of things. I think I feel more comfortable honestly telling you the advice that we receive than the advice that we give, but it is very much respectful. It's very much two-way. And it is, I would also say, and I probably should have mentioned this, it's not just the advice. It's the assessment of what is transpiring. In fact, it is that that is probably as important as anything else. It's like being able to look at a situation. What I like about Singaporeans is that they're rational and they're strategic. And so they can take a problem and they can turn it on its side and look at it from a number of perspectives. And so we can look at the economic crisis. We can look at the implications of the nuclear disaster in Japan. We can consider the role of deeper institutions in ASEAN and what that might mean, and then think about it constructively for an extended period. That is as valuable as anything that we do. Aaron Connolly from Albright Stonebridge Group. I was wondering if I could ask a question about Singapore's largest neighbor, Indonesia. It seems that we're about to go through a period where the success that we've had in the last few years, which has been terrific, all the low hanging fruit has been picked at this point. There's certainly more that we can do, but Indonesia is about to enter a very early election or political season. They're taking off after us in that way. And so I'm wondering if there's any advice from the Singaporean side in particular, recognizing that Indonesians are often very sensitive to the role of Singapore and Indonesia, that we can move the relationship forward and continue to move the relationship forward through 2014 and into the next five-year period. Thank you. Great. Well, really, you should be addressing this question to our ambassador to Indonesia because he's the real Indonesian expert. But since I'm sitting up here on the podium, I'll give you my best shot. Indonesia has made enormous strides in recent years, and I think it is on a much better footing now than it was, say, 12, 15 years ago when the Asian financial crisis hit. So there's a lot more confidence that the political transition has taken root and the democracy has, I think, gone through enough transitions for them to feel that it is a system that with some fine-tuning is basically working. So investments are coming back into Indonesia. Now it looks as if economists are looking at some favor with Indonesia. So it is beginning to see itself as a country that is going to play a major role in the region and in the world. Now I would say Indonesia for the United States must, by definition, be an important partner. It is a major player in Southeast Asia. It is going to have influence in the regional architecture which we have spoken about. And it's also increasingly playing a role on the global stage in groupings like the G20. Now what is, to me, very important is you engage Indonesia, not just Indonesia as one of the potential bricky countries. You know, they've got this acronym, which is a brick, but they've added I into that. It's either BRIIC or BRICI. But whatever it is, you will engage Indonesia at one level as a member of that group of emerging and strong, medium-sized global economies. But I think it is also important to remember that Indonesia is also very much at the center of the region. It's a major player within ASEAN and it's also important that it is engaged as part of that. Because if you neglect that, then you weaken ASEAN and you also therefore weaken the very regional architecture that keeps some kind of order in the Asia-Pacific region. So I would, my advice to you is yes, by all means, go ahead and engage Indonesia by engage it at all levels, not just at the level where it's in the big league of big and medium-sized economies. Engage Indonesia as part of ASEAN, as part of Southeast Asia, because that is very important. Thank you. Yes, actually, Mexico likes BRICSAM where you add South Africa and Mexico. There was a question right here. Thank you. I'm Mickey Spiegel from Human Rights Watch. As you well know, there are human rights restrictions and problems in Singapore and what I'm wondering is in the course of defining a strategic relationship for the 21st century, will those issues be a part of that negotiation? Basically, I would add further, since those negotiations are already in progress, is our human rights on the agenda now? And if not, why not? Thank you. I mean, as you say that there are some issues between Singapore and the U.S. on the human rights, there's this report published. I forget. I'm a retiree, so my memory isn't. What is it? No, the trafficking persons, there's this annual human rights report. There's the annual human rights report, which is published. And it's published every year. The United States will, we open our books. The United States is free to draw conclusions from what it reads. We believe that many of the conclusions it draws are wrong. But on things like this, we're adult enough to know when to agree to disagree. And so I think if you talk about strategic partnership in the 21st century, yes, of course, we will discuss issues like human rights in private. And sometimes when these issues like this annual human rights report come