 So you've been engaged in the past couple of years in particular, but at multiple times over the course of your career, in the sort of future's work of the Army, thinking about what the future Army should look like, needs to look like, and you've talked some about the constraints that culture can put on efforts to push the institution or any institution in new directions. So I think you would agree that the Army is at a point where some change is necessary and desired. How do you think culture fits into that equation now, and how is the Army going to adapt, should it adapt its culture to try to align itself best for the future? Right. So I think, you know, the first thing is if you put something in the hands of soldiers that's better than what they have, they tend to gravitate right towards it. And so as an example, you mentioned I was involved in previous futures efforts. So I was in, I think, all the Army after next project. About that, is it allowed us to get outside of the constraints, the gravitational pull of the here and now, and think about war and operations differently. And where the ideas had some merit, senior leaders and others were attracted to them. So the Stryker Brigade, as an example, which is something we've used to great effect in Iraq and Afghanistan, was a very near-term manifestation of the ideas that were inherent in Army after next about information-enabled forces, very agile forces, network, et cetera. UAVs integrated it in all of that. And while it didn't do all the things of an Army after next battle force, it did manifest many of those ideas with, you know, immediately executable technologies. And so I think there's, you know, that's how you see that. Because now there's a whole culture built around, you know, the way that Stryker units operate. And it's something that I think will continue to, you know, ripple through the Army as we go forward and help the Army change. And so I think that's one key area. Another point that I think is actually very gratifying and encouraging is, as we've begun to talk to the Army, in fact, General Perkins was at a pre- command course here recently, talking about, hey, here's what we're thinking about between now and about 2040. And so we have some more detailed thoughts, you know, closer in and some broader thoughts farther out. And those leaders looked at kind of what he was talking about. And they said, A, we're very encouraged that the Army is actually thinking about this. And B, that looks about right. So, you know, at the, you know, those are the future leaders of the Army. You know, they'll own, the colonels will be generals in the Army of 2025. You know, so that to me is encouraging, because they're looking, they've been thinking, they've been dealing with, you know, very changeable circumstances for the better part of 12, 13 years. And then now they're looking to the future and they're encouraged that the Army is actually thinking about doing things differently. So those leaders are not lockstep in an old think, if you will. And we will continue to work our training and education programs to ensure that we don't fall back into, you know, what would be old bad habits. The other piece is, I think we have to be patient. When I look back, you know, I came into training in Doctor Command, frankly, kicking and screaming as a major. And I went into what was then called Force 21, you know, the experiments to figure out how to digitize the Army and specifically a division, fourth infantry division. And there was a lot of naysaying back then. But if you look around the Army today and you think particularly about the units that went into Iraq in 2003, we are more the Force 21 Army than not. We have not fully fielded the network, but the resistance to digitization, the recognition of the value of it, and particularly the situational awareness that it provides, and some of the new tools like the integration of unmanned aerial vehicles, which have proliferated through the Army, are all ideas that were, you know, begun in the early 1990s. Similarly, if you look at prioritization of investment across many of the warfighting, you know, the owners of our warfighting functions, for those who may watch this, that's things like maneuver. So the armor and the infantry own that warfighting function. Fires, the artillery and air defense capabilities in the Army, those leaders own that warfighting function. They're looking for things that, quite frankly, were talked about when General Shinzeki tried, you know, a lot of things got in the way of that, but tried to take us into what he called the objective force, which really was an Army that was trying to build off of digitization and then become more agile, more lethal, lighter weight, leaner, things that we're trying to get after today. So there's some threads of continuity there. And frankly, the technology is beginning to catch up with the idea. And that's the other piece of it. So you have to be patient. We probably were a little impatient in the early 2000s, trying to field a system with technologies that just weren't quite ready to be put into a program. Happily, I'm not in that business, but it's hard to do because immature technology doesn't manufacture particularly well. So a little patience. And I think soldiers will then put their hands on things that they say, hey, this makes me better. And then it'll be their idea, which is what you want at the end of the day.