 Section V. OF PENSEE This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Derek McLaughlin, London, Ontario, Canada. Latin language reading by Lenny Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. PENSEE by Blaise Pascal. Translated by W. F. Trotter. Section V. JUSTICE AND THE REASON OF EFFECTS. 291. In the letter on injustice can come the ridiculousness of the law that the elder gets all. My friend, you were born on this side of the mountain. It is therefore just that your elder brother gets everything. Why do you kill me? 292. He lives on the other side of the water. 293. Why do you kill me? What, do you not live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, my friend, I should be an assassin, and it would be unjust to slay you in this manner. But since you live on the other side, I am a hero, and it is just. 294. On what shall man found the order of the world which he would govern? Shall it be on the caprice of each individual? What confusion? Shall it be on justice? Man is ignorant of it. Certainly, had he known it, he would not have established this maxim, the most general of all that obtain among men, that each should follow the customs of his own country. The glory of true equity would have brought all nations under subjection, and legislators would not have taken as their model the fancies and caprice of Persians and Germans instead of this unchanging justice. We should have seen it set up in all the states on earth and in all times, whereas we see neither justice nor injustice which does not change its nature with change in climate. 3° of latitude reverse all jurisprudence. A meridian decides the truth. Fundamental laws change after a few years of possession. Right has its epochs. The entry of Saturn into the lion marks to us the origin of such and such a crime. A strange justice that is bounded by a river. Truth on this side of the Pyrenees. Error on the other side. Men admit that justice does not consist in these customs, but that it resides in natural laws common to every country. They would certainly maintain it obstinately if reckless chance which has distributed human laws had encountered even one which was universal. But the farce is that the caprice of men has so many vagaries that there is no such law. Theft, incest, infanticide, patricide have all had a place among virtuous actions. Can anything be more ridiculous than that a man should have the right to kill me because he lives on the other side of the water and because his ruler has a quarrel with mine, though I have none with him. Doubtless there are natural laws, but good reason once corrupted has corrupted all. Nihil amplius nostrum est. Quod nostrum dicimus artis est. Footnote. We can claim nothing more. What we call ours is arts. End of footnote. Exenatus consultis equevischitis crimina exercantur. Footnote. Decrees of the senate and of the people are responsible for crimes. End of footnote. Ut olimuitis signung legibus laboramus. Footnote. As once we suffered from vices, so now from laws. End of footnote. The result of this confusion is that one affirms the essence of justice to be the authority of the legislator, another the interest of the sovereign, another present custom, and this is the most sure. Nothing, according to reason alone, is just in itself. All changes with time. Custom creates the whole of equity for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its authority. Whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it. Nothing is so faulty as those laws which correct faults. He who obeys them because they are just obeys a justice which is imaginary, and not the essence of law. It is quite self-contained. It is law and nothing more. He who will examine its motive will find it so feeble and so trifling that if he be not accustomed to contemplate the wonders of human imagination, he will marvel that one century has gained for it so much pomp and reverence. The art of opposition and of revolution is to unsettle established customs, sounding them even to their source, to point out their want of authority and justice. We must, it is said, get back to the natural and fundamental laws of the state which an unjust custom has abolished. It is a game certain to result in the loss of all. Nothing will be just on the balance. Yet people readily lend their ear to such arguments. They shake off the yoke as soon as they recognize it, and the great profit by their ruin, and by that of these curious investigators of accepted customs. But from a contrary mistake men sometimes think they can justly do everything which is not without an example. That is why the wisest of legislators said that it was often necessary to deceive men for their own good, and another, a good politician, cum veritatem qua liberetur ignored, expedit quant falatur. If we do not wish that it should soon come to an end. This dog is mine, said those poor children. That is my place in the sun. Here is the beginning and the image of the usurpation of all the earth. There should be a third who is disinterested. Footnote of the true law, end of footnote. We have it no more. If we had it, we should take conformity to the customs of a country as the rule of justice. It is here that, not finding justice, we have found force, etc. 298. Justice might. It is right that what is just should be obeyed. It is necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without might is helpless. Might without justice is tyrannical. Justice without might is gain said, because there are always offenders. Might without justice is condemned. We must then combine justice and might, and for this end make what is just strong, or what is strong, just. Justice is subject to dispute. Might is easily recognized and is not disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might has gain said justice, and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus, being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong, just. 299. The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary affairs, and of the majority in others. Whence comes this? From the might which is in them. Hence it comes that kings who have power of a different kind do not follow the majority of their ministers. No doubt equality of goods is just, but being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, they have justified might, so that the just and the strong should unite, and there should be peace, which is the sovereign good. 300. When a strong man armed, keepeth his goods. His goods are in peace. 301. Why do we follow the majority? Is it because they have more reason? No, because they have more power. Why do we follow ancient laws and opinions? Is it because they are more sound? No, but because they are unique, and remove from us the root of difference. 302. It is the effect of might, not of custom. For those who are capable of originality are few. The greater number will only follow and refuse glory to those inventors who seek it by their inventions. And if these are obstinate in their wish to obtain glory, and despise those who do not invent, the latter will call them ridiculous names, and would beat them with a stick. Let no one then boast of his subtility, or let him keep his complacency to himself. 303. Might is the sovereign of the world, and not opinion. But opinion makes use of might. It is might that makes opinion. Gentleness is beautiful in our opinion. Why? Because he who will dance on a rope will be alone, and I will gather a stronger mob of people who will say that it is unbecoming. 304. The cords which bind the respect of men to each other are in general cords of necessity, for there must be different degrees, all men wishing to rule, and not all being able to do so, but some being able. Let us then imagine we see society in the process of formation. Men will doubtless fight till the stronger party overcomes the weaker, and a dominant party is established. But when this is once determined, the masters, who do not desire the continuation of strife, then decree that the power which is in their hands shall be transmitted as they please. Some place it in election by the people, others in hereditary succession, etc. And this is the point where imagination begins to play its part, till now power makes fact. Now power is sustained by imagination in a certain party, in France, in the nobility, in Switzerland, in the Burgesses, etc. These cords which bind the respect of men to such and such an individual are therefore the cords of imagination. 305. The Swiss are offended by being called gentlemen and prove themselves true plebeians in order to be thought worthy of great office. 306. As duchies, kingships and magistracies are real and necessary, because might rules all, they exist everywhere and always. But since only caprice makes such and such a one a ruler, the principle is not constant, but subject to variation, etc. 307. The chancellor is grave and clothed with ornaments for his position is unreal. Not so the king, he has power and has nothing to do with the imagination. Judges, physicians, etc. appeal only to the imagination. 308. The habit of seeing kings accompanied by guards, drums, officers and all the paraphernalia which mechanically inspire respect and awe, makes their countenance when sometimes seen alone without these accompaniments impress respect and awe on their subjects, because we cannot separate in thought their persons from the surroundings with which we see them usually joined. And the world which knows not that this effect is the result of habit, believes that it arises by a natural force. Whence come these words? The character of divinity is stamped on his countenance, etc. 309. Justice. As custom determines what is agreeable, so also does it determine justice. 310. King and tyrant. I too will keep my thought secret. I will take care on every journey. Greatness of establishment, respect for establishment. The pleasure of the great is the power to make people happy. The property of riches is to be given liberally. The property of each thing must be sought. The property of power is to protect. Whence force attacks humbug, when a private soldier takes the square cap off a first president and throws it out of the window. 311. The government founded on opinion and imagination reigns for some time, and this government is pleasant and voluntary. That founded on might lasts forever. Thus opinion is the queen of the world, but might is its tyrant. 