 CHAPTER 18 OF THE SUVERANCE BY INSTITUTION A commonwealth is said to be instituted when the multitude of man do agree, and covenant, everyone with everyone, that to whatsoever man or assembly of man shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative. Everyone, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man or assembly of man in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves and be protected against other man. From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him or them on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled. First, because they covenant, it is to be understood they are not obliged by former covenants to anything repugnant hereon to, and consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other in anything whatsoever without his permission. And therefore they that are subject to a monarch cannot, without his leave, cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude, nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man, other assembly of man. For they are bound, every man to every man, to own and be reputed author of all that already is their sovereign shall do and judge fit to be done, so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice. And they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person, and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempted to depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do. And because it is injustice for a man to do anything for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign a new covenant made not with men, but with God, this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with God but by mediation of somebody that represented God's person, which none doth but God's lieutenant who had the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition. Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign, and consequently none of his subjects by any pretence of forfeiture can be freed from his subjection. That he which has made sovereign make it no covenant with his subjects beforehand is manifest, because either he must make it with the whole multitude as one party to the covenant, or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole as one party it is impossible, because as they are not one person, and if he makes so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he had sovereignty are void. Because what act so ever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one or more of them pretend a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution, and others or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case no judge to decide the controversy. It returns therefore to the sword again, and every man recovered the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant. The opinion that any monarch receiveeth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, preceded from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants, being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword, that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men, that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign, then no man imagine any such covenant to have passed in the institution. For no man is so dull as to say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions, which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That man see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government, preceded from the ambition of some that are kinder to the government of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy which they despair to enjoy. Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest, that is, be contented to vow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thou by his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain. And therefore, if he refused to stand there too, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to that decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever. Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution, author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted, it follows that whatsoever he doth, can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by authority from another doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acted. But by this institution of a commonwealth every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth, and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign complaineth of that whereof he himself is author, and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself. No, nor himself of injury, because to do injury to oneself is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper signification. Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that hath sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign, he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself. And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, and whosoever has right to the end has right to the means, it belonged of right to whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty to be judge both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same. And to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done both beforehand for the preserving of peace and security by prevention of discord at home, and hostility from abroad, and when peace and security are lost for the recovery of the same. And therefore, sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse and what conducing to peace. And consequently, on what occasions, how far and what man are to be trusted with all in speaking to multitudes of people? And who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published? For the actions of man proceed from their opinions, and in the well governing of opinions consisted the well governing of man's actions in order to their peace and concord. And though in matter of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded by the truth, yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace. For doctrine repugnant to peace can no more be true than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. It is true that in a commonwealth whereby the negligence or unskillfulness of governors and teachers false doctrines are by time generally received, the contrary truth may be generally offensive. Yet the most sudden and rough bustling in of a new truth that can be does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the wall. For those men that are so remissly governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are still in war, and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another, and they live as it were in the proscenes of battle continually. It belonged therefore to him that had the sovereign power to be judge or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines as a thing necessary to peace, thereby to prevent discord and civil war. Seventhly is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may know what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may do without being molested by any of his fellow subjects, and this is it man call propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power as had already been shown, all man had right to do all things, which necessarily cause it war, and therefore this propriety being necessary to peace and depending on sovereign power is the act of that power in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety are mayum and tomb, and of good, evil, lawful and unlawful in the actions of subjects are the civil laws, that is to say the laws of each commonwealth in particular, though the name of civil law be now restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome, which being the head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were in these parts the civil law. Eightly is annexed to the sovereignty the right of judicature, that is to say of hearing and deciding all controversies which may arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another. The laws concerning mayum and tomb are in vain, and to every man remaineth from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war, and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted. Ninthly is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths, that is to say of judging when it is for the public good and how great forces are to be assembled, armed and paid for that end, and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the people are to be defended consisted in their armies and the strength of an army in the union of their strength in the one command, which command the sovereign instituted therefore hath, because the command of the militia without other institution maketh him that hath it sovereign. And therefore whosoever is made general of an army he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo. Tenthly is annexed to the sovereignty the choosing of all councillors, ministers, magistrates and officers both in peace and war. For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end which is the common peace and defence he is understood to have power to use such means as he shall think most fit for his discharge. Eleventhly to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment or with ignominy every subject according to the law he hath formally made or if there be no law made according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth or deterring of them from doing this service to the same. Lastly considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves what respect they