 I want to thank you, first of all, for that speech, which is, I think, worthy of the occasion to say the least. It's been extraordinarily comprehensive in its treatment. It's been very serious in its analysis, and I think very significant as well in terms of its prescription. We've heard a speech which is not just analytical, but also prescriptive, and I think that's a fairly unique combination. It's important that it should be so, because we've got to deal with solutions having identified as we think the problem. I think the tone that you have, which animated the entire speech, was set very early on, where you called for reform of the ECB, the establishment of a common budget, and the return of the community method, and the re-establishment of what you call the pro-European consensus. And I think from that standpoint, your various proposals will have to be evaluated, I think, correctly, so. Can I just maybe just ask you one point, just in relation to the federal impetus, might it be said, of your proposals? To what extent do you think that member states would be willing to go to the sexist stage in terms of sharing sovereignty by the creation of a real European central bank, the lender of last resort, as you constantly refer to it, and of the downgrading, well, not downgrading, but repositioning of the central banks, which you quite rightly identified, allied to the creation of the fiscal union along the lines that you were outlining? There's a very major step involved here. And to what extent do you think that, from your experience, member states would be willing to make that step? There are a lot of different challenges, but the bottom line is we have to learn from crisis. And we're all agreed that this is a unique crisis. Most of the articles I read and literature I read have all pointed to the flawed design of the euro, and indeed a need to strengthen and broaden the mandate of the central bank. And I suppose if I'm frustrated by anything, it's reluctance to translate the analysis into firm proactive action. And I get the sense, and I haven't been at the meetings, but I get the sense that this is the one issue that has not been put center stage and has not been advanced, and that the narrow issue of controlling fiscal balances has been the sole agenda for too long since the crisis emerged. And if there's general agreement that the design is flawed, then we need to correct that for sustainability into the future. In terms of winning over member states, that would be very challenging, but we haven't even commenced the debate. It hasn't even been raised to the best of my knowledge at council meetings. And I'm arguing strongly that until we actually deal fundamentally with that issue, we're going to have continuing issues with the sustainability of the eurozone. Thank you very much for that. I've used the position of the chair slightly for the first question. I now invite questions and our comments from members of the Institute. And in the normal way, you will identify who it is you are, and if you are in the fortunate position of representing some organization, you would indicate who that organization is. I do stress this is not a press conference. This is a question and answer session with the members of the Institute. There is a roving mic here, and I'd like to indicate, and the two roving mics, I'd like to indicate that you wanna put a question or make a comment, please do so now and I'll take, okay, so I have three hands going up. Can I just take, I think it's Tony Brown and I'll come over to Roland. Tony Brown, yeah, I'm done, Roland. Very comprehensive speech. I think it's very significant that the leader of Fina Fall is with us 50 years after Sean LaMasse, probably one of the greatest leaders this country has had, took the great initiative of the application to join the union. The question I want to put is in your opening remarks, you referred to four headings and you mentioned the community method. You didn't develop that specifically, but my personal view is that this is one of the critical issues facing us, particularly in relation to the role of the European Commission, which is the body we've always placed a lot of faith in and it's the body from which small and medium sized countries can play a role and have their voice listened to and I'd just like to hear what you have to say about that because I think it is another matter that is not sufficiently debated, but which is critical for the developments along the lines that you're talking about. I would agree with your analysis and if I'm honest, I think in the post-Lisbon architecture that has emerged, the dynamic maybe that has emerged, there's a very strong sense that the Commission's authority has been somewhat sidelined and that the intergovernmentalism has trumped that and the balance is wrong and that that is an issue we should be very concerned about and I think the Commission and I think member states need to reaffirm and reassert the Commission's role in terms of the community method. I also think attitudes have to change and this links into the issue of public attitudes to the EU because what they read and what they see and the dynamics of what they see influences their thinking. Do we all in other words have a genuine input or is it the famous Marcosi sort of jewel? Is that what's dictating the pace? And I think there's a balance to that, but the bottom line that's what people are picking up in the optics and the symbols of how things are emerging and evolving. So I think member states have to work together in terms of reasserting the role of the Commission and having it as the key pillar in terms of bringing people together and setting the agenda on a number of fronts. Thank you, Mr. Martin. I was pleasantly surprised by your remarks actually and I think our Chairperson with his noted statesperson-like approach wouldn't use the word radical, but I thought it was a very radical Federalist speech actually and in fairness, a common sense if we're honest about the nature of the European and the economy at the moment needs