312. Justice is what is established, and thus all our established laws will necessarily be regarded as just without examination, since they are established. 313. Sound opinions of the people. Civil wars are the greatest of evils. They are inevitable if we wish to reward dessert, for all will say that they are deserving. The evil we have to fear from a fool who succeeds by right of birth is neither so great nor so sure. 314. God has created all for himself. He has bestowed upon himself the power of pain and pleasure. You can apply it to God or to yourself. If to God the gospel is the rule. If to yourself you will take the place of God. As God is surrounded by persons full of charity who ask of him the blessings of charity that are in his power, so recognize then and learn that you are only a king of lust and take the ways of lust. 315. The reason of effects. It is wonderful that men would not have me honor a man clothed in brocade and followed by seven or eight lackeys. Why? He will have me thrashed if I do not salute him. This custom is a force. It is the same with a horse in fine trappings in comparison with another. Montaigne is a fool not to see what difference there is, to wonder at our finding any, and to ask the reason. Indeed, says he, how comes it, etc. 316. Sound opinions of the people. To be spruce is not altogether foolish, for it proves that a great number of people work for one. It shows by one's hair that one has a valet, a perfumer, etc., by one's band, thread, lace, etc. Now it is not merely superficial nor merely outward show, to have many arms at command. The more arms one has, the more powerful one is. To be spruce is to show one's power. 317. Deference means put yourself to inconvenience. This is apparently silly, but is quite right, for it is to say I would indeed put myself to inconvenience if you required it, since indeed I do so when it is of no service to you. Deference further serves to distinguish the great. Now if deference was displayed by sitting in an armchair we should show deference to everybody, and so no distinction would be made, but being put to inconvenience we distinguish very well. 318. He has four lackeys. 319. How rightly do we distinguish men by external appearances rather than by internal qualities? Which of us too shall have precedence? Who will give place to the other? The least clever. But I am as clever as he. We should have to fight over this. He has four lackeys, and I have only one. This can be seen, we have only to count. It falls to me to yield, and I am a fool if I can test the matter. By this means we are at peace, which is the greatest of boons. 320. The most unreasonable things in the world become most reasonable because of the unruliness of men. What is less reasonable than to choose the eldest son of a queen to rule estate? We do not choose as captain of a ship the passenger who is of the best family. This law would be absurd and unjust, but because men are so themselves and always will be so, it becomes reasonable and just. For whom will men choose as the most virtuous enable? We at once come to blows, as each claims to be the most virtuous enable. Let us then attach this quality to something indisputable. This is the king's eldest son. That is clear, and there is no dispute. Reason can do no better, for civil war is the greatest of evils. 321. Children are astonished to see their comrades respected. 322. To be of noble birth is a great advantage. In eighteen years it places a man within the select circle, known and respected, as another would have merited in fifty years. It is a gain of thirty years without trouble. 323. What is the ego? Suppose a man puts himself at a window to see those who pass by. If I pass by, can I say that he placed himself there to see me? No, for he does not think of me in particular. But does he who loves someone on account of beauty really love that person? No, for the smallpox, which will kill beauty without killing the person, will cause him to love her no more. And if one loves me for my judgment, memory, he does not love me, for I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where then is this ego, if it be neither in the body nor in the soul? And how love the body or the soul except for these qualities which do not constitute me, since they are perishable? For it is impossible and would be unjust to love the soul of a person in the abstract and whatever qualities might be therein. We never then love a person, but only qualities. Let us then jeer no more at those who are honored on account of rank and office, for we love a person only on account of borrowed qualities. 324. The people have very sound opinions. For example, one, in having preferred diversion and hunting to poetry, the half-learned laugh at it and glory in being above the folly of the world, but the people are right for a reason which these do not fathom. 2. In having distinguished men by external marks as birth or wealth, the world again exalts in showing how unreasonable this is, but it is very reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king. 3. In being offended at a blow or in desiring glory so much, but it is very desirable on account of the other essential goods which are joined to it, and a man who has received a blow without resenting it is overwhelmed with taunts and indignities. 4. In working for the uncertain, in sailing on the sea, in walking over a plank. 325. Montaigne is wrong. Custom should be followed only because it is custom, and not because it is reasonable or just, but people follow it for this sole reason, that they think it just. Otherwise they would follow it no longer, although it were the custom, for they will only submit to reason or justice. Custom without this would pass for tyranny, but the sovereignty of reason and justice is no more tyrannical than that of desire. They are principles natural to man. It would therefore be right to obey laws and customs because they are laws, but we should know that there is neither truth nor justice to introduce into them, that we know nothing of these and so must follow what is accepted. By this means, we would never depart from them, but the people cannot accept this doctrine, and as they believe that truth can be found, and that it exists in law and custom, they believe them, and take their antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not simply of their authority apart from truth. Thus they obey laws, but they are liable to revolt when these are proved to be valueless, and this can be shown of all, looked at from a certain aspect. 326. Injustice. It is dangerous to tell the people that the laws are unjust, for they obey them only because they think them just. Therefore it is necessary to tell them at the same time that they must obey them because they are laws, just as they must obey superiors, not because they are just, but because they are superiors. In this way all sedition is prevented, if this can be made intelligible, and it be understood what is the proper definition of justice. 327. The world is a good judge of things, for it is a natural ignorance, which is man's true state. The sciences have two extremes which meet. The first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at birth. The other extreme is that reached by great intellects, who having run through all that men can know find they know nothing, and come back again to that same ignorance from which they set out. But this is a learned ignorance which is conscious of itself. Those between the two, who have departed from natural ignorance and have not been able to reach the other, have some smattering of this vain knowledge and pretend to be wise. These trouble the world and are bad judges of everything. The people and the wise constitute the world. These despise it and are despised. They judge badly of everything, and the world judges rightly of them. 328. The reason of effects, continual alternation of pro and con. We have then shown that man is foolish by the estimation he makes of things which are not essential, and all these opinions are destroyed. We have next shown that all these opinions are very sound, and that thus, since all these vanities are well founded, the people are not so foolish as is said. And so we have destroyed the opinion which destroyed that of the people. But we must now destroy this last proposition, and show that it remains always true that the people are foolish, though their opinions are sound, because they do not perceive the truth where it is, and as they place it where it is not, their opinions are always very false and very unsound. 329. The weakness of man is the reason why so many things are considered fine, as to be good at playing the lute. It is only an evil because of our weakness. 330. The power of kings is founded on the reason and on the folly of the people, and specially on their folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world has weakness for its foundation, and this foundation is wonderfully sure, for there is nothing more sure than this that the people will be weak. What is based on sound reason is very ill founded, as the estimate of wisdom. 331. We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they diverted themselves with writing the laws and the politics, they did it as an amusement. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious. The most philosophic was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote on politics, it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum, and if they presented the appearance of speaking of a great matter, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as possible. 