look for from others and how little they value other men from whence continually arise amongst them emulation, quarrels, factions and at last war to the destroying of one another and diminution of their strength against the common enemy it is necessary that there be laws of honour and a public rate of the worth of such men as hath deserved or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth and that there be force in the hands of some or other to put those laws in execution but it hath already been shown that not only the whole militia or forces of the commonwealth but also the judicature of all controversies is annexed to the sovereignty to the sovereign therefore it belonged also to give titles of honour and to appoint what order of place and dignity each man shall hold and what signs of respect in public or private meetings they shall give to one another these are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty and which are the marks whereby a man may discern in what man or assembly of man the sovereign power is placed and resided for these are incommunicable and inseparable the power to coin money to dispose of the estate and persons of infant heirs to have preemption in markets and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by the sovereign and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained but if he transfer the militia he retains the judicature in vain for want of execution of the laws or if he grant away the power of raising money the militia is in vain or if he give away the government of doctrines man will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits and so if we consider any one of the said rights we shall presently see that the holding of all the rest will produce no effect in the conservation of peace and justice the end for which all commonwealths are instituted and this division is it whereof it is said a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand for unless this division proceed division into opposite armies can never happen if there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England that these powers were divided between the king and the lords and the house of commons the people had never been divided and fallen into this civil war first between those that disagreed in politics and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion which have so instructed men in this point of sovereign right that there be few now in England that do not see that these rights are inseparable and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace and so continue till their miseries are forgotten and no longer except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been and because they are essential and inseparable rights it follows necessarily that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms renounced and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them the grant is void for when he is granted all he can if we grant back the sovereignty all is restored as inseparably annexed thereon too this great authority being indivisible and inseparably annexed to the sovereignty there is little ground for the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings though they be single as majeures of greater power than every one of their subjects yet they be universes minoris of less power than them all together for if by all together they mean not the collective body as one person then all together and everyone signify the same and the speech is absurd but if by all together they understand them as one person which person the sovereign bears then the power of all together is the same with the sovereign's power and so again the speech is absurd which absurdity they see well enough when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people but in a monarch they see it not and yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed and as the power so also the honour of the sovereign ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects for in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour the dignities of lord, earl, duke and prince are his creatures as in the presence of the master servants are equal and without any honour at all so are the subjects in the presence of the sovereign and though they shine some more some less when they are out of his sight yet in his presence they shine no more than the stars in presence of the sun but a man may here object that the condition of subjects is very miserable as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands and commonly they that live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy and they that live under the government of democracy or other sovereign assembly attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth whereas the power in all forms if they be perfect enough to protect them is the same not considering that the estate of man can never be without some incomodity or other and that the greatest that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible in respect of the miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war or that disillute condition of masterless men without subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governance proceeded not from any delight or profit they can expect in the damage weakening of their subject in whose vigor consisted their own strength and glory but in the restiveness of themselves that unwillingly contributing to their own defence make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace that they may have means on any emergent occasion or sudden need to resist or take advantage on their enemies for all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses that is their passions and self-love through which every little payment appears a great grievance but our destitute of those prospective glasses namely moral and civil science to see afar off the miseries that hang over them and cannot without such payments be avoided End of chapter 18 Chapter 19 of Leviathan This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 19 of the several kinds of Commonwealth by institution and of succession to the sovereign power The difference of Commonwealth consisted in the difference of the sovereign or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude and because the sovereignty is either in one man or in an assembly of more than one and into that assembly either every man has right to enter or not everyone but certain men distinguished from the rest it is manifest there can be but three kinds of Commonwealth for the representative must need to be one man or more and if more then it is the assembly of all or but of a part when the representative is one man then is the Commonwealth a monarchy when an assembly of all that will come together then it is a democracy or popular Commonwealth when an assembly of a part only then it is called an aristocracy other kind of Commonwealth there can be none for either one or more or all must have the sovereign power which I have shown to be indivisible and tire there be other names of government in the histories and books of policy as tyranny and olacarchy but they are not the names of other forms of government but of the same forms misliked for they that are discontented under monarchy call it tyranny and they that are displeased with aristocracy call it olacarchy so also they which find themselves grieved under a democracy call it anarchy which signifies want of government and yet I think no man believes that want of government any new kind of government nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like it and another when they mislike it or are oppressed by the governors it is manifest that man who are in absolute liberty may if they please give authority to one man to represent them every one as well as give such authority to any assembly of man whatsoever and consequently may subject themselves if they think good of the monarch as absolutely as to other representative therefore where there is already erected a sovereign power there can be no other representative of the same people but only to certain particular ends by the sovereign limited for that which erect two sovereigns and every man to have his person represented by two actors that by opposing one another must needs divide that power which if man will live in peace is indivisible and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted and therefore as it is absurd to think that a sovereign assembly inviting the people of their dominion to send up their deputies with power to make known their advice or desires should therefore hold such deputies rather than themselves for the absolute representative of the people so it is absurd also to think the same in a monarchy and I know not how this so manifested truth should have laid be so little observed that in a monarchy he that had the sovereignty from a descent of 600 years was alone called sovereign had the title of majesty from every one of his subjects and was unquestionably taken by them for their king was not withstanding never considered as their representative that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions and give him if he permitted it their advice which may serve as an ammunition for those that are the true and absolute representative of a people to instruct men in the nature of that office and to take heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any occasion whatsoever they mean to discharge the trust committed to them the difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consisted