that kind of approach and unfortunately the politics doesn't quite make it very viable at the moment because as has been rightly said, nobody's actually advocating for it. The fact is the European Union has been a major driver for the European economy in all countries and which country has benefited most? Germany of course, because Germany's the biggest beneficiary of the single market and the Germans have one wonderful advantage. They're a strong economy, but they have a very competitive currency and look at our Chinese friends, the problems they have tried to force down their currency, they didn't get to all sorts of trouble. They're rightly accused under international trade practices or perhaps engaging a bit too much aggression in that, but they are showing commendable flexibility of it of course. The point is how can you achieve the level of transfers that will help states that must pursue austerity policies achieve growth? You need a real Federalist model like you've suggested, a real fiscal union. The tragedy at the moment is nobody is prepared to confront that economic reality. It's common sense in the current situation and admittedly it's easy in opposition, of course it will be said and I'd be the first person to acknowledge that. But at least we gotta welcome that you are actually saying that and until more of us are prepared to acknowledge the facts of the situation, we are not going to move forward because as we see with the Irish economy, austerity policies, countries that must cut back, must balance their books who are vulnerable of large debts, that's unavoidable. We do need a fiscal situation however that will provide funds for growth and as you've pointed out that can only be done at the Federal level but in the current architecture of Europe we need a legal basis because countries in a position to fund that obviously are not going to do without security. So at least this is a contribution to the start of a debate. Thank you for that opportunity. But thank you for your comments. I take the point you're making in terms of the challenges that lie ahead and bringing that together. Now there's been suggestions that this treaty is an incremental step towards that. I made that point in my speech that implied is some suggestion that there will be post-treaty flexibility and changes and so on. I think that in itself I would argue is not enough. And I think really it's up to member states to actually start putting these issues in bilateral discussions with other states. First of all create an agenda that we agree with, start proactively arguing and presenting the points to other member states. We're not alone actually in having these views in terms of what needs to be done but it doesn't seem to be part of the agenda at the moment. And it seems to be all about getting the fiscal thing under control first. And there are domestic political pressures in every state. Coming at politicians in different states from different vantage points and so on. Justin, as I hear in Germany they have their political issues as well to be fair. And they have challenges on that domestic front but equally you've articulately summed it up. The euro is very, very important to Germany as well as to any other state within the euro zone. And I would have thought that there was significant incentive in that and motivation to move rapidly towards this agenda. Okay, Tom Hahey, I don't know. Firstly, thanks. Tom Hahey, member of the Institute. I would like to thank you for a splendid contribution to the debate and one which I know will be seriously poured over here in the house and enter into the internal discussions. But it seems to me that we're in a situation, the house is on fire. It started in an outhouse, it moved to the kitchen, it's now in the lounge. Radical and immediate action is necessary. The people with the necessary resources, the fire hoses, happen to be our German friends together with the French. Now, they could have handled it better, I think in particular if I may say so, President Sarkozy could have handled it better in terms of the imagery that has gone out right around the union. So instead of this being an emergency action, preparing the way for further discussions between all the members of the family about a better way to run our affairs, it has created the impression of imposing a view on the rest of Europe. However, we still need to put the fire out. And certainly I think from an Irish point of view, if we don't put the fire out, in other words if we don't ratify the treaty, we will be caught up in the blaze, rightly around me. That's the way I see it. So the debate I think has to take that into consideration. Thank you very much. But I think I made my position clear in terms of the treaty itself, in terms of our position as a political party, in terms of supporting the treaty. We have put questions to the Taoiseach, we've sought important clarifications now in terms of time scales in relation to the 160th rule, in terms of debt, getting your debt down to the 120th, down to 60%, to the structural deficit. There are important issues there, but as I've said clearly, we support fiscal controls, we support the six pack stability and growth and so on. But we equally have said consistently since March, we think this is missing the point. And we don't believe that the fiscal treaty in itself is putting out the fire basically. It needs much, much more to put the fire out. That's our concern really. And I understand the real politic of what you're saying, but I think we need to be clear to people as well. Because the one thing I learned from the Lisbon debate really, we did enormous research into public attitudes about Europe and about Lisbon one and so on. And it has actually informed my thinking a lot. And maybe if you're not as close to it, you wouldn't be as possessed of this idea of really taking the argument to people. You know, people thought you'd never again pass the second Lisbon treaty. Actually, after Lisbon, one was defeated. And that was the conventional wisdom. In-house as well as