332. Tyranny consists in the desire of universal power beyond its scope. There are different assemblies of the strong, the fair, the sensible, the pious, in which each man rules at home, not elsewhere. And sometimes they meet, and the strong and the fair foolishly fight as to who shall be master, for their mastery is of different kinds. They do not understand one another, and their fault is the desire to rule everywhere. Nothing can effect this, not even might, which is of no use in the kingdom of the wise, and is only mistress of external actions. Tyranny. So these expressions are false and tyrannical. I am fair, therefore I must be feared. I am strong, therefore I must be loved. I am, etc. Tyranny is the wish to have in one way what can only be had in another. We render different duties to different merits, the duty of love to the pleasant, the duty of fear to the strong, the duty of belief to the learned. We must render these duties, it is unjust to refuse them, and unjust to ask others. And so it is false and tyrannical to say, he is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him. He is not able, therefore I will not fear him. 333. Have you never seen people who, in order to complain of the little fuss you make about them, parade before you the example of great men who esteem them? In answer I reply to them, show me the merit whereby you have charmed these persons, and I also will esteem you. 334. The reason of effects. Lust and force are the source of all our actions. Lust causes voluntary actions, force involuntary ones. 335. The reason of effects. It is then true to say that all the world is under a delusion. 4. Although the opinions of the people are sound, they are not so as conceived by them, since they think the truth to be where it is not. Truth is indeed in their opinions, but not at the point where they imagine it. Thus it is true that we must honor noblemen, but not because noble birth is real superiority, etc. 336. The reason of effects. We must keep our thoughts secret and judge everything by it while talking like the people. 337. The reason of effects. Degrees. The people honor persons of high birth. The semi-learned despise them, saying that birth is not a personal but a chance superiority. 438. The learned honor them, not for popular reasons, but for secret reasons. 439. Devout persons who have more zeal than knowledge despise them, in spite of that consideration which makes them honored by the learned, because they judge them by a new light which piety gives them. 440. But perfect Christians honor them by another and higher light. So arise a succession of opinions for and against, according to the light one has. 338. True Christians nevertheless comply with folly, not because they respect folly, but the command of God, who for the punishment of men has made them subject to these follies. 349. Omnis creatura subiecta est vuonitati, liberabitur. 356. Section 6 of Pensei. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Derek McLaughlin, London, Ontario, Canada. Latin language reading by Lenny Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Pensei by Blaise Pascal. Translated by W. F. Trotter. Section 6. The Philosophers. 339. I can well conceive a man without hands, feet, head, for it is only experience which teaches us that the head is more necessary than feet. But I cannot conceive man without thought. He would be a stone or a brute. 340. The arithmetical machine produces effects which approach nearer to thought than all the actions of animals. But it does nothing which would enable us to attribute will to it as to the animals. 341. The account of the pike and frog of liankur. They do it always, and never otherwise, nor any other thing showing mind. 342. If an animal did by mind what it does by instinct, and if it spoke by mind what it speaks by instinct in hunting and in warning its mates that the prey is found or lost, it would indeed also speak in regard to those things which affected closer. As example, nami this cord which is wounding me and which I cannot reach. 343. The beak of the parrot which it wipes although it is clean. 344. Instinct and reason. Marks of two natures. 345. Reason commands us far more imperiously than a master, for in disobeying the one we are unfortunate, and in disobeying the other we are fools. 346. Thought constitutes the greatness of man. 347. Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed. 348. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapor, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. 349. But if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him. The universe knows nothing of this. 348. All our dignity consists then in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot fill. Let us endeavor then to think well. This is the principle of morality. 348. A thinking reed. 349. It is not from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government of my thought. I shall have no more if I possess worlds. By space the universe encompasses and swallows me up like an atom. By thought I comprehend the world. 349. Immateriality of the soul. 348. Philosophers who have mastered their passions. What matter could do that? 350. The Stoics. 349. They conclude that what has been done once can be done always, and that since the desire of glory imparts some power to those whom it possesses, others can well do likewise. There are feverish movements which health cannot imitate. Epictetus concludes that since there are consistent Christians, every man can easily be so. 351. Those great spiritual efforts which the soul sometimes essays are things on which it does not lay hold. It only leaps to them, not as upon a throne, forever, but merely for an instant. 352. The strength of a man's virtue must not be measured by his efforts, but by his ordinary life. 353. I do not admire the excess of a virtue as a valor, except I see at the same time the excess of the opposite virtue, as in Epaminondas, who had the greatest valor and the greatest kindness. For otherwise it is not to rise, it is to fall. We do not display greatness by going to one other extreme, but in touching both at once, and filling all the intervening space. But perhaps this is only a sudden movement of the soul from one to the extreme, and in fact it is ever at one point only, as in the case of a firebrand. Be it so, but at least this indicates agility, if not expanse of soul. 354. Man's nature is not always to advance, it has its advances and retreats. Fever has its cold and hot fits, and the cold proves as well as the hot the greatness of the fire of fever. The discoveries of men from age to age turn out the same. The kindness and the malice of the world in general are the same. Footnote. Changes are usually pleasing to princes. Horus. End of footnote. 355. Continuous eloquence wearies. Princes and kings sometimes play, they are not always on their thrones, they weary there. Granger must be abandoned to be appreciated. Continuity in everything is unpleasant. Cold is agreeable that we may get warm. Nature acts by progress. It goes and returns, then advances further, then twice as much backwards, then more forward than ever, etc. The tide of the sea behaves in the same manner, and so apparently does the sun in its course. 356. The nourishment of the body is little by little. Fulness of nourishment and smallness of substance. 357. When we would pursue virtues to their extremes on either side, vices present themselves, which insinuate themselves insensibly there, in their insensible journey towards the infinitely little, and vices present themselves in a crowd towards the infinitely great, so that we lose ourselves in them, and no longer see virtues. We find fault with perfection itself. 358. Man is neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute. 359. We do not sustain ourselves in virtue by our own strength, but by the balancing of two opposed vices, just as we remain upright amidst two contrary gales. 358. Remove one of the vices, and we fall into the other. 369. What the Stoics propose is so difficult and foolish. The Stoics lay down that all those who are not at their high degree of wisdom are equally foolish and vicious as those who are two inches underwater. 361. The sovereign good. Dispute about the sovereign good. 362. Utsis contentus temet ipso et exte nas cantibus bonis. 363. Footnote, that you may be contented with yourself and the good things that spring from you. Seneca. End of footnote. 364. There is a contradiction, for in the end they advise suicide. 365. Oh, what a happy life from which we are to free ourselves as from the plague. 362. 366. Exenatus consultis ed previschitis. 367. To ask, like passages. 363. Exenatus consultis ed previschitis. 368. Footnote, decrees of the senate and of the people are responsible for crimes. 369. Seneca. End of footnote. 368. Nihiltam absurde dihipotest. Quad non dicatur ab alico filosoforum. 369. Footnote, nothing can be said so absurd that it may not be said by some philosopher. 368. Cicero divinazione. End of footnote. 369. Quibus d'ambestinati sententi isconsecrati, quai non proban coguntur difendere. 369. Footnote, those who are given over to certain preconceived ideas are forced to defend what they cannot prove. 368. Cicero. End of footnote. 369. Ut omnium reerum cicliterarum cuoco e intemperanti elaboramus. 369. Footnote, in literature as in all things we labor in excess. 369. Seneca. End of footnote. 369. Id maxime cuemque deced, cuadescu iusque su un maxime. 369. Footnote, that becomes any one best which is most his own. 369. Cicero. End of footnote. 369. Rosnatura modus primum vedit. 369. Footnote, nature first gave those customs. Virgil. End of footnote. 369. Paucis opus est literis abbonamentem. 369. Footnote, for the good mind few books are necessary. End of footnote. 369. Si quando turpe non sit, ta me non est non turpe cum i d'amutitudine l'auditor. 369. Footnote, if perchance a thing is not base, it does not escape baseness by being praised by the crowd. 369. End of footnote. 369. Mi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac. 369. Footnote, that is my custom, you must do as necessity bids, terence. End of footnote. 364. 369. Rarum est enim utsati secuis cui vereatur. 369. Footnote, it is a rare thing for anyone to fear himself enough. End of footnote. 369. Tot kirka unum kaput tumultu antes deus. 369. Footnote, so many gods brawling around one poor man. End of footnote. 369. Ni il turpius quam cognitioni assertionem prai curere. 369. Footnote, there is nothing more unseemly than to understand before the thing has been stated. Cicero. End of footnote. 369. Nek mi pudet ut istus, fateri neskire quid neskium. 369. Footnote, I am not ashamed, as your friends are, to confess that I do not know what I do not know. End of footnote. 369. Melius non intipiat. 369. Footnote, he will not begin better than he can finish. 369. Seneca. End of footnote. 