not in the difference of power but in the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people for which end they were instituted and to compare monarchy with the other two we may observe first that whosoever beareth the person of the people or is one of that assembly that bears it also his own natural person and though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest yet he is more or no less careful to procure the private good of himself his family, kindred and friends and for the most part if the public interest chance to cross the private he prefers the private for the passions of man are commonly more potent than their reason for once it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united there is the public most advanced now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public the riches, power and honor of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation of a subject for no king can be rich nor glorious nor secure whose subjects are either poor or contemptible or too weak through want or dissension to maintain a war against their enemies whereas in a democracy or aristocracy the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt or ambitious as though many times a perfidious advice a treacherous action or a civil war secondly that a monarch receive a counsel of whom when and where he pleases and consequently may hear the opinion of men verse in the matter about which he deliberates of what rank or quality so ever and as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he will but when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel none are admitted but such as have a right there too from the beginning which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge and are to give their advice in long discourses which may and do commonly excite men to action but not govern them in it for the understanding is by the flame of the passions never enlightened but dazzled nor is there any place or time wherein an assembly can receive counsel secretly because of their own multitude thirdly that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature but in assemblies besides that of nature there arises an inconstancy from the number for the absence of a few that would have the resolution once taken continue firm which may happen by security negligence or private impediments or the diligent appearance of a few of the country opinion undoes today all that was concluded yesterday fourthly that a monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy or interest but an assembly may and that to such a height as may produce a civil war fifthly that in monarchy there is this inconvenience that any subject by the power of one man for the enriching of a favorite or flatterer may be deprived of all he possesses which I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience but the same may as well happen where the sovereign powers in an assembly for their powers the same and they are a subject to evil counsel and to be seduced by orators as a monarch by flatterers and becoming one another's flatterers serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns and whereas the favorites of monarchs are few and they have none else to advance but their own kindred the favorites of an assembly are many and the kindred much more numerous than of any monarch besides there's no favorite of a monarch which cannot as well succour his friends as hurt his enemies but orators that is to say favorites of sovereign assemblies though they have great powers to herd have little to save for to accuse requires less eloquence such as man's nature than to excuse and condemnation then absolution more resembles justice sixly that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the sovereignty may dissent upon an infant or one that cannot discern between good and evil and consisted in this that the use of his power must be in the hand of another man or of some assembly of men which are to govern by his right and in his name as curators and protectors of his person and authority but to say there is inconvenience in putting the use of the sovereign power into the hand of a man or an assembly of men is to say that all government is more inconvenient than confusion and civil war and therefore all the danger that can be pretended must arise from the contention of those that for an office of so great honor and profit may become competitors to make it appear that this inconvenience proceeded not from that form of government we call monarchy we are to consider that the president monarch had appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor either expressly by testament or tacitly by not controlling the custom in that case received and then such inconvenience if it happen is to be attributed not to the monarchy but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects which in all kinds of government the people are not well instructed in their duty and the rights of sovereignty is the same or else the president monarch had not at all taken order for such tuition and then the law of nature had provided this sufficient rule that the tuition shall be in him that had by nature most interest in the preservation of the authority of the infant and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death or diminution for seeing every man by nature seek of his own benefit and promotion to put an infant into the power of those that can promote themselves by his destruction or damage is not tuition but treachery so that sufficient provision being taken against all just quarrel by the government and their child if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy but to the ambition of subjects and ignorance of that duty on the other side there is no great Commonwealth the sovereignty whereof is in a great assembly which is not as to consultations of peace and war and making of laws in the same condition as if the government were in a child for as a child wants the judgment to descend from council given him and is thereby necessitated to take the advice of them or him to whom he is committed so an assembly wanted the liberty to descend from the council of the major part be it good or bad and as a child has need of a tutor or protector to preserve his person and authority so also in great Commonwealth the sovereign assembly and all great dangers and troubles have need of custodious libertates that is of dictators or protectors of their authority which are as much as temporary monarchs to whom for a time they may commit the entire exercise of their power to preserve at the end of that time being often a deprived thereof than infant kings by their protectors, regents or any other tutors though the kinds of sovereignty be as I have now shown but three that is to say monarchy where one man has it or democracy where the general assembly of subjects has it or aristocracy where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated or otherwise distinguished from the rest but he that shall consider the particular Commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms arising from these mingled together as for example elective kingdoms where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time or kingdoms where in the king hath a power limited which governments are nevertheless by most writers called monarchy likewise if a popular or aristocratic Commonwealth subdue an enemy's country and govern the same by a president, procurator or other magistrate this may seem perhaps at first sight to be a democratic or aristocratic government but it is not so for elective kings are not sovereigns but ministers of the sovereign nor limited kings sovereigns but ministers of them that have the sovereign power nor are those provinces which are in subjection to a democracy or aristocracy of another Commonwealth democratically or aristocratically governed but monarchically and first concerning an elective king whose power is limited to his life as it is in many places of Christendom at this day or to certain years or months as dictates his power amongst the Romans if he have right to appoint his successor he is no more elective but hereditary but if he have no power to elect his successor then there is some other man or assembly known which after his disease may elect a new or else the Commonwealth died or dissolved with him and returned it to the condition of war if it be known who have the power to give the sovereignty after his death it is known also that the sovereignty was in them before for none have right to give that which they have not right to possess and keep to themselves if they think good but if there be none that can give the sovereignty after the disease of him that was first elected then has he power nay he is obliged by the law of nature to provide by establishing a successor to keep to those that had trusted him with the government from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war and consequently he was when elected a sovereign absolute secondly that king whose power is limited is not superior to him or them that have the power to limited and he that is not superior is not supreme that is to say not sovereign the sovereignty therefore was always in that assembly which had the right to limit him and by consequence the government not monarchy but either democracy or aristocracy as of all times in Sparta where the kings had a privilege to lead their armies but the sovereignty was in the aforeigh thirdly whereas here to fall the