out-house. I mean, ministers would say to you, we'll never get this through and so forth. But we did, actually. Now, far better preparation for the second one than the first one. Far greater research, greater understanding of where people were. Modifying, getting the protocols to reflect where people were on the first. And engaging with people. And winning the argument. And I think we should never underestimate our capacity to do that. Or never approach a viewpoint from saying, it can never be won. And therefore, we must avoid putting it before the people. That's just a view I have. And I suppose the Lisbon experience influence me. I would acknowledge the things that were difficult now. Acknowledge that, not naive or in any way discounting the significant negative opinion because of the collapse. It happens in general, economic collapse. But if we're fairly sure, and this treaty envisages a treaty in five years' time, and if we have a view that this is heading in the direction of more substantive change, then I think we're better off being a bit upfront with people. And at this phase, we are committing future parliaments. They've been asked to be legally, but we're committing future parliaments to budgetary parameters, certainly for the next decade or so. And that's the position. So political arguments around engaging with the people on this. But our fundamental view on the fiscal treaty, I don't think the fiscal treaty will put the fire out, but I take your point, those who have the fire part to put the fire out do see it as a necessary step on the road. And their view has to be taken into account, plus the fact that access to the ESM is vital. Alan Duke's member of the Institute. And I represent, as far as I know, only a very gloomy me at the moment. I must say, I agree with the three objectives that Deputy Martin has put forward. Reformed the European Central Bank, set up a real fiscal union, and restored the community method. But if I may say so, to a corkman, I'd use the Kerry phrase. If I were going there, I wouldn't start from here. We are doing all of those things in the very worst possible circumstances. There's been a total abdication by 15 heads of state and government since early in 2010 to Merkel and Sarkozy. So it's an uphill battle to get any idea of a community method restored here. The same with fiscal solidarity. The reality of the situation that we're in now, ugly as it is, is that whatever we do or say about this fiscal compact, it is going to be European Union practice for some time because once 12 members say it's ratified, it comes into effect. It's actually going to fall apart fairly quickly, I would think. It has no effect for the programme countries at the moment because the programmes supersede this. And my suspicion is that when the next French government and the next German government see what they're facing with the 0.5% structural deficit target and the 120th adjustment of the margin by which their borrowing requirement exceeds 60%, they are going to find that they don't like the kind of austerity programme that that means for them. And I think that was very well brought out in Pather O'Brien's recent paper produced for the Institute. There's a very telling table in there that shows just where the member states are in relation to these. My guess is that this treaty will fall apart as a matter of practice within two years. We've already seen that the possible next president of France is making the same mistake as the current strategic of this country made before an election in saying that we will renegotiate everything once we get into government. And I think they will have just as much success in the one case as in the other. We are going to be pressing for the kind of solution that Mihal has outlined in the very worst possible circumstances. And the debate we're going to have about what we do next here in the short term is going to affect how we do it. I gather from what you've said that if there is a referendum, Fianna Fáil will campaign for a yes vote. It would help if you could deal with some of the ill-informed speculation. For example, that indulged in by Willie O'Dee last Sunday week in the Sunday Independent. But I think that if we're going to get a result on this that gets over the fact that we're campaigning for something that's going to come into effect whether we like it or not, but we're campaigning for a longer term objective, we're going to have to be very careful with the presentation. The final point I'd make is that while I agree the idea of post-treaty flexibility after we pass this is not enough, the fact is that that is the only, if you like, element of a silver lining in this cloud. And small as it is, it is something that we are going to have to take into account, not only in the national debate here, but also in the kind of debate that's going to be needed with other member states to motivate them to get out of the traps that they're setting for themselves. But I think more observations than I would agree with quite a lot of what Alan has said. I'm not so sure it will fall apart that quickly. Although we do know from experience, particularly in 2005 that others, particularly larger states actually did break and breach the limits and disability and growth path. And I think what's important in any bill like this actually is that there is some sensible attitude to, I mean even in Spain now in terms of the six factors, discussions going on in terms of room for maneuver, in terms of the exactitude of the levels of Spain or being asked to adhere to. So already, even though we've passed all of this, people are having a debate as to, well do you really want to push it to total precision in terms of what figure there must emerge in the deficit this year. So it has to be common sense, but the trends have to be in the right direction. So we favor the fiscal control and generally the idea of ultimately narrowing obviously the gap between expenditure and revenue. We do think that's a necessary part of what we're about. This speech was about setting