365. Thought, all the dignity of man consists in thought. 369. Thought is therefore by its nature a wonderful and incomparable thing. It must have strange defects to be contemptible. But it has such, so that nothing is more ridiculous. How great it is in its nature. How vile it is in its defects. But what is this thought? How foolish it is. 366. The mind of this sovereign judge of the world is not so independent that it is not liable to be disturbed by the first din about it. 367. The noise of a cannon is not necessary to hinder its thoughts. It needs only the creaking of a weather-cock or a pulley. 368. Do not wonder if at present it does not reason well. A fly is buzzing in its ears. That is enough to render it incapable of good judgment. 369. If you wish it to be able to reach the truth, chase away that animal which holds its reason in check and disturbs that powerful intellect which rules towns and kingdoms. Here is a comical God. Oh, ridiculous hero. Footnote. Oh, most ridiculous hero. End of footnote. 367. The power of flies. They win battles, hinder our soul from acting, eat our body. 368. When it is said that heat is only the motion of certain molecules and light the conatus recedendi, which we feel, it astonishes us. 369. What, is pleasure only the ballet of our spirits? We have conceived so different an idea of it, and these sensations seem so removed from those others which we say are the same as those with which we compare them. 368. The sensation from the fire, that warmth which affects us in a manner wholly different from touch, the reception of sound and light, all this appears to us mysterious, and yet it is material like the blow of a stone. It is true that the smallness of the spirits which enter into the pores touches other nerves, but there are always some nerves touched. 369. Memory is necessary for all the operations of reason. 370. Chance gives rise to thoughts and chance removes them. No art can keep or acquire them. 370. A thought has escaped me. I wanted to write it down. I write instead, that it has escaped me. 371. When I was small, I hugged my book, and because it sometimes happened to me to... Note, in the text, the thought is incomplete. End of note. 372. In writing down my thought, it sometimes escapes me, but this makes me remember my weakness that I constantly forget. This is as instructive to me as my forgotten thought, for I strive only to know my nothingness. 373. Skepticism. I shall here write my thoughts without order, and not perhaps in unintentional confusion. That is true order, which will always indicate my object by its very disorder. I should do too much honor to my subject if I treated it with order, since I want to show that it is incapable of it. 374. What astonishes me most is to see that all the world is not astonished at its own weakness. Men act seriously, and each follows his own mode of life, not because it is in fact good to follow since it is the custom, but as if each man knew certainly where reason and justice are. They find themselves continually deceived, and by a comical humility think it is their own fault, and not that of the art which they claim always to possess. But it is well there are so many such people in the world who are not skeptics for the glory of skepticism in order to show that man is quite capable of the most extravagant opinions since he is capable of believing that he is not in a state of natural and inevitable weakness, but on the contrary, of natural wisdom. Nothing fortifies skepticism more than that there are some who are not skeptics. If all were so, they would be wrong. 375. I have passed a great part of my life believing that there was justice, and in this I was not mistaken, for there is justice according as God has willed to reveal it to us. But I did not take it so, and this is where I made a mistake, for I believe that our justice was essentially just, and that I had that whereby to know and judge of it. But I have so often found my right judgment at fault that at last I have come to distrust myself, and then others. I have seen changes in all nations and men, and thus after many changes of judgment regarding true justice, I have recognized that our nature was but in continual change, and I have not changed since, and if I changed I would confirm my opinion. The skeptic Arceselos, who became a dogmatist. 376. This sect derives more strength from its enemies than from its friends, for the weakness of man is far more evident in those who know it not than in those who know it. 377. Discourses on humility are a source of pride in the vain, and of humility in the humble. So those on skepticism cause believers to affirm. Few men speak humbly of humility, chastely of chastity, few doubtingly of skepticism. We are only falsehood, duplicity, contradiction. We both conceal and disguise ourselves from ourselves. 378. Skepticism. Excess, like defective intellect, is accused of madness. Nothing is good but mediocrity. The majority has settled that, and finds fault with him who escapes it at whichever end. I will not oppose it. I quite consent to put myself there and refuse to be at the lower end, not because it is low, but because it is an end, for I would likewise refuse to be placed at the top. To leave the mean is to abandon humanity. The greatness of the human soul consists in knowing how to preserve the mean. So far from greatness consisting in leaving it, it consists in not leaving it. 379. It is not good to have too much liberty. It is not good to have all one wants. 380. All good maxims are in the world. We only need to apply them. For instance, we do not doubt that we ought to risk our lives in defense of the public good, but for religion, no. It is true there must be inequality among men, but if this be conceded, the door is opened not only to the highest power, but to the highest tyranny. We must relax our minds a little, but this opens the door to the greatest debauchery. Let us mark the limits. There are no limits in things. Laws would put them there, and the mind cannot suffer it. 381. When we are too young we do not judge well, so also when we are too old. If we do not think enough, or if we think too much on any matter, we get obstinate and infatuated about it. If one considers one's work immediately after having done it, one is entirely prepossessed in its favor. By delaying too long, one can no longer enter into the spirit of it. So, with pictures seen from too far or too near, there is but one exact point which is the true place wherefrom to look at them. The rest are too near, too far, too high or too low. Perspective determines that point in the art of painting, but who shall determine it in truth and morality? 382. When all is equally agitated nothing appears to be agitated, as in a ship. When all tend to debauchery none appears to do so. He who stops draws attention to the excess of others like a fixed point. 383. The licentious tell men of orderly lives that they stray from nature's path, while they themselves follow it, as people in a ship think those move who are on the shore. On all sides the language is similar. We must have a fixed point in order to judge. The harbor decides for those who are in a ship, but where shall we find a harbor in morality? 384. Contradiction is a bad sign of truth. Several things which are certain are contradicted. Several things which are false pass without contradiction. Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the want of contradiction, a sign of truth. 385. Skepticism. Each thing here is partly true and partly false. Essential truth is not so. It is altogether pure and altogether true. This mixture dishonors and annihilates it. Nothing is purely true, and thus nothing is true, meaning by that pure truth. You will say it is true that homicide is wrong. Yes, for we know well the wrong and the false. But what will you say is good? Chastity? I say no, for the world would come to an end. Marriage? No, continents is better. Not to kill? No, for lawlessness would be horrible, and the wicked would kill all the good. To kill? No, for that destroys nature. We possess truth and goodness only in part, and mingled with falsehood and evil. 386. If we dreamt the same thing every night, it would affect us as much as the objects we see every day. And if an artisan were to dream every night for twelve hours duration that he was a king, I believe he would be almost as happy as a king who should dream every night for twelve hours on end that he was an artisan. If we were to dream every night that we were pursued by enemies and harassed by these painful phantoms, or that we passed every day in different occupations as in making a voyage, we should suffer almost as much as if it were real, and should fear to sleep, as we fear to wake when we dread in fact to enter on such mishaps. And indeed it would cause pretty nearly the same discomforts as the reality. But since dreams are all different, and each single one is diversified, what is seen in them affects us much less than what we see when awake, because of its continuity, which is not, however, so continuous and level as not to change too. But it changes less abruptly, except rarely, as when we travel, and then we say, it seems to me I am dreaming. For life is a dream a little less inconstant. 387. It may be that there are true demonstrations, but this is not certain. Thus this proves nothing else but that it is not certain that all is uncertain, to the glory of skepticism. 388. Good sense. They are compelled to say, you are not acting in good faith, we are not asleep, etc. How I love to see this proud reason humiliated and suppliant, for this is not the language of a man whose right is disputed, and who defends it with the power of armed hands. He is not foolish enough to declare that men are not acting in good faith, but he punishes this bad faith with force. 389. Ecclesiastes shows that man without God is in total ignorance and inevitable misery, for it is wretched to have the wish, but not the power. Now he would be happy and assured of some truth, and yet he can neither know nor desire not to know. He cannot even doubt. 390. My God, how foolish this talk is! Would God have made the world a dammit? Would he ask so much from persons so weak, etc.? Skepticism is the cure for this evil, and will take down this vanity. 