Roman people governed the land of Judea for example by a president yet was not Judea therefore a democracy because they were not governed by any assembly into which any of them had right to enter nor by an aristocracy because they were not governed by any assembly into which any man could enter by their election but they were governed by one person which though as to the people of Rome was an assembly of the people or democracy yet as to the people of Judea which had no right at all of participating in the government was a monarch for though where the people are governed by an assembly chosen by themselves out of their own number the government is called a democracy or aristocracy yet when they are governed by an assembly not of their own choosing it is a monarchy one man over another man but of one people over another people of all these forms of government the matter being mortal so that not only monarchs but also whole assemblies die it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of man that as there was order taken for an artificial man so there be order also taken for an artificial eternity of life without which men that are governed by an assembly should return into the condition of war in every age and they that are governed by one man as soon as their governor died this artificial eternity is that which men call the right of succession there is no perfect form of government where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign for if it be in any other particular man or private assembly it is in a person's subject and may be assumed by the sovereign at his pleasure and consequently the right is in himself and if it be in no particular man but left to a new choice then is the commonwealth dissolved and the right is in him that can get it contrary to the intention of them that did institute the commonwealth for their perpetual and not temporary security in a democracy the whole assembly cannot fail unless the multitude that are to be governed fail and therefore questions of the right of succession have in that form of government no place at all in an aristocracy when any of the assembly died the election of another into his room belonged to the assembly as a sovereign to whom belonged the choosing of all councillors and officers for that which the representative doth as actor every one of the subjects doth as author and though the sovereign assembly may give power to others to elect new man for supply of their court yet it is still by their authority that the election is made and by the same it may when the public shall required be recalled the greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in monarchy and the difficulty arises from this that at first sight it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor nor many times who it is whom he had appointed for in both these cases there is required a more exact ratios the nation than every man is accustomed to use as to the question who shall appoint the successor of a monarch that had the sovereign authority that is to say who shall determine of the right of inheritance for elective kings and princes have not the sovereign power and propriety but in use only we are to consider that either he that is in possession has right to dispose of the succession or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude for the death of him that had the sovereign power and propriety leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all that is without any representative in whom they should be united and be capable of doing any one action at all and therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch every man having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to protect him or if he can protect himself which is a return to confusion and to the condition of a war of every man against every man contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution therefore it is manifest that by the institution of monarchy the disposing of the successor is always left to the judgment and will of the present possessor and for the question which may arise sometimes who it is that the monarch in possession had designed succession and inheritance of his power it is determined by his express words and testament or by other tacit signs sufficient by express words or testament when it is declared by him in his lifetime or by writing as the first emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs for the word heir does not of itself imply the children or nearest kindred of a man but whomesoever a man shall declare he would have to succeed him in his estate if therefore a monarch declare expressly that such a man shall be his heir either by word or writing then is that man immediately after the disease of his predecessor invested in the right of being monarch but where testament and express words are wanting other natural signs of the will are to be followed where of the one is custom and therefore where the custom is that the next of kindred absolutely succeeded there also the next of kindred had right to the succession for that if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise he might easily have declared the same in his lifetime and likewise where the custom is that the next of the male kindred succeeded there also the right of succession is in the next of the kindred male for the same reason so it is if the custom were to advance the female for whatsoever custom a man may by a word control and does not it is a natural sign he would have that custom stand but where neither custom nor testament hath proceeded there it is to be understood first that a monarch's will is that the government remain monarchical because he hath approved that government in himself secondly that a child of his own male or female be preferred before any other because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature to advance their own children than the children of other men and of their own rather a male than a female because men are naturally fitter than women for actions of labour and danger thirdly where is own issue faileth rather a brother than a stranger and so still the nearer in blood rather than the more remote because it is always presumed that the nearer of kin is the nearer in affection and it is evident that a man receives always by reflection the most honour from the greatness of his nearest kindred but if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words of contract or testament man may perhaps object a great inconvenience for he may sell or give his right of governing to a stranger which because strangers that is man not used to live under the same government nor speaking the same language do commonly undervalue one another may turn to the oppression of his subjects which is indeed a great inconvenience but it proceeded not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's government but from the unskillfulness of the governors ignorant of the true rules of politics and therefore the Romans when they had subdued many nations to make their government digestible were one to take away that grievance as much as they thought necessary by giving sometimes to whole nations and sometimes to principal men of every nation they conquered not only the privileges but also the name of Romans and took many of them into the senate and offices of charge even in the roman city and this was it our most wise king King James aimed at in endeavoring the union of his two realms of England and Scotland which if he could have obtained had in all likelihood prevented the civil wars which make both those kingdoms at this present miserable it is not therefore any injury to the people for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will though by the fold of many princes it had been sometimes found inconvenient of the lawfulness of it this also is in argument that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger may arrive also by so marrying with strangers as the right of succession may descend upon them yet this by all men is accounted lawful end of chapter 19 Chapter 20 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Nicky Sullivan Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 20 of Dominion paternal and despotical a commonwealth by acquisition is that where the sovereign power is acquired by force and it is acquired by force when men singly or many together by plurality of death or bonds do authorize all actions of that man or assembly that hath their lives in liberty in his power and this kind of dominion or sovereignty differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another and not of him whom they institute but in this case they subject themselves to him they are afraid of in both cases they do it for fear which is to be noted by them that hold all such covenants and proceed from fear of death or violence void which if it were true no man in any commonwealth could be obliged to obedience it is true that in a commonwealth once instituted or acquired promises proceeding from fear of death or violence are no covenants nor obliging when the thing promised is contrary to the laws but the reason is not because it was made upon fear but because he that promises hath no right in the thing promised also when he may lawfully perform and doth not it is not in the invalidity of the covenant that absolve with him but the sentence of the sovereign otherwise when so ever a man lawfully promises he unlawfully breaketh but when the sovereign the actor acquitted him