up, it will be a public debate. But this is not the centerpiece of our any bilateral strategic relationship. This will be one of an issue in a whole cluster and a whole spectrum of issues that we will have to discuss. And in the end, it's a strategic partnership. I'm not saying these are unimportant. But at the end of the day, what are the most important strategic reasons for having a strong relationship between the two countries? So we must know how to put this in their proper place in the scheme of things. Not saying it's unimportant, but you know, we have to have a broader perspective of that relationship. So we will continue to discuss issues like human rights. And I suspect we will agree to disagree on certain things. But on many things pertaining to human rights, I think they will converge over time. Kurt, do you want to? If I just, and maybe just a slightly different take than Peter, but I very much respect his views on this. I think the key is not where it stacks up in the hierarchy, but the manner in which it's discussed, to be honest. And so, yes, we do have quite discussions on every possible issue, but I think it's extremely important, given the remarkable accomplishments of a country like Singapore, that the United States deal and interact in the most respectful possible ways in these sorts of interactions. And at least when I'm involved, that's how I try to do it, and that's how I'll continue to do it. So I don't think so much it's the hierarchy. It is how issues are addressed, and how they are dealt with in the larger context of a remarkable set of achievements in progress. Great. I'm going to take two last questions, or I'm going to take one from you also. Go ahead, Ernie. No, Ernie's question is too hard, too hard for someone else. I had mine. I just wanted, I'm Ernie Bauer, I just wanted to ask both of you, if you think there, would you agree that having China integrated into this, you know, I had the same sort of same question you had, which was, when you were talking, Peter, I thought, you know, he could be in Beijing right now, and make make the same speech. And then I thought, is that a good thing or a bad thing? Speak into the mic. I thought it's probably a good thing, you know. The question is, is the end goal of strategies that you both have, and maybe share, or maybe you don't share, is the end goal to have China in as a full partner and integrated into these goals that you describe, Peter, trade, security, people to people? And then if the answer is yes, is there enough ambition in our strategy in that regard? I didn't hear a lot about it today, more, you know, sort of worry and anxiety about it. And if the answer is no, why not? Well, first I would say that in my experience, and you know, as a small country, we have to be realistic, we are price takers, so we have learned very early on that politics is out of the possible. You only do what is what is possible. And so with China, I think the ultimate goal must be to make sure that China is fully integrated, not just into the regional community, but into the global community. It's better to have China in than out. And that is why, you know, we were very early and strong support of China's entry into the WTO. And I would say that if we extend that approach and that principle, that would apply. We want China in the global system playing a constructive and positive role, and we will do what it takes to get there because it is our interest. And I suspect it's also in the interest of the United States. And if they are ready to talk about a strategic partnership with Singapore, we will have a strategic partnership with Singapore. I would just add, I agree, I think it's in our interest to have China in and playing by the rules. And also, and those rules are well-established and I think well-defined, and they have been, they have served as the foundation for the most remarkable progress in not only the history of Asia, but the history of the world. And I think, you know, occasionally we hear concerns about containment. I just, that is just so far from what, and by the way, it is an unfortunate legacy of the Cold War. I mean, the Soviet Union and China could not be more different in terms of the kinds of roles they play in the regional context. Ultimately, what we are seeking is not to contain China. We actually want China more engaged, but more engaged in ways that they are supporters of the mechanisms and the institutions that have provided peace, prosperity, and stability for decades. All right. Now, there's a question there and there's a question in the back. I'd like you to ask them both together and then we're going to give our panelists a chance to respond and close up. Bernard Gordon University of New Hampshire for Secretary Campbell. And you've just mentioned the relationship that I was going to ask you about with regard to TPP. We know, everybody in this room knows, and you have just stressed, that there is no element of containment and the history of TPP going back to the early days of when it was a P3 and P4 tells us that. And yet, there is a widespread and growingly intensive view among Australians, among some Americans, Professor Mirshimer in Chicago, Bagwati, just yesterday, the Asia-Pacific director