391. Conversation. Great words to religion. I deny it. Conversation. Skepticism helps religion. 392. Against skepticism. It is, then, a strange fact that we cannot define these things without obscuring them while we speak of them with all assurance. We assume that all conceive of them in the same way, but we assume it quite gratuitously, for we have no proof of it. I see in truth that the same words are applied on the same occasions, and that every time two men see a body change its place, they both express their view of the same fact by the same word, both saying that it has moved. And from this conformity of application, we derive a strong conviction of a conformity of ideas. But this is not absolutely or finally convincing, though there is enough to support a bet on the affirmative, since we know that we often draw the same conclusions from different premises. This is enough, at least, to obscure the matter, not that it completely extinguishes the natural light which assures us of these things. The academicians would have won, but this dulls it and troubles the dogmatists to the glory of the skeptical crowd, which consists in this doubtful ambiguity and in a certain doubtful dimness from which our doubts cannot take away all the clearness, nor our own natural light chase away all the darkness. 393. It is a singular thing to consider that there are people in the world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have made laws for themselves which they strictly obey, as, for instance, the soldiers of Mahomet, robbers, heretics, etc. It is the same with logicians. It seems that their license must be without any limits or barriers, since they have broken through so many that are so just and sacred. 394. All the principles of skeptics, stoics, atheists, etc. are true, but their conclusions are false because the opposite principles are also true. 395. Instinct reason. We have an incapacity of proof insurmountable by all dogmatism. We have an idea of truth invincible to all skepticism. 396. Two things instruct man about his whole nature. Instinct and experience. 397. The greatness of man is great in that he knows himself to be miserable. A tree does not know itself to be miserable. It is then being miserable to know oneself to be miserable. But it is also being great to know that one is miserable. 398. All these same miseries prove man's greatness. They are the miseries of a great lord, of a deposed king. 399. We are not miserable without feeling it. A ruined house is not miserable. Man only is miserable. Ego weed weathens. Footnote. I am the man that hath seen affliction. Lamentations chapter 3 verse 1. End of footnote. 400. The greatness of man. We have so great an idea of the soul of man that we cannot endure being despised, of not being esteemed by any soul. And all the happiness of men consists in this esteem. 401. Glory. The brutes do not admire each other. A horse does not admire his companion. Not that there is no rivalry between them in a race, but that is of no consequence. 4. When in the stable the heaviest and most ill-formed does not give up his oats to another as men would have others do to them. Their virtue is satisfied with itself. 402. The greatness of man, even in his lust, to have known how to extract from it a wonderful code and to have drawn from it a picture of benevolence. 403. Greatness. The reasons of effects indicate the greatness of man in having extracted so fair an order from lust. 404. The greatest baseness of man is the pursuit of glory. But it is also the greatest mark of his excellence. For whatever possessions he may have on earth, whatever health and essential comfort, he is not satisfied if he has not the esteem of men. He values human reason so highly that whatever advantages he may have on earth, he is not content if he is not also ranked highly in the judgment of man. This is the finest position in the world. Nothing can turn him from that desire, which is the most indelible quality of man's heart. 405. And those who most despise men and put them on a level with the brutes, yet wish to be admired and believed by men and contradict themselves by their own feelings. Their nature, which is stronger than all, convincing them of the greatness of man more forcibly than reason convinces them of their baseness. 405. Contradiction. Pride counterbalancing all miseries. Man either hides his miseries, or if he disclose them, glories in knowing them. 406. Pride counterbalances and takes away all miseries. Here is a strange monster and a very plain aberration. He has fallen from his place and is anxiously seeking it. This is what all men do. Let us see who will have found it. 407. When malice has reason on its side it becomes proud and parades reason in all its splendor. When austerity or stern choice has not arrived at the true good and must needs return to follow nature, it becomes proud by reason of this return. 408. Evil is easy and has infinite forms. Good is almost unique. But a certain kind of evil is as difficult to find as what we call good, and often on this account such particular evil gets passed off as good. An extraordinary greatness of soul is needed in order to attain to it as well as to good. 409. The greatness of man. The greatness of man is so evident that it is even proved by his wretchedness. For what in animals is nature we call in man wretchedness, by which we recognize that his nature being now like that of animals he has fallen from a better nature, which once was his. For who is unhappy at not being a king except a deposed king? Was Paulus, Emilius unhappy at being no longer consul? On the contrary everybody thought him happy in having been consul, because the office could only be held for a time. But men thought Perseus so unhappy in being no longer king because the condition of kingship implied his being always king, that they thought it strange that he endured life. Who is unhappy at having only one mouth? And who is not unhappy at having only one eye? Probably no man ever ventured to mourn at not having three eyes. But anyone is inconsolable at having none. 410. Perseus, King of Macedon. Paulus, Emilius reproached Perseus for not killing himself. 411. Notwithstanding the sight of all our miseries which press upon us and take us by the throat, we have an instinct which we cannot repress and which lifts us up. 412. There is internal war in man between reason and the passions. If he had only reason without passions, if he had only passions without reason. But having both, he cannot be without strife, being unable to be at peace with the one without being at war with the other. Thus he is always divided against and opposed to himself. 413. This internal war of reason against the passions has made a division of those who would have peace into two sects. The first would renounce their passions and become gods. The others would renounce reason and become brute beasts, debaro. But neither can do so, and reason still remains to condemn the vileness and unjustice of the passions and to trouble the repose of those who abandoned themselves to them. And the passions keep always alive in those who would renounce them. 414. Men are so necessarily mad that not to be mad would amount to another form of madness. 415. The nature of man may be viewed in two ways, the one according to its end, and then he is great and incomparable, the other according to the multitude, just as we judge of the nature of the horse and the dog, popularly, by seeing its fleetness. It's animal might can be. Footnote and instinct of guarding. End of footnote. And then man is abject and vile. These are the two ways which make us judge of him differently, and which occasion such disputes among philosophers. For one denies the assumption of the other. One says he is not born for this end, for all his actions are repugnant to it. The other says he forsakes his end when he does these base actions. 416. For port royal, greatness and wretchedness. Wretchedness being deduced from greatness and greatness from wretchedness, some have inferred man's wretchedness all the more because they have taken his greatness as a proof of it, and others have inferred his greatness with all the more force because they have inferred it from his very wretchedness. All that the one party has been able to say in proof of his greatness has only served as an argument of his wretchedness to the others, because the greater our fall the more wretched we are and vice versa. The one party is brought back to the other in an endless circle, it being certain that in proportion as men possess light they discover both the greatness and the wretchedness of man. In a word man knows that he is wretched. He is therefore wretched because he is so, but he is really great because he knows it. 417. This two-fold nature of man is so evident that some have thought that we had two souls. A single subject seemed to them incapable of such sudden variations from unmeasured presumption to a dreadful dejection of heart. 418. It is dangerous to make man see too clearly his equality with the brutes without showing him his greatness. It is also dangerous to make him see his greatness too clearly apart from his vileness. It is still more dangerous to leave him in ignorance of both, but it is very advantageous to show him both. Man must not think that he is on a level either with the brutes or with the angels, nor must he be ignorant of both sides of his nature, but he must know both. 419. I will not allow man to depend upon himself or upon another to the end that being without arresting place and without repose. Note. The thought is incomplete. End of note. 420. If he exalt himself, I humble him. If he humbles himself, I exalt him, and I always contradict him till he understands that he is an incomprehensible monster. 421. I blame equally those who choose to praise man, those who choose to blame him, and those who choose to amuse themselves, and I can only approve of those who seek with lamentation. 422. It is good to be tired and wearied by the vain search after the true good that we may stretch out our arms to the Redeemer. 