then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise as by the author of such absolution but the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both his power cannot without his consent be transferred to another he cannot forfeit it he cannot be accused by any of his subjects of injury he cannot be punished by them he is judge of what is necessarily for peace he is a commander and supreme judge of controversies and of the times and occasions of war and peace to him belongs to choose magistrates counselors commanders and all other officers and ministers and to determine of rewards and punishments honor and order the reasons whereof are the same which are alleged in the precedent chapter for the same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution dominion is acquired in two ways by generation and by conquest the right of the dominion by generation is at which the parent hath over his children and is called paternal and is not so derived from the generation as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him but from the child's consent either by express or by sufficient arguments declared for as to the generation God hath ordained to man a helper and there be always two that are equally parents the dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both and he be equally subject to both which is impossible for no man can obey two masters and whereas some have attributed the dominion of man only as being of the more excellent sex they misreconant for there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman as that right can be determined without war in commonwealths this controversy is decided by the civil law and for the most part but not always the sentence is in favor of the father because for the most part commonwealths have been erected by fathers not by the mothers of the families but the question lies now in the state of mere nature where there are supposed no laws of matrimony no laws for the education of children but the law of nature and the natural inclination of the sexes one to another and to their children in this condition of mere nature either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child by contract or do not dispose thereof at all if they dispose thereof the right passeth according to the contract we find in history that the amazons contracted with the men of neighboring countries to whom they had recourse for issue that the issue male should be sent back but the female remain with themselves so that the dominion of the females was in the mother if there be no contract the dominion is in the mother for in the condition of mere nature where there are no matrimonial laws it cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by the mother and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will and is consequently hers again seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother so as she may either nourish or expose it she owneth its life to the mother and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than any other and by consequence the dominion over it is hers but if she expose it and another find in nourish it dominion is in him that nourish it for it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved because preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or to store him if the mother be the father's subject the child is in the father's power and if the father be the mother's subject as when a sovereign queen marieth one of her subjects the child is subject to the mother because the father also is her subject if a man and woman monarchs of two several kingdoms have a child in contract concerning who shall have dominion of him the right of dominion passes by contract if they contract not they follow with the dominion of the place of his residence for the sovereign of each country had dominion over all that reside therein he that had dominion over the child had dominion also over the children of the child and over their children's children for he that had dominion over the person of a man had dominion over all that is his without which dominion were but a title without effect the right of succession to paternal dominion proceeded in the same manner the right of succession of monarchy of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the preceding chapter dominion acquired by conquest or in victory in war is that which some writers call despotical from despotase which signifyeth a lord or master and is dominion of the master over his servant and this dominion is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished to avoid the present stroke of death either in the express words or by the other sufficient signs of the will so long as his life and the liberty of his body allow with him the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure and after such covenant made the vanquished is a servant and not before for the word servant whether it be derived from serverae to serve or from serverae to save or leave to grammarians to dispute is not meant a captive which is kept in prison or bonds till the owner of him that took him or bought him if one that did shall consider what to do with him for such men commonly called slaves have no obligation at all but may break their bonds or the prison and kill or carry away captive their matter justly but one that being taken hath corporal liberty allowed him and upon promise not to run away nor to do violence to his master is trusted by him it is not therefore the victory that giveth the dominion over the vanquished but his own covenant nor is he obliged because he is conquered that is to say beaten or taken or put to flight but because he cometh in and submitted to the victor nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself without promise of life to spare him for this his yielding to discretion which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think of it and that which men do when they demand as is now called quarter which the greeks called zagria taking life is to evade the present fury of the victor by submission and to compound for their life with ransom or service and therefore he that hath quarter hath not his life given but deferred till further deliberation not a yielding on condition of life but to discretion and then only is his life in security as his service do when the victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty for slaves that work in prisons or fetters do it not of duty but to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters the master of the servant is also a master of all that he hath and may exact the use thereof that is to say of his goods of the servants and of his children as often as he shall think fit for he beholdeth his life of his master by the covenant of obedience that is of owning and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do and in the case of the master if he refuse kill him or cast him into bonds or otherwise punish him for his disobedience he is himself the author of the same and cannot accuse him of injury in some the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution and for the same reasons which reasons are set down in the preceding chapter so that for a man that is monarch of diverse nations he hath in one the sovereignty by institution of the people assembled and in another by conquest that is by the submission of each particular to avoid death or bonds to demand of one nation more than of another from the title of conquest as being a concord nation is an act of ignorance of the rights of the sovereignty for the sovereign is absolute over both alike or else there is no sovereignty at all and so every man may lawfully protect himself if he can with his own sword which is the condition of war by this it appears that a great family if it be not part of some commonwealth is of itself as to the rights of sovereignty a little monarchy whether that family consist of a man and his children or of a man and his servants or of a man and his children and servants together where in the father or master is the sovereign but yet a family is not properly a commonwealth unless it be of that power by its own number or by other opportunities as not to be subdued without hazard of war for where a number of men are manifestly weak to defend themselves united everyone may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life either by flight or by submission to the enemy as he shall think best and in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers surprised by an army may cast down their arms and demand quarter or run away then be put to the sword and thus much shall suffice concerning what I find by speculation and deduction of sovereign rights from their nature need and designs of men in erecting of commonwealths and putting themselves under monarchs or assemblies entrusted with power enough for their protection let us now consider what the scripture teaches in the same point to Moses the children of Israel say thus speak thou to us and we will hear thee but let not God speak to us lest we die Exodus 2019 this is absolute obedience to Moses concerning the right of kings God himself by the mouth of Samuel sayeth this shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you he shall take your sons and set them to drive his chariots and to be his horsemen and to run before his chariots and gather in his harvest and to make his engines of war and instruments of his chariots and shall take your daughters to make perfumes cook and bakers he shall take your