our stall out unambiguously in terms of our position on the treaty. We've had our own meeting and discussion internally as a party. We've been very, I mean one of the figures that we've been making, what I would like to think are fairly serious contributions to all dial debates on this subject since last March. And we've been raising these issues in the context of those debates. As part of our contribution, I think what is needed though, I have been disappointed, but it's the lack of any engagement in advance. I do think we should have had a proper forum on the treaty and the dial. Even, and that's new breaking new ground in the sense of in advance of treaties. But for Lisbon we actually set up a specific subgroup of the European Affairs Committee to have hearings on Lisbon to invite people from outside. And that hasn't happened on this occasion. I met every single party as foreign minister, prior to Lisbon too. I met Sinn Féin. Even though I knew their ultimate position would be negative. I met with independent senators, independent TDs to put the case to them, to invite their suggestions. I met Billy Timmons and Joe Costolo. I would have met with regularly and have a friend again in the neighbor. That's missing now to be frank. We had one meeting that was after the December summit. And that's what I'm really getting at when I talk about the pro-EU mainstream opinion, both politically and with the people. That needs to happen. And there needs to be engagement. And that's why before any treaty there should be consultation in advance in the doile and hear people out. And even if they are coming from a position which is not yours, or they might be a negative and against it, I think we have to take people through the issues and interrogate the views that people have. That was standing how they may eventually end up. I think the silver lining, take your point on that. I hope that is the case. I sincerely hope that that is the case. And your comments on elections and politicians will always be where. I think that's what you're saying. And you were one of the more commendable practitioners of the art in terms of talent and so on. But I've noted the French prime ministers, or sorry, socialist leaders' comments. Well, I'm also minded, before the last general election, the Conservatives had particular strong views in terms of the need for referendumism which never materialized subsequently. So we'll see what materializes in that front. I just want to find the context. What was very interesting, why did people change from Lisbon one to Lisbon two? Did the one freshly imbued with a new E.U. idealism, to be honest. But the research indicates very strongly that the gathering storm clouds was the prime motivating factor behind people switching, or that sufficient portion that switched from no T.S. second time around. So sometimes the context, grim and all as it is, can actually move people in a different direction than you might expect. And that actually, we've checked all the campaigning and the preparation, but the fundamental influence actually was the gathering storm clouds economically and financially that people were aware of, and they basically said were better in than out in terms of their attitude to Lisbon. Thank you very much. So I'm very proud of the party at the top corner here. Thanks, I'll put that. Yes, another member of the institute, I'm afraid, party marty. I too was very encouraged by your speech and the evidence that it gave of commitment by your party to the European project, which has been a feature of all Irish governments for the past 50 years. If I connect the devil's advocacy base in talking about the aspect of the resolution of the problem, which focuses on the need for austerity. I wonder about the bigger context, which consists of a great inflation of official debt over the last 30 years. There's a huge overhang of official debt in the system and part of the mechanism by which the system has carried on up to now consisted in a confidence on the part of one of the essential actors, that's to say what's called the markets, that this would was always let's say triple A grade, that has ended quite clearly. And you say that in the case of other countries, I take it you mean the United States and Great Britain, they have been able to use their central banks, the Fed or the Bank of England as the bank of last resort, but what they're actually doing is actually building up this official debt further. And I wonder whether we can deal with the problem in the kind of way that many here are talking about without actually throttling this dragon by the throat before we do anything else. The, I think the key word is confidence. And I mean, Italian debt was no worse 10 years ago than it is today, yet the collapse of confidence has created a crisis in terms of market confidence in Italy. So you do need, I think a policy platform and strategy and decisiveness in terms of trying to bring the confidence back. And I would argue that the drip sort of approach, going back over the 18 months to two years, even the denials about Greece, you know that it won't need to default and so on, and that proved erroneous. And I think that has eroded confidence even further. And it's a very intangible thing, confidence. And there's no clear sort of definition of when it arrives and when it leaves and so on, but I do think a clear, certain strategy followed by decisive action, I think would restore confidence. I do believe that. And that was sounding, I mean, there's no easy way to resolve and there has been a huge buildup of debt and so on. You're absolutely correct in that. But I'm clear on this much, so far what we've been doing hasn't surprised, although I do think that there's many elements to resolving this. And I think that's, if we're right about the silver lining, that maybe this is the essential first step that people want and then all the things will follow. See? But I think there are a number of components to this, which I do think is one of the key components is broadening the mandate of the European