423. Contraries, after having shown the vileness and the greatness of man. Let man now know his value. Let him love himself, for there is in him a nature capable of good, but let him not for this reason love the vileness which is in him. Let him despise himself, for this capacity is barren, but let him not therefore despise this natural capacity. Let him hate himself, let him love himself. He has within him the capacity of knowing the truth and of being happy, but he possesses no truth, either constant or satisfactory. I would then lead man to the desire of finding truth, to be free from passions and ready to follow it where he may find it, knowing how much his knowledge is obscured by the passions. I would indeed that he should hate in himself the lust which determines his will by itself, so that it may not blind him in making his choice and may not hinder him when he has chosen. 424. All these contradictions which seem most to keep me from the knowledge of religion have led me most quickly to the true one. End of Section 6. Section 7. Of Pensee. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Derek McLaughlin, London, Ontario, Canada. Latin language reading by Lenny, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Pensee by Blaise Pascal. Translated by W. F. Trotter. Section 7. Morality and Doctrine. Part 1. 425. Second part. That man without faith cannot know the true good, nor justice. All men seek happiness. This is without exception. Whatever different means they employ, they all tend to this end. The cause of some going to war and of others avoiding it is the same desire in both, attended with different views. The will never takes the least step, but to this object. This is the motive of every action of every man, even of those who hang themselves. And yet, after such a great number of years, no one without faith has reached the point to which all continually look. All complain, princes and subjects, noblemen and commoners, old and young, strong and weak, learned and ignorant, healthy and sick, of all countries, all times, all ages and all conditions. A trial so long, so continuous and so uniform should certainly convince us of our inability to reach the good by our own efforts. But example teaches us little. No resemblance is ever so perfect that there is not some slight difference, and hence we expect that our hope will not be deceived on this occasion as before. And thus, while the present never satisfies us, experience dupes us and from misfortune to misfortune leads us to death, their eternal crown. What is it then that this desire and this inability proclaim to us, but that there was once in man a true happiness of which there now remain to him only the mark and empty trace, which he in vain tries to fill from all his surroundings, seeking from things absent the help he does not obtain in things present? But these are all inadequate because the infinite abyss will be filled by an infinite and immutable object, that is to say, only by God himself. He only is our true good, and since we have forsaken him it is a strange thing that there is nothing in nature which has not been serviceable in taking his place. The stars, the heavens, earth, the elements, plants, cabbages, leaks, animals, insects, calves, serpents, fever, pestilence, war, famine, vices, adultery, incest. And since man has lost the true good everything can appear equally good to him, even his own destruction, though so opposed to God, to reason, and to the whole course of nature. Some seek good in authority, others in scientific research, others in pleasure. Others who are in fact nearer the truth have considered it necessary that the universal good, which all men desire, should not consist in any of the particular things which can only be possessed by one man, and which, when shared, afflict their possessor more by the want of the part he has not than they please him by the possession of what he has. They have learned that the true good should be such as all can possess it once without diminution and without envy, and which no one can lose against his will. And their reason is that this desire being natural to man, means it is necessarily in all, and that it is impossible not to have it. They infer from it note, in the text the thought is incomplete. End of note. 426. True nature being lost, everything becomes its own nature, as the true good being lost everything becomes its own true good. 427. Man does not know in what rank to place himself. He has gone astray and fallen from his true place without being able to find it again. He seeks it anxiously and unsuccessfully everywhere in impenetrable darkness. 428. If it is a sign of weakness to prove God by nature, do not despise scripture. If it is a sign of strength to have known these contradictions, esteem scripture. 429. The vileness of man in submitting himself to the brutes and in even worshiping them. 430. For Port Royal, the beginning after having explained the incomprehensibility. The greatness and the wretchedness of man are so evident that the true religion must necessarily teach us both that there is in man some great source of greatness and a great source of wretchedness. It must then give us a reason for these astonishing contradictions. In order to make man happy, it must prove to him that there is a God that we ought to love him, that our true happiness is to be in him and our soul evil to be separated from him. It must recognize that we are full of darkness which hinders us from knowing and loving him and that thus as our duties compel us to love God and our lusts turn us away from him, we are full of unrighteousness. It must give us an explanation of our opposition to God and our own good. It must teach us the remedies for these infirmities and the means of obtaining these remedies. Let us therefore examine all the religions of the world and see if there be any other than the Christian which is sufficient for this purpose. Shall it be that of the philosophers who put forward as the chief good the good which is in ourselves? Is this the true good? Have they found the remedy for our ills? Is man's pride cured by placing any quality with God? Have those who have made us equal to the brutes or the Mohammedans who have offered us earthly pleasures as the chief good even in eternity produced the remedy for our lusts? What religion then will teach us to cure pride and lust? What religion will in fact teach us our good, our duties, the weakness which turns us from them, the cause of this weakness, the remedies which can cure it and the means of obtaining these remedies? All other religions have not been able to do so. Let us see what the wisdom of God will do. Expect neither truth, she says, nor consolation from men. I am she who formed you and who alone can teach you what you are. But you are now no longer in the state in which I formed you. I created man holy, innocent, perfect. I filled him with light and intelligence. I communicated to him my glory and my wonders. I of man saw then the Majesty of God. He was not then in the darkness which blinds him, nor subject to mortality in the woes which afflict him. But he has not been able to sustain so great glory without falling into pride. He wanted to make himself his own center and independent of my help. He withdrew himself from my rule and on making himself equal to me by the desire of finding his happiness in himself I abandoned him to himself. And setting in revolt the creatures that were subject to him I made them his enemies so that man is now become like the Brutes and so estranged from me that their scarce remains to him a dim vision of his author. So far has all his knowledge been extinguished or disturbed. The senses, independent of reason and often the masters of reason have led him into pursuit of pleasure. All creatures either torment or tempt him and domineer over him either subduing him by their strength or fascinating him by their charms a tyranny more awful and more imperious. Such is the state in which men now are. There remains to them some feeble instinct of the happiness of their former state and they are plunged in the evils of their blindness and their lust which have become their second nature. From this principle which I disclose to you you can recognize the cause of those contradictions which have astonished all men and have divided them into parties holding so different views. Observe now all the feelings of greatness and glory which the experience of so many woes cannot stifle and see if the cause of them must not be in another nature. For Port Royal tomorrow prosopopia It is in vain, O men, that you seek within yourselves the remedy for your ills. All your light can only reach the knowledge that not in yourselves is truth or good. The philosophers have promised you that and have been unable to do it. They neither know what is your true good nor what is your true state. How could they have given remedies for your ills when they did not even know them? Your chief maladies are pride which takes you away from God and lust which binds you to earth and they have done nothing else but cherish one or other of these diseases. If they gave you God as an end it was only to administer to your pride. They made you think that you are by nature like him and conformed to him. And those who saw the absurdity of this claim put you on another precipice by making you understand that your nature was like that of the brutes and led you to seek your good in the lusts which are shared by the animals. This is not the way to cure you of your unrighteousness which these wise men never knew. I alone can make you understand who you are. Adam, Jesus Christ. If you are united to God it is by grace, not by nature. If you are humbled it is by penitence, not by nature. Thus this double capacity. You are not in the state of your creation. As these two states are open it is impossible for you not to recognize them. Follow your own feelings observe yourselves and see if you do not find the lively characteristics of these two natures. How many contradictions be found in a simple subject? Incomprehensible. Not all that is incomprehensible ceases to exist. Infinite number. An infinite space equal to a finite. Incredible that God should unite himself to us. This consideration is drawn only from the sight of our vileness. But if you are quite sincere over it follow it as far as I have done and recognize that we are indeed able in ourselves of knowing if his mercy cannot make us capable of him. For I would know how this animal who knows himself to be so weak has the right to