fields your vineyards and your olive yards and give them to his servants he shall take the tithe of your corn and wine and give it to the men of his chamber and his other servants he shall take your manservants and your maidservants and the choice of your youth and employ them in his business he shall take the tithe of your flocks and you shall be his servants 11-17 this is absolute power and summed up in the last words you shall be his servants again when the people heard what power their king was to have yet they consented thereto and said us we will be as all other nations and our king shall judge our causes and go before us and conduct our wars the same 8-19-20 with the right that sovereigns have both to the militia and to all judicature in which is contained an absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another again the prayer of king Solomon to God was this give thy servant understanding to judge thy people and to discern between good and evil 1 Kings 3-9 it belonged therefore to the sovereign to be judged and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil which rules are laws and therefore in him is legislative power Saul sought the life of David yet when it was in his power to slay Saul and his servants would have done it David forbade them Saul sought the life of David yet when it was in his power to slay Saul and his servants would have done it David forbade them saying God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord the loonointed of God 1 Samuel 24-6 for obedience of servants Saint Paul saith servants obey your masters in all things Colossians 3-22 and children obey your parents in all things the same 3-20 there is simple obedience in those that are subject to paternal or despotical dominion again the scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair and therefore all that they shall bid you observe that observe and do there again is simple obedience in Saint Paul warn them that they subject themselves to princes and to those that are in authority and obey them Titus 3-1 obedience is also simple Lastly our savior himself acknowledges that men ought to pay such taxes as are by kings imposed where he says give to Caesar what is Caesar's and paid such taxes himself and that the king's word is sufficient to take anything from any subject when there is need and that the king is judge of that need for he himself as the king of the Jews commanded his disciples to ask his cult to carry him into Jerusalem saying go into the village over against you and you shall find a she-ass tide and her cult with her untie them and bring them to me and if any man ask you what you mean by it say the Lord hath need of them and they will let them go Matthew 21-3 they will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title but acquiescence in the will of the Lord to these places may be added also that of Genesis you shall be as gods knowing good and evil Genesis 3-5 and who told thee that thou wast naked hast thou eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat the same 3-11 for the cognizance or judicature of good and evil being forbidden by the name of knowledge as a trial of Adam's obedience the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful told her that by tasting it they should be as gods knowing good and evil whereupon having both eaten they did indeed take upon them God's office which is judicature of good and evil but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them a right and whereas it is said that having eaten they saw they were naked no man hath so interpreted that place as if they had been formidably blind and saw not their own skins the meaning is plain that it was then they first judged their nakedness wherein it was God's will to create them to be uncomely and by being ashamed did tacitly censure God himself and thereupon God saith hast thou eaten etc as if he should say dost thou that oest me obedience take upon thee to judge of my commandments whereby it is clearly though allegorically signified that the commands of them that have the right to command are not by their subjects to be censured or disputed so that it appear plainly to my understanding both from reason and scripture that sovereign power whether placed in one man as in monarchy or in one assembly of men as in popular and aristocratical commonwealth is as great a possibility men can be imagined to make it and though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil consequences yet the consequences of the want of it which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor are much worse the condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience but what proceeds from the subjects disobedience and breach of those covenants from which the commonwealth has its beginning and who so ever thinking sovereign power too great will seek to make it less must subject himself to the power that can limit it that is to say to a greater the greatest objection is that of the practice when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged but one may ask them again when or where has there been a kingdom long free from suggestion in civil war in those nations whose commonwealths have been long lived and not been destroyed but by foreign war and subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power in those nations which commonwealths have been long lived and not been destroyed but by foreign war the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power but how so ever an argument from the practice of men that have not sifted to the bottom and with exact reason waited the causes in nature of commonwealths and suffer daily those miseries that proceeded from the ignorance thereof is invalid for though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand it could not thence be inferred that so it ought to be the skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consisted in certain as death arithmetic and geometry not as tennis play on practice only which rules neither poor men had the leisure nor men have had the leisure have hitherto had the curiosity or the method to find out End of Chapter 20 Recorded by Nicky Sullivan Chicago For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org Recorded by Kirsten Ferrari Leviathan by Thomas Hopps Chapter 21 Of the Liberty of Subjects Liberty What? Liberty or freedom signifyeth properly the absence of opposition by opposition I mean external impediments of motion and may be applied no less irrationally and inanimate creatures than to rational for whatsoever is so tied or environed as it cannot move but within a certain space which space is determined by the opposition of some external body we say it hath not liberty to go further and so of all living creatures whilst they are imprisoned or restrained with walls or chains and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space we used to say they are not at liberty to move in such a manner as without those external impediments they would but when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself we use not to say it wants the liberty but the power to move as when a stone lieeth still or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness what it is to be free and according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word man is he that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do is not hindered to do what he has will to but when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies they are abused for that which is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment and therefore when tith said for example the way is free no liberty of the way is signified but of those that walk in it without stop and when we say a gift is free it is not any liberty of the gift but of the giver that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it so when we speak freely it is not the liberty of voice or pronunciation but of the man whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did lastly from the use of the word free will no liberty can be inferred to the will desire or inclination but the liberty of the man which consisteth in this that he finds no stop in doing inclination to do fear and liberty are consistent as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink he doth it nevertheless very willingly and may refuse to do it if he will it is therefore the action of one that was free so a man sometimes pays his debt only for fear of imprisonment which because nobody hindered him from detaining was the action of a man at liberty and generally all actions men do in common welts for fear of the law or actions which the doers had liberty to omit liberty and necessity consistent liberty and necessity are consistent as in the water that hath not only liberty but a necessity of descending by the channel so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do which because they proceed from their will proceed from liberty yet because every act of man's will and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause which causes in a continual chain whose first link in the hand of the God the first of all causes proceed from necessity so that to him that could see the connection of those causes the necessity of all men's voluntary actions would appear manifest and therefore God that seeeth and disposeseth all things seeeth also that the liberty of man is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will and no more nor less for though men may do many things which God does not