in China, on CASS, said directly that the goal of TPP is to contain China. So with the view in mind what the coming up next week of the Chinese visitor, are there ways in which we can effectively help the Chinese leadership understand that the TPP is not designed to contain China? Because if that view continues, it would be very, very, it would be very negative obviously. While you're thinking of your answer, I want to question back there and then I'm going to give it to both of you. Yeah. This is Kumar from Amnesty International. Mr. Ho, you mentioned that some of the State Department's human rights reports are wrong. Would you mind give one or two examples where State Department made mistakes in assessing Singapore's human rights record? Also, Mr. Secretary, Secretary Campbell, are you and Singapore on the same page on South China Sea or you have difference of opinion how to deal with that? That's a big last question. The last question was about the South China Sea. So Kirk, let me let you start and then I will turn to Peter and you're free to offer any closing thoughts. Look, look, what's interesting about TPP just, I mean, you've been involved much longer than I have, but it was only eight months ago or so where people were saying, you know, the United States does not have a trade strategy. You're not engaged in Asia economically. You've got to show us what you've got. You haven't been able to pass the career free trade agreement. You've made no real progress on any major initiative. And now TPP is a massive, you know, kind of containment mechanism. And so eight months later, look, I would simply say that this is an important innovative trade opportunity that we're excited about. This is not by invitation. It is by aspiration. Right. And so we've been very clear about that going forward. And I strongly believe that we will be able to make the case next week when Vice President Xi visits that in every arena, we are supporting an active, strong engagement with China. Let us recall that one of the countries that was most supportive of the G20, which when we talk about Asian institutions, sometimes we forget the G20. But remember, the G8 still has a remarkably European focus. The G20, half of its membership are in the Asian Pacific region. So it's enormously important. In fact, we support Singapore being able to come and participate actively in the meetings as well. So I believe fundamentally it will be in our interests to try to make clear the areas where we want to cooperate, where we want to work together in every aspect of bilateral and multilateral engagement. And I will also say about TPP that the real challenges ahead are it's hard to negotiate a trade agreement without fast-track authority. It really is. It's remarkably difficult. And so our real challenges are just to see if we can, you know, take the necessary steps with our partners and friends who are involved in this effort going forward. On the South China Sea, I think, look, I'm not going to repeat, our position is very carefully laid out, exact precise words. I'm not going to go through that. But I will say we do believe right now that the primary venue of international engagement is the diplomacy that is ongoing between China and Asia. We support that. We do believe that, based on appropriate international legal mechanisms, the general overarching agreement that Singapore and others have about the need to maintain peace and stability to ensure that disputes are settled peacefully and without coercion, those are the foundations for how to deal with a very challenging set of issues going forward. Thank you. Peter. Okay, thank you. First on your specific question regarding the human rights report, since everything is on the record and my memory is very bad and I've been out of the system for close to one and a half years, I suggest you just go and look up one of the press releases where everything is laid out very clearly. You will know where the Singapore government stands on these matters. Regarding the South China Sea, I would say that Singapore, like any country with an interest in A, free sea lines of communication and the peaceful region, once a constructive and peaceable approach to dealing with the disputes in the South China Sea, that's why the so-called DOC, the Declaration of Intent on the Code of Conduct, is so important, but it's clearly not going to be the easy process of getting a quick agreement, because first it requires the 10 ASEAN countries to agree, and second it needs an approach and a willingness to settle things with the Chinese. What's important, I guess, is in spite of the fact that it's a slow and painful process, is the process of discussion and dialogue is still going on among all the countries. Thank you. Peter, when you were speaking, you said that a 21st century strategic partnership needed to go far beyond governments. I think we all agreed. If that's right, this dialogue is very much a part of the 21st century strategic partnership. The relationships that are built, the issues that are discussed openly, frankly, that's exactly the kind of broader partnership that we need to forge, and I thank CSIS, and I certainly thank our panelists for a very interesting final panel. Thank you.