measure the mercy of God and set limits to it suggested by his own fancy. He has so little knowledge of what God is that he does not know what he himself is and completely disturbed at the sight of his own state dares to say that God cannot but I would ask him if God demands anything else from him than the knowledge and love of him and why since his nature is capable of love and knowledge he believes that God cannot make himself known and loved by him. Doubtless he knows at least that he exists and that he loves something. Therefore if he sees anything in the darkness wherein he is and if he finds some object of his love among the things on earth why if God impart to him will he not be capable of knowing and of loving him in the manner in which it shall please him to communicate himself to us. There must then be certainly an intolerable presumption in this sort of arguments although they seem founded on an apparent humility which is neither sincere nor reasonable if it does not make us admit that not knowing of ourselves what we are we can only learn it from God. I do not mean that you should submit your belief to me without and I do not aspire to overcome you by tyranny. In fact I do not claim to give you a reason for everything and to reconcile these contradictions I intend to make you see clearly by convincing proofs those divine signs in me which may convince you of what I am and may gain authority for me by wonders and proofs which you cannot reject so that you may then believe without the things which I teach you since you will find no other ground for rejecting them except that you cannot know of yourselves if they are true or not. God has willed to redeem men and to open salvation to those who seek it but men render themselves so unworthy of it that it is right that God should refuse to some because of their obduracy what he grants to others from a compassion which is not due to them. If he had willed to overcome the obstinacy of the most hardened he could have done so by revealing himself so manifestly to them that they could not have doubted of the truth of his essence as it will appear at the last day with such thunders and such a convulsion of nature that the dead will rise again and the blindest will see him. It is not in this manner that he has willed to appear in his advent of mercy because as so many make themselves unworthy of his mercy he has willed to leave them in the loss of the good which they do not want. It was not then right that he should appear in a manner manifestly divine and completely capable of convincing all men but it was also not right that he should come in so hidden a manner that he could not be known by those who should sincerely seek him. He has willed to make himself quite recognizable by those and thus willing to appear openly to those who seek him with all their heart and to be hidden from those who flee from him with all their heart he so regulates the knowledge of himself that he has given signs of himself visible to those who seek him and not to those who seek him not. There is enough light for those who only desire to see and enough obscurity for those who have a contrary disposition. 431 No other religion has recognized that man is the most excellent creature. Some which have quite recognized the reality of his excellence have considered as mean and ungrateful the low opinions which men naturally have of themselves and others which have thoroughly recognized how real is this vileness have treated with proud ridicule those feelings of greatness which are equally natural to man. Lift your eyes to God say the first see him whom you resemble and who has created you to worship him you can make yourselves like unto him wisdom will make you equal to him if you will follow it. Raise your heads free men says epictetus and others say bend your eyes to the earth and consider the brutes whose companion you are. What then will man become will he be equal to God or the brutes what a frightful difference what then shall we be who does not see from all this that man has gone astray that he has fallen from his place that he anxiously seeks it and that he cannot find it again and who shall then direct him to it the greatest men have failed. 432 4 after all men before Jesus Christ did not know where they were nor whether they were great or small and those who have said the one or the other knew nothing about it and guessed without reason and by chance they also aired always in excluding the one or the other what ergo ignorantes qualities religio annuntia tuobis footnote what therefore ye ignorantly seek religion proclaims to you there acts chapter 17 verse 23 end of footnote 433 after having understood the whole nature of man that a religion may be true it must have knowledge of our nature it ought to know its greatness and littleness and the reason of both what religion but the Christian has known this 434 the chief arguments of the skeptics I pass over the lesser ones are that we have no certainty of the truth of these principles apart from faith and revelation except in so far as we naturally perceive them in ourselves now this natural intuition is not a convincing proof of their truth since having no certainty apart from faith whether man was created by a good god or by a wicked demon or by chance it is doubtful whether these principles given to us are true or false or uncertain according to our origin again no person is certain apart from faith whether he is awake or sleeps seeing that during sleep we believe as firmly as we do that we are awake we believe that we see space figure and motion we are aware of the passage of time we measure it and in fact we act as if we were awake so that half our life being passed in sleep we have on our own admission no idea of truth whatever we may imagine as all our intuitions are then illusions whether the other half of our life in which we think we are awake is not another sleep a little different from the former from which we awake when we suppose ourselves asleep and who doubts that if we dreamt in company and the dreams chanced to agree which is common enough and if we were always alone when awake we should believe that matters were reversed in short as we often dream that we dream heaping dream upon dream may it not be that this half of our life wherein we think ourselves awake is itself only a dream on which the others are grafted from which we wake at death during which we have as few principles of truth and good as during natural sleep these different thoughts which disturb us being perhaps only illusions like the flight of time and the vain fancies of our dreams these are the chief arguments on one side and the other I omit minor ones such as the skeptical talk against the impressions of custom education, manners, country and the like though these influence the majority of common folk who dogmatize only on shallow foundations they are upset by the least breath of the skeptics we have only to see their books if we are not sufficiently convinced of this and we shall very quickly become so perhaps too much I notice the only strong point of the dogmatists namely that speaking in good faith we cannot doubt natural principles against this the skeptics set up in one word the uncertainty of our origin which includes that of our nature the dogmatists have been trying to answer the subjection ever since the world began so there is open war among men in which each must take apart and side either with dogmatism or skepticism for he who thinks to remain neutral is above all a skeptic this neutrality is the essence of the sect he who is not against them is essentially for them in this appears their advantage they are not for themselves they are neutral, indifferent in suspense as to all things even themselves being no exception what then shall man do in this state? shall he doubt everything shall he doubt whether he is awake whether he is being pinched or whether he is being burned shall he doubt whether he doubts shall he doubt whether he exists we cannot go so far as that and I lay down as a fact that there never has been a real complete skeptic nature sustains our feeble reason and prevents it raving to this extent shall he then say on the contrary that he certainly possesses truth he who when pressed ever so little can show no title to it and is forced to let go his hold what a chimera then is man what a novelty what a monster, what a chaos what a contradiction, what a prodigy judge of all things imbecile worm of the earth depository of truth a sink of uncertainty and error the pride and refuse of the universe who will unravel this tangle nature confutes the skeptics and reason confutes the dogmatists what then will you become o men who try to find out by your natural reason what is your true condition you cannot avoid one of these sects nor adhere to one of them then proud man what a paradox you are to yourself humble yourself, weak reason be silent foolish nature learn that man infinitely transcends man and learn from your master your true condition of which you are ignorant hear God for in fact if man had never been corrupt he would enjoy in his innocence both truth and happiness with assurance and if man had always been corrupt he would have no idea of truth but wretched as we are and more so than if there were no greatness in our condition we have an idea of happiness and cannot reach it we perceive an image of truth and possess only a lie incapable of absolute ignorance and of certain knowledge we have thus been manifestly in a degree of perfection from which we have unhappily fallen it is however an astonishing thing that the mystery furthest removed from our knowledge namely that of the transmission of sin should be a fact without which we can have no knowledge of ourselves for it is beyond doubt that there is nothing which more shocks our reason than to say that the sin of the first man has rendered guilty those who being so removed from this source seem incapable of participation in it this transmission does not only seem to us impossible it seems also very unjust for what is more contrary to the rules of our miserable justice than to damn eternally an infant incapable of will for a sin wherein he seems to have so little a share that it was committed 6,000 years before he was in existence certainly nothing offends us more rudely