command nor is there for author of them yet they can have no passion nor appetite to anything of which appetite God's will is not the cause and did not his will assure the necessity of man's will and consequently of all that on man's will dependeth the liberty of man would be a contradiction and impediment to the omnipotence of the liberty of God and this justifies as to the matter in hand of that natural liberty which only properly is called liberty artificial bonds or covenants but as men for the attaining of peace and conservation of themselves thereby have made an artificial man which we call a common wealth so also have they made artificial chains called civil laws which they themselves by mutual covenants have fastened at one end their assembly to whom they have given the sovereign power and at the other end to their own ears these bonds in their own nature but weak may nevertheless be made to hold by the danger though not by the difficulty of breaking them liberty of subjects consisteth of liberty from covenants in relation to these bonds only it is that I am to speak now of the liberty of subjects for seeing there is no common wealth in the world for the regulating of laws and words of men as being a thing impossible it followeth necessarily that in all kinds of actions by the laws pretermitted men have the liberty of doing what their own reason shall suggest for the most profitable to themselves for if we take liberty in the proper sense for corporal liberty that is to say freedom from chains and prison it were very absurd for men to clamor as they do for liberty they so manifestly enjoy again if we take liberty for an exemption from laws they are no less absurd for men to demand as they do that liberty by which all other men may be masters of their lives and yet as absurd as it is this is it they demand not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them without a sword in the hands of a man or men to cause those laws to be put in execution the liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those things which in regulating their actions the sovereign hath pretermitted such as is the liberty to buy and sell an otherwise contract with one another to choose their own abode their own diet their own trade of life and institute their children as they themselves think fit and the like liberty of the subject consistent with the unlimited power of the sovereign nevertheless we are not to understand that by such liberty the sovereign power of life and death is either abolished or limited for it has already been shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject and what pretends so ever can properly be called injustice or injury because every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth so that he never wanted right to anything otherwise than as he himself is the subject of God and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature and therefore it may and doth often happen in common welds that a subject may be put to death by the command of the sovereign power and yet neither do the other wrong doth cause his daughter to be sacrificed in which and the like cases he that so dieth hath liberty to do the action for which he is nevertheless without injury put to death and the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince that puteth to death an innocent subject for though the action be against the law of nature as being contrary to equity as was the killing of Uriah by David yet it was not an injury to Uriah but to God not to Uriah because the right to do what he pleased was to him by Uriah himself and yet to God because David was God's subject and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature which distinction David himself when he repented the fact evidently confirmed saying to the only have I sinned in the same manner the people of Athens when they banished the most potent of their common wealth for ten years thought they had committed no injustice and yet they never questioned what crime he had done but what hurt he would do nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom and every citizen bringing his oyster shell into the marketplace written with the name of him he desired should be banished without actual accusing him sometimes banished in Aristides for his reputation of justice and sometimes a scurrilous jester as hyperbolas to make a jest of it and yet a man cannot say the sovereign people of Athens wanted right to banish them or an Athenian the liberty to jest or to be just the liberty which writers praise is the liberty of sovereigns not of private men the liberty whereof there is so frequent and honorable mention in the histories and philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans and in the writings and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politics is not the liberty of particular men but the liberty of the common wealth which is the same with that which every man then should have if there were no civil laws there would not have been the same and the effects of it also be the same for as among masterless men there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor no inheritance to transmit to the son nor to expect from the father no propriety of goods or lands no security but a full and absolute liberty in every man so in states and common wealths not dependent on one another every common wealth not every man has an absolute liberty to do that is to say what that man or assembly that represented it shall judge most conducing to their benefit but with all they live in the condition of a perpetual war and upon the confines of battle with their frontiers armed and cannons planted against their neighbors round about the Athenians and Romans were free that is free common wealths not that any particular men had the liberty to resist their own representative but that their representative had the liberty to resist or invade other people there is written on the turrets of the city of luca in great characters at this day the word libertas yet no man can then infer that a particular man has more liberty or immunity from the service of the common wealth there than in Constantinople whether a common wealth be monarchical or popular the freedom is still the same but it is an easy thing for men to be deceived by the specious name of liberty and for want of judgment to distinguish mistake that for their private inheritance and birthright which is the right of the public only and when the same error is conferred by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in the subject it is no wonder if it produced sedition and change of government in these western parts of the world we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution and rights of common wealths from Aristotle Cicero and other men Greeks and Romans that living under popular states derived those rights not from the principles of nature but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own common wealths which were popular as the grammarians described the rules of language out of the practice of the time or the rules of poetry out of the poems of Homer and Virgil and because the Athenians were taught to keep them from desire of changing their government that they were freemen and all that lived under monarchy were slaves therefore Aristotle puts it down in his politics book 6 chapter 2 in democracy liberty is to be supposed for it is commonly held that no man is free in any other government and as Aristotle so Cicero and other writers have grounded their civil doctrine on the opinions of the Romans who were taught to hate monarchy at first by them that having deposed their sovereign shared amongst them the sovereignty of Rome and afterwards by their successors and by reading of these Greek and Latin authors men from their childhood have gotten the habit under a false show of liberty of favoring tummels and of licentious controlling the actions of their sovereigns and again of controlling those controllers with the effusion of so much blood as I think I may truly say there was never anything so dearly bought as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues liberty of the subject how to be measured to come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject that is to say what are the things which though commanded by the sovereign he may nevertheless without injustice refuse to do we are to consider what rights we pass away when we make a common wealth or which is all one what liberty we deny ourselves by owning all the actions without exception of the man or assembly we make our sovereign for in the act of our submission consist of both our obligation and our liberty which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence there being no obligation on any man which arise if not from some act of his own for all men equally are by nature free and because such arguments must either be drawn from the express words I authorize all his actions or from the intention of him that submit of himself to his power which intention is to be understood which he so submitted the obligation and liberty of the subject is to be derived either from those words or others equivalent or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty namely the piece of the subjects within themselves and their defense against a common enemy subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies even against them that lawfully invade them first therefore seeing sovereignty by institution is by covenant of everyone to