Central Bank and also a fiscal transfer union. Really, Skyrim? We, I'm Skyrim member of the Institute, I don't want to bore people with my views and I said recently that this was the wrong treaty at the wrong time for the wrong reasons. Now, that doesn't mean that in the end of the day, I hope it will be superseded that it would be rendered meaningless that it might be renegotiated, but that in the end of the day, if I was asked, I would say I probably would support it out of fear, you see, and it would be out of fear, but there's no other merit if you're pursuing a national interest as both the chairperson and yourself said. But secondly, I just want to say, I mean, you've given me, I don't want to follow any part of your political points, but you've given us a few occasions of temptation, if not occasions of sin. However, we leave that aside for the minute. What I really wanted to ask was, is, are we realistic at all? Talking about reforms, this treaty is about power. It's also about belief. It's about belief among creditors countries, which led by Germany and a lot of others, with a lot of supporters, even in countries like Ireland, that what the periphery and what recalcitrant countries fiscally need is discipline. Even though I totally agree with a lot of your analysis that this is not the base cause of the problem at all. But that is there. The Germans have as much intention of reforming the European Central Bank as we have in the short term in any way, as we have of invading the Isle of Man. And that would be my view. Now, that doesn't mean that out of necessity, they may not allow, and arguably in December they have, the Central Bank ECB to do things that we're doing up to now. But I think what I'm really bothered about is formalism. European Union is a meaningless phrase to most people. And your design, the design analysis, and Colin McCarty, it's very interesting, your design analysis, that it was flawed design. But was it a flawed design in the sense that some people would say that Colin Mitterrand knew that this would happen, and the whole thing was to push a European Union in a much further sense that you've been saying. But you might have a six or nine or 12, not 27 from Romania to Portugal to Greece to wherever. And that, you know, the European Union thing, in other words, if it's to be read, is long term. Whereas nothing that is coming out in the policy sense out of European institutions at the minute gives any message that the growth and job stuff is waffle. It is, maybe it can be substantiated, but it is waffle. Ireland can do nothing because Ireland is in hawk and is a credit or country. It can say things, but they don't mean anything. So you have to try to come as to how can you incrementally substantiate things because you are not going to get, in my view, a great leap forward given the current power disposition in Europe. For first point on that, I would say, I mean, additive fear you can add necessity. Necessity is a great motivator for action. And ultimately, Germany will want the order to survive. And in my view, will do what's required ultimately to save the euro. No, it'll have to come to a juncture to make those decisions. And it may come in different forms and different ways. But I do believe that Germany believes in saving the euro. I passionately believe in that. I think also I've made a point earlier that I think the euro was a political project too early, perhaps, and didn't match. And the issue about, I think it was, and I'm not an economist or not an expert, but even at our economic cycle, let's be clear the cheap money came at the wrong time, the low interest rates. And we were growing. And a wall of cheap money came across Europe. And there was further low cost money across the United States post 9-11 and across all the developed economies, which I think did create both credit issues subsequently, but also the property bubble and the periphery, particularly here. I think it was a determining factor. I mean, in this country, we joined the euro, we also promoted bank competition, if you remember, and it was conventionally agreed that this was a good thing. But unfortunately, bank competition ushered in significant bank competition, but all focused on property. And I remember even as an enterprise minister, having, you know, we think about it, we actually had to create our own state venture capital fund to support software companies, food companies, new startup companies, and so forth, because of the absence of private sector equity and the absence of a private venture capital fund industry in this country. And it kind of tells a lot when you look back, you know, all the money was heading into land and property all the time. Even some of the food companies were becoming property companies, which was really a retrograde situation. And so I think there was clearly evident, there is evidence of a flawed design in how the euro started. I think on the other hand, for us, as a country on the periphery, it is huge, powerful positives as well in terms of the trading agenda. And most business people, you speak, would say that to you, in terms of ease of trade, access to markets, and so on. So it had a very positive impact on Ireland. So I, and fear, by the way, is the greatest motivator of all. As I discovered in education psychology, when I was back in a different profession, the greatest motivator in passing an exam is still fear of failure in exams, as various psychologists will testify to that. But let's move, I think we have to be, there are other elements to it as well. And I think, I'm not so sure. I mean, there have been great leap forwards in the past. Don't underestimate the capacity that they'll happen again. But I don't, I'm not naive. There are very significant challenges on that road. But I think people ultimately want to say, do you all? I'm sorry that there's a lot of people offering, but I'm afraid we've come to a point where we've really got to bring the question out to session to an end. And if you wouldn't mind sitting down, I'll thank you. Thank you.