than this doctrine and yet without this mystery the most incomprehensible of all we are incomprehensible to ourselves the knot of our condition takes its twists and turns in this abyss so that man is more inconceivable without this mystery than this mystery is inconceivable to man whence it seems that God willing to render the difficulty of our existence unintelligible to ourselves has concealed the knot so high or better speaking so low that we are quite incapable of reaching it so that it is not by the proud exertions of our reason but by the simple submission of reason that we can truly know ourselves these foundations solidly established on the inviolable authority of religion make us know that there are two truths of faith equally certain the one that man in the state of creation or in that of grace is raised above all nature made like unto God and sharing in his divinity the other that in the state of corruption and sin he has fallen from this state and made like unto the beasts these two propositions are equally sound and certain scripture manifestly declares this to us when it says in some places I think I may I as a confidious hominem footnote proverbs chapter 8 verse 31 rejoicing in his habitable earth and my delight was with the sons of men end of footnote footnote Isaiah chapter 44 verse 3 for I will pour water upon him that is thirsty and streams upon the dry ground I will pour my spirit upon thy seed and my blessing upon thine offspring Joel chapter 2 verse 28 and it shall come to pass afterward that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy your old men shall dream dreams your young men shall see visions end of footnote footnote Psalm 82 verse 6 I said ye are gods and all of you sons of the most high end of footnote and in other places footnote Isaiah chapter 40 verse 6 the voice of one saying cry and one said what shall I cry all flesh is grass and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field end of footnote footnote Psalm 49 verse 20 man that is in honor and understandeth not is like the beasts that perish end of footnote Ecclesiastes chapter 3 whence it clearly seems that man by grace is made like unto God and a partaker in his divinity and that without grace he is like unto the brute beasts 435 without this divine knowledge what could men do but either become elated by the inner feeling of their past greatness which still remains to them or become despondent at the sight of their present weakness 436 some considering nature as incorrupt others as incurable they could not escape either pride or sloth the two sources of all vice since they cannot but either abandon themselves to it through cowardice or escape it by pride they knew the excellence of man they were ignorant of his corruption so that they easily avoided sloth but fell into pride and if they recognized the infirmity of nature they were ignorant of its dignity so that they could easily avoid vanity but it was to fall into despair then surrised the different schools of the stoics and epicureans, the dogmatists academicians, etc the Christian religion alone has been able to cure these two vices not by expelling the one through means of the other according to the wisdom of the world but by expelling both according to the simplicity of the gospel for it teaches the righteous that it raises them even to a participation in divinity itself that in this lofty state they still carry the source of all corruption which renders them during all their life subject to error, misery, death and sin and it proclaims to the most ungodly that they are capable of the grace so making those tremble whom it justifies and consoling those whom it condemns religion so justly tempers fear with hope through that double capacity of grace and of sin common to all that it humbles infinitely more than reason alone can do but without despair and it exalts infinitely more than natural pride but without inflating thus making it evident that alone being exempt from error and vice it alone fulfills the duty of instructing and correcting men who then can refuse to believe and adore this heavenly light for is it not clearer than day that we perceive within ourselves ineffasible marks of excellence and is it not equally true that we experience every hour the results of our deplorable condition what does this chaos and monstrous confusion proclaim to us but the truth of these two states with a voice so powerful that it is impossible to resist it 436 weakness every pursuit of men is to get wealth and they cannot have a title to show that they possess it justly for they have only that of human caprice nor have they strength to hold it securely it is the same with knowledge for disease takes it away we are incapable both of truth and goodness 437 we desire truth and find within ourselves certainty we seek happiness and find only misery and death we cannot but desire truth and happiness and are incapable of certainty or happiness this desire is left to us partly to punish us partly to make us perceive wherefrom we are fallen 438 if man is not made for God why is he only happy in God if man is made for God why is he so opposed to God 439 nature corrupted man does not act by reason which constitutes his being 440 the corruption of reason is shown by the existence of so many different and extravagant customs it was necessary that truth should come in order that man should no longer dwell within himself 441 for myself I confess that so soon as the Christian religion reveals the principle that human nature is corrupt and fallen from God that opens my eyes to see everywhere the mark of this truth for nature is such that she testifies everywhere both within man and without him to a lost God and a corrupt nature 442 man's true nature his true good, true virtue and true religion are things of which the knowledge is inseparable 443 greatness, wretchedness the more light we have the more greatness and the more baseness we discover in man ordinary men those who are more educated, philosophers they astonish ordinary men Christians they astonish philosophers who will then be surprised to see that religion only makes us know profoundly what we already know in proportion to our light 444 religion taught to her children what men have only been able to discover by their greatest knowledge 445 original sin is foolishness to men but it is admitted to be such you must not then reproach me for the want of reason in this doctrine since I admit it to be without reason but this foolishness is wiser than all the wisdom of men for without this what can we say that man is his whole state depends on this unperceptible point and how should it be perceived by his reason since it is a thing against reason and since reason far from finding it out by her own ways is averse to it when it is presented to her 446 of original sin ample tradition of original sin according to the Jews on the word in Genesis chapter 8 verse 21 the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth R.Moses Hadarshan this evil leaven is placed in man from the time that he is formed Masakhet Sukha this evil leaven has 7 names in scripture it is called evil, the foreskin uncleanness and enemy a scandal, a heart of stone the north wind all this signifies the malignity which is concealed and impressed in the heart of man Midrash Tillim says the same thing and that God will deliver the good nature of man from the evil this malignity is renewed every day against man as it is written Psalm 37 verse 32 the wicked watches the righteous and seeketh to slay him but God will not abandon him this malignity tries the heart of man in this life and will accuse him in the other all this is found in the Talmud Midrash Tillim on Psalm 4 verse 4 stand in awe and sin not stand in awe and be afraid of your lust and it will not lead you into sin and on Psalm 36 verse 1 the wicked has said within his own heart let not the fear of God be before me that is to say that the malignity natural to man has said that to the wicked Midrash El Kohlet better is a poor and wise child who is an old and foolish king who cannot foresee the future the child is virtue and the king is the malignity of man it is called king because all the members obey it and old because it is in the human heart from infancy to old age and foolish because it leads man in the way of perdition which he does not foresee the same thing is in Midrash Tillim Barashist Raba on Psalm 35 verse 10 Lord all my bones shall bless thee which deliver us the poor from the tyrant and is there a greater tyrant than the evil leaven and on Proverbs chapter 25 verse 21 if thine enemy be hungry give him bread to eat that is to say if the evil leaven hunger give him the bread of wisdom of which it is spoken in Proverbs chapter 9 and if he be thirsty give him the water of which it is spoken in Isaiah chapter 55 Midrash Tillim says the same thing and that scripture in that passage speaking of the enemy means the evil leaven and that in giving him that bread and that water we heap coals of fire on his head Midrash El Kohlet on Ecclesiastes chapter 9 verse 14 a great king besieged a little city this great king is the evil leaven the great bulwarks built against it are temptations and there has been found a poor wise man that is to say virtue and on Psalm 41 verse 1 blessed is he that considereth the poor and on Psalm 78 verse 39 the spirit passeth away and cometh not again whence some have erroneously argued against the immortality of the soul but the sense is that this spirit is the evil leaven which accompanies man till death and will not return at the resurrection and on Psalm 103 the same thing and on Psalm 16 principles of rabbinism 2 messiahs 447 will it be said that as men have declared that righteousness has departed the earth they therefore knew of original sin Nemo ante obitum beatus est footnote no one is happy before he is dead end of footnote that is to say they knew death of eternal and essential happiness 448 miton sees well that nature is corrupt and that men are averse to virtue but he does not know why they cannot fly higher 449 order after corruption to say it is right that all those who are in that state should know it both those who are content with it and those who are not content with it but it is not right that all should see redemption end of section 7 part 1