everyone and sovereignty by acquisition by covenants of the vanquish to the victor or child to the parent it is manifest that every subject has liberty in all those things the right were of cannot by covenant be transferred I have shown before in the fourteenth chapter that covenants not to defend a man's own body are void therefore if the sovereign command a man though justly condemned to kill wound or maim himself or not to resist those that assault him or to abstain from the use of food air medicine or any other thing without which he cannot live yet half that man the liberty to disobey again if a man be interrogated by the sovereign or his authority concerning a crime done by himself he is not bound without assurance of pardon to confess it because no man as I have shown in the same chapter can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself again the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words I authorize or take upon me all his actions in which there is no restriction at all of his former natural liberty for by allowing him to kill me I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me it is one thing to say kill me or my fellow if you please another thing to say I will kill myself or my fellow it followeth therefore bound by the words themselves either to kill himself or any other man and consequently that the obligation a man may sometimes have upon the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous or dishonorable office dependeth not on the words of our submission but on the intention which is to be understood by the end thereof when therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained then there is no liberty to refuse otherwise there is upon this ground a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice as when he substituted with a sufficient soldier in his place for in this case he deserted not the service of the common wealth and there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness not only to women of whom no such dangerous duty is expected but also to men of feminine courage when armies fight there is on one side or both a running away yet when they do it not out of treachery but fear they are not assumed to do it unjustly but dishonorably for the same reason to avoid battle is not injustice but cowardice but he that enroleth himself a soldier or taketh impressed money taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature and is obliged not only to go to the battle but also not to run from it without his captains leave and when the defense of the common wealth requireeth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms everyone is obliged because otherwise the institution of the common wealth which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve was in vain to resist the sword of the common wealth in defense of another man guilty or innocent no man hath liberty because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government but in case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expected death whether hath they not the liberty then to join together and assist and defend one another certainly they have for they but defend their lives which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent there was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty their bearing of arms subsequent to it though it be to maintain what they have done is no new unjust act and if it be only to defend their persons it is not unjust at all but the offer of pardon take it from them to whom it is offered the plea of self-defense and make it their persevering in assisting or defending the rest unlawful the greatest liberty of subjects dependeth on the silence of the law as for other liberties they depend on the silence of the law in cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule there the subject hath the liberty to do or forbear according to his own discretion and therefore such liberty is in some places more and in some less and in some times more in other times less according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient as for example there was a time when in England a man might enter into his own land and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it by force but in after times that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute made by the king in parliament and in some places of the world men hath the liberty of many wives in other places such liberty is not allowed if a subject have a controversy with his sovereign of debt or of right of possession of lands or goods or concerning any service required at his hands or concerning any penalty corporal or pecuniary grounded on a precedent law he hath the same liberty to sue for his right or against a subject and before such judges as are appointed by the sovereign for seeing the sovereign demandeth by force of a former law and not by virtue of his power he declareeth thereby that he requireeth no more than shall appear to be due by that law the suit therefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign and consequently the subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause and sentence according to that law but if he demand or take anything by pretense of his power their life in that case no action of law for all that is done by him in virtue of his power is done by the authority of every subject and consequently he that brings an action against the sovereign brings it against himself if a monarch or sovereign assembly grant a liberty to all or any of his subjects which grants standing he is disabled to provide for their safety the grant is void for in that he might openly if it had been his will and in plain terms have renounced or transferred it and did not it is to be understood it was not his will but that the grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and the sovereign power and therefore the sovereignty is still retained and consequently all those powers which are necessary to the exercising thereof such as the power of war and peace the caricature of appointing officers and counselors of levying money and the rest named in the eighteenth chapter in what cases subjects are absolved of their obedience to their sovereign the obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long and no longer than the power last it by which he is able to protect them for the right men have by nature to protect themselves when none else can protect them can by no covenant be relinquished the sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth which once departed from the body the members do no more receive their motion from it the end of obedience is protection which where so ever a man see of it either in his own or in another sword nature apply of his obedience to it and his endeavor to maintain it and those sovereignty in the intention of them that make it be immortal yet is it in its own nature not only subject to violent death by foreign war but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it from the very institution many seeds of a natural mortality by intestine discord in case of captivity if a subject be taken prisoner in war or his person or his means of life be within the guards of the enemy and hath his life and corporal liberty given him on condition to be subject to the victor he hath liberty to accept the condition and having accepted it is the subject of him that took him because he hath no other way to preserve himself the case is the same if he be detained in a foreign country on the same terms but if a man be held in prison or bonds or is not trusted with the liberty of his body he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection and therefore may if he can make his escape by any means whatsoever in case the sovereign cast off the government from himself in his heirs if a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty both for himself and his heirs his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature because though nature may declare who are his sons and who are his nearest of kin yet it dependeth on his own will as hath been said in the president chapter who shall be his heir if therefore he will have no heir there is no sovereignty nor subjection the case is the same if he died without known kindred and without declaration of his heir for then there can no heir be known and consequently no subjection be due in case of banishment if the sovereign banish his subject during the banishment he is not subject but he that is sent on a message or hath leave to travel is still subject but it is by contract between sovereigns not by virtue of the covenant of subjection for whosoever entereth into another's dominion is subject to all the laws thereof unless he have a privilege by the amity of the sovereigns or by special license in case the sovereign render himself subject to another if a monarch subdued by more render himself subject to the victor his subjects are delivered from their former obligation and become obliged to the victor but if he beheld prisoner or hath not the liberty of his own body he is not understood to have given away the right of sovereignty and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the magistrates formerly placed governing not in their name but in his for his right remaining the question is only of the administration that is to say of the magistrates and officers which if he have not means to name he is supposed to approve those which he himself had formerly appointed End of Chapter 21